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ABSTRACT
One of the most distinctive aspects of modern Chinese politics 
is the role of "Mao Tse-tung1s thought." This study investigates 
the concrete political and ideological process which gave rise to 
Mao's thought within the Chinese Communist Party, with special refer­
ence to the years 1935-45. This decade, which overlaps the Yenan 
period in Chinese Communist historiography, opens with Mao Tse-tung*s 
rise to power at the Tsunyi Conference, and closes with the formal 
incorporation of his thought into the new CCP constitution at the 
Party's Seventh Congress.
In the course of the. study, it became apparent that Mao Tse-- 
tung played a strong personal role in fostering the cult of his own 
person and thought. However, he received the enthusiastic support of a 
small group of Party intellectuals^who gathered around him, of whom the 
most important is Ch'en Po-ta, Pending further research., conclusions re^  
garding Ch'en's role must remain tentative, but the initial evidence does 
suggest his influence on certain aspects: of Mao,:S'thinking, and in the 
formulation of a historio-philosophical rationale for MaoI:a claim to 
ideological supremacy.
The study falls into two main periods; 1935-40 were, years of 
ideological creativity, when the basic ideas behind Sinified Marxism were 
worked out by Mao and Ch'enj 1940-^ 45 were years; of ideological consol-- 
idation, when the two men worked to systematize and disseminate Mao,;s. 
thought as the CCP's official guiding doctrine. The conclusion emerges 
that the cult of Mao and his thought was not merely a simple concomitant of
4Mao's rise to power during this period. Rather, the dual cult was 
consciously created and propagated within and without the CCP as a 
deliberate act of policy on the part of the ascendant Maoists, with 
Mao and Ch'en very much at the core of this policy.
From time to time, developments within the CCP, in Chinese do­
mestic politics, and in the international arena intervened to accel­
erate or retard the Maoists' deliberate campaign to foster the ascen­
dancy of Mao's thought. However, by the time of the CCP's Seventh 
Congress in 1945, the victorious Maoists had succeeded in their joint 
drive for the "primitive accumulation" of political and ideological 
power. Mao's power was by no means absolute, but the Chinese Com­
munist Party —  and shortly the entire nation —  had entered the 
era of "Mao Tse-tung's thought."
In sum, this study contributes to our understanding of the 
Chinese Communist movement in four areas. It develops previous dis­
cussions of the ideological history of the CCP, especially regarding 
the emergence of the concepts of the "Sinification of Marxism" and 
"Mao Tse-tung's thought." In using these ideological concepts as 
points of reference, this thesis also offers a distinctive approach 
to the study of elite politics within the CCP during the Yenan 
period. At the same time, Mao Tse-tung*s personal role in fostering 
the twin cult of himself and his thought is brought into sharper focus 
than in previous studies. Finally, our knowledge of the early career 
of Ch'en Po-ta is considerably enhanced, particularly regarding his 
role as Party ideologist and historian in the service of Mao Tse-tung.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF A CHINESE WAY
(i) Scope of the Study
The appearance of "Mao Tse-tung1 s thought" (Mao Ze-dong si- 
xiang) as a specific ideological concept in -July 1943 is an event of 
considerable importance in the history of the Chinese Communist Par­
ty. In the ensuing years Mao's thought has become a major factor 
in Chinese politics, and the subject of a good deal of criticism and 
praise. To some, "Mao Tse-tung1s thought" represents the creative 
development of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, while to others it repre­
sents the CCP's break from the mainstream of the international com­
munist movement. (Perhaps in reality it means both?) Surprisingly, 
there has been little attempt to subject the historical process 
which gave rise to Mao's thought to a thorough analysis. The valu­
able paper by Noriyuki Tokuda is too brief to be fully satisfactory, 
and the passing attention given this subject in any number of more 
general treatments. of the Chinese Communist movement is even less 
adequate,'*' Accordingly, this study attempts an analysis of the
q
Tokuda's paper was originally published m  Japanese as Mo Taku- 
t5-shugi, 1935-1945 (The Formation of Mao Tse-tungism, 1935-1945), 
Tokyo: Keio Tsushin, 1971. It was later presented at a conference 
in the United States (Sante Fe, August 1971) with the title, "Mao 
Tse-tung's Ideological Cohesion with the Party and the Revolutionary 
Movement, 1935-1945." Part of the original study was also published 
in English in Japan, entitled "Yenan Rectification Movement: Mao
Tse-tung's Big Push toward Charismatic Leadership during 1941-42," 
.The Developing Economics (Tokyo), IX (March 1971), pp. 83-99. K'ung 
Te-liang has also published a very brief article entitled "First Ap­
pearance of 'Mao Tse-tung's Thought'," Issues and Studies, IX:.5, (Feb- 
nuary 1973.), pp. 34-41.
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political and ideological process which gave rise to the concept of 
Mao Tse-tung*s thought within the CCP between the years 1935-4-5. It 
was during this decade that Mao Tse-tung gradually achieved the 
fusion of political and ideological authority in his own person, from 
the time of his limited victory at the Tsunyi Conference in 1935 to 
the formal incorporation of his thought into the CCP's new constitu­
tion in 1945. These ten years conveniently overlap what is known as 
the Yenan period in Chinese Communist historiography, an important 
era which has inspired some excellent book-length studies to which 
later reference will be made. None, however, has paid special atten­
tion to the ideological aspects of the political struggle that domi­
nated so much of the CCP’s inner life during this key decade. Boyd 
Compton’s translation, of the CCP’s famous "rectification documents" 
is of course extremely important, but it is hardly a substitute for 
a serious monograph’ on the Party’s ideological development during the 
Yenan years. We are not attempting to write such a monograph here, 
but it is hoped that this study will throw additional light on the 
.’debates that accompanied Mao Tse-tung’s emergence as the Party’s 
leading ideological spokesman, and on the specific political con­
text in which they took place. As is indicated by the recent publi­
cation of the purported diaries of Peter Vladimirov, a Comintern 
representative in Yenan during 1942-45, a good deal of controversy
2still surrounds the CCP’s development during these critical years.
%fe.o's China (Party Reform Documents, 1942-44), Trans, and 
Introd. by Boyd Compton, Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1952. Peter Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diaries (Yenan, China: 1942- 
45), Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1975. Since their 
publication, these diaries have sparked off considerable debate as 
to their authenticity. While it is likely that they have been judi-
12
It should he emphasized that we are not proposing a study of the
evolution and content of the whole range of Mao Tse-tung' s political
thought. Although this subject is far from being exhausted, it has
been the focus of many able writers in the field, of whom'the most
3prominent is Stuart R. Schram. Rather, our interest is in the 
concrete ideological and political process that gave rise to "Mao 
Tse-tung1s thought" as a formal ideological concept within the CCP, 
and which led to its adoption as the official "guiding thought" of 
the Chinese Party. As such, we are not primarily concerned with 
whether (in any empirical-sense) Mao’s thought is sophisticated or 
not, original or not, orthodox or not, Chinese or not, relevant or 
not. These problems are best left to the philosopher or the revo­
lutionary, in whose judgement the subjective factor has an acknow­
ledged place. For our part, we are interested in asking more empi­
rical questions: Did the emergence of Mao’s thought reflect the in­
tellectual concerns of China in the 1930’s and 1940's, or was it es­
sentially an extraneous development? Did the concept of Mao’s 
thought spring full-blown from the minds of its advocates, or did it
ciously edited by -the Soviet authorities/ much of the diaries do ring 
true. Consequently, we have referred to them from time to time on 
issues which appear to be clarified further by Vladimirov’s notes and 
comments. That the diaries serve to blacken Mao Tse-tung’s personal 
character and leadership is only too obvious, but this need not deter 
us from using one of the more remarkable sources on the Yenan period.
3
Schram’s well-known study is The Political Thought of Mao Tse- 
tung, 2nd ed., Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1969. Three
other titles should be noted: Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao
Tse-tung, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964; Frederick Wake- 
man, Jr.,.History, and Will (Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse- 
tung’s Thought), Berkeley: University of California-Press, 1973; and 
James Chieh Hsiung, ed., The Logic of "Maoism" (Critiques and Expli­
cation), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.
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represent the culmination of previous ideological movements within 
the CCP? Did Mao’s thought emerge simply as a natural concomitant 
of Mao Tse-tung’s growing political power in the Party, or was it 
the product of a deliberate act of conscious creation on the part of 
its proponents? Which individuals or groups within the CCP suppor­
ted the elevation of Mao's thought as the Party's official body of 
doctrine? Who opposed such a move? Who simply went along? To what 
extent was the emergence of Mao’s thought affected by developments 
within the CCP itself, or by domestic or foreign events beyond the 
control of the Party? Finally, we want to know exactly what "Mao 
Tse-tung's thought" meant in the minds of its proponents, and what 
relationship they felt it had to orthodox Marxist theory on the one 
hand, and to Chinese history and culture (broadly defined) on the 
other. The pursuit of such questions is of course highly interesting 
in itself, but it also provides an excellent framework to study the 
history of the CCP during the Yenan period. In particular, this 
approach places Mao Tse-tung’s rise to power in bold relief, for his 
growing ideological stature became both a major issue in defining 
his personal authority in the CCP, and a central point of attack on 
the part of his critics and opponents within the Party and without. 
Surely this is the essence of what we might call ideological history, 
that is, the study of the evolution of political ideas in the context 
of political power, and of the nature and consequences of their mu­
tual interaction.
Throughout the study, we have given extensive coverage both to 
the evolution of ideas and to the struggle for power within the CCP,
and, less importantly, between the CCP and the Chinese Nationalist 
Party. As the study progressed, it became apparent that it fell na­
turally into two distinct periods, each with its own specific charac­
ter. The first period (1935-40) is one of ideological creativity, 
when -Mao Tse-tung and his associates worked out the basic elements of 
their distinctive ideology, namely, "Sinified" Marxism-Leninism. With 
the publication of Mao’s n0n New Democracy" in January 1940, this 
initial creative period came to a close; the basic thinking and wri­
ting had been done, although the new concept of the "Sinification of 
Marxism" was not yet widely accepted throughout the CCP. The second 
period (1940-45) is essentially one of ideological consolidation, 
when the ascendant Maoists responded to a series of challenges by re­
moulding the ideology of the CCP along the lines that had been worked 
out previously. The task now was to systematize and disseminate the 
basic concepts of Sinified Marxism-Leninism ("Mao Tse-tung’s thought") 
throughout the CCP, and beyond it to Chinese society as a whole.
This period closes in June 1945, when Mao's,thought was incorporated 
into the new Party constitution, and the Chinese people were exhorted 
to rally under the banner of Mao Tse-tung. Mao’s ascendancy within 
the Chinese Communist Party was perhaps not as absolute as it ap­
peared in later years, but there can be no gainsaying the fact that 
the CCP —  and shortly the nation itself —  had entered the era of 
Mao Tse-tung and "Mao Tse-tung's thought."
In the course of research it soon became clear that considerable 
attention would have to be given to the personal role of Mao Tse-tung. 
The importance Mao came to attach to the role of ideology in the
15
revolutionary movement, combined with the considerable doubt evinced 
by many of the Party's top leaders regarding his competence as a 
Marxist-Leninist theoretician, did much to stimulate his determina­
tion to acquire undisputed authority as the CCP's leading spokesman 
on all questions of doctrine. Consequently, Mao's pervasive influence 
is to be seen at every important juncture in the evolutionary pro­
cess that gave rise to the Party's acceptance of his own thought as 
its official guiding ideology. Yet, Mao could not possibly have ac­
complished this feat unaided, and one's attention is thus drawn to 
other individuals who played a role in the process. Mao surrounded 
himself with a small band of Party theoreticians firmly committed to 
his cause, including such figures as Ai Ssu-ch'i, Chou Yang, Chang 
Ju-hsin, and Ch'en Po-ta. These individuals, and many others besides, 
came to be recognized as Mao's personal "think tank," people who 
helped Mao formulate his ideas, and who worked assiduously to win 
their widespread acceptance throughout the Party. They comprised the 
intellectual machine that stood behind Mao in the course of his strug­
gles during the Yenan period, and in many respects Mao's triumph in 
194-5 was very much their triumph as well. Indeed, the high degree 
of awareness with which Mao and his small band of theorists promoted 
his claims to ideological supremacy suggests that the formulation of 
Mao Tse-tung' s thought was an act of conscious creation, and not sim­
ply the result of a seemingly inevitable process in the ideological 
development of the CCP.
Of this group, it is Ch'.en Po-ta who clearly emerges as the 
single most important figure other than Mao himself in the conscious
16
creation of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Consequently, we have paid 
special attention to ChTenTs position in the ideological debates 
within the CCP during 1935-45 with a view to ascertaining his role 
in helping to formulate and propagate the concept of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought. Although the precise relationship between Mao and his enig­
matic political secretary has remained obscure, academic opinion has 
tended to underrate Ch'en's importance in the Maoist camp, and his 
personal intellectual influence on Mao. Lately, however, Ch'en's 
key role in the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's has caused 
some second thoughts as to his relationship with Mao, and a shift to 
a more positive evaluation is now in sight. It has now been recog­
nized, for example, that in times of need Mao has usually "turned to 
his most trusted supporters, especially Ch'en Po-ta.Certainly, 
this study demonstrates quite clearly that Ch'en Po-ta had emerged 
as a Party theorist in his own right prior to meeting Mao in the 
summer of 1937, that he directly influenced Mao's own thinking In cer­
tain important respects during the Yenan period, that he played a 
central role in the Party's Rectification Campaign of 1942-43* &nd 
that he became the leading architect of the "Maoist myth" that has 
dominated the official history of the CCP right to the present day. 
Indeed, Ch'en was extremely prolific between 1935 and 1945, and no 
attempt has been made to discuss the full range of his writings
^On this point, see Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under 
Mao, 1949-66: An Overview," in John M.H, Lindbeck, ed., China: Man­
agement of a Revolutionary Society, London: Allen and Unwin, 1971, 
p. 98. According to a recent dispatch by the Peking correspondent of 
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), a directive of the CCP Central Committee 
has acknowledged that Mao's Selected Works may have to be purged of 
the influence of Ch'en Po-ta. For further details on this tacit ad­
mission of Ch'en's role in shaping Mao's thought, see "Chinese Hint 
That Mao's Works May Be Revised," The New York Times, 8 September 1974.
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and ideas during this period. The focus of our discussion is rather 
on those aspects of Ch’en's thought which are particularly relevant 
to his role in fostering the development of Mao's thought as the CCP’s 
official ideology. Nonetheless, the present work does considerably 
augment the existing body of knowledge concerning Ch'en Po-ta’s role 
in the Chinese Communist movement during the Yenan era.
By 1945, Mao Tse-tung's thought had emerged as an enormously 
powerful phenomenon within the ranks of the CCP. As our study makes 
clear, there were important reasons for this: In the first place,
the creation of a truly distinctive Chinese communist ideology had 
great appeal to many of the Party’s urban intellectuals who sought 
some visible symbol of China's cultural independence from the West, 
including the Soviet Union. Second, Mao and his close supporters 
were aware of the need for Mao to build up a distinctive ideological 
profile as a weapon against the power of the Moscow-oriented Returned 
Students, and indeed of Moscow itself. Third, most members of the 
CCP, regardless of their personal views, appreciated the need for the 
CCP to put forward a relatively coherent ideological doctrine that 
would win the allegiance of China's masses in competition with the 
ideological blandishments of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.
The theoretical key that opened the door to the creation of Mao Tse- 
tung's thought was of course the concept of the "Sinification of 
Marxism.'' Based on the ideas of both Mao and Ch'en Po-ta, the Sini­
fication of Marxism allowed for the formulation of an interpretation 
of Marxism-Leninism that was claimed to be at once distinctly Chinese 
and indisputably scientific. Only when foreign Marxist theory was
18
tested in the crucible of Chinese revolutionary practice, it was ar­
gued, would a new living theoretical construct emerge with the in­
delible stamp of Chinese genius. Given Lenin’s dictum that without 
a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement, we 
can appreciate Li Wei-han’s later claim that:
The establishment in the Party of the idea of integrating 
the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete 
practice of the Chinese revolution was the most fundamen­
tal question —  a question of decisive significance —  in 
building the Communist Party /of China/.-5
The path from the Sinification of Marxism to the creation of Mao Tse- 
tung’s thought was by no means inevitable, but Mao and his close sup­
porters ensured that there would be no serious opposition to Mao' s 
claim to theoretical supremacy within the CCP. When outright oppos­
ition did surface, as in the case of Wang Shih-wei and other dissident 
intellectuals, it was vigorously opposed and ultimately suppressed.
Yet such action was exceptional; as much as anything, the triumph of 
Mao’s thought was due to years of painstaking ideological and poli­
tical work on the part of the Maoists, and, most importantly, to the 
growing'realization within the CCP that in the final analysis Mao’s 
ideas seemed to work. Had Mao’s leadership and policies suffered a 
severe setback during 1935-4-5, his thought might well occupy the 
place in the official history of the Chinese revolution now taken by 
that of Ch’en Tu-hsiu. In the evolution of Mao Tse-tung’s thought 
as the CCP’s official doctrine, as inmost other historical phenomena, 
one is hard put to avoid the conclusion that nothing succeeds quite 
like success.
L^i Wei-han, The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the 
Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China, Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 19&2, p. 98.
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While our. study must of necessity give special prominence to 
both Mao Tse-tung and Ch'en Po-ta in the conscious creation of Mao 
Tse-tung*s thought, we have kept purely biographical discussion to a 
bare minimum. Nor have we paid much attention to their activities 
prior to 1935, when this study commences. This omission is easily 
made good in the case of Mao Tse-tung, whose early life and ideas 
have been subjected to considerable scrutiny by a variety of writers. 
Should the reader be interested in pursuing the details of Mao's 
career prior to 1935, he has only to turn to a host of excellent 
studies on the subject. Unfortunately, the same is not true of Ch'en 
Po-ta, who has so far received scant attention'from students of the 
Chinese Communist movement; Parris H. Chang has written an article 
which is perhaps the only special study of Ch'en Po-ta, but it focu­
ses on Ch'en's role in the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's, with
7little in the way of detailed background information on Ch'en. It 
would thus seem appropriate to preface our present study with some 
brief comments on Ch'en Po-ta's life and thought prior to 1935, with 
particular emphasis on those aspects which are most relevant to our
T^wo prominent biographies of Mao are Jerome Ch'en, Mao and 
the Chinese Revolution, London: Oxford University Press, 19^ 5; and
Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 
1966. A detailed treatment of Mao's later career is Edward E. Rice, 
Mao' s' Way, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Other 
studies of Mao's rise to power . will be cited throughout the text, 
and need not be mentioned at this time.
^Parris H. Chang, "The Role of Ch'en Po-ta in the Cultural 
Revolution," Asia Quarterly, I (1973), pp. 17-58.
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discussion of his role in the creation of Mao Tse-tung's thought 
during 1935-45. Additional material on Ch'en's early career can he 
found in the various biographical sources listed in the footnotes to 
the following discussion.
Throughout the study, we have made extensive use of direct 
quotation from the writings of the principal figures involved. Al­
though this might seem excessively tedious to some, it does help to 
clarify the points under discussion, and to reduce ambiguities to a 
mininum. In certain cases, as with Ch'en Po-ta, many of the writings 
under consideration have not been translated or even discussed to 
any great extent in English-language studies of the Chinese Communist 
movement. Accordingly, extensive citation from some of Ch'en's more 
interesting and/or important worts will give the reader a better 
insight into Ch'en's mode of analysis and expression. In any study 
of the evolution of ideas or ideologies, it is often desirable to 
permit the individual protagonists to speak for themselves rather 
than through the intervention of a second party. It is hoped that 
the clarity thus gained will more than offset the possible tedium 
that this approach might induce in the minds of certain readers.
21
(ii) Ch'en Po-ta: The Formative Years
Ch’en Po-ta is one of the few top-ranking CCP leaders to have
"been born into a "poor peasant” family; on this all the sources 
8agree. At the time of his birth in 1904 (or 1903 in the Chinese 
reckoning) Oh'-en^ s family was living in Huian county, Fukien, repor­
tedly one of the poorest areas in the province. Ch'en's personal 
name is Shang-yu, but ever since the 1930's he has been widely known
as Po-ta, a pen-name he adopted while teaching in Peking under the
9alias of yet another name, Chih-mei. When he was still a child, 
the family left Huian and settled in or near the town of Chimei in 
T’ungan county, on the mainland opposite the island city of Amoy.
0
As is the case with most CCP leaders, biographical sources 
on Ch'en Po-ta are not particularly substantial, but nonetheless a 
good deal of information can be gleaned from those that are avail­
able. Among the most useful sources are the relevant entries in 
Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds., Biographical Diction­
ary of Republican China, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967,
I, pp. 221-223; Chinese Communist Who's Who, Taipei: Institute of
International Relations, '1970, I, pp. 104-105; IS, VI:7 (April 1970), 
pp. 87-93; Donald W. Klein and Ann B. Clark, eds., Biographic Dic­
tionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1971, I, pp. 122-123; Li Feng-min, ed., Zhong-gong 
shou-yau shi-lue hui-bian (Chronologies of Chinese Communist Leaders), 
Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1969,
pp. 81-100; and Who's Who in Communist China, 2nd ed., Hong Kong: 
Union Research Institute, 1969-70, I, pp. 94-95. Also see Hstlan Mou, 
MChen Bo-da jiu wei lu-mian zhi mi —  shi zao-nian de 'fan-gong zi- 
shou' yi-an jie-lu le ma?” (The Mystery of Ch'en Po-ta's Disappear­
ance —  Has His "Secret Surrender and Anti-Communist Confessions” in 
the Early Years Been Revealed?), Zhong-gong yan-jiu (Studies in 
Chinese Communism), V:3 (10 March 1971), pp. 28-42; and Shao Nan,
"Chen Bo-da shi-lue," (Biography of Ch’en Po-ta), ZGYJ, V:8 (10 
August 1971, pp. 85-94. Additional sources can be found in later 
notes to this chapter, and in the selected bibliography.
^Ch'en’s original name (yuan-ming) is Shang-yu; his alternate 
name (you-ming) is Chih-mei; his pen-name (bi-ming), and the one by 
which he is commonly known, is Po-ta. See the biography of Ch'en in 
Fei-qing yan-jiu (Studies in Bandit Affairs), IL:.2 .(.February. 1968),
p T ^ t ;---------------------------------  -
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A studious child, Ch’en-was accepted at about the age of eight into 
a "new style" school recently established in Chimei by a wealthy 
overseas Chinese. The school gradually expanded to include secon­
dary education and teacher training, and Ch’en continued his educa­
tion through all three levels. After leaving Chimei, he went to 
Canton for a brief stay, but in early 1925 he enrolled in the newly 
established Shanghai Labour University. Although a creation of the 
recent Nationalist-Communist united front, the university was in fact 
controlled by the Communists, and included such Party leaders as 
Ch’u Ch’iu-pai on its faculty. Ch'en was apparently quite left-wing 
by the time he entered the university, and he played an active role 
in student activities both on and off the campus. It was at about 
this time that he joined the Communist Party along with his close
friend, Jao Shu-shih, who was later to become a leading Party .
10figure. After completing his studies in Shanghai, Ch'en traveled 
south to Chang chow, Fukien, where General Chang Chen's 49th division 
of the National Revolutionary Army (KMT) was stationed. Chang (a 
fellow Huian villager) offered Ch'en a post as a secretary, and he 
soon won Chang's esteem for his literary ability. Within a short 
space of time most of Chang's speeches and articles were passing 
through his young assistant's hands, and. it is said that Ch'en 
exercised considerable influence on Chang's thinking during this 
period. During the Nationalist suppression of the Communists in
10Most sources agree that Ch'en joined the CCP in 1927 (presum­
ably before the Party was suppressed in April of that year), but it 
may in fact have been a little earlier. See for example Klein and 
Clark, op. cit., I, p. 122; Gendai Chugoku jimmei jiten (Biographical 
Dictionary of Contemporary China), Tokyo: Gaik<5 jih$ sha, 1962, p.
4&3;nhd Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedya (Large Soviet Encyclo­
pedia), Moscow, XLVH {Tpril~T957), p. 488. Many thanks to Mr. David 
Barrett for translating the third source from the Russian.
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the spring of 1927, however, Ch’.en fled to Shanghai and thence to Nan­
king, where he was arrested and imprisoned. With Chang Chen’s per­
sonal intervention, Ch’en was apparently encouraged to write a ’’letter 
of repentance” in which he repudiated the Communists and promised to
devote himself to the study of Sun Yat^sen’s Three People’s Principles.
11He was thereupon released from prison, and given a new start in life.
By this time it was perhaps too late for Ch'en to turn over a 
new leaf, for immediately upon his release from prison he re-estab­
lished contact with the CCP. He was greatly changed, however, for 
the near destruction of the Party had a profound impact on his 
thinking. He recalled in later years that after the failure of the 
revolution of 1924-27:
Henceforth, and for a long time after, matters such as
the pursuit of Marxist-Leninist truth and how to grasp
Marxism-Leninism to comprehend the problems of the Chi­
nese revolution swirled in my mind.-^
The Communist debacle of 1927 had not destroyed his faith in the
ultimate correctness of Marxism-Leninism, but it instilled in him a
desire to study afresh the application of the foreign theory in the
specific context of Chinese society. Shortly thereafter, the Party
arranged for him to go to Moscow for further education along with
many other young activists who had survived the holocaust. Ch’en
enrolled at Sun Yat-sen University, where he took intensive courses
in both Russian language and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He was not
11For this account of Ch’en’s imprisonment and release, see 
Shao Nan, op. cit., p. 86.
12Ch'en Po-ta,; "Si-xiang de fan-xing” (Reflection in Thought), 
Jie-fang ri-bao (Liberation Daily). (28 August 1942),p. 4.
uvery active politically during these years, but he established a 
solid foundation in the historical and theoretical aspects of 
Marxism-Leninism and its application in Russia. Indeed, his studies 
in Moscow provided the intellectual basis for his later emergence as 
a leading CCP theorist and historian, from the mid-1930,s on.
Ch’en’s modest political role during his stay in the Soviet 
Union was a function not only of his desire to study, but also of 
the particular situation prevailing amongst the Chinese students at 
Sun Yat-sen University at the time. In its early years, the CCP 
sent many young members to Moscow to continue their education, among 
them the group that later became known within the Party as the* 
"Returned Students” (or the ’’Twenty-eight Bolsheviks”). Led by Ch’en 
Shao-yu (Wang Ming) and Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po -Ku), the members of this 
group were known at the university as the "international faction" 
(guo-ji-pai) because of their primary loyalty to the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union and the Communist International. Ch’en, on the 
other hand, belonged to the "branch faction" (zhi-bu-pai), a large 
group of students who acknowledged the direct authority of the CCP 
itself, and of its official representatives in Moscow. Considerable 
tension developed between the two groups, especially in 1930 when 
Stalin launched a maj or purge of the CPSU in the aftermath of his 
victory over Trotsky and Bukharin. This purge stimulated the inter­
nationalist faction at Sun Yat-sen University to put their own house 
in order, andLit is said that Po Ku (and probably Wang Ming also) 
singled out Ch’en for engaging in "sectarian activities," and warned
2.5
13him of disciplinary action if he persisted. In all likelihood then, 
Ch’en had personal as well as ideological reasons for supporting Mao 
Tse-tung during his crucial struggle with the Returned Students in 
Yenan in the late 1930*s and early 1940's. A private grudge had been 
added to Ch'en's previous disdain for their rigid adherence to the 
Soviet (i.e., Stalinist) version of Marxism-Leninism and its appli­
cation to China.
Po Ku's threat of punishment never materialized, for sometime In 
late 1930 or early 1931 Ch'en left Moscow to return to China, He 
finally'settled in Peking, where he secured a lecturer's post at 
China University, at that time one of the city's leading strongholds 
of left-wing students. It was apparently at this time also that he 
married Chu Yu-jen, a Szechwanese girl and fellow student whom Ch’en 
had met in Moscow and who returned to China with him.^ At China 
University Ch'en lectured on ancient (pre-Ch'in) Chinese history and 
philosophy under the alias of Ch'en Chih-mei. He used his teaching 
post as a base from which he could take part In underground Party 
activities, and write polemical articles against enemies of the CCP.
13The most detailed account of Sun Yat-sen University in the 
late 1920’s is provided by one of its former Chinese students, who 
was himself one of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks. See Yueh Sheng 
(Sheng Chung-liang), Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and the Chinese 
Revolution (A Personal Account), Lawrence: Center for East Asian
Studies, University of Kansas, 1971. See also the recollections of 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1971, II, pp. 88-102.
"^Shao Nan, op. cit., p. 85, and Hsuan Mou, op. cit., p. .28 
are the only sources to claim that Ch' en is married. HsUan" further 
claims that Chu Yu-Jen is the sister of Chu Yu-lun, the wife of 
Lo I-nung, the well-known CCP leader who was. executed in 1928. For 
details'on Lo, see Boorman and Howard, op. cit'., II, pp. 431-433; ancl 
Klein and Clark, op. cit., I, pp. 639-641.
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under his newly acquired pen-name, Ch’en Po-ta. His teaching duties 
did not prevent him from undertaking Party work in Tientsin in 
1933, in cooperation with K’o ChTing~shih, Nan Han-chen, Chu Ch’i-
15
wen and other later well-known Party figures. This experience 
doubtless proved useful in late 1935, when Ch’en worked with the same 
men to give a definite political direction to the famous student move­
ment that erupted in Peking in December of that year.
By the autumn of 1935 Ch’en was on the threshold of a new stage 
in his life, for the December Ninth Movement would push him to nation­
al prominence among Marxist writers in the Nationalist-controlled 
part of China. Yet by all accounts Ch’en was a most unbecoming 
revolutionary, for he was a short and stocky individual with thick 
glasses and a strong south ROdaiese accent made all the more unintel­
ligible by a pronounced stammer. Nor did his personality do much to 
enhance his image, for he seems to have been cast in a strict mould; 
he neither smoked nor drank, nor was he inclined to engage in idle 
conversation even with his comrades in the Party. He was more a crea­
ture of the mind, and his mind was best expressed through the pen. 
According to one source, Ch’en had been tutored by his elder brother
Tun-yu, with the result that his ’written Chinese was rather good and
16his calligraphy was very beautiful.” Inarticulate in speech, it 
was through the medium of the written word that Ch’en Po-ta was to 
climb high in the ranks of the CCP. Indeed, his career was to have 
much in it reminiscent of the scholar-official of traditional China.
15WWCC, pp. 94-95. It is not known if Ch’en had a secret Party 
name for use in his underground activities in Peking and Tientsin,
IS, VI:7, p. 87. Nothing much is known about Tun-yu; he
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Ch’en's basic philosophy in these early years is illustrated in
17a long review article he wrote in the spring of 1935. To begin, 
Ch'en tackles what he regards as the "most fundamental problem in 
philosophy”, namely, the problem of the relationship between thinking 
and existence. Reiterating the Marxist position that matter exists 
independently of human cognition, he asserts that there is no such 
thing as "abstract truth", but only "concrete truth." Man's percep­
tion of concrete truth is only partial, and must develop through his 
practice in the natural and social worlds. Man’s task is thus to 
apply his partial (relative) truth in actual practice and in this 
way gradually approach complete (absolute) truth. What intellectual 
tool is man to employ in his progress from .the percept ion of relative 
truth to the comprehension of absolute truth? For Ch'en, it is the 
law of dialectics, or the science of the contradictions inherent in 
all natural and social phenomena. Rejecting the idealists’ belief 
that contradictions exist merely as figures of speech or categories 
in logic, Ch'en argues on the contrary that:
Dialectics are inherent in living matter, and are the soul 
of the countless things in the universe. If there were no 
contradictions and no dialectics, there would be no uni­
verse, no nature, no society, and no thought.
Since dialectics are the very "soul” of the objective world, man must
apparently taught at an overseas Chinese school in Burma for many 
years, but later returned to China.
17Ch'en Po-ta, "Fu-bai zhe-xue de mo-luo" (The Decline of a Dec­
adent Philosophy), Du-shu sheng-huo (Reading Life), Shanghai: Du-
shu sheng-huo she, IV:1 (10 May 1936), pp. 4-8-57; and IV:2 (25 May 
1936), pp. 39-4-1.' Although the article is dated 14- March 1935, it 
was not published until the much later date cited above.
Ibid., (pt. ,1), p. 54.
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use this tool to comprehend the real world existing independently of 
his consciousness. Ch'en rejects the idealists' charge that dialec­
tical materialists (vis, Marxists) are dogmatists who apply the 
concept of dialectics in a rigid manner, and arrange the facts of the 
real world according to a fixed formula. In his opinion* "genuine" 
Marxists.
...approach and grasp objective things only in a. living 
way (huo-sheng-sheng de), only in.the course of their 
own practice. They then proceed to analyse the internal 
and external connections in the development of things on 
the basis of the things' concreteness and totality, and 
to analyse the various aspects of the concrete contra­
dictions inherent in the things.19
But, ask the idealists, is the law of dialectics itself dia­
lectical; that is, are contradictions inherent in it as well as the 
rest of the objective world? Ch'en answers in the affirmative, but 
rejects the implication that these inherent contradictions will even­
tually negate themselves, and hence the law of dialectics itself. On 
the contrary, he argues, history has demonstrated that the science 
of dialectics has itself developed as a result of these inner contra­
dictions from a lower to a higher stage. Thus, modern dialectical 
materialism is an improvement on both the primitive dialectical 
materialism-of ancient Greece and Hegel's more sophisticated dialec­
tical idealism. How does this process of change and improvement 
come about? According to Ch’en:
19Loc. cit.
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Since its creation, dialectical materialism has devel­
oped into new stages, and-is just now again developing 
into a new stage. .This process is based on the devel­
opment of history, of man’s practice, and of the law of 
dialectics itself. This development /of dialectical - r 
materialism/ is not merely quantitative, but also qual­
itative. 20
Previously, Ch’en had stated that modern dialectical materialism 
(Marxism-Leninism) was a "brand new thing," the product of the devel­
opment of the dialectic from lower to higher stages. But if Marxism- 
Leninism is in turn developing into a new stage, will another "brand 
new thing" be produced? And if so, what will it be? Ch’en does not 
answer this question in Ms article of 1935, but in the following 
years the answer slowly began to emerge. Finally, Ch’en responds 
to the allegation that dialectical materialists in China are in dan­
ger of being ensnared in foreign "nets." The implication is that Chi­
nese Marxists are subservient to outside influences (i.e., Moscow), and 
are not really in command of their own professed philosophy. Ch’en 
rejects this suggestion, remarking that it is the Chinese idealists 
who really "crawl up to ’foreign' masters." They simply regurgitate 
the anti-Marxist philosophy of such foreign thinkers as Hume, Kant, 
Bergsen, Russell, Dewey, et al., whose theories are notMng but
opium used to "enslave their own people and the people of the
. ■ 2 1colonies."
Ch'en’s emphasis on the need to apply dialectical materialism 
to Chinese problems in a "living way," and his firm denial that 
Chinese Marxists are in danger of being ensnared in foreign "nets" 
should be noted. They suggest that he was less than happy with
20Ibid., pp. 54-55.
01
Ibid., (pt. 2), p. 40.
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China's status as a mere borrower of the new "scientific" philosophy
of the proletariat, forever indebted to the West (including Russia)
for philosophical enlightenment. But was China only a borrower of
dialectical materialism, or did it in fact have an independent claim
to a 'Marxist' tradition in the realm of thought? Ch'en was at this
•time beginning to take the latter position, as illustrated in his
views on T'an Ssu-t'ung, the radical Chinese reformer who was executed
in -1898. I-n late 1933, Ch'en drafted a lengthy essay on T'an's
philosophy, claiming that T'an's thought contained elements of elem-
■ 22entary materialism and incomplete dialectics. Thus by 1933 Ch'en
was attempting to satisfy himself as to the indigenous Chinese roots
of 'Marxism.' Eventually, his search for the origins of dialectical
materialism in China was to lead him back to the philosophy of clas- 
23sical antiquity. ■ For Ch'en, China's long history is not something 
simply to be rejected; on the contrary,' Chinese Marxists like himself 
are able to inherit the "most outstanding aspects" of the thought of 
T'an Ssu-t'ung precisely because they are the "inheritors of all the 
outstanding thought of China.
22 'Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun Zhong-guo qi-meng si-xiang-jia Tan Si-tong"
(On the Chinese Enlightened Thinker T'an Ssu-t'ung) (15 December 1933)
in Ch'en Po-ta, Zar wen-hua zhen-xian shang (On the Cultural Front),
Hong Kong: Sheng-huo shu-dian, 1939, pp. 181, 209-
23The search for precedents of dialectical materialism in China's 
past was a source of constant fascination for many CCP intellectuals. 
For example, the Party theorist,and historian Hsu Meng-ch'iu once 
commented to Nym Wales that as a student in the early 1920's he had 
read a study entitled Ancient Communism in Chinese Society. "It was 
not correct," he recollected, "but we read it with interest." See 
Nym Wales (Helen F. Snow), Red Dust (Autobiographies of Chinese Com­
munists), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, p. 59.
^Chien Po-ta, ."Tan Si-tong," p. 24-4. The reformer Ts'ai YHan-piei
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By 1935 Ch’en Po-ta had moved toward an interpretation of Marxism- 
Leninism that would: (l) establish its compatibility with Chinese
society by finding elements of dialectical materialism in China's rich 
historical record; and (2) encourage the "development of Marxism- 
Leninism in China through its "living" application in the course of 
the Chinese revolution. Such, an interpretation would fend off attacks 
from the Right, for it countered their claim that Marxism-Leninism 
was basically incompatible with Chinese society, and in any event was 
being applied too dogmatically by its Chinese adherents. Also, Ch'en's 
interpretation did much to appeal to the nationalistic feelings of all 
non-Marxist Chinese, for it held out the possibility of developing 
a new philosophical System that was truly Chinese in both its histor­
ical origins and contemporary form. At the same time, Ch'en was to 
fall under attack from the Left, many of whom argued that Marxism’s 
sharp critique of’ feudal society would be blunted by any attempt to 
reconcile Marxist theory and Chinese history. Further, the Left 
maintained that any attempt to develop Marxism-Leninism by adapting 
it to Chinese conditions would distort its universal scientific qual­
ity, applicable regardless of time and place. Even so, Ch'en’s inter­
pretation of Marxism-Leninism was to prove more relevant to the needs 
of a new Nationalist-Communist united front against Japan than did 
that of the Leftists within the CCP. Ch'en’s views on Marxist theory 
were also more in accord, with those of Mao Tse-tung, who in 1935
was also impressed by T'an Ssu-t'ung, receiving from him in particular 
the "inspiration to create a synthesized philosophy." See Robert K. 
Sakai, "Ts’ai Yuan-p'ei as a Synthesizer of Western-and Chinese. 
Thought," Papers on China, Cambridge, Mass.: Center for East Asian
Studies, Harvard University, III'(May 194-9), p. 173.
32
commenced his drive to supreme power in the CCP in the face of strong 
opposition from the leftist Returned Students. In the ensuing years, 
Ch’en's views on Marxism-Leninism were to become increasingly explicit 
along the lines we have discussed, and increasingly in the service of 
Mao Tse-tung. In the autumn of 1935, however, Ch’en Po-ta was at a 
turning point in his own career,* at the age of thirty-one, the in­
articulate lecturer at China University was about to become one of 
the CCP’s most effective spokesmen in the struggle for a new united 
front against Japan. It was in the context of this struggle that 
Ch’en elaborated on his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and in 
so doing established his position as a rising young theorist In the 
ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.
CHAPTER II
CH'EN PO-TA, MAO TSE-TUNG, AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF MARXISM IN CHINA, 1935-37
(i) Nationalism and National Forms
Following the defeat of the Communists in the revolution of 1925- 
27, many of China's leftist intellectuals turned to a reconsideration 
of revolutionary theory in light of China's specific history and 
social system. Marxism became increasingly accepted by wide sections 
of the intelligentsia (including the students) as the true science of 
society, and great efforts were made to translate both classical and 
contemporary Marxist-Leninist works into Chinese. There was little 
questioning of the general proposition that a correct grasp of theory 
was essential as a guide to social practice, and much attention was 
devoted to working out a suitable theoretical position within the 
framework of Marxism.1 Ironically, nationalism became an ever more 
powerful force in the political life of the nation precisely at the 
moment when large numbers of intellectuals were abandoning their tra­
ditional belief systems in favour of an essentially foreign body of 
thought. Nationalism had been an important political factor in China 
for at least a decade, but it received a great stimulus in the 1930's
1
For a brief but useful discussion of the various schools of 
thought in the "Controversy on China's Social History," see Benjamin 
I. Schwartz, "A Marxist Controversy on China," Far Eastern Quarterly, 
XIII-(1954), pp. 143-153.
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from the growing.Japanese threat, especially after the attack on
the northeast in 1931- The student movement in particular became
increasingly nationalistic and militant, and the largely student-
organized December Ninth Movement of 1935-36 had a profound impact
on the entire country. Many later leaders of the CCP (including
Ch’en Po-ta himself) were to rise to prominence during this and
2similar campaigns against Japan's increasing aggression.
Inevitably, this rapid rise in nationalism had an immediate im­
pact on China's two major political parties. This was especially 
true of . the KMT, .which had always been quite nationalistic, and which 
became even more so under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. By the 
early 1930's the "Nationalist Restoration" had been well and truly 
launched, with Chiang- declaring that a major task of the revolution 
was to "revive our Chinese culture, to restore our people's ancient
3
virtues, to proclaim our Chinese national soul." It was at about 
this time too that the Nationalists launched a concerted attempt to 
establish their own Ideology as the basis for China's reconstruction, 
a problem which in one writer's opinion lay "at the root of the Kuom- 
intang's concern in the thirties."  ^ Whatever the shortcomings of the
2On the rapid growth of nationalism among the students during 
the 1930's, see John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.
3
For an excellent discussion of the "Nationalist Restoration" 
in the mid-1930's see Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration 
The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology",. FEQ, XIV (1955), pp. 515- 
532. The quotation from Chiang is on p. 525.
^James C. Thomson, While China Faced West (American Reformers in 
Nationalist China, 1928-193?), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1969, p. 17.
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KMT's New Life Movement of 1934-35, there is no doubt that it repre- 
sented an attempt to win the youth of China to the Nationalist cause. 
The attention devoted to China's "national soul" was not character­
istic of Chiang Kai-shek alone; rather, it formed the basis of what 
was to develop into a major debate in the mid-thirties on the nature 
of the Western impact on China. In the 1920's, people as diverse as 
Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu had argued in favour of the widespread in­
troduction of Western influences into China, but with the rise of 
nationalism in the wake of Japanese aggression this relatively un­
critical attitude became suspect. A landmark in the debate was the 
publication in January 1935 of a joint declaration by ten leading 
academics who opposed the "wholesale Westernization" approach taken 
by their more zealous colleagues. While agreeing that China had much 
to learn from the West, they argued that it was mistaken to advocate 
the too complete imitation of England, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Italy, or Germany:
We demand a cultural construction on the Chinese basis _
We must examine our heritage, weed out what should be 
weeded out, and preserve what should be preserved....It is 
right and necessary to absorb Western culture. But we 
should absorb what is worth absorbing and not, with the 
attitude of total acceptance, absorb its dregs also.°
There is no doubt that the ten professors in question approached the
5
For an account of the New Life Movement, see Samuel C. Chu,
The New Life Movement, 1934-1937, New York: East Asian Institute,
Columbia University, 1957.
^For this quotation and its source, see the translation in 
Wm. Theodore de Bary, et al., Sources of Chinese Tradition, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 854-^ 56,
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problem of Westernization from an essentially conservative point of 
view, but their concern reflected the increasing nationalism of the 
age. As such, it was in tune with the times, and could not be light­
ly dismissed by political activists in any camp who wished to relate 
to the temper of these turbulent years. As we saw in Chapter I, Ch'en 
Po-ta himself was much concerned in the spring of 1935 with refuting 
the allegation that Chinese dialectical materialists were overly in­
fluenced by their "foreign masters," and assuring his readers that 
the., "new philosophy" he espoused was on the point of entering a 
higher stage in its development in China.
It was in this general intellectual climate that the December 
Ninth Movement broke out at the end of 1935, and by the following 
spring the movement had spread from Peking to every part of the 
country. The students demanded that the Nationalist government ter­
minate its campaigns against the Communists, and join with them in a 
new united front against Japan. At this time China University, where 
Ch'en was teaching, had the largest number of CCP members of any 
university in Peking, and it played a major role in the campaign along 
with Yenching and Tsinghua, two leading universities in the capital. 
Shih-Li-teh, who headed the Iaaiscn Department of the Peking Students' 
Federation at the time, later revealed that Ch'en was a "responsible
comrade" in the CCP's Northern Bureau and played an active role in 
7the movement. Nothing specific is known about his activities,
7
John Israel, "The December 9th Movement: A Case Study m
Chinese Communist Historiography," in Albert Feuerwerker, ed., His­
tory in Communist China, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968, pp. 247-
276. For Shih Li-teh's comments on Ch'en's role, see Li Ch'ang, et 
al., "Yi-er-jiu" hui-yi~lu (Reminiscences of "December Ninth"),
Peking: Zhong-guo qing-nian chu-ban-she, 1961, p. 39.
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other than that he worked in cooperation with K!o Ch'ing-sM.h, Nan 
Han-chen and other later luminaries in the CCP. It was also about 
this time that he got to know Liu Shao-ch’i, who headed the Party’s 
Northern Bureau in the mid-thirties, and established good personal 
relations with him. Liu, it is said, thought highly of Chren at the 
time. 8
Following the Comintern’s initiative, the CCP too had been moving
(albeit more slowly) toward a united front policy, and the December
Ninth Movement did much to prepare public opinion for some kind of
9renewed cooperation between the Communists and the Nationalists. In 
December 1935 Chou Yang, a leading CCP cadre in cultural affairs in 
Shanghai, disbanded the League of Left-Wing Writers and set up a new 
body, the United Association of Chinese Writers. The task:-of the 
new organisation was to play down militant left-wing literature in 
favour of cooperation with all writers, Marxist or not, who opposed 
Japan. Chou and his associates put forward the slogan of ’’national 
defence literature” as the umbrella under which all patriotic writers 
could work toward a common cause, the defence of China against Japan­
ese aggression. This slogan won the immediate support of many Commun­
ist intellectuals such as Kuo Mb-jo, Ai Ssu-ch'i, Ho Kan-ehih .and 
Ch'en Po-ta himself, but it was not accepted by others. Indeed, an
8FQYJ, 11:2, p. 98.
9For a detailed comparison of the Comintern-'s and the CCP’s atti­
tude toward the new united front, see Gregor Benton, "The * Second " 
Wang Ming Line’ (1935-38)," The China Quarterly, 61 (March. 1975), pp. 
61-94.
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influential group of leftist writers including Lu Hsiin, Hu Feng, Feng 
Hsueh-feng, and Mao Tun shortly after organized another association 
of their own, the Chinese Literary Workers. They adopted a slogan 
which they felt was both more comprehensive and more radical than that 
of their rivals, namely, "mass literature of national revolutionary
i,10war."
Central to Chou Yang's slogan of national defence literature was 
the concept of "national forms" (min-zu xing-shi), the ideas behind 
which were- largely those of Ch'u Ch*iu-pai, the CCP leader who had 
been executed by the Nationalists in 1935. As certain of Ch'u's lit­
erary ideas were to influence the attitudes of Ch'en Po-ta and ultim­
ately Mao Tse-tung towards Marxist-Leninist theory, a brief comment 
on- Ch'u's literary thinking is in order. In the early 1930's, Ch'u 
had developed his own views on the question of ".common speech" in 
language and "national forms" in literature. Regarding language, he 
felt that the May Fourth Movement had not gone far enough in making 
the written language accessible to the common people. The so-called 
"plain speech" (bai-hua) of the twenties was in fact an awkward mix­
ture of Chinese and foreign elements, and was to a large extent in­
comprehensible to the ordinary man when read aloud. Ch'ti therefore 
advocated the creation of a real bai-hua which ordinary people could
10For an outline of this literary debate, see Merle Goldman, 
Literary Dissent in Communist China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ-
ersity Press, 1967, pp. 5-17. For more detail see Hsia, Tsi-an, "Lu 
Hsun and the Dissolution of the League of Leftist Writers,"in Hsia 
Tsi-an, The Gate of Darkness (Studies on the Leftist Literary Move­
ment in China), Seattle:■ University of Washington Press, 1968, pp. 
101-145.
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understand when spoken, but he did not favour the uncritical use of 
the language of the peasants, which he regarded as often obscure. In­
stead, he felt that the language of Chinafs new urban working class, 
who were exposed to the modernising influences of the cities, was fast 
becoming a kind of national "common speech1 (pu-tong-hua). As such, 
this developing language of the proletariat could be the starting 
point of a new mass revolutionary literature, although this did not 
preclude the use, when necessary, of local dialects in written form.
He even suggested that in the future it might be desirable to encour­
age particular regional literatures; for example, a Kwangtung or a 
Fukien literature. In fact, Ch'u called for a flexible attitude to­
ward the written language, providing the starting point was the 
easily understood pu-tong-hua of the urban, proletariat. Given this,
it was even possible to use certain foreign expressions if it were
XX * *felt desirable or necessary. On the question of literature, Ch'u
sharply rejected the common view in left-wing literary circles that 
new contents demanded new forms. On the contrary, he argued that 
traditional literary forms could be given new content, and sugges­
ted that the yan-yi (historical romance) of the past could be used 
to Illustrate modern revolutionary history. For example, one could 
envisage a new yan-yi entitled "The Canton Commune" (Guangzhou gong- 
she) or, perhaps, "Chu and Mao Boldy Descend the Chingkang Mountain" 
(Zhu Mao da xia Jin-gang shan). Ch'u also maintained that certain
1 1
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, "Da-zhong wen-yi de wen-ti" (The Problem of 
Literature and Art for the Masses), (5 March 1932), In Qu Qui-bai 
wen-ji (Collected Works of Ch'ti Ch'iu-pai), Peking: Ren-min wen-xue 
chu-ban-she, 1953> II> pp. 884-893. See especially pp. 887-889.
40
old forms in literature were superior to certain new forms, in that
they were linked directly to traditional oral literature and took the
form of easily understood narration. He criticized the arrogance of
those writers who held that while the literary level of the masses
should be raised, there could be no lowering of standards in order to
cater to their existing tastes. According to this view, the masses
should be taught to appreciate new forms in literature, and there
should be no going back to traditional forms. Ch'u did not deny the
value of new forms in literature; rather, he believed that old and new
forms could be used at the same time, with the masses gradually coming
to accept the new forms. Providing the content of revolutionary
mass literature was suitably progressive, it was possible to experi-
12ment with many different forms both old and new.
These were the basic ideas behind the concept of national .forms 
promoted by Chou Yang’s new organization, for Chou himself had been 
greatly influenced by Ch'u Ch’iu-pai in the early 1930's when they 
worked together in the League of Left-Wing Writers. But the group 
of writers centered around Lu Hsun remained suspicious of Chou Yang's 
new writers association and the literary Ideas it espoused. They 
felt that Chou's organization would.be diluted with non-Marxist 
writers, and that the revolutionary content of national defence liter­
ature would succumb to the tide of nationalism that was sweeping over 
the country. In later years Mao Tun, one of the Lu Hsun group, com­
plained that the emphasis laid upon nationalism at this time
. 12Ibid., pp. 890-892.
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13"overshadowed the importance of the class outlook." The dis­
pute was embittered by various personal quarrels among some of the 
leading personalities on both sides, but it was essentially ideo­
logical in nature. It was also quite serious; in her study of the 
issue, Merle Goldman has concluded that Lu Hsun and Feng Hsiieh-feng 
in particular "masterminded and spearheaded a policy of deliberate 
insubordination to the party’s cultural directives."^ This open 
dispute in the cultural field was an acute embarrassment to the CCP 
in its efforts to launch a new united front, and Ai Ssu-ch'i com­
plained bitterly that the "most important danger at the present time 
is...left-wing dogmatism." These left-wing dogmatists, wrote Ai,
"have a most advanced appearance, but they repeatedly sell out, and
15
their surrender harms those who are united to save the country."
Ai’s accusation was of course directed at the "literary leftists" in 
Shanghai, but it was similar to the charges Mao Tse-tung was leveling 
against the Returned Student faction within the leadership of the 
Party in the remote fastness of Yenan.
In October 1936, with the dispute over the two slogans in full 
13Mao Tun, "Literature in the Kuomintang Controlled Areas", in 
The People's New Literature, Peking: Cultural Press, 1950, p. 75.
^Goldman, op. cit., p. 13-
Ai Ssu-ch'i, "Lun si-xiang wen-hua wen-ti" (On the Problem 
of Thought and Culture), in Hsia Cheng-nung, Xian jie-duan de Zhong- 
guo si-xiang yun-dong (Contemporary Intellectual Movements in China), 
Shanghai: Yi-ban shu-dian, 1937, p. 30.
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swing, Ch'en Po-ta intervened with a proposal which he hoped would
16unite the two sides. He reeognized that disputes were an inevit­
able part of life, but felt that this particular one had dragged on 
for so long that the only people benefiting from it were the enemy; 
hence his call for an "armistice" among the warring factions on the 
literary front. Nonetheless,- he immediately endorsed the slogan of 
national defence literature and called upon its left-wing opponents 
to recognize its validity in a united front setting. He acknow­
ledged that certain people felt that this slogan lacked a radical 
ring, but he pointed out that it was designed to further the goals 
of the united front against Japan. As such, it had to be broad 
enough to appeal to large numbers of people who were opposed to Japan 
for a wide variety of reasons arising from their differing social in­
terests. Also, argued Ch'en, the idea of national defence should be 
liberally interpreted to include such revolutionary causes as "oppo­
sition to darkness and oppression, demands for freedom and trans­
formation of the life of the people, and opposition to orthodoxy and 
superstition." All these things, Ch'en pointed out, are equally 
concerned with national defence. With national defence defined so 
broadly, was there any need for the alternative slogan of mass
16The discussion in this paragraph is based on Ch'en Po-ta, 
"Wen-yi-jie liang-ge kou-hao de lun-zheng ying-gai xiu-zhan" (There 
Should be a Truce in the Dispute Over the Two Slogans in the Liter­
ary and Art World) (October 1936), in Guo-fang wen-xue lun-zhan 
(The Debate on National Defence Literature), Shanghai: Xin-chao she,
1936, pp. 397-602. The text of Ch'en's essay used here is in ZGYJ, 
V:8 (10 August 1971), pp. 112-113.
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literature of national revolutionary war? Yes, said Ch'en, there 
was. This slogan should represent the forces of the Left in the 
literary world, hut only under the umbrella of national defence liter­
ature, and not as an opposing slogan. The more radical form of liter­
ature should he a hey element and the major force in national defence 
literature. Hence, the slogan of the Lu Hsun group was to represent 
the "individual standpoint of left-wing writers" within the united 
front in the literary field, hut it could not he the slogan of the 
united front in literature itself. Having suggested this compromise 
hy which the two opposing groups might cooperate in a common struggle 
against Japan, Ch'en called upon the individuals involved on both 
sides to "sacrifice their prejudices" and reunite. As the war with 
Japan ominously approached, the leftist' faction among the Shanghai 
writers reluctantly accepted the idea of a broad united front against
Japan, and Ch'en's efforts certainly played a role in this develop-
17 . .ment. Nevertheless, several important members of the original
group, never really accepted the CCP's authority in the cultural field,
until they were forced to do so during the Rectification Movement at
Yenan in the early 1940rs, or after the Communists' victory in 1949.
17Soon after his fall from power in 1970, Ch'en's support of 
national defence literature in 1936 was denigrated as an example of 
"right capitulationism" on the literary front. For an exhaustive 
discussion of this issue, see Hsifan.Mou, "Chen Bo-da yu san-shi 
nian-dai wen-yi liang-ge kou-hao de lun-zheng" (Ch'en Po-ta and the 
Dispute over the Two Slogans in Art and Literature During the 1930 's}, 
ZGYJ, V:S (10 August 1971), pp. 4-22.
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(ii) Ch'en's "NewEnlightenment Movementn
Although the December Ninth Movement helped the Communists in 
their efforts to form a new united front, the literary dispute in 
Shanghai illustrated the difficulty in finding the right slogans 
which would he accepted by all the major political groupings con­
cerned. On 10 September 1936 the left-wing Shanghai periodical Du- 
shu sheng-huo (Reading Life) published a special issue in an attempt 
to spark off a broad movement on the cultural front, and Ch'en Po-ta
rose to the occasion by calling for a "New Enlightenment Movement"
18(xin qi-meng yun-dong, henceforth simply NEM). According to a con­
temporary account by Ho Kan-chih, Ch'en was the first person "con­
sciously" to raise the question of a new intellectual movement to 
accompany the political forces generated by the December Ninth Move­
ment. Ho also declared that Ch'en's first two articles on the NEM
were the "earliest calls" for and the "foundation stones" of the en- 
19tire movement. Ch'en's proposals provoked a lively debate in poli­
tical and intellectual circles throughout the country, and won the 
immediate support of Chou Yang, Ai Ssu-ch'i, Ho Kan-chih, Hu Ch'iao- 
mu and other leading CCP intellectuals. The response from non-Marxists
18Ch'en Po-ta, "Xin zhe-xue-zhe de zi-ji pi-pan he guan-yu xin 
qi-meng yun-dong de jian-yi" (A New Philosopher's Self-criticism and 
Proposal for a New Enlightenment Movement), Du-shu sheng-huo (Reading 
Life), IV:9 (10 September 1936), pp. 453-455.
19 /Ho Kan-chih, Jin-dai Zhong-guo qi-meng yun-dong shi (A History
of the Modern Chinese Enlightenment Movement), Shanghai: Sheng-huo
shu-dian, 1936, pp. 206-208.
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was more reserved and critical, as could "be expected, but from this 
time on Ch'en became an increasingly well known figure in the numer­
ous debates on the united front prior to the Japanese invasion in 
July 1937.
What exactly was the NEM? Or, perhaps more accurately, what did 
Ch'en think it shoul'dbe? In a series of related essays, Ch'en devel­
oped the theme that the NEM should be a "second New Culture Movement , 
—  a cultural salvation movement", similar to yet different from the 
May Fourth Movement of 1919. During this famous movement, argues 
Ch'en, there was no conflict of interest between enlightenment and 
patriotism, the reason being that:
Fighters of the New Culture Movement were at the same time 
fighters of the patriotic movement, and fighters of the 
patriotic movement equally became fighters of the New Cul­
ture Movement.^
Yet in spite of this important similarity, there is a crucial dif­
ference between the May Fourth Movement and the NEM, for in the 
intervening years dialectics (dong de luo-ji) have replaced formal 
logic.as the dominant philosophical system In China. Consequently, 
Marxists are to be the main force of the present NEM, and the "con­
crete application of dialectics will become the central concern" of 
this new movement. As in the case of the united front in literature, 
so in the NEM; the Communists will willingly cooperate with other 
groups in the united front, but will not voluntarily relinquish 
their leading role. Having established this point, Ch'en then
20Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun xin qi-meng yun-dong" (On the new Enlight­
enment Movement), Xin shi-ji (New Century), 1:2(1 October 1936).
The text used here is in Hsia Cheng-nung, op. cit., pp. 67-75. The 
passage cited is on p. 68.
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declares that the ’’recognition or denial of dialectics" is by no
means the criterion for participation in the NEM; the only criteria
are the "defence of the motherland and the enlightenment of the
people." Ch'en concludes that the NEM will develop widely only if
it is constructed on the basis of "non-sectarianism.’! Accordingly,
it should include individuals from various social strata, providing
they support the defence of China against Japan and resist the cur-
21rent attempts to revive traditionalism. ' In spite of these efforts 
to broaden the appeal of the NEM, Ch'en's proposals were attacked as 
being "excessively narrow in scope and excessively leftist in expres­
sion, " and his ultimate ins-istance on the leading role of Marxism in
the NEM probably did much to undermine its general appeal to non-
22Marxists in the cultural field. Nonetheless, the NEM’s normal 
course of development was cut short by the Japanese invasion in mid- 
1937, when intellectual debate in Peking and Shanghai came to an 
abrupt halt. The NEM might have been more successful had it not been 
for the intervention of the war, but this must remain speculative.
Although Ch'en declared that Marxists should play the main role 
in the NEM, this did not imply that they were without serious short­
comings. On the contrary, in his original article calling for the 
NEM, Ch'en suggested that in the field of philosophy (his own special 
area, of interest) Marxists should carry out a thorough "self-criti­
cism" as part of their contribution to the new movement. Specifically,
2IIbid., pp. 73-75.
22Ho Kan-chih, op. cit., p. 220.
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they should criticize themselves for having failed to (l) make a 
systematic critique of China's traditional philosophical systems, and
(2) integrate in a satisfactory way Marxist theory and the practical 
politics of China. Both of these points are relevant to our discus­
sion. In Ch'en's opinion, Marxism has become the dominant philosophy 
in China in the years since the failure of the revolution of 1925-27, 
yet Marxists have failed to deal effectively with the two important 
problems referred to above. In the first place, laments Ch'en:
There is, in general, a lack of a systematic, penetrating 
critique of. China's old traditional thought, and this 
millenia-old ruling traditional thought has become today 
a powerful tool which the imperialists (especially the Ja­
panese imperialists) and traitors are using to enslave the 
consciousness of the Chinese people.^ 3'
In calling for a "systematic, penetrating critique" of China's
philosophical heritage, Ch'en is by no means implying.that it
should be totally rejected. In another article, for example, he
suggests that in struggling for "a China with a new culture" it is
2/
necessary to "defend the best traditions in Chinese culture." One 
of these traditions no doubt relates to his earlier discovery that 
dialectical materialism existed independently in China prior to the 
introduction of Marxism in'the twentieth century. The time has come,
23Ch'en, "Xin zhe-xue~zhe de zi-ji pi-pan", p. 4-53-
2 L^Ch'en Po-ta, "Wen-hua shang de da lian-he yu xin qi-meng yun- 
dong de li-shi te-dian" (The Great Unity in Culture and the Histor­
ical Characteristics, of the New Enlightenment Movement) (Summer 1937), 
in Hsia Cheng-nung, op. cit., pp. 128-137. The reference is to p.
128. Also see Ch'en Po-ta, "Xue-xi pi-ping (Study and Criticsm) 
(Spring 1937?), in Ch'en, Zai wen-hua zhen-xian shang, pp. 28-33.
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argues Ch'en,for China's Marxist philosophers to evaluate the legacy 
of the past on the basis of dialectical materialsm. However, in addi­
tion to having failed to deal adequately with China's intellectual 
heritage, Ch'en also complains that:
The greater part of China's Marxist philosophers have not 
integrated practical polities into their philosophical 
writings, and have not successfully used examples from 
China's living politics to elucidate dialectics, thus con­
cretizing dialectical materialism in Chinese problems and 
further enriching it....Hence Marxism can easily become 
empty talk and can be misrepresented by other s. 25
In a later article Ch'en suggests that Ai Ssu-ch'i's efforts in the 
popularization of Marxist philosophy are "epoch-making,” but are 
"still inadequate" regarding the union of philosophy and the "total 
reality of China's history." For Ch'en, this inability of Marxist 
theorists to combine their new philosophy with the historical and 
contemporary reality of China is deplorable; in such a situation 
theory becomes separated from reality and this in turn strengthens 
the tendency of theory to lag behind reality. Thus, Marxist-Leninist 
theory loses its ability to serve as the guiding ideology of the rev­
olutionary, movement, dooming the Chinese revolution to ultimate fail­
ure.
Ch'en’s twin calls for the preservation of the "best traditions" 
in Chinese culture, and for the "enrichment" of Marxism by "concre-
25Ch'en, "Xin ■ zhe-xue-zhe de zi-ji pi-pan", p. 453-
26Ch'en Po-ta, "Zai lun xin qi-meng yung-dong: si-xiang de zi-
you yu zi-you de si-xiang" (Again on the New Enlightenment Movement: 
Freedom of Thought and Free Thought), in Ren-shi yue-kan (Knowledge 
Monthly), 1:1 (16 May 1937?). The text used here is in Hsia Cheng- 
nung, op. cit., pp. 84-99. The reference is-to p. 90.
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tizing" it in Chinese reality were probably worrying to certain sec­
tions of the CCP. Marxism appeared to be in very great danger in 
Ch'en's hands of losing its status as the scientific philosophy of 
the international proletariat, and becoming rather a cultural philo­
sophy serving only the interests of the Chinese nation. The strong 
cultural overtones in Ch'en's thinking were even more pronounced in 
the views of Chang Shen-fu, another young Marxist theorist involved 
in the debate on the New Enlightenment Movement. In an essay of 4 
May 1937, for example, Chang supported Ch'en's proposal for such a 
movement, declaring that it should be "rational, synthetic, and scien­
tific." Marxism, of course, was to provide the basic "rational" and 
"scientific" content of the NEM, but this should be seen in the con­
text of Chang's ideas concerning "synthesis" as applied to the cul­
tural sphere. Chang strongly defended the need to infuse Chinese 
culture with the new culture from the West, and he rejected the stub­
born defence of Chinese tradition to the exclusion of Western in­
fluences. The task at hand, argued Chang, was to strike the proper 
balance between traditional Chinese and modern Western elements in 
the "genuinely new culture" that the NEM was to create for China:
There should be a dialectical or organic synthesis /zong- 
he/ of the various cultures existing at the present time.
As a rule, the creation of a genuinely new culture results 
from the fusion /jie-he7 of two dissimilar cultures. When 
a foreign culture (or civilization) is transplanted, it 
cannot grow if it does not conform to the soil in the local 
place..../and does not/ bear a national character.
27Chang Shen-fu, "Wu-si yun-dong yu xin qi-meng yun-dong" (The 
May Fourth Movement and the New Enlightenment Movement) (4 May 1937), 
in Hsia Cheng-nung, op. cit., pp. 108-109.
50
It should he noted that Chang equates "culture" with "civilization," 
and does not limit his discussion of cultural synthesis merely to the 
narrower fields of art and literature. This is in keeping with the 
broad sociological approach to culture characteristic of Marxists 
like Chang, but it does raise questions about Marxism itself. Surely, 
the revolutionary philosophy of the proletariat was itself part and 
parcel of the Western cultural (or clvilizational) impact of the West. 
If so, would not Marxism also be synthesized with traditional Chinese 
culture in Chang’s formulations? In his essay, Chang did not deal 
specifically with the possible theoretical Implications .of his argu­
ment for cultural synthesis. However, there were apparently other 
Marxists who were not blind to the nuances of Chang’s ideas, which 
were similar to those of Ch’en Po-ta himself.
Small wonder, then, that Ch’en felt it necessary to attack cer­
tain unnamed "literary Pharisees" for suggesting that in a new united 
front Marxism would quickly degenerate into "united philosophy" (lian- 
he zhe-xue) or "patriotic philosophy" (ai-guo zhe-xue), and would 
lose its "philosophical party nature" ■ These charges of course im­
plied that Marxism and nationalism were irreconcilable, and this was 
the brunt; of the criticism the literary leftists levelled against the 
united front policy and the probable consequences that would flow 
from It. But were Marxism and nationalism indeed Incompatible? Not 
according to Ch’en, who agreed with his critics that Marxism in the 
present era in China would have the appearance of being a patriotic 
philosophy. In the face of Japanese aggression, argued Ch'en, any
Of}
Ch'en, "Wen-hua shang de da lian-he", pp. 128-130.
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philosophy which was not patriotic would he of no use to the Chinese
people. But the patriotism he was advocating was not to he confused
with "ordinary” patriotism. Ch’en*s hind of patriotism had its "own
historical characteristic,” in that under the right, circumstances it
might "rather quickly transform itself into /the basis ofj a new
rational social life.” In other words, Ch*en*s patriotic philosophy
was at one and the same time Marxist philosophy, for it emerged in a
historical situation characterized hy a patriotism that was different
from ordinary patriotism (i.e., bourgeois nationalism).*^ In firmly
rejecting the charge that there was any conflict of interest between
Marxist philosophy and Chinese nationalism, Ch'en provides us with
the key to his fundamental understanding of Marxism itself:
The real task of our philosophy /viz,- Marxism/ is to
transform the world, but in our present circumstances the
task of our philosophy is to serve the defence of the 
motherland. Our philosophy is the philosophy that will 
liberate all mankind, but at the same time it is also the 
present patriotic philosophy of us Chinese people. Our 
new philosophy is not abstract dogma; it must struggle 
under each concrete historical situation, and within each 
concrete historical environment, for each genuinely pro­
gressive cause. In China, which is suffering annexation 
/6y Japan7, the cause of national liberation is a very 
great progressive .cause.^
For Ch’en, Marxism is not "abstract, dogma” which exists independently
of a specific time and place; it is rather a living philosophy which
is .intimately bound up with the "concrete historical situation" and
"concrete historical environment!’ peculiar to China.
29Ibid., p. 136. 
30Ibid., p. 130.
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While Ch'en played-a major role within the CCP in redefining the 
nature of Marxism in the. light of growing nationalism in the immediate 
years prior to 1937, this is not to suggest that he was alone in his 
efforts. Rather, he.was simply one of the leading spokesmen of the 
important group of urban Party intellectuals who enthusiastically ac­
cepted the Party's demand for a new united front in the face of Japan­
ese aggression. In the spring of 1937., some six months after the NEM 
had been launched by Ch'en, the CCP theorist Hsia Cheng-nung edited 
a collection of articles relating to the movement. Three of Ch'en's 
most important articles were included, in addition to contributions 
by such well known figures as Ai Ssu-ch'i, Ho Kan-chih, Chou Yang and
others. In his concluding essay, Hsia attempted to uncover the "prin-
31ciples of China's ideological movement at the present stage," Ide^  
blogy, says Hsia, is based on class, and the ideology of the leading 
class at a given moment in history is the "leading element" in any 
contemporary ideological movement. Hence, this leading element es­
tablishes the fundamental principles of the Ideological movement in 
question. In European intellectual history the leading role of the 
bourgeoisie and its ideology is quite clear, but in China things are 
different. Both in terms of political progressiveness and sheer 
numbers, the "labouring masses" play this leading role in present- 
day China, and in China's contemporary ideological movements as well. 
In other words, the ideology of the labouring masses (viz., Marxism- 
Leninism) is to be the leading element in the New Enlightenment Move­
ment. However, because of China's "special character" the labouring
31^ The discussion in this paragraph is based on. Hsia Cheng-nung, 
op. eit., pp. 207-208.
masses have certain limitations in comparison with their European 
counterparts. First, the Chinese masses are undertaking two historic 
tasks, one of which is their own and one the hourgeoisie1 s. They 
must first help satisfy the demands of the hourgeoisie, and only then 
move on to the realization of their own aspirations. Second, the 
Chinese masses have not yet gone through the tempering process of 
capitalist society, nor have they fully experienced the effects of the 
(bourgeois) liberation of the individual. In the realm of thought, 
these two historical limitations have not been conducive to the tho­
rough elimination of feudal thought from the ranks of the Chinese 
labouring masses, nor to the systematic establishment of their own 
class ideology and fighting forces. In consequence, the Chinese 
masses are "a little backward” in comparison with the labouring clas­
ses of Europe, America and certain other countries. In light of this 
analysis, Hsia is forced to the conclusion that:
Although it takes the ideology of the labouring masses as 
its guide, China's ideological movement in its present 
stage /i.e., the NEM/ definitely cannot take the philoso­
phy- of the European proletariat and transfer it to China 
in an unchanged form. It is only when it is applied to 
real problems that dialectical materialism can exist and 
be of significance. It itself will then develop. We can­
not deny that the sharpest and most correct weapon in to­
day1 s ideological movement is dialectical materialism,
" but we must pay special attention to the fact that the pre­
sent stage is one in which dialectical materialism will 
develop in China.32
By early 1937, then, there was a feeling among certain CCP in­
tellectuals in the cities that the time had come for Marxism-Leninism 
to "develop” in China. Only if it took form in the course of concrete
^Loc. cit.
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struggles in China, they argued, would Marxism-Leninism he relevant 
to the special needs of the Chinese people at this crucial moment in 
their history. In proposing his New Enlightenment Movement, ChTen ’ 
Po-ta had clearly indicated that it was only through the reconcilia­
tion of the philosophy of the international proletariat and the rising 
nationalism of the Chinese people that Marxism-Leninism could develop 
in China. In his support for "national forms" in literature, for the 
preservation of the "best traditions" in Chinese culture, for a "sys­
tematic critique" of China’s traditional philosophy, and for the "en­
richment" of dialectical materialism by "concretizing" it in Chinese 
problems, Ch’en was pointing —  however imprecisely —  toward the 
later concept of the "Sinification of Marxism." Indeed, left to it­
self Ch'en's New Enlightenment Movement might well have led to a more 
or less explicit theory along these lines, but events intervened to 
deny this as a possibility. Prior to the Japanese invasion of China 
in July 1937, many of the active participants in the movement (inclu­
ding Ch’en himself) fled to the safety of Yenan. There they were to 
become the core of the ideological and propaganda machine which Mao 
Tse-tung was busily assembling in the course of his struggle with the 
Returned Students. At this point in our study it becomes necessary 
to discuss Mao’s rise to power and his attitude toward Marxism-Lenin­
ism, for he achieved supremacy within the CCP precisely at the moment 
when Ch’en Po-ta and his urban colleagues were calling for the devel­
opment of Marxism-Leninism in China. Mslo was thinking similar 
thoughts, although he had somewhat different views on the specific 
question of the correct attitude toward China's history and tradition­
al philosophy.
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(iii) Mao Tse-tung's Rise to Power
Mao Tse-tung's rise to supreme power in the CCP dates from late 
1934, when the military failures of the Returned Students gave him 
the chance to re-establish his power in both the Red Army and the 
Party organization at Juichin. This in turn placed him in a strong 
position at the crucial meeting at Tsunyi in January 1935, when the
33Party leadership convened-to reorganize itself during the Long March. 
The precise details of the Tsunyi Conference remain obscure to this 
day, but there can be little doubt that the meeting was a most impor­
tant milestone in Mao's career. He was re-elected to the Politburo 
and to the chairmanship of the important Military Affairs Committee, 
positions' which provided the basis for his eventual domination of the 
Party.^ Nonetheless, Mao's support was far from overwhelming and, 
as Hu Chi-hsi has pointed out, came largely from the army, especially 
the dedicated Maoist faction which by that time probably dominated 
it.^ The delicate .balance of power is indicated by the fact that in 
spite of Mao's real gains it was Chang Wen-t'ien who was elected 
secretary-general of the Party, and there was no criticism of the
33For a plausible account of Miao's political comeback prior to 
the Tsunyi Conference, see Dieter Heinzig, "The Otto Braun Memoirs 
and Mao's Rise to Power," CQ, 46 (April-June 1971), pp. 274-288.
'^ 'Sienry G. Schwartz, "The Nature of Leadership: The Chinese
Communists, 1930-1945," World Politics, XXII:4 (July 1970), p. 560.
35Hu Chi-hsi, "Hua Fu, the Fifth Campaign of Encirclement and 
the Tsun-yi Conference," CQ, 43 (July-September 1970), p. 46.
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Party's political line (i.e., the political line of the Returned 
Students). While some of the Returned Students were prepared to 
admit to errors in the military sphere, they would not countenance 
criticism in the more important realm of politics.
In spite of Chang Kuo-t'ao's open opposition to Mao's growing, 
power after Tsunyi, Mao's First Army completed its epic Long March 
in October 1935 and settled down in its new home in Shensi. During 
a temporary stay in the small town of Wayaopao, the Politburo con­
vened a full meeting to review the situation in the Party and the 
country as a whole. Official sources have called this meeting "one
of the most important ever called" by the CCP Central Committee, and
37the reasons are not hard to fathom. Convened m.mid-December, the 
conference declared its support for the policy of a united front in 
China in line with the Comintern's decisions earlier'that year. This 
policy gave the CCP a new lease on life and set the stage for the 
Party's rapid growth during the war against Japan. It was also at 
Wayaopao that Mao abandoned the compromise he had made at Tsunyi, and 
came out with a direct attach on the political line of the Returned 
Students. In a Politburo resolution of 25 December (which clearly
^ Mao Ze-dong ji (Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung), edited under 
the direction of Takuechi Minoru, Tokyo: Hokubo sha, 1970-74, IV,
p. 393. This ten-volume collection of Mao's writings in their orig­
inal form will be used as the standard reference to Mao's works ex­
cept for those released after 1949, when.the present official Chinese 
texts will be used. On Mao's position at. the Tsunyi Conference, see 
also Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsun-yi Conference," CQ, 40 
(October-December 1969), p. 13*
■^ Mao Ze-dong xuan-ji (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), Peking: 
Ren-min chu-ban she, 1967, I, p. 128.
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reflected his opinions), Mao paid lip-service to the need to guard 
against the right, yet he went on to declare that the "main danger" 
was a "'left' elosed-door tendency" which had existed for some time 
within the Party. That the leftists in question were none other than 
the Returned Students is suggested by the resolution's conclusion 
that the "basic source" of leftism within the Party is its.propon­
ents' "inability to apply Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism in a living way
to China's specific concrete environment, thus rendering Marxism-
38Leninism-Stalinism a lifeless dogma." This charge of "dogmatism" 
was to become a major theme in Mao's struggles with the Returned 
Students, and the "living" application of Marxism-Leninism to- China 
the very cornerstone of his approach to problems of ideology.
The Wayaopao Conference was crucial to Mao's rise to power be­
cause it turned the tables on the Returned Students and placed them 
squarely on the defensive. No longer the tireless scourgers of 
"right opportunism" in the Party, they would now have to devote their 
energies to deflecting the charge that they themselves were guilty of 
a serious left deviation. Mao's growing prestige within the CCP fol­
lowing the meeting at Wayaopao is reflected in the comments of Edgar 
Snow, the American-journalist who interviewed Mao and other Party 
leaders in July 1936. After spending some time with the Communists 
in the small town of Paoan, Snow reported that in his dealings with 
a wide variety of people, "I never met one who did not like 'the 
Chairman' —  as everyone called him —  and admire him. The role of 
his personality in the movement was clearly immense." Broadening his
■^ Mao, Ji V, p. 36.
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scope, Snow further declared that "the influence of Mao Tse-tung
throughout the Communist world of China is probably greater than that
of anyone else." Yet in spite of Mao's dominant position Snow could
observe that there was " —  as yet, at least —  no ritual of hero-
worship built up around him. I never met a Chinese Red who drivelled
39*our-great-leader' phrases." This was in mid-1936; by the summer 
of the following year the cult of the "great leader" was beginning to 
make its appearance.
The last few months of 1936 were of supreme importance to both 
Mao and the CCP. They witnessed the destruction of Chang Kuo-t'ao 
as a force to. be reckoned with, and the legitimization of the Party 
as a result of the Sian Incident in December of that year, when Chiang 
Kai-shek was forced to agree to a new united front with the Communists. 
The first of these two events further consolidated Mao's leading pos- 
. ition within the CCP,* the second presented him with the opportunity 
of becoming a.truly national leader as well, in direct competition 
with Chiang, In April 1937 the Politburo met in Yenan to discuss the 
new situation arising' from the Sian Incident, and in May a national 
conference of the Party was convened to discuss the new line. Accor­
ding to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao further strengthened his position at 
this conference by supporting Liu Shao-ch'i's critique of the Party's 
leftist errors in the past. Liu's report antagonized the Returned 
Students, and Mao's support of Liu's position marked the beginning 
of the Mao-Liu coalition that was eventually to dominate the Party.
39Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.,
1937, pp. 82-83. ’
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Certainly, it was soon after the May conference that Liu was trans­
ferred to Yenan, and took up an increasingly important number of Party 
posts, probably with the personal support of Mao.^ In a few months1 
time Mao was to be confronted by Wang Ming, the one remaining Returned 
Student who could pose a serious challenge to Mao' s position in the 
Party. WangTs attitude toward Mao was clearly revealed in an article 
of mid-1937, in which he twice referred to "Comrades Chu Teh and Mao 
Tse-tung" as the leaders of the Chinese Red Army. Not only was Mao 
ranked second to Chu, but both were described solely as military as 
opposed to political leaders of the Chinese Communist movement.
In spite of Wang Ming’s hesitations, by the late spring.of 1937 
Mao Tse-tung was very much the first among equals in the CCP, and 
early signs of a personality cult began to make their appearance. On 
22 June, Liberation, the CCP's new central organ, published its first 
woodcut portrait of Mao, and a close comparison of this with the por­
trait of Chu Teh published in the same journal on 16 June reveals 
Mao's growing pre-eminence. The two pictures in question were done 
by the same artist, but his treatment of the two leaders is radically
^Chang Kuo-t’ao’s version of the beginnings of the Mao-Liu al­
liance’ is in his introduction to the Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch’i, 
Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, I (196$) pp. vi-viii. For fur-
ther details on this, admittedly obscure episode, see James Pinckney 
Harrison, The Long March to Power (A History of the Chinese Communist 
Party, 1921-72), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, pp. 282-283 and
notes,
. Wang' Ming, China Can Win! (The New Stage in the Aggression of 
Japanese Imperialism and the New Period in the Struggle of the Chinese 
People), New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937, pp. 10, 28.
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different. Both Chu and Mao are shown full face, hut the background
scene to Mao —  marching columns with flags flying —  is much more
dynamic than the scene backing up Chu. In addition, Mao’s face is
strikingly illuminated by the glowing rays of the sun, a motif which
has associations with the emperor in traditional China and which was
to become the hallmark of the later cult of Mao. Finally, whereas an
empty space beside Chu's picture is filled with decorative lines, a
similar one below Mao’s portrait contains a quotation from Mao calling
for the "complete liberation of our nation and society.1 The marching
columns, the rays of sun, the apt quotation —  all of these indicate
that the cult of Mao was definitely in the making by June 1937, and 
42possibly earlier. This is further suggested by the publication of
Mao's first collection of writings, the Collected Essays of Mao Tse-
4-3tung, in Shanghai in December 1937. No other Communist leader at 
the time was to have a similar honour, and none has had since during 
his own lifetime.
 ^For Chu's portrait, see Jie-fang, 6 (14 June 1937), p. 25; for 
Mao's portrait and quotation, see JF, 7 (22 June 1937), p. 24-. The 
sun motif reached its zenith during the Cultural Revolution in the 
late 1960's , when a popular song ( "Dong-fang hong" —  "The East is 
Red") directly comparing Mao to the rising sun virtually became the' 
national anthem of China. Likewise, the use of quotations from Mao 
reached its peak in the "Little Red Book" phenomenon of the same per­
iod. For a detailed treatment of the cult of Mao at the height of its 
development, see Robert W. Rinden, "The Cult of Mao Tse-tung," a paper 
delivered at the Conference on Ideology and Politics in Contemporary 
China, Sante Fe, USA, 2-6 August 1971. Interestingly, Mao later ac­
knowledged his support for the cult as a means of increasing his poli­
tical power during the Cultural Revolution, but confessed that it had 
perhaps been overdone, and should henceforth be toned down. See Edgar 
Snow's conversation with Mao Tse-tung (10 December 1970) in Edgar Snow, 
The,Long Revolution, New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 168-170.
The volume in question is Mao Ze-dong lun-wen ji (Collected Es­
says of Mao Tse-tung), Shanghai: no pub...,, 1937.
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Thus far we have not discussed the question of Moscow's attitude 
toward Mao, but with his rapid rise to a commanding position in the 
CCP it now'becomes necessary to do so. Prior to Tsunyi the Comintern 
always had a major say in selecting the top leadership of the Chinese 
Party, but this tradition was broken at Tsunyi itself. No doubt Mos­
cow's likely.attitude was heatedly debated by everyone concerned; 
would Mao's victory be accepted as a fait accompli, or would there 
be efforts made to replace him with someone —  perhaps Wang Ming —  
with closer personal links to the CPSU? Charles B. McLane has made a 
close study of Soviet attitudes toward Mao during these critical years, 
and he has concluded that on the whole Mao was highly regarded in Mos­
cow. Yet while the Comintern was appreciative of Mao's efforts as a 
rural peasant leader, there was some reluctance to promote his claims 
as a top Party leader. Indeed, when Li Li-san fell from power in late 
1930 Moscow replaced him with a leadership of its own choosing, thus 
ignoring Whatever claims Mao and others in the field might have had 
to Li’s post.^* Nevertheless, Moscow’s success In this Instance 
marked the end of an era; it was the "last identifiable instance of 
outright Soviet intervention In the internal affairs of the Chinese
/ 5
Communist Party." As McLane pointed out in his study of the period, 
the early 1930’s witnessed a gradual decline in Moscow’s interest in 
maintaining strict supervision over.the internal affairs of the CCP, 
and Moscow's gradual disengagement from the affairs of the Chinese
^For details on Moscow’s early attitude toward Mao, see Charles
B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1958, pp. 29-34. :
^Ibid., p. 9
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Z.6
Party was accelerated by tbe Sian Incident in December 1936.
Stalin placed great hopes on the united front which emerged from this 
episode, and his attention soon focused on the task of strengthening 
the KMT and its armies in the struggle against Japan. Thus it was 
that Mao’s rise to power in the CCP was accompanied by a marked de­
cline in Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese 
Party. After years of subordination to the will of Moscow, the cen­
ter of the world revolution, the Chinese Communists under Mao were at 
last becoming masters of their own house.
(iv) Mao’s Search for ’’Correct” Theory
It was in this favourable environment —  growing power within the
Party and declining interference by Moscow —  that Mao turned to what
was probably his first concerted attempt to master Marxist-Leninist
theory. When Edgar Snow met Mao In the summer of 1936, he found him
to be an ’’ardent student of philosophy:”
Once, when I was having some nightly interviews with him on 
Communist -history, a visitor brought him several new books 
on philosophy, and Mao asked me to postpone our engagements.
He consumed these books In three or four nights of intensive 
reading, during which he seemed oblivious to everything e l s e .47
The summer of 1936, we will recall, was precisely when Ch’en Po-ta
and his colleagues were preparing to launch their New Enlightenment
Movement. From a later essay of Mao’s we know that he was aware of
the main outlines of the NEM, for he referred to the ’broad movement
of dialectical materialistic philosophy” which had recently developed
Z.6For Soviet attitudes on the Sian Incident and its aftermath, 
see ibid., pp. 79-91.
^Snow, Red Star, pp. 85-86.
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in China's intellectual circles. Mao's interest in philosophy was 
probably genuine, but there is no doubt that his voracious appetite 
for new books in mid-1936 was whetted by the fierce ideological dis­
pute which had erupted at Wayaopao a few months previously. The 
argument over "correct" theory was at the core of Mao’s struggle with 
the Returned Students, all of whom had studied Marxism-Leninism at 
Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow for several years, spoke and read 
Russian fluently, and were well versed in the history of the CPSU. If 
Mao had one outstanding vulnerability in his new position as leader of 
the CCP, it was to be found in his inadequate grasp of formal Marxist- 
Leninist theory. In light of this, Snow’s description of him In the 
summer of- 1936 as an "ardent student of philosophy" certainly rings 
true.
While Mao lacked a systematic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism at 
this time, it should not be construed from this that he had no views 
on theory, or ideology, as such. On the contrary, by the time of the 
Tsunyi Conference Mao had come to some very firm conclusions about 
the role of Ideology In the revolutionary movement. At Tsunyi he had 
been unable to drive home his attack on the Returned Students' poli­
tical line, but at Wayaopao he was in a much stronger position and 
could speak more openly on political and ideological matters. It was 
at this important meeting that he firmly established the key princi­
ple that was basic to his understanding of the revolution, namely, 
that the CCP's proletarian nature was determined by its ideology, not 
by its social composition. In a resolution expressing Mao's line
48Mao, Ji VI, p. 275.
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(adopted 25 December 1935), the Politburo emphasized the need to ex­
pand the Party rapidly if the new united front strategy was to be suc­
cessful. Since China was an economically backward country, this im­
plied that peasants and petty bourgeois intellectuals would always 
be in the majority within the Party. However, this in no way jeopar­
dized the CCP's status as a proper Bolshevik party, the reasons being 
that:
The major criterion in the Party's absorption of new members 
is whether or not they are able to struggle resolutely for 
what the Party advocates. Attention should be paid to social 
composition, but this is not the major criterion. We should 
make the Party a smelting furnace of communism ^yi-ge gong- 
chan-zhu-yi de rong-lu/, and take numerous new members who 
wish to struggle for what the Communist Party advocates and 
temper them into Bolshevik fighters with the highest class 
consciousness. .The struggle between the two lines within the 
Party and- communist education are the methods to achieve this 
aim. Bolshevik unity in ideology within the Party is the con­
crete expression of the firm proletarian leadership of the 
Party.49
Several comments should be made regarding this passage. One, it re­
affirms Mao's earlier belief that ideology, not social composition,
determines the CCP's ability to exercise the hegemony of the prole- 
50tariat. Two, it extends the analogy of the "smelting furnace"
Mao, Ji V, p. 38. For the Returned Students' earlier critique 
of Mao's "mistaken viewpoint" on the role of the peasants in the revo­
lution in China, see Ch'en Shao-yu, Wei Zhong-gong geng-jia Bu-er-sai- 
wei-ke-hua er dou-zheng (Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of 
the CCP), Moscow: no pub., March 1932. The complete text of this im­
portant pamphlet is in Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations within the 
Chinese Communist Movement,. 1930-34, Seattle: University of Washing-
ton Press, 1961, 1967, II (The Chinese Documents), pp. 499-609. The 
reference is to p. 559. See also Hsiao, op., cit., I (A Study of Doc­
uments), pp. 202-207, for information on the background to the pam­
phlet ,
50Needless to say, this view was squarely at odds with repeated 
Comintern directives reminding the CCP that its proletarian nature 
lay "not only in its political line but in its composition and the 
role played by the workers in all of its leading organs." For further
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(which Mao had used at the Kul'.ien Conference in December 1929) from 
the Red Army to the CCP itself, thus opening the Party's doors wide 
to peasant and intellectual elements. Three, in calling for a strug­
gle between the "two lines" in the Party, the passage virtually de­
clared war on the Returned Students, as the same resolution also de­
clared left deviationism to constitute the main danger in the Party 
at that time. It is important to remember the political context of 
this resolution, which simply restated ideological positions at which 
Mao had arrived between 1927 and 1930. When he propounded them in 
the earlier period he did so merely as a rural cadre in the CCP; when 
the Politburo repeated them at Wayaopao Mao was the de facto leader 
of the entire Party. The union of organizational power and political 
• ideology had eluded Mao- during the period of the Kiangsi Soviet (1931- 
34), but at Wayaopao the fusion at last began to take place.
At Wayaopao Mao had declared unequivocally that the leftists in 
the Party (viz, the Returned Students) had reduced Marxism-Leninism 
to a "lifeless dogma" because they were unable to mite theory with 
"China's specific concrete environment." Yet in calling for the union 
of Marxist theory and Chinese practice Mao was by no means offering 
original views on the subject, for the CCP had been attempting to do 
this very thing ever since its founding in 1921. There was general 
agreement that in applying Marxism-Leninism to China, full account 
would have to be taken of the country's particular socio-cultural
details on this Comintern resolution of 26 August 1931, see Helene 
Carrere d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, Marxism and Asia, Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1969, p. 246.
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characteristics. This of course begs the question of how one is to 
distinguish between "correct1 and "incorrect" integration of theory 
and practice, but by late 1936 Mao had clearly made up his mind about 
this. In an important series of lectures delivered in December 1936 
to the students of the newly-established Red Army College at Paoan,
Mao had the following to say about the military theories of the Re­
turned Students:
Without a doubt all of these theories were incorrect.
They were mechanistic.. .and were the theories and prac­
tices of stupid and ignorant people. They did not have 
the slightest flavour of Marxism about them; indeed, 
they were anti-Marxist.51
Mao1 s comments were of course directed at the Returned Students’ mili­
tary theories in this instance, but the implications must have been 
fairly obvious to all concerned. It would be highly unlikely that 
such "stupid and ignorant people" would be able to handle the broad 
scope of Marxist-Leninist theory In an intelligent way. In the course 
of these lectures, Mao was primarily concerned with military affairs,
but he did provide a few clues to his developing approach to more
52general Marxist-Leninist theory as well. Very early on he stressed 
the need to study military problems in the context of a specific time
^Mao, Ji V, p. 127.
^^Many writers have noted the intimate connection between Mao’s 
military thought and his thinking In general. Stuart Schram, for ex­
ample, has stressed the "organic link between Mao's military thought 
and his mind and personality as a whole." Schram, Political Thought, 
p. 265. In addition, the Communist writer Hu Ch'iao-mu has claimed 
that the book based on Mao’s military lectures of 1936 constitutes an 
"important political and philosophical work, because it makes a pene­
trating analysis of the laws of the Chinese revolution as a whole."
Hu Ch’iao-mu, Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China, Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1954? PP* 42-43*
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and place, and declared his opposition to a "mechanical approach to
the problem of war." He called upon the Party and army to learn from
countries other than China, but rejected the notion that this fund of 
knowledge provided all that was needed to be known. Instead, he sug­
gested that the military theories of the past were simply the raw mat­
erials from which people today would fashion new theories to meet new 
situations. It is necessary to study the conclusions derived from 
the experience of the past, argued Mao, but:
We should verify these conclusions in the light of our own
experience and assimilate what is useful, reject what is 
useless, and create what is specifically our own. The lat­
ter is very important, for otherwise we cannot direct a 
war.53
Mao is of course dealing here with the correct approach to the theory 
of revolutionary war,- but it is immediately obvious that the creative 
adaptation which he is advocating was coming to "characterize his ap­
proach to the theory of revolution itself. No longer content with 
simply exposing the shortcomings of the theories expounded by the 
Returned Students, he was now groping toward the union of theory and- 
practice that would be at one and the same time "correct" and "spe­
cifically our own." Indeed, any new theory that resulted from the 
union of Mhrxist theory and Chinese practice would by necessity.be 
distinct from the Marxist theory that existed prior to such a union.
As Ch'en Po-ta had pointed out a few months previously, Marxism which 
was not concretized in Chinese problems soon degenerated into mere 
"empty talk" and could easily be misrepresented by others. Surely 
this was the essence of Mao's critique of the Marxist-Leninist theory
53Mao, Ji V, pp. 96-97.
68
espoused "by the Returned Students, theory which had been concretized 
in Russian rather than Chinese problems. Had they not, after all, 
misrepresented Marxism-Leninism by taking its specific Russian form 
and treating it out of context of time and place as a universal form?
During 1935 Mao's attacks on the "anti-Marxist" theories of the 
Returned Students were accompanied by his increasing insistence on 
the autonomy of the CCP vis-a-vis Moscow. At no time did Mao re­
pudiate the CPSU’s leading position in the international Communist 
movement, but there is no mistaking his efforts to gain a greater de­
gree of independence for the CCP than the Comintern had previously 
tolerated. This is seen in his remarks to Edgar Snow in the summer 
of 1936, remarks which Mao knew would find their way back to the 
Kremlin. While acknowledging the leading role of the Comintern, and 
the CCP’s membership in it, Mao made it quite clear that:
This in no sense means that Soviet China is ruled by Mos­
cow or by the Comintern. We are certainly not fighting 
for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over 
to Mo scow 154-
Mao was not purely defensive in his attitude toward the CCP’s role 
in the world revolutionary movement. Not only was he beginning to 
assert the autonomy of the CCP with regard to Moscow, but he was also 
claiming a more positive role for the Chinese Party in an internation­
al context. This claim was most clearly articulated in the series of 
lectures Mao delivered in December 1.936 to the students of the Red 
Army College. Although he was primarily concerned with military
«lbo Tse-tung, as reported by Edgar Snow in his interview with 
Mao on 23 July 1936. The passage cited is translated and documented 
in Schram, Political Thought, p. 419.
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questions in these lectures, he was able to touch on international
affairs as well. Turning to the subject of the CCP's impact abroad,
he stated in no uncertain terms that:
The Chinese Communist Party has led and continues to lead 
a stirring, magnificent and victorious revolutionary war.
This war is not only the banner of China's liberation, but 
possesses international revolutionary significance as well.
The eyes of the revolutionary people around the world are 
upon us. In the new stage, the stage of the anti-Japanese 
national revolutionary war, we will lead the Chinese revo­
lution to its completion, and exert a profound influence on 
the revolution in the East and throughout the w o r l d .55
For Mao, the often-thwarted Chinese revolution was at last coming of 
age, and the CCP was about to claim its legitimate place in the fore­
front of thq international struggle. It is in this broader inter- ' 
national context —  as in the national context too —  that we must 
see Mao's later efforts to improve his credentials as an important 
Marxist-Leninist theorist in addition to his standing as a successful 
political and military leader.
(v) Mao, Ch'en, and Marxism-Leninism
By mid-1937 it was apparent that Mao Tse-tung and Ch’en Po-ta 
(and their like-minded colleagues) were moving toward a common posi­
tion regarding Marxist-Leninist theory. Both of them felt that 
Marxist-Leninists in China had failed to integrate in a satisfactory 
way the universal truth of dialectical materialism and the concrete 
practice of the Chinese revolution. For Mao, this failure reduced 
Marxism-Leninism to "lifeless dogma" and, for Ch'en, to mere "empty 
talk." This emasculated the theory of the proletariat, and it lost 
its ability to serve as a reliable guide to the revolutionary
55Mao, Ji V, p. 102.
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process in China. Yet, change was in the air; Mao’s rapid rise to 
power in the CCP gave him the chance to put forward his own "correct" 
interpretation of the doctrine, while Ch’en and his urban colleagues 
perceived in their New Enlightenment Movement the possibility of 
Marxism-Leninism actually "developing" in China. Both Mao and Ch’en 
were searching for a new ideology that was at once Marxist and Chi­
nese, and their later collaboration in Yenan is not surprising. But 
this growing similarity in their views prompts at least two questions 
which should be dealt with briefly. First, is there any reason to 
believe that the two men were aware —  and possibly influenced by —  
each other's writings on Marxism-Leninism during 1936 and the first 
half of 1937? Second, despite the apparent similarity in their views, 
is there any evidence to suggest that there were major differences in 
their approaches to the problem of Marxism-Leninism in China? It is 
impossible to answer the first question definitively, but it seems 
that the two men were not greatly influenced by each other at this 
time. Ch'en was no doubt aware of general developments concerning 
the Party's struggle deep within China, but it is unlikely that he 
and his colleagues in Peking had access to detailed information con­
cerning inner-Party affairs until some months after the Sian Incident 
in December 1936, when the CCP was able to operate more openly. This 
is especially true of Mao's important speeches on the Party's inter­
nal problems, most of which were delivered at closed meetings and 
not circulated at the time. In any event, in none of Ch'en's articles 
during this period does he once refer to Mao by name, nor does he dis­
cuss the affairs of the CCP as such in view of its status as an il­
legal party. Likewise, while Mao was aware of the New Enlightenment
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Movement in urban China, he never discussed it at any length, nor 
referred to Ch’en and his connection with it.
That the two men were unaffected by each other except in the 
most general sense is further suggested by a comparison of their at­
titudes toward the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and China’s 
traditional philosophies. Both men believed that Marxist-Leninist 
theory should be integrated with Chinese reality, but this similarity 
of opinion in fact masks an important difference in their overall ap­
proach to the problem. This reinforces the likelihood that they de­
veloped their views independently of each other, and in response to 
different values they held and different situations they faced. Ch’en 
Po-ta was a Communist, but he was also a professor of ancient Chinese 
history and philosophy at one of Peking’s leading universities. His 
professional milieu was academic, and even in his political activi­
ties he was primarily concerned with cultural matters, philosophy in 
particular. This is not to deny his practical experience in political 
struggle, for he had worked in Chang Chen's army, had been imprisoned 
and exiled, and had been directly involved in the December Ninth Move­
ment. Nonetheless, it. was rather typical of the man that when he 
called for the union of Marxist theory and Chinese reality, he linked 
this demand with another for a thorough study of China ’ s traditional 
thought. Nor was his attitude entirely negative, for elsewhere he 
had called for the preservation of the ’best traditions in Chinese 
culture,” one of which was undoubtedly the existence (in his, opinion, 
at any rate) of dialectical materialism in China prior to its intro­
duction from the West. Ch’en’s attitude toward China's traditional
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philosophy at this time appeared to he selective; he would ruthless­
ly discard its reactionary elements, but with equal fervor defend and 
preserve its more progressive aspects. This approach became more 
evident in Ch'en1 s writings as time went on, and was doubtless encou­
raged by the current upsurge of nationalism in China. The temper of 
the times demanded that Marxists who wished to remain politically 
relevant should seek to find elements of congruence rather than dis­
sonance between their new philosophy from the West and China's own 
philosophical heritage.
At this time, however, Mao Tse-tung took a much harder line on 
China's traditional philosophy than did Ch'en. Mao had a good gen­
eral education in the early part of the century, and was still at 
normal school at the time of the Russian revolution of 1917. The 
tides from the West were flowing strongly then, and Mao and his con­
temporaries tended to be somewhat indiscriminate in their rejection 
of the past.’ Since the early 1920's Mao had been a busy political 
activist, with little opportunity for study, and for the past ten 
years lie had lived mostly in the countryside. Like Ch'en, Mao had 
come to advocate the more effective union of Marxist theory and 
Chinese practice, but he saw little congruence between .Marxism and 
traditional Chinese philosophy. In the spring and summer of 1937 
he delivered a series of lectures in Yenan on the subject of dia­
lectical materialism, in which he concluded that:
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Because of the Backwardness of China’s social develop­
ment, the dialectical materialist philosophical currents 
developing in China.today have not emerged from the in­
heritance and transformation of our own philosophical 
legacy, hut have emerged from the study of Marxism-Lenin­
ism. If we wish to ensure that the dialectical material­
ist currents of thought will deeply penetrate into and . 
continue to develop in China, and moreover will firmly 
direct the Chinese revolution along the road to complete 
victory, then we must struggle with the various decadent 
philosophies currently existing /in China/. /We must/ 
hoist the flag of criticism on the ideological front 
throughout the whole country, and thereby liquidate the 
philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus can 
we reach our g o a l .
This is certainly a blunt statement, and it was written for a militant
audience at the Anti-Japanese University. But it is unlikely that
Ch'en Po-ta would have endorsed it at the time,* apart from his own
conviction’s, by mid-1937 it had simply become impolitic to call for
the ’’liquidation" of China’s philosophical heritage. In the ensuing
months, Mao was to change his stand on this issue, doubtless under
the urgings of his new political secretary.
This difference in Mao's and Ch’en’s attitudes toward China’s 
philosophical legacy serves to highlight a subtle but significant 
difference in their approaches to the.problem of the union of Marxist 
■ theory and Chinese reality. Both men were good Marxists in that they 
firmly believed the union of theory and practice to be the essential 
prerequisite to the successful direction of the revolutionary process. 
To this extent they shared a common approach to the question of the 
unity of Marxist-Leninist theory and Chinese reality. Yet Mao’s con­
cern in this regard had a certain practical/political ring to it.
It was practical insofar as it emerged as a result of Mao's long
56Mao, Ji VI, p. 275.
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struggles on the revolutionary front to reconcile the theory he had 
read with the rather different reality he had encountered. His con­
cern emerged from a pressing practical need to find theories which 
were useful to the survival and growth of the political and military 
movement he was leading. As a young man he had rather uncritically 
accepted the "basic premises of Marxism-Leninism, and it was only in 
the course of actual revolutionary practice that he had perceived the 
rather noticeable divergences between the Western theory and the 
Chinese reality. His concern to bring theory more into line with
reality was thus firmly grounded in the concrete tasks he faced in
57leading the practical movement deep m  the Chinese countryside.
This concern was also political in nature insofar as it emerged and 
developed in the context of a fierce struggle for supreme power in the 
CCP between Mao and the Returned Students. The unity of theory and 
practice was desirable to Mao because the new theory it produced 
would —  provided he could claim it as his own —  confer a much- 
needed ideological legitimacy on his leadership of the Party. Mao's 
rise to power in the CCP would then be seen as not merely the result 
of historical chance, but rather as the inevitable consequence of 
Mao's correct grasp of theory. Thus the new theory (by whatever name) 
could well become a political weapon which Mao could wield in his
57By his own admission, it was only in the spring of 1925 that 
Mao first began to appreciate the revolutionary potential of the 
peasantry as opposed to that of the urban proletariat. See his com­
ments in Snow, Red Star, p. 157. It was not until 1927, when he was 
thirty-four years old, that Mao began to translate his new awareness 
of the peasants' revolutionary potential into important political 
writings such as his famous "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant 
Movement in Hunan," (March 1927). Key passages from this important re­
port have been translated in their original form in Schram, Political 
Thought, pp. 250-259.
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efforts to consolidate and strengthen his leading position in the 
Party. It would, at the same time, assist him in establishing a cer- ■ 
tain degree of ideological and organisational independence from 
Moscow and the Comintern.
Ch'en approached the unity of Marxist theory and Chinese reality 
from quite a different perspective. His concern was much more theor­
etical in that it grew out of Ch’en's strong grasp of Marxist-Leninism 
(picked up in Moscow) being filtered through the ’Controversy on 
China’s Social History” which dominated urban intellectual circles in 
the early 1930's. While Mao was refining his ideas in the practical . 
struggle in the countryside, Ch’en was re-defining his concept of 
Marxist theory in heated polemics with a wide range of political theo­
rists in China’s major cities. . It was In the course of these rather 
academic and theoretical debates that Ch'en began to work out the 
correct relationship between Marxist-Leninist theory and Chinese 
reality. There was also a much stronger cultural element in Ch’en's 
desire to unite theory and practice than in the case of Mao. As a 
young lecturer in ancient Chinese history and philosophy at a Peking 
university, he was well placed to respond favourably to the rising 
tide of nationalism in China’s cities after 1931. For Ch'en, the 
new theory which would result from the union of Marxism-Leninism and 
Chinese reality was desirable because it would establish a living 
relationship between Marxism and Chinese culture, make Marxism more 
acceptable to the average Chinese person and —  very importantly —  
symbolize China's cultural independence from the West.
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All this is not to suggest that there was no overlapping in the 
attitudes of Mao and Ch’en on the question of uniting Marxist theory 
and Chinese reality. It is obvious, for example, that Mao’s desire 
for political independence from the Soviet Union (and its more zea­
lous allies in the CCP) contained elements of Ch’en's desire for 
cultural independence from the West in general. In time, Mao came 
to place much greater emphasis on the broader cultural dimensions of 
the unity of Marxism-Leninism and the distinctive features of the 
Chinese people and nation. Thus by October 1938 be had moved to the 
position of equating the union of Marxist theory and Chinese reality 
with the new and startling concept of the "Sinification" of Marxism, 
a more culturally charged term than he had ever used before. In fact, 
Mao had picked up the term from Ch’en, who first used it In an essay 
of May 1938, several months before it was adopted by Mao in his im­
portant report to the. CCP’s Sixth Plenum in October of that year.
Even so, Mao was to employ this cultural term In decidedly political 
ways, for it very quickly became identified with the swelling Maoist 
campaign against Wang Ming and the Returned Students,
CHAPTER III
TOWARD THE MAOIST MYTH, 1937-38
(i) Mao’s Philosophy of TSinificationt
In the months since Wayaopao Mao had relentlessly attacked the 
Returned Students’ version of Marxism-Leninism, hut he had not come 
up with a clear-cut alternative which was distinctly his own. By the 
spring of 1937 the time had come for Mao to put forward such an alter­
native, for the emerging united front necessitated a substantial in­
take of new Party members, and provided unprecedented opportunities 
for open propaganda work in the Nationalist-controlled areas of China. 
At such a critical juncture it would not do if the CCP were itself 
in ideological disarray, especially among the Party’s top leadership. 
Mao revealed his awareness of this problem in his opening report of 
3 May 1937 to the Party’s national conference In Yenan. He reaffirmed 
the need to struggle resolutely against the twin evils of right and 
left deviationism, and called for the education of thousands of cadres 
to meet the demands of the new united front. In his concluding re­
marks, he once again turned to the importance of ideology within 
the Party:
In order to overcome ^hese7 undesirable tendencies, it 
is necessary to raise the Marxist-Leninist theoretical 
level of the entire Party. This theory alone is the 
compass to guide the Chinese revolution to victory.-*-
1Mao, Ji V, p. 204.
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In calling for a new campaign to raise the Party's theoretical 
level, Mao did not fail to make his own personal contribution. In the 
spring and summer of 1937, he delivered a series of lectures on dia­
lectical materialism at the Anti-Japanese University in Yenan (the 
former Red Army College). These lectures are available today in two 
forms, neither of which is complete in itself: (l) some "lecture
notes" originally published in 1938; and (2) two philosophical essays 
published separately in 1950 and 1952. Most scholars have accepted
the original lecture notes as genuine, and this is the position taken
2here. As for the two later essays, the editors of Mao’s Selected 
Works have themselves pointed out that in their present form they are
3
revisions of the original lectures Mao delivered in 1937. That they 
were actually delivered in 1937 (in however different a form) is ap­
parent from the basic similarity in the ideas expressed in the earlier 
lecture notes and those in the later essays. Nevertheless, since the 
two essays have indeed been revised, we propose to confine our analy­
sis basically to the earlier lecture notes. We will only refer to the 
later essays when there appears to be a definite continuity in thought
2
Schram (Political Thought, pp. 84-88) discusses at some length 
the question of the authenticity of Mao’s early lectures on Marxist 
philosophy, and accepts them as genuine. He rejects in particular 
John E. Rue’s suggestion that they were forged by Mao’s enemies in 
the Party with a view to discrediting him as a theorist. On this 
point see John E. Rue, "Is Mho Tse-tung’s ’Dialectical Materialism’ a 
Forgery?," Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI:3 (May 1967), pp. 464-468.
3
Mao, XJ I, pp. 259, 274. For the argument that these two essays 
were substantially revised prior to publication, see Cohen, op. cit.,
pp. 22-28.
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on a certain issue which is of importance to our discussion.^ In Ms
i
lectures on dialectical materialism Mao argued the case for certain 
immediate political concerns such as the united front with the Nation­
alists, hut the real importance of these lectures lies elsewhere. As 
D.W.Y. Kwok has suggested, Mao's philosophical efforts at this time
"clearly reveal his determination to become both the theoretical and
* 5practical scientist of society and its revolution." Mao had already 
proven himself a master of practice, but to establish his reputation 
as a theoretician as well was a prerequisite to his being accepted as 
the top leader of a political party calling itself communist. The 
ideal of unity of theory and practice embodied in one leading indi­
vidual was deeply ingrained in the Marxist-Leninist tradition (and, 
incidently, in the Ghinese political tradition also), especially since 
the example of Lenin himself. Even Stalin was busily establishing his 
reputation as a theorist in the course of the bitter inner-party dis­
putes which dominated Soviet politics in the 1930's. It is most im­
probable that Stalin's efforts in this regard went unnoticed in Yenan,
^In a private communication, Stuart Schram has brought to the 
author's attention the existence of an anonymous version of Mao's 
lectures which contains one of the essays ("On Practice") in "sub­
stantially its present form." Said to be a reprint of an edition 
which originally appeared in Chungking in September 1944, this anony­
mous version is Bian-zheng-fa wei-wu-lun (Dialectical Materialism), 
Chungking?: Zhong-guo chu-ban she, 1946• Interestingly, the preface 
to the 1946 reprint claims that these lectures are "extremely good," 
for they discuss dialectical materialism in an idiom much more rele­
vant to Chinese needs and conditions than do most texts on the same 
subject. This of course is precisely the strength of Mao's lectures, 
in spite of their shortcomings in other ways, and they probably had 
much appeal to a Chinese readership for this reason.
D^.W.Y. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, p. 197.
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where Mao was likewise attempting to establish his undisputed supre­
macy in the Chinese Party.
In the course of his lectures Mao expressed the hope that he might 
one day publish a book on dialectical materialism, for those existing 
in China at the time were either mistaken in content or badly written. 
In particular, he felt that China had no "explanatory book" on dialec­
tical materialism which was effective in its "use of common language 
and discussion of personal experience." Nevertheless, he confessed 
that he himself was just beginning the study of dialectical material­
ism, and was unable to write a "good book" for the time being.^ With 
the upsurge of the Anti-Japanese War in mid-1937 it is unlikely that 
the book was ever written; in any case, the incomplete lecture notes 
are all that are available for study at the present time. It is not 
our intention to discuss the entire content of Mao's lectures, or to 
evaluate their merits as Marxist philosophy. Most students of the 
subject tend to agree with Mao that in 193V he was as yet unable to 
write a "good book" on dialectical materialism. Karl Wittfogel and
C.R. Chao, for example, have amply demonstrated that the lectures are
full of plagiarisms from Chinese translations of contemporary Soviet
7writings on Marxist philosophy. Apparently, even some of Mao's col­
leagues in the higher echelons of the CCP were less than enthusiastic 
about Mao's efforts in this field. It is said that Teng Fa in parti­
cular once remarked that the lectures were "full of errors," with
M^ao, Ji VI, p. 303.
7K.A. Wittfogel and C.R. Chao, "Some Remarks on Mao's Handling 
of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics," Studies in Soviet Thought, 
111:4 (December 1963), pp. 251-277.
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Chou En-lai agreeing that this was possible. It was perhaps for 
this reason that the lectures never received extensive publicity out­
side Yenan, it not being until the spring of 1942 that Chang Ju-hsin
9
publicly referred to them in Liberation Daily.
Regardless of their shortcomings as Marxist theory, Mao's lec­
tures are of the utmost importance to our present discussion; it is 
in his critique of idealism that Mao developed, at least in outline, 
a philosophical justification for the Sinification of Marxism. When 
individuals think, argues Mao, they are compelled to use concepts, and 
this can easily cause their knowledge to be split into two aspects.
One aspect is reality, which is of an individual and particular nature 
the other is concepts, which are of a general nature. With idealists, 
this separation of the general and the particular can be dangerous, 
for they push this separation —  which is necessary in the process of 
thinking —  to the point where it distorts their view of reality it­
self. That is, idealists come to regard generality (concepts) as 
objective reality, and particularity (reality) merely as a form of 
existence of generality. In other words, the real is subordinated to
Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'al, Sinkiang: Pawn or
Pivot?, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958, pp. 229-
231. This information is based on the personal recollections of 
General Sheng Shih-ts'ad, who apparently discussed some of Mao's early 
philosophical writings with Teng and Chou In late 1939 or early 1940.
9
Chang. Ju-hsin, "Xue-xi he zhang-wo Mao Ze-dong de li-lun he ce- 
lue" (Study and Grasp'Mao Tse-tung's Theory and Strategy), JFRB (18- 
19 February 1942)> p. 3 both issues. This article will be discussed 
fully in Chapter VII in the context of the Rectification Movement of
1942-43.
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the conceptual, and becomes simply a form of existence of the con­
ceptual, For Mao, this is not valid because:
■ Particularity and generality are in actual fact inter­
connected and inseparable; if separated .they depart from 
objective truth. Objective truth is manifested in the 
unity of the general and the particular. If there is no 
particularity, generality cannot exist; if there is no 
generality, it is not possible to have particularity.^
Mao does not carry this line of argument any further in his original 
lecture notes (or at least in the fragments available for study), but 
he does so in the revised version of his lecture on contradictions.
In "On Contradiction,1 Mao applies the theory elucidated above to the 
study of actual historical phenomena such as the "historical roots of 
Leninism." According to Mao, Stalin, in his discussion of Leninism 
in his Foundations of Leninism (1924)> provided a "model" for under­
standing the particularity and generality of a thing, and their inter­
connection. Stalin pointed out that Leninism has a universal charac­
ter insofar as it is "Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletar­
ian revolution"; at the same time Leninism has a particular character 
inasmuch as Russia was the specific "birthplace of the theory and tac­
tics of the proletarian revolution." Further, argues Mao, Stalin ex­
plained that the universal character of Leninism (its Marxian-ness)
11is contained within its particular character (its Russian-ness).
Given Mao's belief that the general and the particular character of 
a thing cannot be separated, the implication is that Leninism as a 
theory of revolution cannot be separated from Its societal baclcground.
10Mao, Ji VI, p. 269.
n Mao, XJ I, pp. 293-295.
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In other words, Mao is saying that there is no pure, abstract Marxist 
theory in Leninism that can rise above Leninism's concrete Russian 
origins. Therefore, Leninism is nothing more or less than the union
12of Marxist theory and Russian practice; it is 'Russianized' Marxism.
If this analysis is correct, it raises two important questions. 
First, is Leninism simply the sum total of its parts (Marxism plus 
Russia), or is it in fact something qualitatively different? Second, 
since Leninism has both a general (Marxist) and a particular (Russian) 
character, can it be applied to countries other than Russia —  China 
for example? The answer to the first question is suggested by Mao's 
treatment of Leninism as the integral union of the general and the 
particular, i.e., the conceptual and the objectively real. But, one 
might ask, what relationship is established between concept and re­
ality or, in other words, between consciousness and matter? Mao 
responds by using the idealists as a negative example, for they are 
unable to grasp the "materialist truth" that "consciousness is lim­
ited by matter," and think instead that "only consciousness is active, 
whereas matter is merely an inert, composite entity." He then con­
cludes that "only dialectical materialism correctly shows the active
role of thought, and at the same time points out the limitation im-
13posed upon thought by matter." If indeed matter is more than an 
"inert, composite entity" and is able to impose limitations upon 
thought, this leads to the logical conclusion that Leninism is not
12Mao does not use this term, but his line of argument leads 
directly to this conclusion, and was eventually to lead to the coin­
age of the term, "Sinification."
13Mao, Ji VI, pp. 269-270.
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simply the sum total of Marxism plus Russia; rather, it is the inte­
gral combination of the two, in which the original Marxism (thought) 
has been changed (limited) by Russia (matter). To repeat for the 
sake of clarity, Leninism is not simply Marxism in its original German 
form dressed up in a Russian idiom; it is instead 'Russianized' Marx­
ism which is qualitatively different from Marx's original theore­
tical formulations.
Turning to our second query, it would appear that Leninism, be­
cause of its Russian character, cannot be transplanted successfully 
to any other country. Or if it can, does this imply that Leninism 
would have to be applied to the new country in its entirety, in its 
pure Russian form? Mao could easily reject the first possibility as 
Marxism in its West European form had been successfully transplanted 
to Russia. Yet Mao had to reject the second possibility also in 
light of the fact that he had been criticizing the Returned Students 
for attempting to do that very thing, and with disastrous results. 
Nevertheless, Mao does affirm the applicability of Leninism to China, 
but in a new form, by pointing out that general character represents 
"universal truth for all times and all countries, which admits of
no exception," while individual character "exists conditionally and
1/
temporarily and hence is relative." This would mean that Leninism's 
general character (its Marxian-ness) would be valid for China because 
it represents "universal truth." As for Leninism's particular char­
acter (its Russian-ness), it could be dispensed with because it is 
merely "relative." The implication is that once transplanted to
14Mao, XJ I, pp. 294-295.
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China, Leninism would have to shed its Russian particular character 
and adopt a Chinese particular character. Thus, the integral com­
bination of Marxist general character and Chinese particular charac­
ter would be 'Sinified' Marxism; as such, it could not be referred to 
as Leninism, for Leninism is 'Russianized' Marxism containing both 
universal and particular character.
Would 'Sinified' Marxism be different from but equal to Leninism, 
or would it be both a different and superior form of Marxism? We will 
recall that Ch'en Po-ta had claimed earlier that modem dialectical 
materialism (Marxism-Leninism) is a higher stage of development over 
both the crude dialectical materialism of classical Greece, and the 
more sophisticated dialectical idealism of Hegel. From his lecture 
notes, it would appear that Mao fully accepted the idea of the quali­
tative development of Marxism from its original nineteenth-century 
form to newer and higher forms. For example, while acknowledging the 
role of Marx and Engels in founding the modern form of dialectical 
materialism, Mao does not hesitate to point out that "Lenin developed 
this theory." As he sees it, Leninism is not simply a different but 
equal form of Marx's original theory, but rather a different and sup­
erior form. Nor is development beyond Leninism an impossibility; in 
light of the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia and the 
arrival of the era of world proletarian revolution, the theory of dia­
lectical materialism "has entered a new stage of development which
15will enrich its content even more." For Mao, Leninism represented 
both the adaptation and development of Marxism, in a particular Russian
15Mao, J1 VI, p. 300.
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setting. Now, in the summer of 1937, he was contemplating a similar 
adaptation and development of Leninism in China1 s^ particular environ­
ment. This suggests that the new theoretical synthesis which would 
appear in China would represent a higher formulation than did Lenin­
ism itself. Such a claim would obviously have had serious reper­
cussions on the CCPTs (and Mao’s) relations with Moscow, and it is 
probably for this reason that its full implications were not spelled 
out at the time. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the essen­
tial philosophical basis of the claim was worked out by Mao in 1937, 
and this formed the theoretical underpinning of the later creation of 
Mao Tse-tungTs thought. For Ch'en Po-ta and his like-minded urban 
colleagues, it was a claim they could accept. Had they not themselves 
predicted that with the advent of their New Enlightenment Movement 
the time had come for Marxism to develop in China?
(ii) Ch'en1s Rise in the Maoist Camp
In the summer of 1937, when Mao was delivering his lectures on 
dialectical materialism, where was Ch'en Po-ta, and what was he doing? 
It seems that he left Peking sometime in June, shortly before the 
Japanese invasion of north China the following month. As a member 
of the CCP's Northern Bureau, Ch’en made his way secretly to Yenan, 
where he was in a position to meet Mao personally for the first time. 
According to some reports Mao was not immediately impressed by Ch'en, 
because the latter was a rather inarticulate individual who did not 
enjoy social activities. Mao, however, was increasingly impressed 
by Ch'en’s abilities as a writer, and shortly thereafter Ch'en was
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16asked to act as Mao's pblitical secretary (zheng-zhi mi-shu). The
fact that he was chosen for this important assignment from among the
numerous young Party intellectuals who were then flooding into Yenan
is an indication of Mao's high regard for Ch'en, who was then thirty-
three years old. As political secretary, Ch'en was responsible for
drafting and/or editing many of Mao's speeches, articles, and tele-
17grams, including those concerned with foreign affairs. Ch'en was
now at the very centre of the Maoist camp at Yenan, and it was from
this time on that the two individuals developed what one writer has
18called their "symbiotic" relationship.
Ch'en had other responsibilities as well, some of which likely 
preceded —  and prepared the ground for —  his' appointment as Mao's 
political secretary. According to Boyd Compton, an outstanding fea­
ture of the Yenan period was the rather important educational system 
that functioned under the CCP Central Committee. Prior to 1935, 
selected cadres from national Communist parties were sent to Moscow 
for advanced training in Marxism-Leninism, as indeed Ch'en had been 
himself. After the Comintern's Seventh Congress in 1935, however, 
there was an increasing emphasis on the development of higher Party 
schools in individual countries. With regard to China, for example,
^Boorman and Howard, op. cit., I, p. 221. Also see Ch'ao Wen- 
tao's biography of Ch'en in Xin Zhong-guo ren-wu zhi (Biographies of 
New China), Hong Kong: Zhou-mou bao-she, 1930, p. 227.
17FQYJ, 11:2 (February 1968), p. 98.
18Robert S. Elegant, Mao's Great Revolution, New York: World
Publishing Company, 1971, p. 237.
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the early years of the Yenan period saw the establishment of the Cen­
tral Party School, the Marxist-Leninist Institute (reorganized in 1941 
as the Central Research Institute), the Anti-Japanese Military and
Political University, the Lu Hsun Academy of Arts and Letters, the
19Academy of Natural Sciences, and other similar bodies. This mush­
rooming educational system, which developed side by side with Mao’s 
growing power in the Party, provided him with the means to exercise 
a degree of ideological control over the Party which had never been 
possible before. It was this educational system that was to serve as 
the incubator for Mao's later Rectification Movement of 1942-43• In 
the meantime, these new educational and research organizations pro­
vided a natural outlet for the talents of the many CCP intellectuals 
from the nation’s cities who were then streaming into Yenan in the 
wake of the Japanese invasion. Ch’en Po-ta occupied a prominent 
position in this important group of people from shortly after his ar­
rival in Yenan. He was appointed head of the research section in 
the CCP’s Propaganda Bureau —  an obviously key position —  and under­
took unspecified responsibilities at the Marxist-Leninist Institute 
as well. He also lectured on political questions at Lu Hsun Academy 
and, according to one account, even found time from his many political 
duties to write a musical drama entitled Song of the Villages for the 
itinerant theatrical troupes of the Academy. Of more immediate in­
terest, however, was his appointment at the CCP’s Central Party 
School, where he became director of the ’’China Problems Research Sec­
tion" (Zhong-guo wen-ti yan-jiu shi) and lectured primarily on
19Compton, op. cit., pp. xxx-xxxi.
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20"China Problems" (Zhong-guo wen-ti). This special research section 
within the Central Party School seems to have dealt with problems of 
the revolution peculiar to China as opposed to problems of the world 
revolution in general. This certainly fits in with Ch'en’s long­
standing concern that Chinese Marxists should unite their "new philo­
sophy" more successfully with the concrete problems posed by the revo­
lution in China. Indeed, many of the articles Ch’en wrote during 
1937-38 specifically dealt with the problem of the application of 
Marxism-Leninism in China, and we shall discuss them in due course.
Ch’en’s arrival in Yenan in mid-1937 prompts an interesting
question. Was he in any way involved in the preparation of Mao’s
lectures on dialectical materialism, in which Mao developed the
rationale for the Sinification of Marxism? On the face of it, it
seems highly unlikely that Ch’en had anything to do with these lec-
21tures in their original form. In the first place, Ch’en arrived 
in Yenan just as Mao was preparing to deliver the lectures; given 
the normal amount of delay before the two men could have met —  and 
considering the earlier suggestion that it took some time for Mao 
to warm to Ch’en —  it seems doubtful that Ch’en was involved in 
Mao’s initial steps in philosophy. Second, Ch'en had spent the ten 
years since 1927 primarily engaged in the study and interpretation
20Boorman and Howard, op. cit., p. 221; Ch'ao Wen-tao, op. cit., 
p. 227; Klein and Clark, op. cit,, p. 122, Elegant (p. 257) is 
the only source to mention the play, but gives no further details.
21Ch’en’s influence is more likely to have been felt m  the 
revision of part of Mao’s lectures for publication in 1950 and 1952, 
but this is a separate question beyond our present concerns.
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of Marxism-Leninism, whereas by his own admission Mao had only recent­
ly commenced the serious study of dialectical materialism. In light 
of this, it is highly unlikely that, if Ch’en indeed did have a sub­
stantial influence on the preparation of these lectures, they would 
have been full of the "plagiarisms" and "errors" referred to previous­
ly. Ch'en was fluent in Russian and well-versed in Soviet develop­
ments, and his early writings display a ready familiarity with both 
Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy; he had no need to plagiarise 
Chinese translations of Soviet, works on philosophy. Third, Ch'en's 
influence is denied by Mao's rather harsh call in these lectures for 
the "liquidation" of China's traditional philosophy, a position that 
Ch'en would scarcely have endorsed in mid-1937. For all these reasons 
it is most improbable that Ch'en had any substantial influence on 
Mao's early efforts in philosophy. He was, however, to have a defin­
ite influence on Mao's thinking in 1938 and subsequent years.
We will recall that at the Party's national conference In May 
1937 Mao had called upon everyone in the Party to raise their "Marx­
ist-Leninist theoretical level." His own philosophical lectures were 
designed to be his personal contribution to this new ideological cam­
paign, and Liberation naturally enough lent its support. In the 
special issue of 6 September 1937 it introduced a supplement con­
cerned with the problems of theory and research. The editor noted 
that the new section was designed to assist the reader in his study 
of theoretical questions, and the hope was expressed that such a 
supplement would be published regularly once or twice a month In the 
future. The first supplement (and the second) was taken up by
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translated excerpts of Stalin1s new official history of the CPSU, but
the editor declared his intention of publishing in future issues study
materials specifically relating to the "problems of the Chinese revo- 
22lution." Ch'en Po-ta, as the director of the special section of the 
Central Party School dealing with the "China Question," was probably 
responsible for preparing these materials for the newspaper. Yet after 
only a few issues this new theoretical supplement died out, having con­
fined itself exclusively to translated materials from Russian sources. 
Nothing further was mentioned about the special study materials on the 
Chinese revolution, and it appears that none were ever published. In 
spite of his personal encouragement, Mao's ideological campaign seemed 
to be getting off to a bad start.
In late 1937 Ch'en wrote a long article which was obviously in­
tended for publication in Liberation's new supplement. In this essay 
Ch'en refutes the allegation that Sun Yat-sen had rejected Marxism 
as a solution to China's problems. He argues on the- contrary that ' • 
Sun's basic ideas are in harmony with much of Marxism, although he 
does admit that on certain important points Sun "misunderstood" the 
real nature of Marxist theory. Hence he proceeds to clarify the 
position regarding (l) the materialist view of history; (2) the na­
ture of the class struggle; (3) the question of surplus value; (4) 
the problem of social reformism; and (5) the methods of achieving
op
■JF, 13-14-15 (joint issue of 6 September 1937), pp. 166-167.
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23socialism.  ^ It is the- last section which is -of interest to us here, 
for in it Ch’en deals with the question of Marxism’s applicability to 
China. Marxism, argues Ch’en, is without doubt the essential intel­
lectual hey to understanding the development of society, but it is not 
a dogma —  when history changes Marxism must change along with it. For 
example, Lenin and Stalin developed Marxism to accord with new prob­
lems arising after Marx’s and Engel's death, but their development of 
Marxism was firmly based on Marxism itself. Hence, says Ch'en, "Len­
inism is merely the development of Marxism under new historical con- 
24.ditions." In developing Marxism, Lenin and Stalin did not depart 
from the "fundamental thinking" of Marxism, i.e., the core idea that 
socialism can be constructed only after the proletariat have become 
the "political masters" of the social system in question. The seizure 
of political power by the proletariat was characteristic of the so­
cialist revolution in Russia, and will be equally true of socialist 
revolutions in all other countries as well. Apart from this essen­
tial point , however, Marxism is really quite flexible; indeed, there 
can be a wide variety of specific methods employed in bringing about 
the socialist revolution, methods which vary "in accordance with the 
historical and economic conditions of each country." For example, 
Ch'en agrees with the idea that the proletariat can seize power
23Ch'en Ro-ta, "Guan-yu Ma-ke-si xue-shuo de ruo-gan bian-zheng" 
(Some Clarifications Concerning Marxist Theory), in Sun Zhong-shan 
xian-sheng xuan-ji (Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen), no pi.: Xin-hua 
shu-dian, 1945, pp. 310-335. Ch’en's article is part of an appen­
dix to this collection of Sun’s writings. According to a note by 
Ch’en, the essay was originally drafted in the winter of 193V, but 
only published (with revisions) in 1939, when it was assigned as study 
material for the Red Army.
2^ Ibid., p. 330.
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through peaceful means provided the concrete historical conditions are 
right, although he does not elaborate further on this. In his con­
cluding comments, he reminds the reader that when Marxism was first 
introduced into Russia the Slavophiles claimed that the new philosophy 
was foreign and unsuitable to Russia, and would be harmful if intro­
duced into the country. Nonetheless, he says, Marxism was In fact
successfully applied In Russia and the cries of the Slavophiles came 
25to nothing.
There are a few points we should make regarding this essay: One,
Ch’en1 s. Ideas on the need for Marxism to change in response to new 
historical situations are similar to the opinions Mao expressed in 
his lectures on philosophy the previous summer. (These ideas are 
closely linked to the views on Marxism which Ch'en developed in 1935- 
36. ) Hence the two men appear to have shared a similar attitude to­
ward Marxist theory, and this similarity no doubt formed the basis of 
their close cooperation during the Yenan years and after. Two, Ch'en 
re-affirmed his belief that traditional Chinese philosophy contains 
elements of 'Marxism' , however tenuous. Mb-tzu, for example, was 
aware of the idea of the class struggle, as seen in his statement 
that "the strong are certain to oppress the weak; the rich are cer­
tain to be pitiless toward the poor" (qiang bi ling ruo, fu bi bao 
26gua). This attitude toward traditional philosophy constituted a
25Ibid., pp. 332-334.
26lbid., p. 318.
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major difference between Ch'en's and Mao’s views on the relationship
between Marxism and Chinese culture, although the difference was to
be resolved in due course. Three, this essay contains what appears
to be Ch'en's first reference to Mao Tse-tung, whom he quotes briefly
on the desirability, if conditions are appropriate, of the peaceful
27seizure of power by the proletariat. Significantly, Ch’en quotes 
Mao on a question of Marxist theory (not political or military con­
cerns), and this probably indicates Ch’en’s acceptance of Mao's grow­
ing claims as the CCP's pre-eminent theoretician. In any event, Ch'en 
does not refer to or quote any other CCP leader in the course of his 
lengthy article; there is no mention, for instance, of Chang Wen-t'ien, 
who was apparently considered at the time to be "one of the /Party's/
2g
best theorists, second to Mao."
Ch'en wrote this article in the winter of 1937, but for some 
unexplained reason it was not published until 1939. This is pos­
sibly due to Ch'en1 s concern with pointing out Sun Yat-sen's many 
"misunderstandings" of Marxist theory, and his insistence that social­
ism in China could not be constructed until the proletariat had be­
come the "politicalmasters.!5 of the nation. In late 1937, with the 
new united front with the Nationalists just taking shape, Ch'en's 
article was probably regarded as being too leftist in tone. By
27Ibid., pp. 333-334.
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This at any rate is Nym Wales' observation, based on her visit 
to Yenan in the summer of 1937, and it seems to confirm Chang's con­
tinuing status as a top Party theoretician. It is equally clear, how­
ever,. that even he had by this time fallen into Mao-'s growing shadow. 
See Nym Wales (Helen F. Snow), My Yenan Notebooks, Madison, Conn: 
mimeo., 1961, p. 200.
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1939, however, the united front had been reduced to a fiction, and the 
publication of the article would have been less of an embarrassment 
to CCP-KMT relations. It is also likely that Ch'en's essay was shelved 
for the time being partly as a consequence of the failure of Mao's 
ideological campaign in the latter half of 193? to get off the ground. 
This failure is not difficult to explain, for Wang Ming returned from 
Moscow to Yenan shortly after the campaign got under'way. Wang was 
the acknowledged leader of the Returned Students, and the only re­
maining person with sufficient stature (other than Stalin) to chal­
lenge Mao1s growing domination of the CCP.
(iii) Mao, Ch'en, and the "Maoist My“bh"
Wang Ming arrived in Yenan in late October 193V aboard a Soviet 
military aircraft, and Mao and other Party leaders were on hand to 
greet him. As a prominent figure both in the CCP and the Comintern, 
Wang's credentials were very strong indeed, and Mao must have felt 
uneasy about Wang's return to China. More worrying, perhaps, were 
the official instructions from Stalin that Wang was sure to be 
bringing with him, for there was no certainty that they would be 
favourable to Mao. As it turned out, Stalin's instructions had a 
mixed impact on Mao's fortunes, although they ultimately worked to 
his advantage. According to Wang, Stalin felt that Mao Tse-tung 
should be confirmed as the CCP's top leader in deference to the exis­
ting situation, and Mao must have taken considerable satisfaction from 
this. His triumph was bittersweet, however, for Stalin apparently 
urged the Russian-educated leaders in the Party (viz, the Returned 
Students) to help Mao overcome his ignorance of Marxism-Leninism,
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lack of an internationalist outlook, and tendency toward narrow 
empiricism. This must have been particularly galling to Mao, for 
he had only recently delivered his lectures on dialectical material­
ism in an effort to improve his reputation as a theorist. Yet, he 
was probably pleased with another of Stalin's instructions to the 
effect that Chang Wen-fien was unsuitable for the post of secretary- 
general of the CCP, a position he had held since January 1935. (Chang 
was apparently under suspicion in Moscow because of his connections 
with the Trotskyists while he was a student at Sun Yat-sen University. ) 
Chang understandably took umbrage at this accusation, and the unity 
of the Returned Students began to fragment as Wang played off Chang 
and Po Ku against each other in an attempt to succeed to the post of 
■secretary-general of the Party. Mao's hand was further strengthened 
by yet another of Stalin's directives, suggesting that in the new 
conditions of the Anti-Japanese War the CCP should be as self-reliant 
as possible, and no longer bound by Comintern policy regarding China. 
Notwithstanding Stalin's slur upon Mao's theoretical abilities, the 
overall impact of the instructions from Moscow was to strengthen 
Mao's position. He had been confirmed’ as the Party's top leader, the 
erstwhile unity of the Returned Students had been fractured, and the
Party’ s movement towards self-reliance had been approved by no less
29an authority than Stalin himself.
29This interpretation of Stalin's "three-point instruction" is 
based on the factual account given in Warren Kuo, Analytical History 
of the Chinese Communist Party, Taipei: 'Institute of International 
Relations, 1966-1971, III, pp. 326-330.
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Nevertheless, it took some time "before the full implications of
Stalin's directives began to work decisively in Mao’s favour. In the
meantime, a fierce struggle for power erupted between Mao and Wang,
with the initial advantage going to the latter. Upon Wang's return
to Yenan, a lengthy session of the Politburo was convened to listen
to his report on Moscow's (and his own) desire for faster progress
towards a close united front with the Nationalists. Mao apparently
held his tongue for the time being, but in November an Important
meeting of "Party activists" was held at which Mao launched a stinging
attack on Wang and his supporters. Mao claimed that Wang and his
group had become unprincipled opportunists in their excessive zeal for
co-operation with the Nationalists. As such unprincipled co-operation
with the KMT could easily lead to subversion within the CCP, Mao
maintained that the only correct policy for the Communists was one of
30"independence and initiative within the united front." The details 
of the dispute do not concern us here, but one recent study has con­
cluded that, compared to the line espoused by Mao, Wang Ming's poli­
cies towards the KMT "were 'accomodationist' and framed with one eye
31on Moscow's foreign policy needs." The struggle flared up again 
in December, when the Politburo met In formal session to make a com­
plete review of the Party's general line. According to Chang Kuo- 
t'ao, it was at this meeting that Wang suddenly (without consulting 
anyone beforehand) proposed a new slate of members for the Politburo, 
in which Chang Wen-t'ien was demoted to seventh place. Mao resented
30Mao, XJ II, pp. 358-364.
31Benton, op. cit., p. 94.
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the fact that Wang had not consulted him prior to submitting his new
slate, but upon Wang's assurance that he had no intention of "seizing
32the commander's seal," Mao went along with Wang’s proposals. Wang’s 
tactics succeeded in placing Mao on the defensive, and in the follow­
ing months Wang was able to win a good deal of support for his "con- 
ciliationist" policies towards the KMT, even from such people as Chu 
Teh and Chou En-lai. Indeed, Wang's return to China had the immediate 
effect of "temporarily shifting the CCP towards the Right," and this
in turn strengthened the position of Wang and the Returned Students
33in the Party hierarchy.
Wang Ming' s hand was further strengthened by the Politburo ’ s 
decision (13 December) to convene the CCP's Seventh Congress in the 
"shortest possible time." Wang no doubt regarded a new congress as 
the proper forum in which to realign the Party leadership, -and es­
pecially to undo what had been done at Tsunyi in 1935. This must have 
been extremely worrying to Mao, for the Tsunyi Conference had been 
a hastily arranged affair with some important Politburo members mis­
sing (e.g., Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Wang Ming himself), and it had been 
held without the knowledge (let alone approval) of the Comintern.
That the Seventh Congress was going to be a real showdown between the 
Maoists and the Returned Students is clearly suggested by the agenda. 
The '! central task" of the congress was to discuss and decide upon the 
best way to carry out the united front against Japan. In addition, 
the congress was to make a "basic summation" of the CCP’s history
^Chang Kuo-t’ao, op. cit., II, p. 572.
33'Benton, op. cit., pp. 75, 94.
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3/
since the Sixth Congress in 1928, which had been held in Moscow.
In his study of the subject, Gregor Benton has concluded that, upon
his return to Yenan, Wang Ming’s "political onslaught on Mao...and
his arrogant behavior in the Party added up to an indisputable bid 
35
for leadership." Certainly, the decision to convene the Seventh 
Congress in the near future presented Wang with a perfect opportunity 
to attempt this very thing. As for Mao, it was incumbent upon him to 
prevent the congress from being held until such time as his position 
was secure from the "onslaught" of Wang and the Returned Students.
Being under severe attack on the political front, it was per­
haps natural that Mao should turn to the military sphere to strengthen 
his position. Numerous articles began to appear in early 1938 on the 
importance of the army; on 11 January, for example, the army comman­
der Ch’en Po-chun published an article in Liberation which was little 
more than a public relations effort on behalf of Mao. It consisted 
of a lengthy excerpt of a military text written by Mao in 1934 ("Guer­
rilla Warfare"), with Ch'en expressing the hope that it would be help­
ful to "leading cadres" throughout the Party involved in active war- 
fare. Mao personally added to his growing stature as the CCP’s 
pre-eminent military thinker at this time. On 30 May 1938 he pub­
lished a new article on guerrilla warfare, and between 26 May and 3 
June he gave an important series of lectures on protracted war, 
which were published in Liberation on 1 July 1938. Mao’s lengthy
3^ JF, 28 (XI January 1938), pp. 21-22.
35
Benton, op. cit., p. 77.
36
Ch'en Po-chun, "Lun kang-Ri you-ji zhan-zheng de ji-ben zhan- 
shu —  xi-ji" (On the Raid —  the Basic Tactic in the Guerrilla War 
Against Japan", JF, 28 (11 January 1938), pp. 14-19.
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treatise tool: pride of’place in this special issue of Yenan's leading
journal, which celebrated the second anniversary of the Sino-Japanese
War and the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Mao's
growing prestige is further indicated by the fact that the opening
page of this special issue is half covered by a handwritten message
from Mao himself, encouraging people to persist in the war against 
37Japan. In spite of Mao's efforts m  Marxist philosophy, we would
agree with Noriyuki Tokuda that at this critical juncture in Mao's
rise to power, his theory of warfare was perhaps the "corner-stone of
3$the foundation supporting the legitimacy of his leadership." Not 
surprisingly, then, we see that Mao abandoned philosophy in favour of 
strategy when it came to a final showdown between himself and his 
Moscow-educated opponents.
Wang Ming's line in early 193# was to a considerable extent 
based on two propositions, namely, "genuine" co-operation with the 
KMT, and all-out defence of Wuhan, the new national capital. This 
was in sharp contrast to Mao's line, which stressed a looser relation­
ship with the Nationalists, and mobile warfare rather than the defence 
of fixed points. As it turned out, Wang's two-point strategy was in 
tatters by the autumn; the KMT had arbitrarily closed down the CCP's 
organizations in Wuhan, and the city itself was about to fall to the 
encircling Japanese. Wang's personal power quickly eroded along with 
his political and military strategy, and as a result his campaign 
against Mao failed to sustain its momentum. If Wang had planned to
^JF, 43-44 (joint issue of 1 July 1938), p. 1.
3&Tokuda, op. cit., p. 16.
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attempt a re-organization of the Party leadership at the coming Party
congress (a reasonable assumption), his hopes were rudely shattered.
First, the proposed Seventh Congress never took place; the Sixth
Plenum of the Sixth-Congress was held instead, with Mao explaining
that "because of the tensions of war" it had been impossible to pre-
39pare adequately for a formal congress. ■ Second, rather than being
dislodged by Wang Ming and his supporters, Mao was actually able to
reinforce his position. Indeed, official sources claim that although
Mao had been severely challenged by Wang and his group, their "right
deviation" was at last "basically overcome" at the Sixth Plenum, the
result being "unanimity of thought" in the Party leadership.^ There
may be some exaggeration in this claim, but most students of the
period agree that it is essentially correct. According to Lyman P.
van Slyke, for example, at the Sixth Plenum "no purge was carried out,
but the Returned Students, the last group standing in the way of Man's
complete control of the Party, were probably reduced in importance
4-1and forced to recognize Mao’s supremacy." This conclusion is rein­
forced by the acknowledgement of Mao's supremacy within the CCP in an
article on him in the 193& edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia
4-2published in Moscow. We do not know whether Stalin had ultimately
39Mao, Ji VI, p. 164.
See the editorial comments in Mao, XJ II, pp. 357, 502, 506.
4-1Lyman P. van Slyke, Enemies and Friends (The United Front in 
Chinese Communist History), Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1967, p. 107.
4.2For details on this reference, see McLane, op. cit., p. 34.
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backed Wang Ming in his*'final attempt to wrest power from Mao, but 
with Wang's failure to do so it now became prudent on Moscow's part 
to acknowledge publicly Mao's pre-eminence in the CCP.
In the meantime, Ch'en Po-ta had established himself in the
Maoist camp, and his writings began to reflect Mao's growing power.
Ch'en made his first appearance in Liberation on 1 April 1938 with a
short article on Sun Yat-sen's views on the concept of the united
front. Both Ch'en and Ai Ssu-ch'i (who also contributed to this issue
of the journal) were introduced to the readers as "professors" whose
"new interpretations" of Sun's theories were worthy of some atten- 
43tion.  ^ In this article and others in the spring of 1938, Ch'en 
avoided any discussion of Marxist theory, an omission probably dic­
tated by the tense situation within the Party resulting from Wang 
Ming's return from Russia. Nonetheless, Ch'en returned to the ques­
tion of Marxist theory on 1 July 1938, the seventeenth anniversary 
of the CCP. Liberation's special issue on that date contained three 
articles celebrating the Party's anniversary, one each by Lo Fu (Chang 
Wen-t'ien), Lin Po-ch'u (Lin Tsu-han), and Ch'en himself (in that or­
der). Lin's essay was a brief eulogy to the CCP and its heroic 
struggle against Japan, and was probably contributed by Lin in his 
relatively neutral capacity as the chairman of the government of the
43Ch’en Po-ta, "Sun Zhong-shan xian-sheng guan-yu mm-zu ge- 
ming tong-yi zhan-xian si-xiang de fa-zhan" (The Development of Mr.
Sun Yat-sen's Thought Concerning the United Front in the National 
Revolution), JF, 33 (l April 1938), p. 136.
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Yenan base area.^ Lo'Ts essay was more substantial (and will be 
discussed below), and no doubt represented the general views of the 
Returned Students. Ch’en’s lengthy article, while coming last, was 
clearly the most important of the three pieces, and should be seen 
as representing the views of the Maoist faction. Indeed, the three 
articles represented a kind of united front within the upper echelons 
of the CCP itself, and it is significant that Ch'en, a relative-new­
comer to Yenan, should have been chosen by the Maoists to articulate 
their position. Ch’en's relationship with Mao had become very close 
by this time, and the publication of his essay on the Party’s anniv­
ersary marked his emergence as a leading spokesman for the Maoist
i c
camp. In the space of a single year, Ch'en had made the transi­
tion from his obscure lectureship in Peking to the inner circle of 
the Maoist machine at Yenan. He was on his way to the top.
Ch'en’s article of 1 July is representative of much of his later 
writings, for it is equally concerned with Marxist theory and CCP 
history. For the time being we would like to consider the latter 
only, saving his treatment of theory for discussion a little later. 
(See Chapter IV following.) It is Ch’en's contention that the CCP 
has become an important factor in Chinese politics due to the fact 
that it has persisted In the "struggle between two lines." This 
struggle, says Ch’en, commenced at the birth of the Party in 1921,
^Lin Po-ch’u, "Wei-da de qi-yueh" (Glorious July), JF, 43-44 
(joint issue of 1 July 193$), PP« 70-71.
45Material on the personal aspects of Ch’en's relationship to 
Mao is extremely scarce. For a rare anecdote reflecting Mao’s concern 
for Ch’en in 1933, see Ho Ch’ing-hua, "Sui-cong Mao zhu-xi zai Shen- 
bei" (With Chairman Mao in North Shensi), Hong-qi piao-piao (Red Flag 
Flying), XIII (October 1959), pp. 52-53.
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and has continued right up to the present day. He then chronicles 
this history of struggle within the Party, and one is immediately 
reminded of the treatment of Party history formally adopted by the 
Seventh Congress in 1945. The "right opportunism" of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 
the "adventurism" of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai (who is unnamed), and the "lef­
tist" line of Li Li-san are all included in Ch'en's account. Indeed, 
in light of Ch'en1s later concern with Party history in 1943-44, it 
is more than likely that his essay of 1933 was the prototype of the 
official history adopted in 1945. (See Chapter X for a discussion 
of this issue.) In spite of this similarity with the 1945 resolution 
on Party history, however, there Is a basic difference in Gh'en's 
treatment of the Returned Students. They are nowhere mentioned by 
name:, either individually or collectively; neither is Mao nor any 
other member of his faction. Ch'en is. clearly writing to a formula 
agreed upon by Mao and the Returned Students. The only people to be 
mentioned by name are (l) the negative examples —  Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li 
Li-san, Chang Kuo-t’ao, etc.; and (2) the martyrs —  LI Ta-chao, P’eng 
P'ai, Ch'u Ch’iu-pai, etc.^ But if Ch'en did not criticize the Re­
turned Students by name, he did so indirectly, with one of the nega­
tive examples taking the blame.
Ch’en conceded that the Party's Fourth Plenum in January 1931 
had maintained the Party's "Bolshevik unity," but he also claimed that 
this plenum was followed during the years of the Kiangsi Soviet by a 
struggle against both left and right opportunism. Left opportunism,
^Ch'en Po-ta, "Wo-men ji-xu li-shi de shi-ye qian-jin" (We 
Will Continue to Advance Toward our Historical Goal),, JF, 43-44 
(joint issue of 1 July 1933), pp. 74-75, 77.
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according to Ch'en, was characterized during this period by a lack 
of understanding of the nature of the democratic revolution, a neglect 
of the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance, and "adventur­
istic proposals" for attacks on key cities at times of military suc­
cesses. Right opportunism, on the other hand, exhibited a pessimistic, 
defeatist attitude in times of difficulty, and a tendency toward flight- 
ism. It is quite obvious that the characteristics of left opportunism 
are in fact those of the Returned Students (as perceived by the Mao­
ists), while the short-comings of the right opportunists are without 
a doubt those of Chang Kuo-t'ao. Unable to refer to the Returned 
Students by name, Ch'en.gets over the difficulty very simply by de­
claring that both left and right opportunism, are best represented by 
Chang Kuo-t'ao! Chang is also charged with having carried out suc­
cessive left and right lines during the Party's attempts to co-operate
4.7with the KMT in the new united front. For the time being Ch'en and 
the Maoists had to use Chang Kuo-t'ao as a whipping-boy in place of 
the Returned Students. It was pretty obvious, however, that if 
Ch'en's account in any represented the Maoist reconstruction of Party 
history, the Returned Students were not going to fare' very well at all.
Ch'en's account of Party history is as significant-' for its 
timing as its content. As we will recall, one of the tasks assigned 
to the coming Seventh Congress was to make a "basic summation1' of 
Party history since the Sixth Congress in 1928. Although no mention 
was made of the proposed congress, the editors of Liberation announced
47Ibid, p. 75.
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in the special issue of 1 July 1938 a campaign to collect as much 
material as possible on the PartyTs past. People were urged to send 
in whatever materials they possessed: documents and publications is­
sued by both the Party center and local organizations; essays, arti­
cles, and books written by individual Party members; personal remin-' 
iscences concerning the Party's history —  all were requested. Accor­
ding to the editorial note, the purpose of the collection was to fur­
ther the study of the "experience and lessons of the Chinese revolu­
tion," and it was hoped that everyone would co-operate in the task
LA
of gathering materials. In light of the review of Party history due 
at the coming Seventh Congress, and seen in the context of this call 
for historical materials on the Party, Ch'en's account of 1 July must 
be seen as the initial step in the Maoists’ official reconstruction 
of Party history. As such, it is also a firm indication that the 
Maoists were finally asserting their supremacy over Wang Ming and 
the Returned Students. This is further suggested by the fact that Lo 
Fu's article commemorating the Party's seventeenth anniversary makes 
no detailed analysis of Party history comparable to Ch'en's. The 
Returned Students were to have little say in the forthcoming recon­
struction of Party history in the wake of Mao's rise to supreme 
power.
^JF, 43-4-4 (joint issue of 1 July 1938), p. 69. This campaign 
to gather documentary material on the CCP's history was of consider­
able importance, for nearly all .of the Party's official records had 
been lost during the Long March. For Hsu Meng-ch’iu's comments on 
this problem, see Nym Wales, Red Dust, pp. ix, 57, 76.
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By the summer of 193# the major elements of the future "Maoist 
myth" were clearly discernable: (1) Mao's successful leadership of
the practical movement since the Tsunyi Conference; (2) his gradual 
displacement of all opposition groups in the Party; (3) his increasing 
independence from the influence of Moscow; (4) his growing stature as 
the.Party's leading military strategist;. and (5) his emergence (how­
ever tentatively) as a Marxist-Leninist theorist in his own right.^ 
Mao was /by this time very much the first amongst equals, and we have 
already noted the initial signs of his cult appearing in June 1937.
Two more indicators should be noted now: In a report of 9 July 1938
Lin Piao, president of the Anti-Japanese University and one of the 
Red Army's leading commanders, openly praised "Comrade Mao's leader­
ship genius", and on 15 July Liberation published its second woodcut 
50portrait of Mao. By mid-1938 the Maoists were in a position to in­
corporate the key elements of the Maoist myth into the official re­
view of Party history promised at the coming Seventh Congress. As 
the individual chosen to write the first draft of the Maoist recon­
struction of the CCP's history, Ch'en Po-ta emerged as one of the 
leading architects of the Maoist myth itself.
49 .For an interpretation of certain aspects of the "Maoist myth,"
see William F. Dorr ill, "Transfer of Legitimacy in the Chinese Com­
munist Party: Origins of the Maoist Myth," in John Wilson Lewis, ed.,
Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 19707 pp. 69-113.
50 .L m  Piao is cited m  Jerome Ch'en, Mao, p. 20. For Mao's 
second portrait in Liberation, see JF, 45 (15 July 1938), p. 4.
CHAPTER IV
THE SINIFICATION OF MARXISM, 1938
(i) Ch'en and the "Sinification" of Chinese Culture
By 1938 both Mao Tse-tung and Ch'en Po-ta were equally concerned 
with the problem of developing Marxism in China according to China's 
own characteristics. Yet, we have noted a difference in their atti­
tudes toward traditional Chinese culture, with Ch'en adopting a more 
positive attitude than that displayed by Mao. The burning issue in 
early 1938, however, was not the development of Marxism in China, 
but rather China's ability to sustain herself in the face of the re­
cent Japanese invasion. In the months that followed Mao's lectures 
on philosophy, China sank deeper into despair as the Japanese rapid­
ly subjugated large parts of the nation. In his lectures on pro­
tracted war in late May and early June 1938, Mao noted that the 
"predatory policy" of the Japanese had two aspects, the material and 
the spiritual. Besides simply plundering the country, claimed Mao, 
the Japanese were, in the realm of the spirit,
...robbing the Chinese people of their national conscious­
ness; under the flag of the /Rising7 Sun all Chinese can be 
nothing but docile subjects, beasts of burden forbidden to 
have the least bit of Chinese national spirit,"!
Mao's concern with this "Chinese national spirit" (Zhang-guo qi) was 
shared by many of his fellow countrymen at the time, and great pro­
paganda campaigns were carried out by both the KMT and the CCP to
■ W ,  Ji VI, p. 70.
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2
fan the flames of nationalism. In his lectures on protracted war,
Mao turned to the question of the political mobilization of the people
in the face, of Japanese aggression. He acknowledged that much had
already been done to mobilise the mass media for this purpose, but
felt that so far It could only be considered "a drop in the ocean."
Further, he complained that too much of the propaganda to date had
been "uncongenial to the tastes of the masses," with the result that
"barriers had arisen" between the actual propaganda and the people to
whom it was intended to appeal. All this, concluded Mao, had to be
changed as soon as possible If the people were to be effectively
3mobilized for the war effort.
One obvious way of making Communist ideology and propaganda 
more congenial to the Chinese people —  regardless of class —  was 
to soften the conflict that existed between Marxist theory and China's 
traditional culture. Ch'en Po-ta had long been sensitive to the 
charge that Marxism was a "foreign dogma" hostile to the spirit of 
Chinese culture, and as such could have no future in China. The time 
had now come for him to elaborate on his belief that this charge was 
groundless, and that there was no real conflict between Marxist 
theory and Chinese "national essence." Indeed, the effec­
tive union of these two crucial ingredients would provide the intel­
lectual basis for a new type of ideology and propaganda that would
2
Ironically, it was the Japanese invaders themselves who were 
the most effective catalysts of Chinese nationalism. On this impor­
tant point, see Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Commu­
nist Power (The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-194-5), Stan-' 
ford: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 69-70.
M^ao, Ji VI, p. 102.
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prove appealing to the Chinese masses. Although Ch'en avoided the 
delicate issue of Marxist theory in the spring of 193#, he had been 
working hard in helping to formulate a cultural policy for the CCP.
Mao had tended to neglect the cultural side of both the revolution 
and the war against Japan, but for Ch'en the cultural dimension was a 
major concern. In an essay written in the winter of 1937, but not 
published until May the following year, Ch’en is at pains to empha­
size the importance of the cultural factor in the war. The Japanese 
attack on Chinese culture, he claims, is simply a part of the general 
Fascist attempt to destroy world civilization and plunge mankind into 
a new era of darkness. Since.Chinese culture —  both traditional and 
contemporary —  reflects the genius of no less than one-quarter of 
humanity, the struggle of the Chinese in defence of their own culture 
is far from being parochial:
Our defence of the existence and development of Chinese 
culture is simultaneously linked to the existence and 
development of world culture, and to its Zultimate7
destiny.4
For Ch’en, the struggle against Japan was the crucible of the new 
Chinese culture that would emerge from the fusion of past and present. 
The basic existence of Chinese culture would be assured through this 
struggle; equally, the war would provide the immediate context in 
which Chinese culture would further develop.
Ch’en's emphasis on the development of Chinese culture was like­
ly to disturb his non-Marxist readers, many of whom felt that all
^Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun kang-Ri wen-hua tong-yi zhen-xian’ (On the 
Anti-Japanese United Front in Culture) (Winter 1937), in Ch'en, Zai 
wen-hua zhen-xian shang, p. 52.
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talk of developing Chinese culture was out of place in the critical
war-time situation, and in any event was probably no more than a guise
for the introduction of Marxism. However, Ch'en Is quick to reassure
his readers that the creation of a new culture is an important aspect
of the national struggle against the Japanese, and need not conflict
with the preservation of traditional culture. With regard to China's
cultural legacy, especially the key areas of morality and thought,
Ch'en states his basic premise:
We are historicists, and we believe that the emergence of 
a new morality cannot be unconnected with the development 
of the old morality....Further, we do not consider that 
the old thought has no legacy of tradition to pass on to 
the new thought.^
In calling for the fusion of old and new in the cultural sphere, Ch'en 
had gone farther towards striking a compromise between Chinese history 
and Marxist theory than had most of his colleagues in the CCP. Yet as 
a Marxist he could not abandon the central proposition that, in the 
course of this reconciliation of history and theory, the basic content 
of the culture that would emerge would be new in the sense that it 
would bear the characteristics of the current age. And the age, as we 
know from Ch'en's earlier assertions, was one in which the new science 
of dialectical materialism was rapidly assuming a commanding position 
in China's intellectual life. Consequently, Ch'en had to return to 
the question that had so embittered leftist literary circles in 1936- 
37, namely, the relationship between content and form. In a letter
Ibid., p. 56. There is a striking similarity between this pas­
sage and another from Mao Tse-tung's report to the CCP Sixth Congress 
a few months later. On this point, see the long quotation from Mao 
on p. 129 following. It Is not unreasonable to assume that Ch’en had 
a hand in drafting Mao's speech, especially the section dealing with 
problems of theory and culture.
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published in May 1938, Ch'en reaffirms his support of the movement to 
make the written word more accessible to China's millions. Given the 
need to mobilise the masses in the war against Japan, he continues, 
the popularization movement is essential to China's very survival.
Yet Ch'en's fervent support of the popularization movement placed him 
on the horns of a dilemma: Too much emphasis on Marxism (by whatever
name) in the movement to mobilize the masses would surely alienate 
them; on the other hand, excessive stress on traditionalism (in what- 
ever guise) would amount to a betrayal of the proletarian revolution. 
Ch'en quickly resolves this dilemma, however, by going back to the 
issue of national forms in literature. "Regarding- the populariz­
ation movement," he states, "I consider that the use of traditional 
forms to introduce new contents will be especially effective."^ In a 
longer essay of the same month, he elaborates considerably on the need 
to use traditional forms to get through to the masses successfully, 
and to prepare the ground for the gradual creation of a new Chinese 
culture:
If we are to transform our traditional national culture and 
morality into a new national culture and morality in a liv­
ing, vital, intelligent and scientific way, /we must allow/ 
new contents to emerge in traditional forms. This is not to 
deny our need for new forms. What we are saying is that new 
contents in our culture will give birth to new forms, but 
new contents in our culture may emerge in any form, however 
old.7
Ch'en Po-ta, "Jiu xing-shi de li-yong" (The Use of Traditional 
Forms) (23 May 1938?), in Ch'en, Zai wen-hua zhen-xian shang, p. 35.
To illustrate his point, Ch'en refers approvingly to two recent liter­
ary productions of a Mr. Tung Chen-hua, namely, The Romance of May 
Fourth (Wu-si yan-yi) and his Record of the National Disaster (Guo- 
nan j i).
7
Ch'en Po-ta, "Wo-men guan-yu mu-qian wen-hua yun-dong de yi- 
jian" (Our Opinions Concerning the Present Cultural Movement) (4 May 
1938?), in Ch'en, Zai wen-hua zhen-xian shang, p. 93.
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These were basically the ideas of Ch’u Ch'iu-pai, but Ch'en had 
espoused them ardently- since the early 1930's. In 1938, after much 
acrimonious debate with the literary leftists, Ch'en Po-ta, Chou 
Yang and other advocates of Ch'u's literary theories were about to 
win the day. With the official support of Mao himself, the CCP's 
official policy on the cultural front came to reflect Ch'u's dualism: 
Marxist ideology was to be transmitted to the masses in forms both 
old and new, the main object being the mobilization of the nation's 
millions in the struggle for national and social emancipation.
Ch'en's essays on cultural problems In the spring of 1938 made 
an -important contribution to the formulation of the CCP's official 
policies in this area, and they also prepared the way for his long 
article of 1 July 1938 on the occasion of the Party's seventeenth an­
niversary. It was In this essay that Ch'en returned to the central 
issue of Marxist theory and Chinese history. He states that the 
Chinese Communist Party firmly believes in the "scientific communism
of Marx and Lenin," and Is the political representative of the pro­
letariat, a new class on the ascent in China. But, he cautions, it 
should not be thought that communism is something that has been 
"dreamed of" throughout the centuries only In foreign lands. On the 
contrary:
It is something which has been dreamed of for several
thousands of years by the most outstanding representa­
tives of our nation. Mo-tzu /Tot example/, one of our 
country's ancient philosophers.. .used to dream of this 
kind of society.8
8Ch'en Po-ta,. "Wo-men ji-xu li-shi de shi-y e qian-jin," p. 72.
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Nonetheless, dreams havfe to be realized in practice, and for this it 
is necessary to have an adequate theory of society —  a theory which 
only Marxism-Leninism provides. But Marxism is not a "lifeless dog­
ma" j it is a "living’science" which takes into full account the indi­
vidual characteristics and historical conditions of the various na­
tions. Since Marxism is a living science it is not static, but must 
change in response to new circumstances. Hence, says Ch’en, Chinese 
Communists must be able to "concretely develop and fill out" the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with the special charac­
teristics and historical circumstances of China. Pulling all of
these strands of thought together, we may conclude that in Ch'en's .
view, Marxist theory (1) has antecedents in traditional Chinese cul­
ture; (2) can be adapted to the specific environment of China; and
(3) can be enriched and developed through application in China.
In light of this it is not surprising that Ch'en disclaims any 
conflict between Marxism and Chinese culture; nor does the CCP reject 
everything in China's "rich legacy in culture and thought" simply be­
cause it believes in Marxism. Quite the reverse:
The Chinese Communist Party is one which takes over all the 
best in China's inherent cultural traditions, and all of 
’ China's most outstanding /intellectual/ theories. Members 
of the Chinese Communist Party consider themselves to be the 
inheritors of the revolutionary essence of Sun Yat-sen's 
Three People's Principles, the inheritors of all the outstan­
ding enlightened thought of the modern Chinese reform and re­
volutionary movements, and the inheritors of all the most 
outstanding cultural legacy of ancient China.9
Surely, if the CCP undertook to inherit this tremendous cultural and
intellectual legacy from the past, Marxism-Leninism-would go by the
9Ibid., p. 73.
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board. Would it not be impossible for the Party to maintain its 
revolutionary integrity exposed to such an immense influence from 
the past? On this point Ch’en is confident that in addition to in­
heriting this cultural legacy, the CCP will be able to "transform, 
develop, and enrich" it on the basis of Marxism. Yet this cultural 
legacy is not simply a pliable mass that Marxism can shape at will; 
rather, a complex process of interaction will be triggered off be­
tween the foreign theory and the native tradition which will remould 
both. As Ch'en phrases it:
The Chinese Communist Party's skill at accepting all the 
best in our nation's cultural and .intellectual legacy is 
increasing the limitless value of Marxism-Leninism in 
China. At the same time, it is increasing the value of 
all the best in our nation's cultural and intellectual 
legacy. ^-0
Ch'en does not indicate at this time the probable consequences of 
this interaction between theory and culture, but it was a subject 
to which he returned a few weeks later.
Ch'en was strongly arguing the case for the combination of Marx­
ist theory and Chinese culture in his article of 1 July. Interesting­
ly, this is a subject which Chang Wen-t'ien assiduously avoided in an 
essay in the same issue of Liberation, although he too dealt with the 
question of the role of Marxism in China. Marxism-Leninism, argues 
Chang, should be regarded a-s a modern science; like other scientists, 
Marx and Lenin contributed their discoveries to the general store of 
human knowledge. Hence, Marxism-Leninism represents a body of scien­
tific thought which is as applicable to China as to any other country;
10T . .Loe. cit.
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Indeed, as the only correct theory of society Marxism was readily 
accepted once it was introduced into China. Marxism-Leninism can 
thus be said to have roots in Chinese thought and culture insofar as 
(in accordance with the dialectic of history) Chinese thought and 
culture would inevitably have developed in the direction indicated by 
Marxism.^ For Chang, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the com­
patibility of Marxism and Chinese culture is established by the scien­
tific nature of Marxism; unlike Ch’en, he sees no need to prove that 
some of China's ancient philosophers were proto-Marxists. Chang, 
then, is silent on the alleged necessity to effect some kind of com­
bination of Marxist theories with specific, concrete elements in 
China's cultural tradition. Nor is he prepared to declare, as did 
Ch'en, that Marxism itself will be enriched by interaction with 
China's cultural legacy. Retaining the scientific analogy, Chang 
maintains that the introduction of Marxism-Leninism into China great­
ly speeded up the development of Chinese thought and culture, and at 
the same time raised their general level. This, says Chang, is similar 
to the way the introduction of modern science and technology into
China greatly advanced and improved the level of science and techno-
12logy at that time existing in China. Although he did not say it 
in so many words, it was apparent that Chang believed the idea of
11Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien), "Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang shi-qi 
zhou-nian ji-nian" (In Commeration of the Seventeenth Anniversary 
of the Chinese Communist Party), JF, 43-44 (joint issue of 1 July 
1938), p. 68.
12Loe. cit.
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combining Marxist theory with Chinese culture was as futile as the 
notion that modern science and traditional culture (of whatever nation 
ality) should somehow he amalgamated.
In stressing the scientific nature of Marxism, Chang Wen-t'ien 
reflected the growing concern of the Returned Students that in the 
hands of people like Ch'en Po-ta, Marxism was in danger of being 
"nationalized." Many of them knew Ch'en from their student days in 
Moscow, and they probably remembered that in 1936 he had proudly ac-
13cepted the charge that he was an advocate of "patriotic philosophy." 
Having formally opened the debate on the relationship between Marxist 
theory and Chinese culture in his important article of 1 July, Ch'en 
quickly moved on to the offensive. On 23 July he published another 
major article in Liberation, entitled "On National Traditions in the 
Cultural Movement." In this essay, Ch'en laments the fact that many . 
"outstanding revolutionaries" and cultural workers have fallen into 
"formalism" and "dogmatism"; consequently, they have been guilty of 
neglecting‘the study of their own nation's history, preferring to 
talk about world philosophy and literature to the neglect of China's 
traditional philosophy and literature. In a scarcely veiled refer­
ence to the Moscow-trained Returned Students, Ch'en attributes the
13Interestingly, by this time some of the Returned Students 
were beginning to adopt a more positive attitude toward China's tra­
ditional culture. In an article in the summer of 1938, for example,
Po Ku declared in passing that the Chinese Communists "understand the 
necessity for respecting and accepting all the good traditions and 
theories of our nation." See Ch'in Po-ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien), "On the 
Development, the Difficulties, and the Future of the National Anti- 
Japanese United Front," in Ch'en Shao-yu, Old Intrigues in New Cloth­
ing, Chungking: New China Information Committee, Bulletin No. 7,
1939, pp. 22-23.
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shortcomings of the dogmatists in the cultural field to their.failure 
to understand the theory of the relationship between socialist content 
and national form which Stalin had formulated concerning the develop­
ment of culture in the Soviet Union. Failing to understand this 
theory, these dogmatists have consequently been unable to apply it in 
practice, "in accordance with the revolutionary movement in their own
nation, their own nation's characteristics, and the cultural movement
1/
needed by their own nation." This neglect and even dismissal of 
China's own national cultural traditions, warns Ch'en, is most wor­
rying, for it plays into the hands of the Trotskyists and other rene­
gades. In particular, it gives strength to the Trotskyists' views 
that the peasants constituted, a reactionary force in Chinese history 
and society, and that the two main camps of idealism and materialism 
were absent in traditional Chinese philosophy. Besides playing into 
the hands of the class enemy, the neglect of China's long historical 
tradition is fundamentally unso-und from a theoretical point of view.
As Ch'en sees it:
Genuine Marxists all understand that a new culture can­
not fall out of the sky (ping-kong diao-xia-lai ) and be 
unconnected with the development of history and culture 
in the past. If one is unable to accept and transform 
one's traditional culture in a critical way, it is im­
possible to create a new culture.
This, says Ch'en, was a truth taught by Lenin arising from his own
experience during the Russian revolution, but it is universally
^Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun wen-hua yun-dong zhong de min-zu chuan- 
tong" (On National Traditions in the Cultural Movement), JF, 46 
(23 July 1938), p. 26.
15Ibid., p. 28.
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applicable. If the Chinese Communists wish to create a new culture
for China, they must be able to comprehend the vast panorama of
Chinese history, and must be "good at accepting and developing the
16best traditions in the past." In invoking the authority of both 
Stalin and Lenin, Ch’en was able to strengthen his position against 
the Returned Students, most of whom were- well versed in Marxism- 
Leninism, and prone to use their mastery of the classical texts as 
an ideological weapon against the- less theoretically-qualified 
Maoists, As a Moscow ’returned student* himself, Ch'en was well able 
to employ the same tactics on behalf of the Maoist faction in the 
Party.
Besides being basically unsound theoretically, and playing into 
the hands of the Trotskyists politically, the tendency of the dogma­
tists to ignore China's cultural traditions had another, more serious 
consequence. It encouraged the production of a good deal of CCP ide­
ology and propaganda that was ineffectual in appealing to the broad 
masses of the people. Supporting Lu Hsun’s rejection of the theory 
that "old bottles cannot contain new wine," Ch’en complains that in 
the past too many of the Party's cultural workers have neglected the 
use of "traditional (i.e., old) national forms.” They have failed 
to realize that in order to get through to the masses of ordinary 
Chinese people (most of whom are peasants), it is necessary to trans­
mit new ideas in well-known national forms relevant to particular 
parts of China. In short, says Ch'en, the new national culture that 
Communists are trying to create should be both "Sinified” (Zhong-guo-
1A
Ibid., p. 27.
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17hua) and "localized" (d'i-fang-hua). Ch'en's use of these two terms
is most interesting, for one of them (Sinification) was to he adopted 
by Mao Tse-tung in his report to the Sixth Plenum of the CCP in Octo­
ber 1938. Ch'en had first used these terms as early as 4 May the same 
year, in his essay, "Our Opinions Concerning the Present Cultural
Movement," and they appear to have originated with him, or at the very
18least to have become identified with him at this time. However, the 
ideas behind the two slogans were not Ch'en's, but rather Ch'u Ch'iu- 
pai's. By 1938, however, Ch'u's ideas had greatly influenced a large 
number of intellectuals in the CCP, including Ch'en himself. Indeed, 
Ch'en had probably known Ch'u personally from as early as 1925, when 
the two men were at Shanghai University —  the former as student and 
the latter as instructor.
Ch'en does not go into any detail as to what he means precisely 
by his terms "Sinification" and "localization," apart from equating 
the former term with "nationalization" (min-zu-hua). Nevertheless, 
their general intent is clear. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, it will be remembered, 
had felt that "plain speech" (bai-hua), the new form of Chinese which 
had emerged by the 1920's was not really an effective "common speech" 
(pu-tong-hua). This was because, in the course of absorbing foreign 
influences (many of which were beneficial), bai-hua had been to a 
large extent "Westernized" as well as "modernized." That is, it con­
tained a good many foreign words and speech patterns which were
17Ibid., pp. 26-27.
18Ch'en Po-ta, "Wo-men guan-yu mu-qian wen-hua yun-dong de yi- 
jian", pp. 93-95.
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difficult for ordinary‘people to understand and assimilate. The re­
sult was a "bai-hua that was really an awkward mixture of Chinese and 
foreign elements that had not been effectively fused into a true pu- 
tong-hua that was readily comprehensible to ordinary people. Hence, 
the existing form of bai-hua was -unable to perform the linguistic 
role for which it was intended; it was neither fully modern (linguis­
tically comprehensible) nor fully Chinese (culturally acceptable).
On the other hand, Ch’Ws proposed form of pu-tong-hua (the modern 
speech of the urban proletariat) would represent the development of 
the existing bai-hua into a spoken and written language of a new kind, 
one that was at one and the same time modern and Chinese. To 
employ the terminology of Ch’en Po-ta, pu-tong-hua as Ch'u conceived 
it would be a ” Sinified'' form of bai-hua. In calling for the Sini­
fication of Chinese culture in general (not just language and liter­
ature), Ch’en was in effect rejecting the theory that culture in 
twentieth century China must be either modern (Western) or tradition­
al (Chinese), but not both simultaneously. By establishing the cor­
rect relationship between modern and traditional influences in China's 
emerging culture, argues Ch’en, one can proceed to Sinify it by re­
taining the essence of the modern influences, but casting them in a 
form which preserves the genius of the traditional culture. Like 
Ch’u’s pu-tong-hua, Ch’en’s Sinified culture is both modern and Chi­
nese. Hence, although the Chinese Communists are firm believers in 
Marxism-Leninism —  an essentially Western philosophy —  Ch’en does 
not hesitate to claim.that they are equally the defenders of China’s
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genuine "national essence" (guo-cui), though certainly not its "dregs" 
as well.19
Ch’en's concept of localization, like that of Sinification, is 
also hased on the literary theories of Ch’u Ch'iu-pai. Ch'u believed 
in encouraging local and regional literary traditions if conditions 
permitted. Provided they remained subordinate to the national pu- 
tong-hua, they could serve as useful media of communication with or­
dinary people living within a particular dialect area. If, as Ch'en 
was suggesting, the CCP rigorously applied these two concepts in the 
broad field of culture, the Party's ideology and propaganda would 
likely prove more congenial to the tastes of ordinary Chinese people, 
regardless of their regional background or social class. Ch'en 
had strongly'implied 'that his two concepts were to be applied not 
merely to language and literature, but to the broad field of culture 
which included Marxist-Leninist theory itself. In light of this, two 
interesting questions arise: One, can the new Marxist wine be poured
into old Chinese bottles; i.e., can Marxism be Sinified yet retain 
its a-cultural scientific nature and hence its universal applicabili­
ty? Or, on the contrary, would Marxism become so Chinese in content 
and form that —  while being more acceptable in China —  it would be 
rendered irrelevant to the rest of the world? Further, would the in­
teraction between "socialist content" and "national form" (Ch'en's 
terms) in fact change the very nature of Marxism itself; in other 
words, would Sinified Marxism really be Marxism at all? Two, can
19
Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun wen-hua yun-dong zhong de min-zu chuan- 
tong, p. 28. Ch'en further defines "national essence" as "min-zu 
de jing-hua," a term no more precise in meaning than the more com­
mon "guo-cui."
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Marxism —  like language and literature —  be localized; i.e., can 
there be different varieties of Marxism which are geared to the par­
ticular conditions in different areas of China (e.g., a "Kwangtung 
Marxism" or a "Fukien Marxism")? This at first glance seems absurd, 
but is it; if it is possible to Sinify Marxism (i.e., make it Chinese) 
surely it is equally possible to "Fukienize" it (i.e., make it Fuki- 
enese)? Again the problem mentioned above is raised: If Marxism
were to be both Sinified and localized, would there be much left of 
it that Marx and Lenin would recognize and claim as their own?
This was obviously a question that troubled Ch'en, for he knew 
that it would be on the minds of both potential supporters and oppon­
ents of the slogans he was proposing. He assures his readers, how­
ever, that in the final analysis the new contents in culture (such 
as Marxist philosophy) will not be compromised by their appearance 
in national or even local forms. In the dialectical relationship 
between the new contents and the old forms, it is the former which 
will dominate in the end:
The extensive use of traditional cultural forms is pre­
cisely the condition which is conducive to the widespread 
development of new cultural contents. Moreover, in the 
process of development the new cultural contents will con­
tinuously /bu-duan d§7 achieve supremacy over the old
forms, continuously make the old forms become subsidiary 
to the new cultural contents, and thus effect the transi­
tion to new cultural forms.20
In the first stage of this complex process of interaction, new Marx­
ist contents will fuse with traditional Chinese forms, but the process
20Ch’en Po-ta, "Wo-men guan-yu mu-qian wen-hua1 yun-dong de yi- 
jian", p. 93.
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will not terminate at this point. On the contrary, it will progress 
to a second and higher stage In which the interaction of content and 
form will transform the traditional Chinese forms into modern Chinese 
forms. In such a synthesis, the final product (although, in Ch'en's 
mind, nothing Is ever final) will he a distinctive culture which re­
presents the total Integration of modern Marxist (scientific) contents 
and modern Chinese (national) forms. A new nation will he born with 
a culture that is at once truly modern and unmistakably Chinese; this 
new culture will be both scientific and national in character. It 
was such a culture that Mao Tse-tung was to call for in these very 
terms in his famous work of 1940, "On New Democracy," a text that 
was certainly influenced by Ch'en Po-ta.
(ii) Mao's Call for the "Sinification of Marxism"
Ch'en's call on 1 July for the CCP to reassess its attitude to­
ward China's national traditions was the signal for a new ideological 
campaign within the Party. Ch'en's article was soon followed by 
those of Ai Ssu-ch'i, Chang Ju-hsin, Yang Sung, and others (Including 
Ch'en himself) on a wide variety of subjects relating to Marxist 
theory and Chinese history. Indeed, the intellectual life of the en­
tire Party was rapidly being re-oriented; henceforth, Marxism was to 
be studied and applied in light of China's distinctive history and 
culture, and.not in a foreign context. As for the education of the 
ordinary people of the country —  the sea in which the Communist fish 
swam —  Mao declared that the "great task" in this regard was two­
fold: It was necessary to "heighten the national culture and national
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consciousness of the people," and to "educate the new generation in
21the national spirit." Mao’s concern with the "national spirit" was 
understandable in light of China's plight in the autumn of 1938; 
Japanese armies were sweeping over the country, and the huge industrial 
complex at Wuhan was about to fall into their hands. By the spring 
of 1939 the CCP’s campaign to reassess its attitude toward China’s 
national history and traditions had blended with a "national spiritual 
mobilization," which tried to bolster the people's sagging morale in 
the face of repeated Japanese victories.
When Mao delivered his major report ("On the New Stage") to the 
Party’s Sixth Plenum in October 1938, he did so within a very spec­
ific context —  increasing nationalism within and without the CCP, 
his growing supremacy within the Chinese Party, and Moscow’s accep­
tance of his pre-eminent position. Mao's report, delivered between 
12-14 October, was a lengthy summary of the state of the nation, the 
Party, and the revolution. In the latter part of the report he ad­
dressed himself to the question of Marxist-Leninist theory, reaffir­
ming his belief that the "study of theory is the precondition of 
victory" in the revolution. The CCP had made great strides in raising 
its theoretical level, but there was still much to be done in this re­
gard, Hence his call for a "Party-wide competition" in the study of 
the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, to commence after 
the conclusion of the Sixth Plenum. This ideological campaign, then, 
was to coincide with the flood of articles on Chinese history and 
tradition which had begun to appear on the pages of Liberation. This
21Mao, Ji 71, pp. 216-217.
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linkage of Marxist theory and Chinese history was by, no means fortui­
tous, for the burden of Mao’s comments on ideological study in his re­
port was on the absolute necessity to unite the two. Mao first of 
all pointed out that members of the CCP should regard Marxism-Leninism 
merely as a guide to action, not as a rigid dogma:
We must not study the letter /zi-mu7 of Marxism-Leninism, 
but the standpoint and methodology by which they Zyiz,
Marx and Lenin7 investigated and solved problems. It is 
only this guide to action, only this standpoint and meth­
odology, that constitute revolutionary science, and pro­
vide the only correct orientation enabling us to appre­
ciate the object of revolution and to direct the revolu­
tionary movement. 22
In Mao's eyes, one must distinguish clearly between the "letter" and 
the "standpoint and methodology" of Marxism-Leninism; the latter is 
the part of Marxism-Leninism that constitutes "revolutionary science," 
while the former does not. What does all this mean? In his lectures 
on dialectical materialism in 1937, Mao had distinguished between the 
general and the particular character of all phenomena. The general 
character was absolute and enduring, while the particular character 
was relative and hence temporary. Applying this analysis to Leninism, 
Mao argued that Leninism's general character was, its Marxist content, 
while its particular character was its Russian form. If in turn we 
apply this analysis to Marxism-Leninism (not merely Leninism), we 
can say that the general character of Marxism-Leninism is its content 
(i.e., it is "revolutionary science"), and that its particular cha­
racter is its form (i.e., it is both European and Russian). Thus, in 
distinguishing between the "letter" and the "standpoint and method­
ology" of Marxism-Leninism, Mao was in fact distinguishing between
22
Ibid., pp. 259-260-
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absolute content and relative form. He was exhorting the Chinese 
Communists to assimilate the revolutionary content of Marxism-Leninism-, 
but to reject its national form.
Yet Mao had previously argued that a thing1s general character 
is contained within its particular character; that is, the revolu­
tionary content of Marxism-Leninism is contained within its European 
and Russian form. If, as Mao suggested in his report to the Sixth 
Plenum, Communists in China were to strip Marxism-Leninism of its 
national form in order to expose its revolutionary content, what would 
be left —  a highly abstract "standpoint and methodology" divorced 
from any concrete environment or context, perhaps best expressed in 
the language of pure mathematics? Mao was quick to reject this con­
clusion :
There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only 
concrete Marxism. What we refer to as concrete Marx­
ism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that 
is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in China’s 
concrete environment, and not applied abstractly.  ^*
Mao appeared to be calling for the creation of a new variant of Marx­
ism-Leninism particular to China, but how was this to be achieved?
We will recall that Ch’en Po-ta had previously declared the time had 
come for Chinese culture to be Sinified, that is, to be rendered both 
modern and Chinese —  modern in content and Chinese in form. This is 
very similar to what Mao had in mind for Marxism, namely, the crea­
tion of a new variant of Marxism that exhibited a scientific revo­
lutionary content within a Chinese national form. Thus Mao borrowed 
Ch'en's terminology (though not the basic idea) in declaring to the
23Loc. cit.
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Sixth Plenum of the CCP- that:
The Sinification of Marxism ,/Ma-ke-si-zhu-yi de Zong- 
guo-hua7 —  making it exhibit a Chinese character in 
all its manifestations, that is to say, applying it in 
accordance with China’s characteristics —  becomes a 
problem which the entire Party must understand and solve 
without delay. ^4
The process of creating a new variant of Marxism was to be described 
as Sinification, but Mao gave no indication of what the new variant 
itself was to be called. In May 1939, however, Liberation suggested 
that of all the CCP's leaders, it was Mao Tse-tung who was most suc­
cessful in combining the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete 
practice of the Chinese revolution. From this it was but a short 
jump to the proposition that Mao's thought represented the new variant 
of Marxism that was emerging from the process of Marxism-Leninism’s 
Sinification.
Interestingly, Mao’s call for the Sinification of Marxism was 
accompanied by a softening of his attitude toward China's historical 
heritage, especially traditional philosophy. In the past, Mao had 
called for two fundamentally contradictory things —  the adaptation 
of Marxism to China's concrete environment and the liquidation of 
China's traditional philosophy. This of course overlooked the fact 
that China' s contemporary environment had not, in the words of Ch' en 
Po-ta, "fallen out of the sky"; it was itself the creation of history 
and intimately linked to history. As we will recall, the proper
o/
Loc. cit. For rather obvious reasons Mao did not apply Ch'en's 
concept of localization to Marxism-Leninism. This idea had its place 
in the field of art and literature, for example, but it would have 
proved rather awkward if applied to political theory. This.would have 
been especially true in 1938, when Mao was doing his best to.unify 
CCP ideology under himself as an emerging national leader.
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attitude toward China’s-historical heritage was an important point of 
disagreement between Ch'en and Mao. Mao's rather hard stance vis-a- 
vis the traditional heritage was certainly philosophically unsound, 
but in the face of growing Chinese nationalism and the concern over 
China's "national spirit" his attitude was fast becoming politically 
unsound as well. Doubtless with these considerations in mind, in his 
report to the Sixth Plenum Mao finally dropped his call for the de­
struction of China's philosophical heritage. He pointed out that in 
addition to the Sinification of Marxism:
Another task of our study Is to examine our historical 
legacy and to evaluate it critically by the use of 
Marxist methodology....Today's China is a development 
from historical China, and as Marxist historicists we 
should not cut ourselves off from history (ge-duan li- 
shi). We should sum it up from Confucius to Sun Yat- 
sen, and adopt all that Is precious in this legacy.25
In 1936. Ch’en Po-ta had lamented the failure of Marxists in China
to make a systematic evaluation of China's traditional philosophy;
Mao echoed this sentiment in declaring that vis-a-vis this very
problem the Communists In China were "still elementary school pupils."
Still on the subject of China's historical legacy, Mao further 
comments that "the assimilation of this legacy.. .becomes a methodology 
that is of substantial help in directing the great /revolutionary/ 
movement at the present time. What exactly does he mean by this?
We should bear in mind that Mao had previously said that Marxism pro­
vides a methodology to guide the revolution; therefore there are in 
fact two methodologies —  Marxism and the Chinese legacy —  that
25Ibid., p. 260.
26t■ ..
LOC ■ CZL u«
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serve as guides to the revolution in China. Yet Mao had previously- 
argued that present-day China had emerged from yesterday's China, 
and that the two were inseparably linked. Therefore, by the assimi­
lation of the "legacy" he really means the assimilation of the charac­
teristics of both China's past and China's present, that is, the sum 
total of the Chinese environment, material and mental alike. Mao's 
previous exhortations on the need to adapt Marxism to China's concrete 
environment had focused on the present-day environment, but now a 
historical dimension had been added. China's historical heritage 
had been successfully absorbed into the new concept of the Sinifica­
tion of Marxism. Of the two methodologies —  Marxism and the Chinese 
legacy —  which Mao had put forward as the essential guides to the 
Chinese revolution, what is the relationship between them? Are they 
of equal importance, or is one more valuable than the: other? Mao 
answers this question by giving firm precedence to Marxism, for we 
have already quoted him to the effect that "our historical legacy" 
must be evaluated critically "by use of Marxist methodology." There-' 
fore, Marxist methodology serves as the indispensible guide to both 
the revolution and the historical legacy. .Once correctly-evaluated 
by Marxism, however, the historical legacy itself becomes a metho­
dology which evaluates Marxism's relevance to guiding the concrete 
revolutionary struggle in China. This seems to accord with Ch'en 
Po-ta's previous assertion that in the dialectical Interaction be­
tween content and form, new contents gradually transform old forms 
Into new ones. Applied to Mao's discussion of Marxist theory (new 
content) and Chinese history (old form), this implies that Marxism's
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interaction with traditional Chinese history will eventually lead to 
the creation of modern Chinese history. Yet in the process Marxism 
itself will have been changed; i.e., it will have developed to a 
higher stage, and its contents will be richer than before its appli­
cation in China. Hence Mao at the Sixth Plenum called upon all Party 
members to improve their understanding of both Marxism and Chinese 
history, for their dialectical interaction was the essential key to 
the success of the revolution.
For Mao, then, It is not sufficient that Chinese Marxist-Lenin­
ists merely "evaluate" their historical heritage; they should also 
"assimilate" it into their own world view, for this would provide 
them with a new methodology to help guide the revolution. What Mao 
seems to be saying is that in assimilating China's historical legacy 
(i.e., China's total environment), Chinese Marxists are not simply 
adopting a new particular•form-in which general content (revolution­
ary science) can reside. Or, perhaps more precisely, they are adop­
ting a new form, but this new form is not merely an inert receptacle 
into which the content is poured. Instead, the new form itself 
plays an active role vis-a-vis the old content; in other words, the 
new Chinese form becomes a methodology by which to evaluate Marxist 
content. In his lectures on dialectical materialism in 1937 Mao had 
emphasized the "materialist truth" that "consciousness is limited by 
matter," and had firmly rejected the proposition that matter is an 
"inert, composite entity." From this we deduced that In Mao's eyes 
Leninism was the creation of a process in which European Marxism 
(consciousness) was transformed (limited) by the Russian environment
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(matter); that is, Lenin had adapted, transformed and developed 
Marxism in the course of his own revolutionary practice in the Russian 
context. Now, in the autumn of 1938, Mao was openly arguing in the 
CCP that Marxism-Leninism in China should undergo a similar process 
of adaptation, transformation and development.
In Mao's mind theory was composed of two distinct though inter­
related elements —  methodology and form, or more precisely, scien­
tific methodology and national form. In calling for the Sinification 
of Marxism-Leninism, Mao was rejecting the application in China of 
both Marxist theory (revolutionary science in a European form) and 
Leninist theory (revolutionary science in a Russian form), and was 
Instead proposing the creation of new revolutionary theory adapted to 
China (revolutionary science in a Chinese form). This is possible 
in view of the fact that theory itself has both a general scientific 
(absolute) character, and a particular national (relative) character, 
the general character being contained within the particular. Provi­
ding the general character of the original theory were retained, a 
new particular character could be-grafted on to It, the resulting 
union being new theory. Let us look at this process of Sinification: 
Marxist-Leninist theory Is separated into two distinct conceptual 
elements, revolutionary science ("methodology") and European and 
Russian national form ("letter"). In the course of concrete revo-1 
lutionary practice in China the original national forms are dropped, 
and the (now abstract) revolutionary science takes on a new Chinese 
national form. This fusion of content and form ("methodology" and 
"letter") results in the creation of new theory to be added to the
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general storehouse of revolutionary science. This new theory is not 
simply the original content dressed up in a new Chinese garb, for the 
new form exerts a certain transforming influence on the original con­
tent. Mao thus conceives of the new Chinese national form as con­
firming, rejecting or supplementing the variety of propositions which 
the original revolutionary science (Marxism-Leninism) had brought to 
bear on the Chinese environment. After all, in 1933 Mao had declared 
that, with regard to the world's existing body of military theory, 
Chinese Marxists should "assimilate what is useful, reject what is 
useless and create what- is specifically our own." In his report to 
the Sixth Plenum Mao did not name the new theory he was calling for; 
he simply called for the process of Sinification to commence. Steps 
were soon afoot, however, to designate this theory (as in the case 
of Marxism and Leninism) after the revolutionary scientist who cre­
ated it —  Mao Tse-tung himself.
This is all very abstract theorizing, and we can agree with
Stuart Schram that the meaning of the Sinification of Marxism was
27both "complex and ambiguous" in Mao’s own mind at the time. Un­
fortunately, Mao devoted little attention to developing his ideas on 
the subject of Sinification. Nor did he give any specific examples 
of what he really.meant, apart from saying that as far as literary 
style was concerned, "/?oreign7 dogmatism must be put to rest and
replaced by a fresh and lively Chinese style and maimer pleasing to
28the eye and ear of the Chinese common people." As a busy leader 
27Schram, Mao's Thought, pp. 112-113.
2SMao, Ji VI, p. 261.
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in time of war, Mao was thinking on his feet aiid not in the solitude 
of his study, and he probably had not worked out all the implications 
of what he was proposing. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt 
that he was consciously proposing the creation of new revolutionary 
theory based on the application and development of Marxism-Leninism 
in China. This new theory would be a fresh contribution to the gen­
eral body of Marxist-Leninist theory; it would represent an addition 
to Marxism-Leninism, but certainly not its replacement. (In his lec­
tures on dialectical materialism Mao had suggested that Lenin had ap­
plied and developed Marxism in Russia, and had greatly added to its 
value, but had not replaced it. Henceforth Marxism should never be 
studied in isolation from Leninism, but likewise Leninism should al­
ways be studied in conjunction with Marxism. ) Indeed, any theories 
created in the course of concrete revolutionary practice (no matter 
where) should be added to the general storehouse of scientific revo­
lutionary theory originating with Marx.
(iii) Ch'en, Mao, and the Sinification of Marxism
We have previously discussed Ch'en Po-ta in connection with 
Mao's proposal for the Sinification of Marxism, but now it is desir­
able to try to pin-point the exact relationship between Ch'en's and 
Mao's thinking. We know that Ch'en was working closely with Mao at 
this time as his political secretary, and that he had gained enough 
of Mao's confidence to be asked to write Liberation's main article 
on Party history on the occasion of the CCP's seventeenth anniver­
sary. Mao's report, "On the New Stage," was extremely long, and it 
is quite likely that as a competent theorist and Mao's political
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secretary Ch'en assisted in the preparation of this report. We know 
that as an active leader Mao did not personally draft all of his 
numerous writings; it was the responsibility of his political secre­
tary to assist him in this. (Indeed, we have already noted a striking 
similarity in one key passage which appears in both Mao's report to 
the Sixth Plenum and an earlier essay written by Ch'en.) Certainly, 
some of Ch'en's ideas appear linked to Mao's call for the Sini­
fication of Marxism: (1) Mao's two major demands for the integration
of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revo­
lution, and for the Marxist evaluation of China's historical heritage 
(especially the philosophical heritage "from Confucius to Sun Yat- 
sen") are identical with the two main tasks Ch'en set for China's 
Marxist theorists in October 1935, in connection with the New Enlight­
enment Movement. (2) Mao's more sympathetic attitude toward China's 
historical legacy represents a distinct reversal of his position in 
1937, and .is in keeping with Ch'en's repeated calls for Marxists to 
adopt a more constructive attitude toward the positive aspects of 
Chinese history. (3) The term "Sinification" (which Mao first used 
in his October report) seems -to have originated in Ch'en's essay of 
4 May 1938, in which he called for the Sinification and localization 
of all Chinese culture. In short, Ch'en provided Mao with the slogan 
and much of the rationale (but not the basic concept,-which Mao had 
formulated independently) for the union of Marxist theory and Chinese 
practice, and he encouraged Mao's appreciation of the need for the 
CCP to adopt a more positive attitude toward China's historical le­
gacy. Finally, the basic concept of the Sinification of Marxism
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fully accords with Ch'en's opinions since at least 1936, and after 
Mao's proposals in 1938 Ch'en was to become a leading exponent of the 
theory within the Party. All of these factors would seem to confirm 
Ch'en's role in the original formulation of the concept itself, and 
his growing importance as a Party theoretician and advisor to Mao.
In calling for the Sinification of Marxism Mao was clearly moving
into uncharted theoretical terrain. A lack of enthusiasm within the
Party for the concept is suggested by the omission in the Sixth
Plenum's political resolution of any mention of the need to Sinify 
29Marxism-Leninism. Many Party leaders probably feared that the Sini­
fication of Marxism-Leninism would deprive it of the prestige and 
authority associated with its two famous European exponents, and 
would isolate Communists in China from the mainstream of the inter­
national Communist movement. Also, the concept would possibly anta­
gonize Stalin and the Comintern, who might see in the Sinification of 
Marxism the unhealthy influence of Chinese petty bourgeois nation­
alism in the CCP. A hint of possible inner-Party dissension on this 
issue is provided by an important discrepancy between the official 
Chinese and English texts of Mao's report, "On the New Stage." While 
both texts warn against the separation of "internationalist content 
from national forms", the Chinese version calls upon the Party to 
purge "dogmatism" from its ranks, while the English version urges the 
liquidation of "chauvinism" from the CCP. Thus, Mao's original charge
2 J^F, no. 37 (25 November 1938), p. 41. See also Qun-zhong 
(The Masses), 11:12 (25 December 1938), p. 593.
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of dogmatism, directed most certainly against the Returned Students,
is deftly transformed into an accusation of chauvinism turned against 
30Mao himself. Again, as Merle Goldman has pointed out, in the 
spring of 1939 such famous CCP cultural leaders as Hu Feng and Feng 
Hsueh-feng openly rejected the implications of Mao's idea of the union 
of Marxist theory and Chinese national form in the field of litera­
ture. (Both writers had previously rejected as bogus the idea that,
in literature and art, new Marxist contents could be combined with
31traditional national forms. ) Indeed, Mao was to have a difficult 
struggle ahead before his proposal for the Sinification of Marxism 
was to be accepted within the Party, especially by the Returned Stu­
dents and other'theoretically competent people. This struggle was 
to become one of the main themes in the future Rectification Campaign 
of 1942-43* when Mao's undisputed position as the leading theorist ■ 
of. the CCP was established.
In spite of the opposition which his proposal stirred up, there 
is little doubt that the concept of the Sinification of Marxism was 
immensely valuable to Mao in his efforts to achieve ideological 
supremacy within the Party. His idea of Sinification may have been 
"complex and ambiguous,” but by this very standard it effectively 
placed Marxism-Leninism in a vacuous limbo divorced from the absolute
^Schram, Political Thought, p. 173. Stuart Schram, who first 
brought this discrepancy to light, was told by Edgar Snow that it 
might well have been Po Ku who was responsible for altering the Eng­
lish text of Mao’s report. However, it is impossible to confirm the 
validity of Snow’s hypothesis.
31Goldman, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
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authority of either the classical texts or Stalin, the CPSU, and 
the Comintern, the official living interpreters of the texts. One 
question in particular must have been on the minds of many of the 
Party leaders assembled for the Sixth Plenum: Who would control
the actual process by which Marxism-Leninism was to be Sinified, and 
who would define the correctness or incorrectness of the finished 
theoretical product? If Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the Comintern were 
to be displaced as the ultimate authorities on whether or not the 
Chinese Communist Party was guided by "correct" Marxist-Leninist 
theory, who was to take their place? Mao's theory of Sinification 
was thus doubly useful; properly used, it could help him establish 
his Ideological pre-eminence in the CCP, and at the same time streng­
then his ideological position (and that of the Party as a whole) vis- 
a-vis Moscow and the Comintern. His main task, having proposed the 
Sinification of Marxism-Leninism, was to exert his control over both 
its process and its finished product. He was not to be alone in 
this endeavour. On 30 September, just two weeks prior to Mao’s call 
for the Sinification of Marxism at the Sixth Plenum, it was announced 
that the New Philosophy Society had been founded in Yenan. Its de­
clared aim was to discourage the study of "pure theory" (chun. li-lun) 
and to promote the study in depth of more concrete theoretical pro­
blems in light of China's real needs. Like the rest of the nation, 
it was stated, philosophers in China should fulfill their respon­
sibilities in the "war of resistance, the reconstruction of the na-
32tion, and the development of theory in China." Among the leading 
32JF, 53 (30 September 1938), p. 22.
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founders of this new philosophy society were such "proto-Maoist” 
theorists as Ai Ssu-eh’i, Chou Yang, Chang Ju-hsin, Yang Sung and, 
of course, Ch’en Po-ta himself. The campaign for the Sinification 
of Marxism-Leninism —  and the conscious creation of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought —  was about to begin in earnest.
i
CHAPTER V
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROPHET, 1939-4-0
(i) Ch’en’s Efforts to Sinify Marxism
By the autumn of 1938 Mao had emerged as the de facto leader of
the CCP. He had overcome the opposition of both Chang Kuo-t’ao and
Wang Ming, and had at long last been recognized by Moscow as the
top man in the Chinese Party. Even Wang Ming acknowledged Mao’s
supremacy, for in a speech in Yenan on 15 January 1939 he referred
to Mao as "the leader" of the CCP. Nor was Mao’s prestige growing
only within the Party; following an interview with Mao in the summer
of 1938 the American correspondent Haldore Hanson suggested that,
next to Stalin, Mao Tse-tung was the "most powerful Marxian thinker
2and leader in world politics." Interestingly, Hanson regarded Mao
as both a practical leader and a "Marxian thinker" at a time when
his credentials as a theorist were by no means universally accepted
within the CCP. Yet Hanson seems to be typical of his colleagues
in this regard, for, as Kenneth Shewmaker has suggested,' Western
correspondents who visited Yenan during the war years tended to over-
. . 3estimate Mao's originality and stature as a Marxist theoretician, 
n
Ch'en Shao-yu, Old Intrigues in New Clothing, p. 13.
2As quoted in Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Com­
munists, 1927-194-5, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971,
p. 186.
3rbid., p. 189.
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Many of Mao’s colleagues high in the Party were by no means similar­
ly disposed. In an article of 30 June 1939, for instance, Mao re­
vealed that his two important reports, "On Protracted War” and "On 
the New Stage," had been subjected to "criticism, challenge and 
doubt" from various quarters since their publication in 1938.^ Mao 
did not identify the sources of these criticisms, but it is likely 
that they came at least in part from Wang Ming and his supporters 
among the Returned Students. Mao was probably also referring to the 
criticisms that Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his fellow Trotskyists had been 
levelling at the CCP's (i.e., Mao’s) strategy in the war. Following 
the formation of the new united front, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and many other 
political prisoners had been released as part of a general amnesty 
proclaimed by Chiang Kai-shek. Upon his release, Ch’en went to live 
in Wuhan and later in Chungking, where he engaged in polemics with 
the CCP on a wide range of issues relating to the CCP’s conduct of
5
the revolution m  China.
While the Maoists were battling to defend their line against 
the criticisms of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the Returned Students as well,
the Nationalists launched their own ideological offensive against
the Communists. Never a popular leader previously, Chiang Kai- 
shek's personal prestige soared after the Japanese invasion in July
M^ao, Ji VI, p. 343.
5
For a somewhat garbled but useful account of the polemic be­
tween Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the CCP in the course of 1938, see Warren 
Kuo, op. cit., Ill, pp. 391-402. For one of the CCP’s many attacks 
on the Trotskyists, see Ch'en Po-ta, "Ping Chen Du-xiu de wang-guo- 
lun" (A Critique of Ch’en Tu-hsiu's Theory of the National Disaster),
JF, 60-61 (joint issue) (15 January 1939), pp. 23-29.
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193V. In the spring of 1938, despite his military reversals, Chiang 
was elected General Director, or Leader, of the KMT. A few months 
later, the fall of Wuhan marked the end of the Japanese offensive 
(until it was revived briefly in 1944), and the war in China set­
tled into a long period of stalemate. With both increased authority 
and opportunity, Chiang turned his attention once again to the pro­
blem of dealing with the Communists. At its Fifth Plenum in January 
1939, the KMT's Central Executive Committee adopted certain "Measures 
for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties," and followed them up 
with appropriate steps to ensure enforcement.^ It was a shrewd move 
on Chiang's part to Infer that the CCP was an "alien" political par­
ty, for this would help to undermine whatever appeal Mao had gener­
ated among the public by his recent determination to Sinify Marxism- 
Leninism and thus make it more acceptable to the average Chinese. 
Besides weakening the Communists, Chiang wished to reinforce his own 
position as the nation's true saviour in the eyes of the public.
The task was not easy, for by early 1939 Japan's seeming invinci­
bility, Wang Ching-wei's sensational defection, and the ravages of 
uncontrolled inflation had produced a feeling of defeatism among the 
Chinese population. Accordingly, Chiang took a leaf from his pre­
war New Life Movement, and in the spring of 1939 he launched a 
rather grandiose "National Spiritual Mobilization." According to 
Paul Linebarger, who witnessed it first hand, the campaign lacked
7
a "broadly popular character," and never really got off the ground.
^Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944; 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 38.
^Paul M.A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek (A Poli­
tical Study ), Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941> P- 157.
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In spite of its shortcomings, however, the movement did heighten 
nationalistic feelings among at least some of the population, and as 
such It helped to shape the environment in which the CCP had to 
formulate its own policies at the time. With or without the Nation­
alists’ encouragement, however, nationalism was on the ascent in 
China, and the Communists could not be seen to be lagging behind.
It was in this context that Ch'en Po-ta rose to prominence as 
one of the CCP's leading proponents of the Sinification of Marxism- 
Leninism. By the summer of 1938 Ch'en had become a well-known fi­
gure in- the Maoist camp, owing to his position as theoretician,
Party historian, and personal adviser to Mao himself. In the ensuing 
months Ch'en's star rose even higher, for he was elected in early 
1939 to the standing committee of the presidium of the first elec-
g
ted Council of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. In addition, he 
was entering upon one of the most prolific periods In his career as 
a writer. At the Party's Sixth Plenum Mao had called for the study 
of Marxism-Leninism in the context of China's own history, and not 
In abstraction. At the same time he had declared that there was 
no basic Incompatibility between Marxism-Leninism and Sun Yat-sen's 
Three Principles of the People, at least in the short run. According-- 
ly, he had urged all Party members to study Sun's principles "from
£
Warren Kuo, op. cit., Ill, p. 581. Kuo's source is JF 68 (4 
April 1939), a special issue on the first Council of the Shen-Kan- 
Ning Border Region. The Council, which met in Yenan between 17 Jan­
uary and 4 February 1939, elected Ch'en to Its presidium (ranked 
twentieth out of twenty-five), and to its standing committee (ranked 
third out of seven). Presumably, Ch'en's high rank on the presidi­
um's standing committee reflected his position as a representative 
’ of the Maoists, and not his Individual standing in the Yenan hierarchy.
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the perspective of Marxism," and to strive for their realization in 
9practice. The task, then, was to effect a reconciliation between 
Chinese history and culture, the principles of Sun Yat-sen, and Mar- 
xist-Leninist theory. Such a reconciliation was sorely needed, for 
the CCP under Mao was being attacked from both Left and Right on the 
question of ideology. The Trotskyists (and the Returned Students as 
well) doubted that Mao's theoretical and practical leadership was 
sufficiently Marxist-Leninist, while the Nationalists alleged that the 
CCP was in fact an "alien party," and not truly Chinese. Under these 
conditions, Mao and his supporters had only one course of action; 
they had to demonstrate that the CCP under the leadership of Mao was 
genuinely Marxist-Leninist and Chinese. Ch'en Po-ta spearheaded this 
ideological offensive, for in early 1939 he published a series of 
writings in which he attempted to establish Marxism-Leninism firmly 
within the context of Chinese history and culture. His ideas and 
arguments are scattered throughout the numerous articles he wrote 
during these months, but we shall try to indicate sources as accur­
ately as possible in the following discussion.
Ch'en locates the beginnings of dialectical materialism in 
China at the time of the fall of the Shang dynasty. Certain thinkers 
(e.g., the Duke of Chou) began to doubt the constancy of Heaven in 
ordering human affairs, and exhibited a growing confidence in the 
innate ability of men to look after their own interests. Ch'en con­
9Mao, Ji VI, p. 227.•
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cedes that this suspicion of Heaven’s "inconstancy" (wu-chang) on 
the part of the early Chou rulers was prompted by their own interests 
in the preservation of the new dynasty, for it undermined the Shang 
claim to unceasing Heavenly grace and divine protection. Nonethe­
less, Chou's doubts represented a distinct advance beyond the "rigid 
superstition" of the Shang rulers concerning the omnipotence of 
Heaven. Although the Chou rulers still believed in the !’Lord-on- 
High" (Shang-di) and in the "Mandate of Heaven" (Tian-ming), their 
new found suspicion (not disbelief) of Heaven and growing confidence
in man represents the "earliest beginnings of the development of
10materialist and dialectical thought in ancient China. In a later 
article on the philosophy of Lao Tzu, Ch'en detects in the sage’s 
thought an "insurmountable contradiction between idealism and mater­
ialism, and between dialectics and metaphysics." Still, Lao Tzu did 
demonstrate that (l) the rulers of any given society do not exist 
independently of the material universe (i.e., they are not divine); 
and (2) their rule is not permanent, but is in constant flux and 
subject to decline. Hence, concludes Ch'en, because Lao Tzu wrote 
of the earthly nature and the changing fortunes of the ruling classes,
• p i
his thought exhibits an "initial materialism and a crude dialectics."
10Ch'en Po-ta, "Zhong-guo gu-dai zhe-xue de kai-duan" (The Be­
ginnings of Philosophy in Ancient China), JF, 62 (26 January 1939), 
p. 27.
11Ch'en Po-ta, "Lao Zi de zhe-xue si-xiang" (Lao Tzu's Philo­
sophic Thought), JF, 63-64 (joint issue) (16 February 1939), p. 29.
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It is Mo Tzu, however, whom Ch'en regards as China's "greatest and
most enduring philosopher of ancient times.", detecting in his thought
elements of the "materialist view of history and the theory of the 
12class struggle." Mo Tzu, for example, was a representative of the 
lower strata of society in ancient China, and he denounced the op­
pression of the rich and the powerful and dreamed of a new, more 
equitable society in the future. Of all the ancient philosophers, it 
was Mo Tzu who best understood -the two major problems in the history 
of Chinese philosophy, namely, the relationship between "appearance 
and reality" (ming-shi wen-ti) and the relationship between "know­
ledge and action" (zhi-xing wen-ti). /In modern philosophical ter­
minology, says Ch'en, these two problems are referred to as ontology 
(ben-ti-lun) and cognition (ren-shi-lun)._7 Mo Tzu realized, however 
imperfectly, that reality exists independently of human cognition, 
and that practice is the sole criterion for evaluating cognition. 
Further, he did not view the seeming opposites —  knowledge and ac­
tion —  as being fragmented, but regarded them instead as being 
locked in a single unity. Thus, concludes Ch'en, Mo Tzu grasped 
the fundamentals of materialism and the unity of opposites, and his
thought should be regarded as the "original precursor of modern
13Chinese dialectical materialism."
1 p
Ch'en Po-ta, "Ji-nian Ma-ke-si yu Sun Zhong-shan" (in Commem­
oration of Marx and Sun Yat-sen), JF, 66 (8 March 1939), pp. 19-20.
13Ch'en Po-ta, "Guan-yu zhi-xing wen-ti de yan-jiu" (Concerning 
the Study of Knowledge and Action), JF, 50 (28 August 1938), p. 10. 
For further details see Ch'en Po-ta, "Mo Zi de zhe-xue si-xiang" (Mo 
Tzu's Philosophic Thought), JF, 82 (30 August 1939), pp. 20-23,* and 
"Mo Zi zhe-xue si-xiang" (Mo-Tzu's Philosophic Thought), JF, 102 (31 
March 1940).
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Nowhere does Ch'en attempt to prove that full-blown dialectical 
materialism existed in ancient China, or even in traditional China 
up to the beginning of the twentieth century; his argument is only 
that certain "elements" of dialectical materialism can be found in 
China's past. For example, his description of Tlan Ssu-iAmg's 
"crude" materialism and "incomplete" dialectics is rather similar to 
his estimation of Lao Tzu's "initial" materialism and "crude" dia= 
lectics. (Likewise, Ch'en detects in the thought of Sun Yat-sen cer­
tain "elements of materialism," and some "individual, spontaneous 
elements of dialectics.")^ Ch’en does not adequately account for 
the sluggish development of dialectical materialism in the more 
than two millenia that separate Lao Tzu and T';an Ssu-t'ung. He sug­
gests only that the necessary social conditions for the effective 
development of dialectical materialism in China did not exist until 
the twentieth century. (Wang Yang-ming, for example, was an impor­
tant dialectical thinker, but his philosophy was severely weakened
15by his espousal of idealism rather than materialism. ) Even so, 
argues Ch'en, when dialectical materialism in China finally did de­
velop to its present level as "scientific communist ideology," it
14Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun gong-chan-zhu-yi-zhe dui-yu san-min-zhu-yi . 
guan-xi de ji-ge wen-ti" (On Several Problems in the Relationship of 
Communists to the Three People's Principles), in Lo Fu, et al., San- 
min-zhu-yi yu gong-chan-zhu-yi (The Three Principles of the People 
and Communism), Hong Kong: Xian-shi chu-ban-she, 1947, p. 60. An
English translation of this article is Ch'en Po-ta, "Several Pro­
blems in the Relationship of Communists to the Three People's Prin­
ciples", in Wang Chia-hsiang, et al., Communists and the Three Peo­
ple's Principles, Chungking: New China Information Committee,
Bulletin No. 16, 1940, pp. 2>54.
15Ch'en Po-ta, "Guan-yu zhi-xing wen-ti de yan-jiu," pp. 10-11.
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was not due only to the impact of the Russian revolution, which mere-
1<ly "influenced and accelerated" the development of Marxism in China.
On the contrary, Ch'en emphasizes the internal, indigenous factors
which provided the complex social environment conducive to the growth
of Marxism-Leninism in China:
The emergence of Marxism as a self-conscious current 
/of thought7and a self-conscious force in China was 
based on the development of the foundation and strength 
of the Chinese working class, at a time when the wor­
king-class movement was developing from being a class- 
in-itself to becoming a class-for-itself. Generally 
speaking, this was after'the May Fourth Movement. This 
was a time when, in accordance with the above /evolu­
tion/ in the social /i.e., class7 base, social conscious­
ness emerged in China, and when the development of China's 
cultural traditions was best able to link up with the 
growth of Marxism. It was thus a time when the founda­
tions existed for the acceptance of Marxism into the 
modern culture of China. Consequently, the emergence 
of Marxism in China cannot simply be regarded as /the 
introduction of/ a 'foreign import.'17
By demonstrating that elements of dialectical materialism are 
to be found in China's traditional philosophy, and that the develop­
ment of Marxism in modern China is primarily due to internal factors, 
Ch'en hoped to refute the arguments of the Right. Their allegation 
that Marxism was totally inapplicable to China because of China's 
"special national conditions" was, in Ch'en's eyes, quite insup­
portable. Yet this exposed him to attack from the Left, who claimed 
that —  precisely because China did not have any so-called "special
^Ch'en Po-ta, "Ji-nian Ma-ke-si yu Sun Zhong-shan," pp. 19-20,
Ch'en Po-ta, San-min-zhu-yi gai-lun (An outline of the 'Three 
People's Principles), Chungking: Sheng-huo shu-dian, 1939, pp. 120-
121.
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national conditions” — ‘Marxism itself could not have any "peculiar­
ity” when applied to China. This argument, claims Ch’en, is nothing 
more than the Left's "empty verbiage," for to say that Marxism in 
China should have no special characteristics is simply to render it 
a "dead, abstract dogma." It amounts to cutting Marxism in China 
off from real life instead of basing it on a concrete historical 
foundation. Hence, claims Ch'en, to be really effective Chinese 
Marxists must be able to grasp five intellectual keys in their own 
revolutionary struggles: (l) the revolutionary theories of the West
and the rest of the world; (2) the methods by which the proletariat 
in the West and Russia have "creatively applied" the theories of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; (3) the best elements in traditional 
Chinese culture and thought; (4) the central features of Chinese 
revolutionary tradition of the past hundred years; and (5) the revo­
lutionary essence of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People.
By synthesizing these five essential elements and uniting them with 
the actual practice of the Chinese revolution, concludes Ch'en, Chi­
nese Marxist-Leninists will be able to "concretize" and thus "Sinify"
18Marxism-Leninism in China.
By including Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People as 
merely one of the five major ingredients of fully Sinifled Marxism, 
Ch'en anticipated his interpretation of Sun's ideology as a transi­
tional phenomenon. In his An Outline of the Three People's 
Principles., Ch'en complains that none of the many books written on
18Ibid., pp. 119-122.
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Sun's ideology has treated it on the basis of "scientific princi­
ples." This Ch’en proposes to do, arguing that a correct, scien­
tific interpretation of Sun's system of thought is necessary to en­
sure the "development of the science of revolution in China." Basi­
cally, Ch'en maintains that Sun's ideology must he seen in its 
specific historical context, as something that emerged from China's 
own history and is today being rapidly transformed by actual revo­
lutionary practice. It is not a permanent and immutable phenomenon, 
but merely a transitional element in the broad stream of history. 
Ch'en claims that the three individual principles of Sun Yat-sen were 
developed from three major strains in traditional Chinese thought. 
Sun's concept of "nationalism," for example, grew out of the racial 
thought that was common in China especially at the time of the Mon­
gol and Manchu conquests, i.e„, the concept of the "defence of China 
against the barbarians" (yi xia zhi fang). His idea of "democracy" 
evolved from certain of the ideas of the traditional Chinese philo­
sophers such as Mencius, who believed that "the people are precious 
and the rulers inconsequential" (min gui jun qing). As for Sun's 
third principle, "people's livelihood it Is based on the tradi­
tional Chinese concept of the "great harmony" (da-tong), especially
as it was interpreted by the late Ch'ing reformers K'ang Yu-wei
19and T'an Ssu-t'ung.
"^ Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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Having established*that Sun's ideology grew directly out of 
China's traditional thought, Ch'en hastens to add that Sun's ideas 
have developed far beyond those of the past. The Three Principles 
of the People did not and could not have existed in traditional 
China, for they are "historical products of modern semi-colonial and 
semi-feudal China, and reflect the national and social contradic­
tions in modern China." Sun's ideas did not spontaneously emerge, 
but were gradually developed by Sun in the course of his long years 
of revolutionary practice. Nor were the Three Principles of the 
People Sun's exclusive creation, for they evolved from the "unending 
bloody revolutionary struggles of the modern Chinese people, and the
revolutionary practice of the radical vanguard of the modern revo- 
20lution." When he wrote his book in late 1938, Ch'en's purpose was 
to emphasize the domestic Chinese sources of both Sun's ideology and 
Marxism-Leninism as well, yet in this reference to the "radical 
vanguard of the modern revolution" he acknowledges, albeit indirect­
ly, that Sun's system of thought was also influenced by radical cur­
rents of thought in the West, including Russia. Of course, Ch'en 
continues, Sun's ideology must progress'beyond its origins; being a 
product of history, it must change with the passage of time. It 
must evolve along with the "development of the contradictions in our
nation and society, and the development of revolutionary practice in 
21China." Indeed, argues Ch’en, the Three Principles of the People 
were developing right up to the time of Sun's death in 1925. Were
20Ibid., pp. 2-4.
21Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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they not greatly enriched, for example, by the addition of the CCP's 
"Three Great Policies" (alliance with the Soviet Union, co-operation 
with the Communists, and assistance to the workers and peasants) in 
the early 1920Ts?
In his discussion of Sun Yat-sen's ideology and Marxism-Leninism, 
Ch'en makes it perfectly clear that there is a fundamental difference 
between them. The former is the ideology of the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution in China, while the latter most definitely represents the 
ideology of the more advanced international proletarian revolution. 
Nevertheless, at the present time in history the two different systems 
of thought have much in common, and can be regarded as "good friends" 
for some time to come. Yet in the long run the Chinese Communists 
will never abandon their belief in "scientific communism" (Marxism- 
Leninism), and will struggle to the end to establish a true communist 
society. At the appropriate stage in this revolution the Three Prin­
ciples of the People will be by-passed by Marxism-Leninism, which 
even now is assimilating all other revolutionary Ideologies, and is 
in turn being assimilated into the new cultural system evolving in 
China. We can now begin to appreciate just how complex a process 
the Sinification of Marxism is going to be, involving as It does the 
forging of a new ideological synthesis by the complicated interplay 
of at least five separate elements —  foreign non-Marxist theories, 
Marxist-Leninist theories and methods, traditional Chinese thought 
and culture, modern Chinese revolutionary tradition, and the revo­
lutionary essence of Sun Yat-sen's thought. Ch'en does not demon­
strate exactly how this new synthesis is to be worked out in detail,
153
"but simply repeats his belief that it can be forged only in the cru­
cible of actual revolutionary practice in China. Yet he does not 
doubt in the least that such a synthesis can be achieved:
Our nation is the oldest and largest in the history of 
world civilization, and possesses unlimited intelligence 
and ability. Regarding the acceptance of various for­
eign cultures and ideologies in the course of its his­
tory, it has always been especially able to embellish 
and develop them, thus rendering them particular crea­
tions /te-chan7 of our nation. /To illustrate this/? 
there is no need to go beyond the introduction of Indian 
Buddhism into China. The result was an especially col­
orful /period of7 creativity and development, in which 
Buddhism was made extremely glorious....This is the most 
famous /example of this/. We can see that by relying on 
the intelligence and ability of this great nation of 
China, we will certainly be able to take Marxism-Leninism 
and, on the basis of China’s new society, discover its 
/KJarxism-Leninism's7 especially glorious colours, /We 
can thu§7 lead China forward to a new history of civili­
zation, creating happiness in both our own nation and the 
entire world. 2^
One can question the amount of purely scientific reasoning in this 
line of argument, and no doubt there were many in the CCP who were not 
enthusiastic at seeing Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism compared in this _ 
way. Yet Ch’en Po-ta was carrying on the great Chinese tradition of 
syncretism, believing intensely that the sheer power of China's massive 
cultural heritage would ultimately transform Marxism-Leninism into some­
thing both scientific and Chinese. After all, even after Indian Budd­
hism had been transformed by China’s indigenous culture, did it not 
in the end remain unquestionably Buddhist? The answer to this ques­
tion —  and to the similar question of whether or not Sinified Marxism 
would really be Marxism at all —  is beyond the scope of this study.
In any event, Ch'en believed that the fundamental, underlying
pp
Ch'en Po-ta, ”Ji-nian Ma-ke-si yu Sun Zhong-shan,” p. 21.
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essences (whether religious or scientific) of hoth Buddhism and Marx­
ism were fully capable of surviving their cultural transformation, 
and we will leave it at that. Apparently many of his comrades in
Yenan agreed, for Ch'en's writings during this period were said to be
23popular with Party cadres both old and young.  ^ Indeed, by mid-1939 
Ch’en had done perhaps more than any other Party theoretician to give 
substance to Mao’s call for the Sinification of Marxism. In the pro­
cess he had established himself as one of the CCP’s leading theore­
ticians, and the leading advocate of the Sinification of Marxism- 
Leninism within the ranks of the Party. During the cadre education 
movement of 1939-40, for example, an important essay of his ("Certain 
Clarifications Concerning Marxist - Theory") was reprinted In large
numbers by the Eighth Route Army, and widely distributed for study
24by officers and men alike.
(ii) The Campaign to Study Mao’s Writings
We have dealt at length with Ch’en Po-ta1 s writings in the spring 
of 1939 because they played a major role in establishing the ideolog­
ical climate which directly preceded the CCP.1 s first important cadre 
education movement. In his report to the Party’s Sixth Plenum in 
late 1938, Mao had called for a "Party-wide competition" in the study 
of Marxist-Leninist theory as part of a wider educational movement 
among the cadres. Accordingly, the Sixth Plenum adopted a political ' 
resolution which called for strenuous efforts to "raise the theore­
tical level of the entire Party," particular attention being paid to
2^Ch’ao Wen-tao, op. cit., p. 227.
2^ FQYJ, .11:2, p. 98.
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the problem of "how to apply in a living way Marxism-Leninism and 
international experience in China in the course of practical strug­
gle."^ In the last weeks of 1938 the Party established a Bureau of 
Cadre Education which was to be responsible for carrying out the pro­
gram in a "planned and organized way." We will not discuss the de­
tails of this education movement here, except to note that it lasted 
for exactly one year (May 1939-June 1940), and involved approximately 
4000 cadres and students within a thirty-mile radius of Yenan. Its 
main content was the study of Marxism-Leninism in a Chinese context,
but this was supplemented by courses in various basic skills essential
26to effective political and government leadership. Lo Mai (Li Wei- 
han), one of the Returned Students, played a leading role in guiding 
the movement, and in an important speech of 1 June 1939 he declared 
that the Sixth Plenum had elevated the study of Marxism-Leninism to 
a "position of primary importance in party-building." Accordingly,
Lo set the cadres the task of making a "general and systematic study" 
of Marxism-Leninism, political economy, dialectical and historical 
materialism, history of the CPSU, and the program of the Communist 
International. Chinese history was also to be studied from the 
standpoint of Marxist methodology, said Lo, at the same time lamen­
ting the lack of a good "comprehensive textbook" on Chinese history, 
and calling for greater research efforts in this regard. The "laws 
of party-building" were next on LoTs list of subjects, and he
25JF, 57 (25 November 1938), p. 41.
For further details on the cadre education movement, see 
Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. -191-192.
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recommended the cadres to read the draft copy of Communism and the 
Communist Party, a text recently approved hy the Central Committee. 
Finally, reminding his audience that Communists were not mere academ­
icians, Lo exhorted them to pay careful attention to current national 
and international events. All this study was necessary, concluded
Lo, to respond to the call of the Sixth Plenum and to prepare the way
27for the convocation of the CCP Seventh Congress.
Where did Mao Tse-tung's writings fit into this elaborate pro­
gram of study? Although ChTen Po-ta and others had quoted Mao on 
several•occasions in their recent writings, nowhere did they hold up 
Mao as a model to be studied and emulated. Yet Lo Mai, while not 
recommending the study of Mao's writings as such, did urge his audi­
ence to ,Tlearn from the spirit of hard study without tire of the
28Party's important leaders such as Comrade Mao Tse-tung.and others." 
Although Lo did add the "and others," there is little doubt that Mao 
was being singled out as the outstanding model for emulation within 
the ranks of the CCP. Thus, a campaign for the emulation of Mao and 
his writings appears to have developed side by side with the cadre 
education movement. Fortunately, we can pinpoint the inauguration
27Lo Mai (Li Wei-han), "Wo-men yao xue-xi shen-ma? Zen-yang 
xue-xi?" (What Should We Study? How Should We Study?), JF, 79 (5 
August 1939), p. 7, The text is dated 1 June 1939. The text re­
ferred to by Lo is Gong-chan-zhu-yi yu gong-chan-dang (cao-gao) /Com­
munism and the Communist Party (Draft]7, first published in Yenan on 
IS May 1939 by the "Communism and the Communist Party" Editorial Com­
mittee. A reprint was issued in April 194-1 by the "Party Life" Edi­
torial Committee, the initial two chapters of which can be found in 
You-guan Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang cai-liao (Materials on the Chinese 
Communist Party), Tokyo: Yushodo Bookstore Microfilms, 1970, Reel 12.
2SLo Mai, "Wo-men yaa xue-xi shen-ma?," p. 10.
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of this campaign in a special editorial which appeared in the 1 May- 
1939 edition of Liberation. This editorial purported to review the 
work of Liberation since its first issue just over two years previous­
ly. After summarizing the journal Ts strengths and weaknesses, the
editors declared that:
There is no doubt that the documents published in this 
journal by the CCP Central Committee, and the articles 
likewise published by various responsible comrades in 
the Central Committee constitute the soul of all this 
journal’s proposals and opinions. /Those which7 may be 
specially mentioned are "On Protracted War" and 1 On the 
New Stage," two works by Comrade Mao Tse-tung which were
published successively in this journal. They sum up the
experience of the War of Resistance, indicate the future
/development/ of the War of Resistance, and are of his­
toric significance. y
This carefully worded statement was clearly intended to estab- 
lish Mao's pre-eminence within the leadership of the CCP, especially 
in the field of theory. It was supplemented by a large handwritten 
slogan in praise of Liberation which accompanied the editorial. 
Signed simply "Wang Ming," this slogan was obviously designed to in­
dicate publicly that Wang had agreed (however unenthusiastically) to
indent if y his name with the editorial and —  in consequence —  with
30the ideological supremacy of Mao Tse-tung. References to Mao's 
writings, became increasingly common in the months following the ap­
pearance of the May first editorial. In an article of 30 May 1939, 
for example, the theoretician Yang Sung quoted Mao on several occa­
sions regarding various national and international questions, thus
2Q
Bian-z'he (Editors), "Jie-fang er zhou-nian ji-nian" (In Commem- 
eration of the Second Anniversary of Liberation), JF, 70 (l May 1939), 
p. 7.
°^lbid., p. 8.
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31helping Mao to shed his somewhat parochial image. Similarly, in an
essay of 30 August 1939, the well-known Marxist theorist Ai Ssu-ch'i
encouraged his readers to study such "famous works" of the Chinese
Communist Party as "On Protracted War," "On the New Stage," and "On
32Guerrilla Warfare." And on 15 November 1939, m  a speech to a local
Party conference, Kao Kang praised Mao’s theories concerning the three
stages (defence, stalemate, offense) in the war against Japan, al-
33though he bracketed Mao’s name with the Central Committee.
In the course of the cadre education movement Mao appears to 
have established effective control over the CCP mass media, which was 
expanding rapidly at the time. For example, he wrote prefaces-or 
leading articles for the inaugural issues of a host of new journals 
that the CCP now began to publish, including the Military and Politi­
cal Journal of the Eighth Route Army, The Communist (a new theoretical
34-journal), Chinese Culture, The Chinese Worker, and others. Mao 
quickly became the most sought after writer in the entire CCP, and 
he was lionized by the Communist press. Gone were the days when his 
contributions to the Party’s leading journals were rejected and 
scorned (by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the late 1920’s, and the Returned Stu­
dents in the early 1930’s). He was now hailed as the foremost of
31Yang Sung, "Lun zui-jin Ou-zhou de ju-shi yu wo guo min-zu 
kang-zhan" (On the Most Recent Situation in Europe and Our Country’s 
National War of Resistance), JF, 72 (30 May 1939), p. 12.
^Ai Ssu-ch'i, "Zen-yang yan-jiu bian-zheng-fa wei-wu-lun" (How 
to Study Dialectical Materialism), JF, 82 (30 August 1939), p. 17.
33 •Cited in Jerome Ch’en, Mao, p. 20. Ch’en’s source is JF, 95
(30 December 1939), p. 20.
^The various texts are in Mao, Ji VI, pp. 307-310; Ji VII, pp. 
69-83; Ji VII, PP. 147-206; SW II, pp. 403-404; Ji VI, pp. 343-348; 
and Ji VII, pp. 57-68.
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the Party's theoretical writers as well as its greatest practical
leader. By the summer of 1939 there were no clear indications of a
highly developed cult centering on Mao or his thought, hut all the
signs were pointing in that direction. Yet there were hints that
Mao's growing pre-eminence was not whole-heartedly endorsed by all
Party leaders, including some of those who might be considered pro-
Maoist, or at least neutral. In an important writing of 30 May 1939,
for example, Ch'en Yun urged Party members to study both Marxism-
Leninism and Chinese .history, but nowhere did he even so much as
35refer to Mao or his writings. Likewise, in his review of the "his­
tory of Marxism-Leninism" on the occasion of the CCP's eighteenth 
anniversary in July 1939, Chang Wen-t'ien referred to Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin (and Sun Yat-sen, too), but failed to mention Mao 
and his writings.^
However, it was Liu Shao-ch'i, who was in due course to become
a staunch supporter of Mao, who appears to have openly voiced his
misgivings at Mao's growing power in 1939. In a lecture given at the
Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Yenan on 7 August 1939, Liu reflected
%
the current line in declaring that the CCP had Inherited all the
^Ch'en Yun, "How to be a Communist Party Member," (30 May 1939), 
as translated in Compton, op. cit., p. 106.
36Lo Fu, "Zai min-zu zi-wei-zhan zui qian-xian de gang-wei 
shang" (On the Most Advanced Position in the National War of Self- 
Defence); Lo Fu, "Lun gong-chan-dang de jie-ji li-chang yu min-zu 
li-ohang de yi-zhi" (On the Unity of the Class Stand of the Communist 
Party and the National Stand), both in JF, 75 (7 July 1939),pp. 26- 
29, 30-36.
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"fine traditions of the many progressive thinkers and prominent men"
in China's long history, hut nowhere does he refer to the current
37attempts to Sinify Marxism. More surprising is his total avoidance 
of any mention of Mao or his writings. Yet he referred to a wide 
range of Chinese traditional thinkers and Soviet theoreticians such 
as M. Mitin. He urged his audience to become "best pupils of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin," but avoided listing Mao Tse-tung as some- 
one to be emulated in like fashion. Finally, in what was most cer­
tainly a direct reference to the dangers of the increasing veneration 
of Mao at the time, Liu declared that Party members must adopt a 
proper attitude toward the various good and bad phenomena in the 
Party:
We /must/ first of all recognize and distinguish which of 
the various phenomena, ideologies, diverse opinions and 
views in the Party are correct... and which are incorrect.
...If both sides of an argument are wrong, a third opinion 
or viewpoint should be correct. After sober analysis and 
consideration, /we should/ decide on a clear and correct 
attitude of our own, and take our stand on the correct side.
/We should/ not follow blindly, nor worship any idols.39
Two points should be made here: First, in suggesting that there might
be a third —  and better —  way in a two-sided quarrel, Liu was pro­
bably pleading for a compromise between the ascendant Maoists and the 
Returned.Students. The signs of the times, on the contrary, were 
all pointing in the direction of a complete Maoist victory over their
37Liu Shao-ch'i, Lun gong-chan-dang yuan de xiu-yang, (On the 
Self-Cultivation of Communist Party Members), Hong Kong: Xin min- 
zhu chu-ban she, 1949, p. 76. This is a reprint of the original text 
as published in 1939.
^Ibid., p. 12.
^Ibid., pp. 86-67.
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erstwhile opponents.- Second, in anticipation of this total victory —  
and in fear of its possible consequences —  Liu went so far as to 
warn his audience to be wary of the "idol worship" which had recently 
appeared in the form of growing praise of Mao and his writings.^0 
That Liu’s implied criticism of Mao was perhaps too pointed is strong­
ly suggested by the fact that in 1962, when Liu revised the text of 
this lecture, Mao was cited no less than eight times, and the refer­
ence to idol worship was replaced by a caution not to "drift with the 
tide."^ By that time, of course, Liu had emerged as one of Mao’s 
most ardent eulogizers, and his earlier writings had to be altered 
to reflect his later enthusiasm for Mao. In light of Liu's growing 
importance in the Party from 1939 on, and his remarkable volte-face 
on the question of Mao’s supremacy in the CCP, we shall have occasion 
to return to Liu at regular intervals in the years up to 194-5. To a 
certain extent, Liu’s changing attitude toward the growing cult sur­
rounding Mao probably reflects the position of many of the Party's 
other top leaders as well.
In discussing the coolness with which top Party leaders like 
Liu Shao-ch1i greeted the increasing glorification of Mao and his 
writings, it is not intended to suggest that they were totally
^Of course, few of the top leaders in the Party personally 
idolized Mao at this time. In an interview with Edgar Snow on 9 
October 1939, for example, Po Ku revealed his dissatisfaction with 
Mao’s excessively hostile attitude toward Britain and the United 
States, See Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1957, pp. 24-23. Nonetheless,
as the cult of Mao developed in the early 1940's, even people like 
Po were ultimately forced to participate in it.
^Liu Shao-ch’i, Collected Works, I, pp. 207-208.
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opposed to Mao’s leadership as such. Nonetheless, apart from the dis­
agreement in principle that many of them might have harboured toward 
a Maoist cult, they probably also felt that in any case Mao's theo­
retical accomplishments were less than outstanding. Constant refer­
ence was now being made in the Party press to the importance of two 
of Mao’s writings of 1938, ”0n Protracted War” and ”0n the New Stage.” 
These were certainly important contributions to the Party’s develop­
ment, but hardly sufficient in themselves to sustain a claim to theo­
retical pre-eminence for their author. No mention was made of any 
of Mao’s many writings prior to 1938, and even his philosophical 
efforts of 1937 were ignored even by such supporters of Mao as Ch’en 
Po-ta himself. Clearly, If the current campaign to study Mao’s wri­
tings was going to succeed, It would be very helpful if Mao were to 
strengthen his own position as a Marxist-Leninist theoretician. Also, 
as John E. Hue has pointed out, Mao was increasingly desirous of 
counteracting the influence of Stalin’s new history of the CPSU,
which had been published in 1938 and assigned as required reading in
42the cadre education movement in Yenan. If Mao was to wean the CCP 
away from over-reliance on "foreign models" (however Bolshevist), it 
would make sense to provide the Party with a few basic texts of its 
own. Likewise, it would be desirable to discredit even further the 
Returned Student leadership and the policies, they had pursued in the 
past.
42John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1966, p. 282.
Mao tackled the latter problem by turning to the question of
Party history, a subject which Chang Wen-t'ien had studiously ignored
in his two essays on the CCP's eighteenth anniversary. As Mao noted
in his important preface (4 October 1939) to The Communist, the Party's
new theoretical journal, it was only by delving into the CCP's history
that the correct means could be found to build up a Bolshevised jiarty.
In his review of these eighteen years, Mao declared that it was only
after the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935 that the CCP "definitely
took the Bolshevik road and laid the foundations for the establish-
43ment of the national united front against Japan." But it had long 
been the Returned Students' thesis that it was their own Fourth Plenum 
in January 1931 that had marked the CCP's maturation as a truly Bol­
shevik party (hence another of their inner-party nicknames, the 
"Twenty-eight Bolsheviks"). They were now being asked by Mao to ac­
cept a new interpretation of Party history that still accorded the 
Fourth Plenum a positive role in the Party's development, but consi­
derably reduced its overall importance. Even worse, the new inter­
pretation prepared the way for the total discrediting of the Fourth 
Plenum (and hence of the Returned Students themselves) in the course 
of time. Indeed, Mao's preface to The Communist is a landmark in 
the Maoist reconstruction of Party history, and it helped set the 
tone for Ch'en Po-ta's later writings on the CCP which glorified 
Mao and completely disparaged the Returned Students.
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Shortly thereafter, Mao turned to the problem recently raised by 
Lo Mai, namely, the lack of a comprehensive textbook on Chinese his­
tory written from the Marxist standpoint. On 15 December 1939 Mao 
published a treatise which met this very need, entitled "The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party." Official sources have 
revealed that the text was written jointly by Mao and "several other 
comrades" in Yenan in the winter of 1939. Chapter I (a survey of 
Chinese history) was drafted by the "other comrades" but revised by 
Mao, while Chapter II (the modern Chinese revolution) was written 
by Mao himself. Chapter III (party-building) was for some unexplained 
reason "left unfinished by the comrades working on it."^ In this 
important text Mao introduced the term "new democracy," which he 
further developed in his major essay by that name of 19 January 1940. 
In light of this, we will postpone our discussion of this concept 
until we deal with the later and more famous (although not necessar­
ily more important) work, but there are two questions arising from 
the earlier text which we would like to raise now. One, who were the 
"other comrades" who wrote Chapter I on Chinese history? Two, why 
was Chapter III on party-building left unfinished? In view of Ch'en 
Po-ta's close relationship to Mao, his numerous posts in the Party's 
research establishment, and his recent writings on Chinese history 
and culture, it seems reasonable to conclude that Ch'en participated 
in drafting Chapter I, probably along with certain other intellec­
tuals in the Maoist camp. This is further suggested by the rather 
more positive attitude toward traditional history in the original
'^ Mao, XJ II, p. 584.
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text of 1939 than in the later revised version published in Mao's 
Selected Works in the 1950's.^
The case of the missing chapter on party-building is also an. 
interesting problem, and probably involves Ch'en as well. In the 
original version of the text, Mao concludes Chapter II by saying that 
"Below, we will discuss step by step the question of building up 
the Chinese Communist Party." It would seem then, that when Chapter 
II was printed it was intended that Chapter III would be Included, 
but that it was withdrawn only at the very last minute. In light of 
the importance of the chapter on party-building, one would have 
thought that the publication of the entire text would have been de­
layed to allow for the late completion of the chapter, if it were 
merely a question of time. Hence, the conclusion must be that the 
chapter was deleted for a more important reason than at first seems 
apparent. Some light is shed on this when we realize that the spe­
cial Party committee responsible for the study and preparation of 
materials on the history of the CCP was headed by Chang Wen-t'Ien, 
and included Ch'en Po-ta as one of its Important members. In spite 
of his key position on the committee, Chang had dodged the issue 
of Party history in his recent articles on the CCP's eighteenth 
anniversary. This forced Mao personally to tackle the question in 
his preface to The Communist, where he launched a direct attack on
45Compare, for example, the passage on China's revolutionary 
progenitors in Mao, Ji VII, p. 99 and Mao, XJ II, p. 586. As Stuart 
Schram has suggested in a private communication, however, this dim­
inution of the Importance of Chinese history might’have been in­
spired more by Soviet pressure than by Mao himself during the general 
revision of Mao's writings before publication.
^6Mao, Ji VII, p. 135.
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the Returned Students' line (heretofore the Party's official line) on 
Party history. As the proposed chapter on party-building would have 
entailed a review of Party history, the committee was probably para­
lyzed by the conflict between its pro- and anti-Maoist members. Cer­
tainly, as chairman of the committee, Chang Wen-t'ien was well placed 
to frustrate the Maoist faction (including Ch'en Po-ta), and he ap- 
pears to have succeeded in having the controversial chapter shelved. 
For their part, the Maoists seem to have given in on the issue at 
this time, and to have acquiesed, however unwillingly, in the publi­
cation of Mao's textbook in its truncated version. Nonetheless, the 
issue no doubt aggravated the already bad relations between the two 
factions, and by late 1939 the struggle for control of the Party's 
history began to emerge as one of the key areas of conflict between 
the Maoists and those Returned Students still willing to fight. It 
was a struggle in which Ch'en Po-ta was to play a particularly pro­
minent role on behalf of the Maoists.
(iii) Mao's Theory of "New Democracy"
In addition to the internal Party pressures compelling Mao to 
strengthen his position as the CCP's leading theorist, there were 
certain external needs that required his strengthening of the posi­
tion of the Party on the national scene. By the end of 1939 the ■ 
Nationalists had virtually blockaded the Shen-Kan-Ning Border 
Region, and repeated Japanese victories in China had induced a mood
47For a brief discussion of this committee on Party history, 
see Warren Kuo, op. cit., Ill, p. 235.
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of despair throughout the nation. These developments necessitated 
a positive response from the Party leadership, demonstrating to the 
nation that the CCP was a genuinely national Party capable of lead­
ing the Chinese people to victory. Mao met the need by publishing, 
on 15 February 194-0, "On New Democracy," a lengthy treatise in which 
he attempted his first systematic exposition of the nature of the 
Chinese revolution. It was regarded by all sides as a major writing 
when It was published (in the new CCP journal, Chinese Culture), 
and It has remained one of the key texts in Mao’s body of writings. 
However, our interest here is limited to Mao's concept of the term, 
"new democracy," and its theoretical implications. As "On New Demo­
cracy" was written for the general public, it is sometimes less use­
ful for understanding Mao's ideas than is his important textbook of 
the previous December, which was written for internal Party purposes. 
Consequently, we will refer to both writings in our discussion of 
new democracy, a concept used in the earlier text but (according to 
Mao's editors) "considerably developed" in the later work.
Due to China's particular national conditions, argues Mao, the
bourgeois-democratic revolution that China is going through at the
present time is not the old type, but is a "new, special type":
We call this type of revolution a new-democratic revolution 
... an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the 
broad masses of the people under the leadership of the pro­
letariat. That is, it is a revolution /carried out under7 
a united front of the various revolutionary c l a s s e s . 9^
^8Mao, XJ II, p. 584.
49Mao, Ji VII, p. 129.
168
Mao does not say in so many words that he is offering a new theory 
for the guidance of revolutionaries hoth within China and the wider 
world, hut this is certainly the implication of his argument. He 
makes it clear that his new-demo era tic revolution is not a mere tac­
tic, something to he dispensed with if the proletarian forces were 
to become powerful enough to carry out the revolution on their own.
On the contrary, "China must go through this revolution, for only
thus can it progressively develop toward the socialist revolution;
50there is no other way." New democracy, then, is to occupy a cen­
tral place in Mao1 s (and hence the CCP' s) theory of the Chinese revo­
lution, and it is to he the distinctive characteristic of the pro­
letarian revolution in China. It is a new type of revolution to pro­
duce a new type of society —  "no longer democracy in general, hut
democracy of the Chinese type /2hong-guo-shi de7, a new and special
C1type, namely, new democracy £xin min-zhu-zhu-yi// Mao’s new-demo­
cratic revolution is proletarian in content hut Chinese in form; that 
is, it is a "Chinese type" of proletarian revolution. The theory 
of the new-democratic revolution is thus the product of the correct 
application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the practice of the revo­
lution in China. It represents the proper integration of the "uni­
versal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the 
Chinese revolution", a fusion which Mao and Ch'en Po-ta had heen 
seeking for many years. Although Mao does not use the actual term, 
it is ohvious that his theory of the new-democratic revolution is a
^Loc. cit.
51Ibid., p. 151.
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direct product of the Sinification of Marxism-Leninism. The new
theory is at one and the same time Marxist in content and Chinese
in form. This is further suggested by the nature of the distinctive
new culture to which the new-democratic revolution will give rise.
Mao declares that, in his opinion, new democratic culture is "scien-
52
tific1 and "national," or in other words, Marxist and Chinese.
This of course poses the question of whether the new theory —  
precisely because of its essential Chineseness —  is applicable out­
side of China. In other words, is it a culture-bound theory that is 
irrelevant to the entire non-Chinese world? Not according to Mao, 
who suggests in his Party text that the new-democratic revolution is
in the course of developing not only in China, but "in all other
53
colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as China." As Mao 
does not see the new-democratic revolution developing in Europe,
North America and other non-colonial countries, the implications of 
his line of reasoning are obvious. He is suggesting that the Russian 
revolution of 1917, hitherto the sole example of an internationally 
valid Marxist-Leninist revolution, is to be supplemented (not re­
placed) by a new revolutionary model. That is, the Russian prole­
tarian revolution is to remain the prime example of a Marxist revo­
lution in the non-colonial (developed) world. On the other hand, a 
new revolutionary model —  China’s new-democratic revolution —  is 
henceforth to be regarded as the major example of a Marxist revo­
lution in the colonial and semi-colonial (under-developed) world.
2^Ibid, pp. '201-202.
53 ■Ibid, p. 129.
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Mao's new theory was likely to raise a few eyebrows in Moscow, whose 
ideological authority would be considerably weakened if the CCP's 
claim were to be sustained. By 194-0, however, the Russians were much 
too preoccupied with the rapidly developing war in Europe to pay 
much attention for the time being to what the CCP was saying, as op­
posed to what it was doing. As long as the Chinese Party was sup­
porting the united front against Japan, its precise ideological status 
could be left for closer consideration until after the war was over.
Mao’s concept of the new-democratic revolution provided the 
corner-stone to the CCP claim that Mao Tse-tung was a creative theo­
rist in his own right, and not merely a simple imitator of Marxism- 
Leninism. In fact, Mao had originated neither the actual term "new 
democracy,” nor the general idea behind it, for both had been common 
coinage for some time. In late 1937, for example, Wang Ming referred 
to China's future as a "new style democratic republic,” and in 193$
Po Ku predicted that China would surely become a "new, democratic
54-state.... the Republic of China of the Three People's Principles." 
Nonetheless, it was Mao who took this previously ill-defined concept 
and fleshed it out into a comprehensive, systematic theory of the 
Chinese revolution and its international significance. Even so, Mao 
was not alone in this endeavor. According to 0. Briere, the Jesuit 
priest then living in China and paying careful attention to the phi­
losophical aspects of the Chinese Communist movement, it was Ch'en
^Wang Ming is cited in Benton, op, cit., pp. 83-84-; on Po Ku, 
see his essay, "On the Development, the Difficulties, and the Future 
of the National Anti-Japanese United Front,” in Ch'en Shao-yu, Old 
Intrigues in New’Clothing, pp. 30-31*
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Po-ta who "developed the philosophical aspect" of Mao’s concept of
new democracy. D.W.Y. Kwok also states that Ch’en "is reputed to
have provided a good part of the philosophy" of new democracy, and a
Japanese source claims that Ch'en took an active part in the "New
55Democratic Culture Movement" in 194-0. Unfortunately, these authors 
give no sources for their claims, nor do they elaborate on exactly 
what they mean. One suspects that Kwok and the Japanese are simply 
referring to Briere (who made his observation in 1949), although 
they do not name him.
Yet it appears that Ch’en did exert a significant degree of in­
fluence on the formulation of the philosophical and cultural aspects 
of new democracy. From the philosophical, or ideological, point of 
view, the major distinguishing feature of the new-democratic revo­
lution is that it is a ’’democratic" revolution under the leadership 
of the ideology of the proletariat, vis, Marxism-Leninism. This 
sharply distinguishes it from the "old" type of democratic revolution, 
which was guided by the ideology of the bourgeoisie. We will recall 
that Ch’en Po-ta's New Enlightenment Movement of 1936-37 was "new" 
precisely because it was guided by Marxist dialectics, the "new phi­
losophy" of the Chinese proletariat. It is thus apparent that the 
general philosophical/ideological rationale behind Mao’s new demo­
cracy is directly derived from Ch’en’s earlier movement. "New demo­
cracy" and "new enlightenment" are both "new," and hence different 
from and superior to "old" democracy and "old" enlightenment, because
■^ For these references, see 0. Briere, Fifty Years of Chinese 
Philosophy, 1898-1950, London: George Allen and Unwin -Ltd., 1956,
p. 81; Kwok, op. cit., p. 192, n. 48; and Gendai Chugoku jimmei 
jiten, p. 485.
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they are social movements under the leadership of the "new philo­
sophy" of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism. Mao paid close atten­
tion to the Marxist philosophical debates in Shanghai and Peking in 
the late 1930's, and there can be little doubt that he was influenced 
by them. This was even more true after 1937, when many of the lead­
ing participants in these debates (including Ch’en Po-ta himself) came 
to play important roles in shaping the CCP’s ideology in Yenan. On 
the question of culture, let us recall Ch’en’s earlier proposal for 
the Sinification of China's modern culture, broadly defined. In the 
process of modernization, argued Ch’en, China’s modern culture was 
in danger of losing its distinctive Chinese character. The task, 
then, was to establish the proper balance between the genuine re­
quirements of modernization (which entailed the risk of Westerni­
zation) and the need to preserve a genuine Chinese character (which 
risked encouraging narrow nationalism) in China’s new cultural forms. 
The concept of Sinification outlined by Ch’en referred to the pro­
cess by which this balance could be found, the result being the gra­
dual emergence of a new Chinese culture which was both modern and 
Chinese. Mao had later applied Ch’en’s concept of Sinification to 
the narrower field of ideology, but he had avoided any extended com­
ments on the cultural sphere in general. By 1940, however, Mao was 
clearly more confident in cultural matters, and he dealt with them at 
length. In calling for a "new-democratic culture" that was equally 
a "national, scientific and mass culture," Mao was in fact repeating 
Ch’en’s proposals of 1938 for the Sinification of China’s culture.
The essential logic behind Ch'en’s proposal, as Mao’s new slogan
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takes into full acount, was that it was only a truly Sinified cul­
ture that stood any chance of appealing to the broad masses of the 
Chinese people in the modem twentieth century.
By 194-0 Mao's standing within the Chinese Communist Party was 
clearly at a new height. This was due to the gradual campaign to 
glorify him —  and the burst of new theoretical efforts on Mao's part 
accompanying it —  which developed in the course of the cadre educa­
tion movement. Mao’s growing stature did not pass unnoticed by the 
editors of Liberation, who undertook a new review of the journal's 
successes and failures on the occasion of its hundredth issue, 29 
February 1940. Since Liberation was the official journal of the CCP 
Central Committee, said the editors, many "leading comrades" in the 
Party had directly participated in its work. For example, over the 
' years the journal had published "many great works" of Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung, including "On Protracted War" and "On the New Stage," and 
now, most recently, "On New Democracy." The editorial represented 
a further escalation of Mao's personal prestige, for it described
him as being no less than the "leader of the people who is esteemed
56by the masses both at home and abroad." The editorial thus went 
much further than its-predecessor of 1 May 1939 in elevating Mao per­
sonally head and shoulders above all of the other top leaders in the 
Party. In deference to these leaders, however, the editors took 
pains to refer collectively to the "valuable writings" of (l) eight
56Editorial, "Zhan zai Zhong-hua min-zu jie-fang shi-ye de gian- 
jin gang-wei shang" (Standing in the Advanced Position in the Cause 
of China’s National Liberation), JF, 100 (29 February 1940), p. 3.
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Party leaders of the first importance (Chu Teh, Wang Ming, Lo Fu,
Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng, Ch'en Yun, Wang Chia-hsiaig and Liu Shao-
ch1 i, in that order),* and (2) eighteen additional Party and/or army
leaders who were presumably of lesser importance than the first eight
named. This careful listing of these twenty-six top Party and army
leaders was clearly designed to satisfy both the real (e.g., Chu Teh)
and the symbolic (e.g., Wang Ming) leading personalities in the CCP.
They may well have supported (or at least accepted) the new campaign
to elevate Mao above themselves, but they were obviously determined
57not to let their own achievements pass unnoticed in the process.
Mao's prestige was growing outside the confines of the CCP as 
well. Paul Linebarger, an American scholar who was in China at the 
time, and who was by no means sympathetic to the Communists, wrote 
that Mao Tse-tung is an "expert dialectician, skilled in rational­
izing the policies of the Communist International, and keenly criti-
58cal within the limits of his Marxian orthodoxy." This descrip­
tion of Mao is very interesting, for it accurately reflects the 
exact image that Mao was trying to promote of himself. That is, even 
so critical an observer as Linebarger concluded that Mao was a com­
petent Marxist-Leninist theorist who maintained a firm spirit of in­
dependence from Moscow. Mao could not have described himself better,
57Note the similarity in the title of this editorial and the 
first of Lo Fu's articles on the eighteenth anniversary of the CCP. 
(See p. 159, n.36 above.) Was Lo finally persuaded to praise Mao 
openly in this special editorial, or was it written by someone else 
in response to Lo's neglect of Mao in his earlier essay? Perhaps 
there was a compromise; Lo agreed to praise Mao provided the other 
important Party and army leaders were given due regard at the same 
time.
58Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 167-168.
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and Linebarger's comments reflect the remarkable degree of success 
enjoyed by the effective propaganda machine that the ascendant Mao­
ists had built up in Yenan. Even the Nationalists, who had no love 
for Communists of any hue, were increasingly forced to acknowledge 
that Mao Tse-tung stood apart from the normal run of CCP leaders. 
Writing in the autumn of 1939, for example, Yeh Ch'ing scathingly 
reviewed Mao's recent comments on the outbreak of World War II in 
Europe, concluding that his erroneous views arose from the fact that:
Mr. Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of 
'Sinifying' things. I express my sympathy for him in 
his policy of 1 Sinification'... .What I mean by sym­
pathy is that I like the way he appreciates the Chinese 
national culture, and wants to be a one hundred per 
cent Chinese. In this respect he is more worthy of 
Ch' en 
ment.^
Although Ch'en’s article is filled with venom from beginning to end, 
it is interesting that he clearly distinguishes between Mao and Wang 
Ming on the basis of their attitude toward Sinification. Wang had 
long been intimately associated with Moscow and the Comintern, .and 
had regarded himself as the leading spokesman of the true Bolsheviks 
in the Chinese Communist movement. This may have gone down well in 
the CCP (prior to Mao’s ascendancy), but it was scarcely calculated 
to impress the Nationalists or other non-communist groups in China.
Ch'en Kuo-hsin (Yeh Ch'ing), "A Discussion of Mao Tse-tung's 
Comments on the Present State of International Relations," as trans­
lated in Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 403-417. The quotation is from 
pp. 416-417. Stuart Schram, in a private communication to the author, 
has suggested that "Ch'en Kuo-hsin" is probably a mistranslitera- 
tion (or a variant) of Jen Cho-hsftan, the real name of Yeh Ch'ing.
We have substituted "Sinification" for Linebarger's."Chinafication," 
which is obviously a literal translation of "Zhong-guo-hua." For a 
fuller discussion of Yeh's critique of Mao and; his theory of Sinifi­
cation, see Chapter VI of this study, especially pp. 185-195.
hao-yu, and hence deserving of greater achieve-
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Mao's connections with Moscow were never so close, and his posture of 
independence from the Comintern was considerably enhanced by his 
recent policy of Sinification of Marxism-Leninism. Apparently, if 
Yeh's views are representative of the Nationalists, Mao was a more 
acceptable leader of the CCP than Wang Ming or any of his Returned 
Student followers. Even if Mao's policy of Sinification did not ac­
tually appeal to people like Yeh, it did provide them with another 
opportunity to drive a wedge between the two major factions of the 
CCP. Without in any way discounting this possibility, there is lit­
tle doubt that Mao's growing appreciativeness of Chinese history and 
traditional culture did strike a responsive chord even among those 
Chinese who had little love for the Communists. If nothing else, 
Mao's new policy of Sinification represented a step in the right 
direction; today Marxism might merely be Sinified, but tomorrow it 
could be completely assimilated in the traditional Chinese fashion, 
and thereby deprived of its Western, revolutionary pretensions.
Nineteen thirty-nine was an important year in Mao's gradual
rise as the top leader —  and the leading theoretician —  in the
Chinese Communist Party. Thus Stuart Schram is correct in concluding
that by the winter of 1939-40, "Mao was at last in complete control
of the policy and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party....Wang
Ming was relegated to subordinate functions and ceased to play any
60real role by the end of 1939." Yet. this statement has to be qual­
ified, for Mao was to encounter a series of challenges to his author­
ity during much of 1940 and part of 1941. It was in the summer of
60Schram, Mao, p. 216.
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1940, for example, that Wang Ming and his supporters organized their 
last clear act of defiance of the Maoists, before completely losing 
their influence in the Party. These challenges to Mao's ascendancy 
were by no means of the same magnitude as those of Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
or Wang Ming in his prime, but they were apparently serious enough 
to convince Mao that greater efforts were required to place the 
Party squarely under his leadership, and to root out once and for all 
the remaining pockets of opposition that lingered on in the Party 
organization. This determination led to his call for a "rectification 
movement" that was to dominate the life of the Party during most of 
1942, and to establish Mao Tse-tung finally as the undisputed leader 
of both the theory and practice of the CCP.
CHAPTER VI
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, 1940-41
(i) The Challenge to Mao's Authority
Mao Tse-tung's power and prestige reached a new height in the 
winter of 1939-40, hut this coincided with an important development 
in the war against Japan. After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, 
the Japanese did not undertake any further major offensives in China, 
and a period of relative stalemate set in. This gave the National­
ists an opportunity to turn their attention to the Communists, and 
during 1939 severe strains began to appear in the united front. Ap­
parently, the KMT's increasing harassment of the Communists caused 
certain groups in the CCP to call for a tougher line against the 
Nationalists. "Such an extreme leftist tendency," runs one official 
account, "emerged as the principal danger within the Party, which
hindered the Party in its effort to further enlarge and consolidate
1
the united front against Japan." This leftism was contrary to the 
Party's policy, and Mao had to take steps to nip the "tendency" in 
the bud before it became too powerful. In light of this, the Hun­
dred Regiments Offensive in the summer and autumn of 1940 was as 
much designed to convince certain groups in the Communist camp as 
others in the Nationalist side that the war of attrition.
1 . . .Wang Shih, et al., Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang Ii-shi jian-bian
(A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party), Shanghai: Ren-
min chu-ban she, 1958. . Translated in Joint Publications Research 
Service, 8756 (16 August 1961), p. 214-
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against Japan was still the number one priority for all concerned. 
However, Chu Teh and P' eng Teh-huai apparently overruled Mao re­
garding the exact tactics and timing of the offensive. This alleged 
dispute between Mao and his top military commanders remains obscure, 
but it does seem in keeping with the general loosening of discipline
in both the Party and the army occasioned by the leftist currents
2
which had emerged in the spring of 1940.
Yet one man’s difficulty is often another’s opportunity. In 
July 1940, when Mao was facing the leftist upsurge discussed above, 
Wang Ming reissued the pamphlet he had originally written in 1931, 
The Two Lines. At this late stage Wang probably had no hope of ac­
tually regaining his former powerful role in the Party. Nonethe­
less, he capitalized on the leftist climate within the CCP in an 
attempt to have the general line of the Returned Students (which 
the Maoists were now claiming was ’left opportunist”) accepted as 
correct within the context of its times. Wang was perhaps prepared 
to accept the validity of Mao's general line since the Tsunyi Con­
ference, but not at the cost of having his own line in the early 
1930's completely repudiated in the Party’s history. In Wang’s 
opinion, there was nothing inconsistent in viewing the Returned Stu­
dents’ line as correct for its times, at the same time regarding 
Mho's present line as correct in light of changing circumstances
2
The Maoists have singled out P'eng Teh-huai as the leading 
culprit in this regard. See the Red Guard materials collected in 
Current Background, 851 (26 August 1968), pp. 6, 28; and also in The 
Case of Pbng Teh-huai, 1959-1968, Hong Kong: Union, Research Insti-
tute, 1968, pp. 191-193* 212. According to these documents, P'eng 
admitted to his errors in the Hundred Regiments Offensive in the 
course of a "self-examination” at the Lushan Plenum in 1959.
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between the early 1930’s and early 1940’s. How else are we to inter­
pret Wang's plea, in the new preface (March 1940) to his pamphlet, to
the effect that:
Every true dialectical and historical materialist cannot 
deal with a problem apart from the conditions of a cer-
time and place. He cannot regard what was correct yes­
terday as entirely wrong today, nor decide that what is 
incorrect today could not have been right yesterday.
Likewise, he cannot regard what was right there as en­
tirely incorrect here, nor decide that what is incorrect 
here could not have been right there. Everything is-de­
cided by time and place, by the various concrete condi­
tions and circumstances of a given time and place.^
Wang's ultimate intention may have been merely to seek a modus viv- 
endi which would save face on the part of the Returned Students, but 
it is unlikely that the reissue of his pamphlet was well received by 
the Maoists. Mao's difficulties in the spring of 1940 gave Wang an 
opportunity that might not be repeated, but his precipitate action 
likely convinced the Maoists that he could not be trusted. Should 
they face even greater difficulties in the future, might not Wang 
and his supporters pose a real threat to Mao's ascendancy? In any 
case, Wang did not help his position by studiously retitling his 
pamphlet Struggle for the Further Bolshevigation of the Chinese Com­
munist Party. This was clearly a rejoinder to Mao's recent claim 
that the CCP had "definitely taken the Bolshevik road" only after the 
Tsunyi Conference in 1935, and not at the Fourth Plenum in 1931. 
Wang's republication of his controversial treatise on Party history 
was probably his last .clear act of defiance of the ascendant Maoists
3
As quoted in Warren Kuo, op. cit., II, p. 264; revised trans­
lation based on the Chinese text, II, pp. 209-210. -For more de­
tails on Wang’s book and its role in CCP history, see Hsiao Tso-liang, 
op. cit., pp. 202-207.
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before he was to suffer the humiliation of the Rectification Move­
ment. As Gregor Benton has pointed out, the New Fourth Army was 
the last stronghold of Wang's united front policy, and when this
army was destroyed by the Nationalists in January 194-1, Wang's re-
/
maining political influence perished along with it.
Apart from Wang's opposition, Mao was still facing other pockets 
of dissidence in the Party. In a directive of 25 December 194-0, for 
example, he complained that the "ultra-left viewpoint is creating 
trouble, and is still the main danger in the Party." Undoubtedly,
this leftist tendency had been strengthened by the outcome of the
Communists1 Hundred Regiments Offensive. Greatly perturbed by.this 
dramatic display of Communist power, the Nationalists decided that
the time had come for greater efforts to contain their united front
allies. The existing blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region 
was intensified, and, as we have seen, in early 1941 Nationalist ar­
mies destroyed the CCP’s New Fourth Army in southern Anhwei province. 
This incident strengthened the position of the leftists within the 
CCP, for it seemed to confirm their theory that the class contra­
dictions between the KMT and the CCP had come to overshadow the na­
tional contradictions between China and Japan. Although the CCP 
was able to weather the Nationalists1 new offensive between October 
1940 and March 1941, there was apparently some disarray in its ranks. 
In a directive of 8 May 1941, for example, Mao noted that "some com­
rades" felt that under the new circumstances "we no longer need the
B^enton, op. cit., p. 88; Tokuda, op. cit., p. 34?
5Mao, XJ II, pp. 723-724.
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kind of state power that includes all those who stand for resistance 
and democracy, hut need a so-called state of power of workers, pea­
sants, and urban petty bourgeoisie."^ This amounted to a total rejec­
tion of Mao’s recently formulated concept of the new-democratic revo­
lution. The leftists were treating his new theory of the Ghinese revo­
lution as a mere tactic, something that could be dispensed with ac­
cording to changes in the practical situation. This, of course, was 
unacceptable to Mao, and it is not surprising that he complained
that the "Party’s correct policy has become blurred in the minds of
7these comrades, at least for the time being." By the spring of 
1941, however, Mao was no longer prepared to tolerate the ideologi­
cal and organizational dissension that had wracked the CCP since 
early 1940. The Party was facing a crisis, and Mao no doubt be­
lieved that only decisive action on his part would save it from dis­
aster.
It could be argued that the leftist tendency we have been dis­
cussing was serious, but not severe enough to precipitate a crisis 
of leadership in the CCP. Mao, after ally had made great gains at 
the Sixth Plenum in 1938, and there appeared to be no single lea­
der (Wang Ming included) strong enough to challenge him with any 
great hope of success. Nonetheless, when the internal Party conflicts 
discussed above are seen in the context of the difficult problems 
the Party was facing in other areas, one can appreciate just how ex­
plosive the situation really was. Rapid expansion had placed fresh
7-Log. cit
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strains on the Party's organization, and the premature termination 
of the cadre, education movement in mid-1940 had hampered the indoc­
trination of the flood of new members. In the economic sphere, the 
increasing effectiveness of the Nationalist blockade of the Shen- 
Kan-Ning Border Region had led to commodity scarcity and "rampant 
inflation," resulting in increased taxation of the population in the
g
Communist areas. Militarily, the destruction of the New Fourth 
Army in January 1941 had reduced the united front to a fiction, and 
the Japanese soon seized the opportunity to step up their pressure 
on the Communists. Although conditions in the various Communist 
base areas were to deteriorate further, it is obvious that by the 
spring of 1941 the Communists were indeed facing a crisis.
In a recent study of the Yenan period, Mark Selden has gone so 
far as to compare the crisis of 1941 with those of 1927 and 19343 
each of which involved the Communist movement in "crippling defeats 
verging on annihilation." In each of these instances Mao Tse-tung 
emerged as the "leading architect" of the new line that was to save 
the CCP from destruction at the hands of its enemies. The break-up 
of the first united front in 1927 gave rise to Mao's rural strategy, 
the liquidation of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1934 saw Mao espouse the 
cause of the second united front, while the military and economic 
blockade of the Communist base areas in 1941 gave birth to Mao's
9
theory and practice of the mass line. Selden is undoubtedly correct
g
Selden, op. cit., pp. 180-181. Selden has collected a great 
deal of economic information on the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region be- . 
tween 1933 and 1943.
9Ibid., p. 177.
in equating the crisis of 194-1 with those of 1927 and 1934 in terms 
of its potential danger to the continued existence of the CCP, hut 
there is a major difference between the crisis of 1941 and the two 
earlier ones. In 1927 and 1934 Mao was very much on the fringe of 
things in terms of Party leadership; in 1927 he was a relatively 
minor figure in the Party's top echelons, while in 1934 he had al­
ready been dropped from his important Party and army positions under 
the Returned Students' ascendancy. Consequently, when things went 
wrong at these respective crisis points, those leaders actually in 
power (Ch'en'Tu-hsiu in 1927, Wang Ming and Po Ku in 1934) became 
the inevitable scapegoats. Mao was then well placed to emerge from 
the wings as a leading critic of the fallen leaders, and on both oc­
casions he was able to establish himself as the pivotal figure in 
the new leadership group that emerged. In 1941 > however, the situ­
ation was quite the reverse. Mao himself was clearly in command of 
the Party, and should the CCP succumb to the growing crisis of 1941 
it would be Mao who would carry the lion's share of the blame.
This time it would perhaps be Wang Ming and/or a Returned Student- 
military coalition group who would step from the wings as Mao's 
chief accusers and successors. Mao had survived the crises of 1927 
and 1934 partly because he had little responsibility for them in 
the first place, but the same would not be true if the Party failed 
to weather the crisis of 1941.
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(ii) Yeh Ch'ing Attacks-Mao
No doubt realizing that Mao was in a difficult situation, Yeh 
Ch'ing (Jen Cho-hsuan) seized the opportunity to launch a sharp at­
tack on Mao's personal leadership, and in particular on his compe­
tence as a Marxist theoretician, Yeh was a former CCP leader who 
left the Party in 1928, having been arrested and threatened with 
execution by the Nationalists. He adopted an "independent Marxist" 
stance thereafter, and rose to prominence in Shanghai during the 
1930's as a vigorous participant in the various intellectual debates 
of that decade. Disturbed by the Japanese invasion of 1937, Yeh 
quickly abandoned his polemics with the CCP's urban theorists (in­
cluding Ch'en Po-ta), and he renewed his contacts with the Nation­
alist Party, with which he had cooperated at various times in the 
’past. Becoming increasingly nationalistic in his outlook, he toned 
down his Marxist beliefs somewhat (without abandoning them entirely), 
and rejoined the Nationalist Party in 1939. After holding many 
posts in the KMT’s political education system, in 194-2 he became 
head of the research section of the Party's organization department, 
and in 194-3 he was elected an executive secretary of the KMT's San- 
min zhu-yi Youth Corps.^ Yeh's rise to power in the Nationalist 
Party was due in part to the success of a book he published in the 
spring of 194-1, A Critique of Mao Tse-tung. Reprinted and expanded 
many times since it was first published, Yeh's Critique was perhaps 
the most comprehensive and sophisticated attack against Mao to have
^For these details on Yeh Ch'ing's career, see the listing 
under Jen Cho-hsiian in Boorman and Howard, op. cit., II, pp. 218- 
219.
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11issued from the Nationalist camp at the time it was published.
Yeh dealt at some length with Mao’s theoretical concepts, in parti­
cular with his proposal for the Sinification of Marxism, and it is 
this issue which interests us here. Although in its broad outlines 
Yeh’s critical analysis of Mao and the CCP is representative of 
official KMT attitudes, Yeh consistently argues from within the 
’.’socialist” tradition as an avowedly objective student of "scien­
tific communism." Obviously, such an approach would best appeal 
to the particular audience at which Yeh was directing his message, 
namely, those literate individuals within the broad leftist move­
ment in China who were weighing the merits of Mao's call for a "new 
democracy" the previous year. Indeed, Yeh time and again declares 
that Mao’s aim in proposing the idea of new democracy is to estab­
lish a "basis for the existence.. .and development" of a communist 
party in China, i.e., the CCP. Not unexpectedly, Yeh hastens to, 
assure the reader that Mao’s attempt to plant the roots of new demo­
cracy in China, however ingenious‘it may be, will in the final 
analysis "fail completely." It will fail, says Yeh, because the 
idea of new democracy is the defective concept of a so-called Chinese 
Communist leader who understands neither the essence of communism
11 t*Yeh Ch'ing (Jen Cho-hsuan), Mao Ze-dong pi-pan (A Critique 
of Mao Tse-tung), 5th ad., Taipei: Pa-mi-er shh-daan, 1961. Yeh’s 
booh was completed in March 1941, and published immediately there­
after in Chungking and other places throughout China. It has gone 
through many revisions since then, largely involving the addition of 
new material rather than substantive alteration of the original text. 
For details on the book’s publication history, see Yeh’s preface to 
the 5th edition used here.
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nor the process by which it can he adapted to the special needs of 
12China.
Yeh is not entirely dismissive of Mao. Indeed, since he is more 
experienced than Wang Ming and his generation of CCP leaders, Mao 
has recognized the need to resolve the contradiction between "Marxist 
methods" and "Chinese reality," For this he should be congratulated. 
Nonetheless, because Mao's understanding of Marxism is basically 
faulty, his grasp of the concept of the Sinification of Marxism is 
correspondingly confused, and his efforts along this line have been 
unsuccessful. Since the time of Sun Yat-sen’s emergence as a theo­
rist, argues Yeh, the world "communist" or "socialist" movement (Yeh 
uses the two terms interchangeably) can be divided into two major 
schools of thought. Employing their own terminology, one school ad­
vocates "communism," while the other espouses the "Principle of 
People's Livlihood." In terms of content, argues Yeh, there is no 
fundamental difference between these two "isms" (zhu-yi); rather, 
their distinctive characters emerge from the differing methods they 
employ in realizing their aims in practice. In other words:
This similar aim constitutes the generality of socialism, 
and is applicable to the world. These dissimilar methods 
constitute the peculiarity of socialism, and are applic­
able to specific countries.13
12Ibid., p. 91. 
13Ibid., pp. 99-100.
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From this one can immediately see that the hind of socialism that is 
universally applicable regardless of time or place is only socialism 
in its generalized or abstract form, namely, the "concept" (yi-nian) 
of the common ownership of property. This type of abstract socialism, 
says Yeh, has been talked about since ancient times in China and 
the rest of the world, but it has never been realized in practice. 
Since it did not accord with the concrete conditions in specific 
countries at particular times, it was unscientific and hence utopian 
in character. Yet, argues Yeh, the world has already moved beyond 
this utopian socialism of the past, and contemporary socialism or 
communism may be divided into two concrete, specific types according 
to regions of the globe —  European socialism and Chinese socialism.
One is naturally intrigued as to how these two distinctive 
types of concrete socialism came about, and Yeh is quick to oblige 
with an answer. All theories or "isms," he suggests, are created 
by the flesh and blood individuals for whom they are named, indi­
viduals who lived a "concrete" existence in a specific time and 
place, and whose thought is coloured by these temporal and spacial 
characteristics. Hence, the precise qualities of the thought that 
emerges from the minds of these gifted individuals cannot but be 
determined by the particular era and specific country in which they 
lived. Nowhere is this general truth more evident than in the case 
of the emergence of the' two different types of socialism to which 
Yeh refers. In the momentous transition from utopian to scientific 
socialism, claims Yeh:
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It was Marx and Sun Yat-sen who particularized the gener­
al. The former's particularization was Europeanization 
T^5u-zhou-hua7, and the latter's particularization was Sin­
ification /2hong-guo-hua7. All particularities are con­
crete. Therefore, European socialism and Chinese social­
ism are both particular socialisms, concrete socialisms. 
Because they accord with the conditions under which they 
exist, they may both be termed scientific socialism. They 
each use particular methods to arrive at a general goal, 
and traverse different paths to the same destination. 14
Yeh's concept of "particular methods" is of considerable importance 
to his entire argument, for he believes that Marxism is the parti­
cular method by which the general goal of socialism can be realized 
in countries in which capitalism is fully developed. Hence, since 
capitalism is not by any stretch of the Imagination fully developed 
in China, Marxist methods are not applicable. Furthermore, says 
Yeh, capitalism —  with the resulting division of society into two 
antagonistic classes (bourgeoisie and proletariat) —  will never 
develop In China, because the implementation of Sun Yat-sen Ts theo­
ries will enable China to skip the stage of. capitalism on the way 
to socialism. Under the guidance of Sun's ideas, China can avoid 
the costly "two-stage revolution" (i.e., political and social revo­
lution) which is the particular product of the capitalist class 
system, and which in turn is the only method for the transformation 
of capitalism into socialism. As for China, things will be entire­
ly different, because, in the course of that country fe "one-stage 
revolution":
*^ Loc. cit.
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State operation of industry, regulation of capital, and 
equalization of power-are the most appropriate /^methods/, 
and they will lead to the common ownership of property.
A Sinified communism will have gradually emerged, hut this 
will be called the Principle of People’s Livelihood* Xt 
will be the socialism of Sun Yat-sen, not Marxist social­
ism, 15
On the basis of the foregoing argument, Yeh scornfully dismisses 
Mao’s attempts at Sinifying Marxism as both futile and misleading. 
"Thus,” he concludes, "the Marxism of Mao Tse-tung is Sinified in 
name but rigidly foreign in reality, and is purely a form of ’dog­
matism’ . This pessimistic conclusion naturally has implications 
for the political party which Mao leads, and it is no surprise that 
Yeh finds the CCP to be neither a genuine product of Chinese society, 
nor needed by the Chinese people in their struggle for liberation.
It is all too obvious, he says, that the CCP is entirely the creation 
of external, non-Chinese forces, the USSR and the Comintern in par­
ticular. Indeed, the short history of the CCP has already indicated 
that it only has three paths open to it in the years ahead. One, it . 
can be "Russified” (E-guo-hua) if It adopts Russian Bolshevism as 
its ideology and the CPSU/Comintern as its organizational form, as 
it has done at various times in the past. Two, it can be "Sinified", 
but falsely, and in a backward form, if it adopts the ideology and- 
behaviour of such traditional Chinese "roving bandits" as Li Tsu­
ch ’eng (who led a peasant rebellion against the Ming dynasty), as it 
is now doing in spite of the united front. Third, suggests Yeh, it
15Ibid., p. 98. 
l6Ibid., p. 106.
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can "be truly "Sinified"■in a modern, progressive form if it adopts 
the Three Principles of the People as its ideology and genuinely 
joins forces with the Nationalists, as it did at least partially in 
the past. In abandoning their allegiance to the CCP, Yeh adds reas­
suringly, Party members need not give up their hopes for the future 
of their homeland. They should realize that mere labels can be de­
ceiving, that while the Communist party in Europe is a progressive 
force, in China it is reactionary. In joining the Nationalist Party, 
former members of the CCP are at the same time embracing the ideas 
of Sun Yat-sen, whose ideology is in full accord with the realities 
of China’s contemporary one-stage revolution. As such, this ideology
is both scientific and progressive, because it is a "product of the
17age, and can undertake the historical'task of transforming China."
In conclusion, Yeh reaffirms his belief that Mao and himself 
(and Karl Marx and Sun Yat-sen, too) share the common conviction 
that "world history is moving toward socialism." The crucial differ­
ences that exist between them lie in their conflicting interpreta­
tions of the "historical laws" which govern this process of change 
from one social system to another. Since, argues Yeh, the two- 
stage, revolution of Marx is applicable to countries "in which capi­
talism is developed and class divisions are distinct, we may desig­
nate it as the path for advanced countries." Sun Yat-sen’s theory 
of the one-stage revolution, however, is quite distinct. Since 
it is applicable to China and to other countries "in which capitalism
17Ibid., p. 113.
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is not developed and class divisions are not distinct, we may desig­
nate it as the path for backward countries.1 Although Yeh is auda­
cious in claiming that China represents the revolutionary model for 
all "backward1 countries in their march toward socialism, he hastens 
to reassure his readers that China and her fellow underdeveloped 
countries will not remain inferior to Europe indefinitely. While 
he pays tribute to Europe for pioneering the initial impetus toward 
the formulation of correct theories leading to the movement-toward 
socialism, he continues:
Once Europe pointed out clearly the inevitability of 
moving toward socialism, China was able to take this 
as an_example and consciously 1 catch up1 /ying-tou gan- 
shang7, and cannot but take the shortest route..../to
socialism// This is of course a special situation.
Although Yeh claims that the socialist movement in China and other 
underdeveloped countries can "catch up" with the movement toward 
socialism in Europe and the advanced world, he does not claim that 
the path pointed out by Sun Yat-sen is thereby superior to that in­
dicated by Marx. "All things are composed of the unity of the gen­
eral and the particular," he states, indicating that in the era of 
scientific socialism, the European path to socialism is a "general 
law" in the sense that it preceded and provided the basis for the 
emergence of the Chinese path to socialism, which is a "particular 
law." /This does not contradict his earlier proposition that, in
the decisive transition from utopian to scientific socialism, Marx­
ism represented the particularization (Viz, "Europeanization" ) of 
the abstract notion of socialism and communism// Like everything
i £
Ibid,, p. 119.
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else, concludes Yeh, the "historical laws of the world" are formed
by the unity of the general and the particular:
They are formed by the unity of the historical laws of 
Europe and the historical laws of China. In other 
words, the historical laws of the world are formed by 
the unity of Europe's two-stage revolution and China's 
one-stage revolution....Communism is European social­
ism, and the Three People's Principles represent Chi­
nese socialism. Each has its own framework, and each 
has its own countries to which it is applicable.19
We do not wish to discuss the merits of Yeh's general argument, 
for that is something best left to the reader. Two points are 
worthy of brief mention, however, the first being Yeh's rather 
sweeping assumption that the sum total of world historical devel­
opment can be encompassed by the European and Chinese revolutionary 
models. Throughout Yeh’s discussion, he reveals a consistent ten­
dency to equate the global significance of Europe (and North Amer­
ica) on the one hand, and China on the other. The suggestion of 
such equivalence was, of course, very flattering to those Chinese 
nationalists who were struggling to free their countrymen (and 
themselves) from the crippling sense of cultural inferiority that had 
resulted from the decline of China at the hands of the more power­
ful West. On this particular issue, Yeh had much in common with 
the emerging views of 3Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, who had also 
concluded that the Chinese revolutionary model (i.e., the Maoist 
revolutionary model) was of increasing international significance, 
especially in relation to the colonial world of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. While they were to remain bitterly divided in the
^Loc. cit..
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political sphere, both Yeh and Mao betrayed an -unmistakable sense of 
nationalism that gave a similar hue to the way in which they con­
ceived China's role in the world, and its relations with other na- 
20tions. On the other hand, Yeh berated Mao for attempting to apply 
the methods of the European socialist revolution (viz, Marxism) to 
China's special conditions, As we have seen from our previous dis­
cussions, Mao would have heartily agreed with Yeh that such an attempt 
would be futile. It was precisely for this reason that Mao constant­
ly distinguished between the inner content of Marxism and its outer 
form, rejecting the latter as "dogma" in the Chinese context, but 
retaining the essence of the former. In actuality, however, Yeh's 
critique of Mao revolved around the correct interpretation of Sun 
Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. To Yeh, Sun's ideology repre­
sented above all the Sinified form of the universal socialist idea, 
so it naturally followed that any attempt such as Mao's to concoct 
yet another (and necessarily bogus) form of Sinified socialism was 
misguided at best, and subversive in actual practice. Hence his 
appeal to Mao to give up his foolish endeavours, join forces with 
the Nationalist Party, and strive ardently for the realization of 
Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. Only by doing.so, con­
cluded Yeh, could the Chinese Communist Party and its ideological
20For a general discussion of the international significance 
of Sun Yat-sen1s Ideology, see Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "Sun 
Yat-senism as a model for Syncretistic Ideologies of Developing 
Countries," in Richard Lowenthal, ed., Issues in the Future of Asia, 
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969, pp. 149-176.
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doctrines be truly Sinified, and hence of use to the Chinese people 
and their revolutionary cause. Failing that, the Chinese Communists 
were doomed to final destruction.
Yeh Ch'ing1 s attach on Mao came at a time when the CCP was 
facing most serious threats to both its internal and external stabi­
lity. As these threats also endangered Mao's own position as the 
Party's top leader, it is not surprising that in the spring of 194-1 
he moved to reassert his' authority in the Party. The cadre education 
movement had been wound up in June 194-0, but this was probably dic­
tated more by necessity than by choice. The leftist upsurge in the 
Party in the spring of 1940 had inaugurated an entire year of inner- 
Party dissension, and the formal study movement had to be abandoned 
before it had penetrated deeply into the rank-and-file membership of 
the Party. Mao clearly indicated his impatience with this inner- 
Party discord by attempting to breathe new life into his ill-fated 
educational campaign. In February 1941 the Party published for the 
first time Mao's "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 
a series of lectures he had delivered in 1936. Their belated pub­
lication over four years later at first glance seems odd, but not 
when it is realized that it was in these lectures that Mao had devel­
oped his first systematic critique of the military strategy of the 
Returned Students during the early 1930's. By 1941 it was common 
knowledge in Yenan that Mao characterized the military line of the 
Returned Students as "left adventurism", and this.was doubtless 
borne in mind by those leftist comrades who were then arguing in
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favour of an open spilt'with the Nationalists, and a reversion to the 
military strategy of agrarian revolution. As Mao saw it, the careful 
study of his lectures would he a salutary experience for those'Re­
turned Students who might he repeating their former errors, and equal
ly for those individuals who had no wish to become personally iden-
21tified with the military line of this now-discredited faction.
In a preface and postscript to a volume entitled Rural Surveys
(March-April 19-41 )* Mao made a thinly veiled attack on the military
policies of the Returned Students. He pointed out that the Party's
present "dual policy"—  synthesizing both alliance and struggle
(with the Nationalists) —  "is the most revolutionary policy for
22China today. It is mistaken to oppose and obstruct this line." 
Having laid down the law in the military sphere, Mao moved on to the 
consideration of broader concerns in the life of the Party. Empha­
sizing that the CCP was working in a "most complicated Chinese en­
vironment," he drew the conclusion that at the present stage in 
the revolution one of the Party's "indispensible historical tasks"
was the "scrupulous and resolute preservation of the communist pur-
23ity" of all its members. In the following month of May, Mao 
formally called for the revival of the defunct cadre education move-
21Stuart Schram has also suggested that the publication of 
these lectures in early 1941 might have symbolized the de facto end 
of the Nationalist-Communist united front. See Schram, Mao, pp. 
218-219.
22Mao, Ji VII, p. 298.
23Loc. cit.
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ment, and by early 1942 this had been transformed into the Recti­
fication Movement, one of the pivotal episodes in the history of the 
CCP.
(iii) Ch’en Po-ta's Dispute with Wang Shih-wei
Before moving on to a consideration of the beginning of the 
Rectification Movement, it is necessary to discuss a rather obscure 
quarrel in the winter of 1940-41 between ChTen Po-ta and Wang Shih- 
wei, both of whom worked in the Party's Marxist-Leninist Institute. 
This dispute appears to have had a considerable impact on the course 
of the Rectification Movement itself, and as such it deserves to be 
discussed in some detail. In early 1940 Ch'en took an active part 
in promoting Mao's call for a new-democratic government, and in Feb­
ruary of that year he was elected to the Executive Committee of the 
Yenan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government. 
Shortly thereafter, on 8 March, he published an essay calling for a
"democratic constitution of the dictatorship of the various revolu- 
o/
tionary classes." By mid-1939 Ch'en had begun to cut down on his 
writings on purely cultural topics, feeling that he was not really 
a specialist on questions of art and'literature. In addition, he 
acknowledged that many literary specialists were now working in 
Yenan, and he reiterated his belief that the problems in this field 
could only be solved in the course of practice. Excessive verbalizing
2^ Ch'en Po-ta, "Guan-yu mu-qian xian-zheng yun-dong ji-ben 
wen-ti de yi-jian" (Opinions on Basic Problems in the Current Move­
ment for Constitutional Government), JF, 101 (8 March 1940), p. 19.
On Ch'en's election to this new association, see the communique 
issued in Its name on 20 February 1940 in Mao, Ji VII, p. 252,
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25was both unnecessary and undesirable. Indeed, after the publica­
tion of Mao's treatise on new democracy, Ch’en's interests began to 
turn to more practical matters such as political economy, an inter­
est that persisted to the very end of his political career. His 
growing neglect of purely philosophical and cultural concerns was 
a direct reflection of his steady rise to power in the Maoist faction 
in the Party. More than ever before, Ch'en was beginning to play 
an increasingly conspicuous role as a leading Maoist spokesman on 
general policy issues. It was during the Rectification Movement in 
particular that he clearly emerged as an important personality in
his own right, and not simply a shadowy figure manoeuvring behind
,. 26 the scenes.
Although much against his will (or so he says), Ch'en was from 
time to time dragged into disputes with some of the literary spec­
ialists In Yenah to whom he had previously deferred. Although he 
clashed with a certain Hsiang Lin-ping on the question of national
forms in literature, his major conflict in this field was to be
27with Wang Shih-wei. Wang had joined the CCP in 1926 (just before 
Ch’en), and had become known in Marxist circles primarily as a
25Ch’en Po-ta, "Xie zai Shl-wei tong-zhi ’Wen-yi de min-zu xing- 
shi duan-lun' zhi-hou” (Written After Comrade Shi-wei's 'Short Es­
say on National Forms in Art and Literature', JFRB (3*-4 July 194-2), 
p. 4. Although published only in July 194-2, the article is dated 
7 January 1941* The references are to the first part of the essay.
26This is not to deny Ch'en’s lack of a personal power base 
within either the Party or the army, and his consequent dependence 
on Mao's support both at this time and in later years.
27Ch'en Po-ta, "Xie zai Shi-wei tong-zhi," p.4.
199
translator of Marxist-Leninist -writings from the.Russian. He had
also written a few short stories, however, and maintained a strong
interest in general literary problems. Around 1929 he had become
associated with the Chinese Trotskyists, published in their journals,
and translated some of Trotsky’s works. Nonetheless, in the early
1930's he went to Moscow to study Marxist philosophy, but continued
to correspond with Ch’en Tu-hsiu right up to 1930. Upon his arrival
in Yenan in the late 1930's, Wang was considered to be a specialist
in ideological and literary matters, and was appointed to a research
2Bpost at the Marxist-leninist Institute. Very little is known of 
his activities at the Institute, and to a large extent one has to 
rely on the account provided by Ch'en Po-ta himself, which can hard­
ly be regarded as detached. It seems, however, that in the autumn 
of 194-0 Wang drafted an essay on the question of national forms in 
literature, and the essay was circulated to various members of the 
Institute. Ch’en took strong exception to most of Wang's views, 
and —  tearing himself away from other work he was then engaged in —  
he hastily drafted a point by point rebuttal of Wang's major conten­
tions. Ch'en was agitated by the fact that Wang had attacked some 
of Ch'en's earlier essays on literary problems, and Wang in turn 
was so incensed by Ch'en's rebuttal that he attempted to prevent 
its publication. A compromise was worked out by which Wang agreed 
to revise his article in light of Ch'en's criticisms, with Ch'en 
himself foregoing the right to have his critique published alongside
^^ Merle Goldman, "Writers' Criticism of the Party in 194-2,"
CQ, 17 (January-March 1964), p. 210.
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Wang’s article. Wang's-revised essay was published in the spring of
194-1, but Ch’en’s rebuttal did not appear until 3-4- July 194-2, when
it was published in Liberation as ’’reference material” in the cam-
29paign against Wang and other ideological deviationists,
We will not enter into a detailed discussion of the substantive 
issues that were raised in the dispute between Ch’en and Wang. None­
theless, a few comments are in order. Essentially, Ch’en defended 
his prior advocacy of the use of certain traditional cultural forms 
to convey new political contents, but agreed with Wang that the dan­
ger always existed of the new contents being subverted by the old 
forms. The hey to the problem, maintained Ch’en, was in the intel­
ligent use of the old forms, so that the new contents would remain 
unimpaired. It would not do, he said, to
...’utilize old forms’ by depicting Chu Teh and P'eng 
Teh-huai', representatives of the proletariat and the
ordinary people, as the 'Gods of War’ /Guan Gong Lian7,
or by transforming the actions and behaviour of Chu 
and P'eng into the actions and behaviour of aristo­
crats.-^
If this were done, argued Ch’en, the whole exercise would be counter­
productive, and would simply amount to a capitulation to tradition; 
this was certainly not what he was advocating in calling for the
creative use of national forms in literature. In any event, he con-
29Ch’en Po-ta, ”Guan-yu Wang Shi-wei" (Concerning Wang Shih- 
wei), JFRB (l5 June 194-2); p. 4. This is a speech given by Ch’en 
on 9 June 1942, at a meeting held at the Central Research Institute 
in the course of the campaign against Wang. Also see Ch’en’s ar­
ticle in n. 25 above. Wang’s revised essay was published in Chinese 
Culture, 11:6, 1941*
^Ch’en Po-ta, "Xie zai Shi-wei tong-shi,” p. 4.
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eluded, there was no need to insist on the exclusive use of either 
old or new forms, experimentation with both being the preferable 
course. The pressing need was to abandon further discussion on the 
theory of national forms, and to test the ideas that had already 
been advanced in the course of actual practice. In rebutting Wang’s 
criticisms of the use of national forms in culture, Ch'en drew 
attention to Wang’s apparent confusion of the "proletarian revolu­
tion" with the "national war of resistance." Indeed, Wang gave far 
too much emphasis to the proletarian nature of the current revolu­
tionary movement in China. This in turn led him to place too much 
importance on the necessity of there being in existence a well- 
developed proletariat with a fairly high level of culture. These 
conditions simply did not exist in China, argued Ch’en, for the 
broad masses of■ the people (not just the proletariat) were united 
against an external foe (and not against the internal bourgeoisie). 
Further, the ordinary people were fully capable of raising their 
own cultural level, in the course of actual struggle, and were not 
dependent on the prior' achievement of a high cultural level on the 
part of the proletariat. Wang's views, concluded Ch’en, were detri­
mental to- the cause of the Chinese people's national war of resis-
31tance, and only served to give comfort to the Japanese.
It is immediately obvious that Wang's alleged emphasis on the 
proletarian nature of the current revolutionary movement in China —  
and his simultaneous depreciation of its broad national signifi­
cance —  identified him as a "leftist" of some sort; Was he, for
31Loc. cit.; also in Ch’en Po-ta, "Guan-yu Wang Shi-wei," p. 4.
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example, part of the "leftist tendency" within the ranks of the Party 
or, even more sinisterly, a representative of Trotskyism within the 
CCP's highest research, educational and cultural organs? Wang was 
evidently aware that such thoughts might he going through the minds 
of certain of his colleagues at the Institute and elsewhere, and he 
decided to clear the air before things got out of hand. After 
reading Ch'en's critique of his views, he belatedly admitted to the 
Party authorities that he had close connections with the Trotsky­
ists in the past, but that he had long since severed this relation-
32ship. Wang no doubt hoped that a timely confession would prevent 
the situation from deteriorating further. Certainly, as we have 
seen, what appears to have been a temporary compromise between Wang 
and Ch'en (and the Party authorities) was worked out in due course. 
Ch’en later claimed that at the time he wrote his rebuttal of Wang’s 
views on national forms, he knew "absolutely nothing" about the 
latter's former Trotskyist associations, and had wondered why Wang 
had become so agitated over the affair. With the benefit of hind­
sight, Ch’en now realized that he had unintentionally exposed Wang 
Shih-wei's "Trotskyist ideological fox’s tail." Wang, said Ch'en, 
had attempted in his original article to propagate Trotskyist ideo-
33logy under cover of a discussion on questions of art and literature.
32Ch’en, "Guan-yu Wang Shi-wei," p. 4-.
33Loc. cit. In fact, Wang's ideas on art and literature were very 
close to those of the "literary leftists" in the debate on "national 
defence literature" in 1935-36, a debate with which Ch'en was very fam­
iliar. Although Wang was now being labelled a Trotskyist, the basic 
issues were linked directly to the earlier debate. •
203
We have discussed this little known dispute between Ch'en Po- 
ta and Wang Shih-wei in some detail because it had three possible 
consequences of importance for the coming Rectification Movement. 
First, occurring as it did in the winter of 194-0-41, it probably 
helped convince the Maoists that the leftist tendency that had been 
developing in the Party since early 1940 was beginning to find re­
flection (and reinforcement) in the Party's leading research and 
propaganda organs. This probably strengthened Mao's determination 
in the spring of 1941 to crack down on this growing ideological 
deviationism before it got out of hand, and prompted him to call for 
the revival of the cadres educational movement that had been tem­
porarily suspended. Second, the existence of ideological hetero­
doxy among a small group of Influential but organisationally power­
less intellectuals (as revealed in the Ch'en-Wang dispute) might 
well have suggested to Mao the possibility of using them as scape­
goats. These intellectuals were relatively isolated from the Party's 
main political and military organizations, and they could be attacked 
either individually or collectively without causing any major up­
heavals in the Party organization. Thus, the campaign against ideo­
logical deviationism throughout the Party could be carried to a high 
pitch with little damage to either the morale of the ordinary cadre 
who might be in need of some ideological rectification, or the es­
sential work he was doing under very trying' conditions. Certainly, 
as the Rectification Movement unfolded this appeared to be the pat­
tern, with a small group of intellectuals taking the brunt of public 
criticism. Third, as Merle Goldman has suggested, Ch'en most likely
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had some influence on the decision to single out Wang Shih-wei as
3/
the principal target in the summer of 1942. Indeed, as Mao Tse- 
tung's closest advisor in cultural affairs, Ch'en probably played 
a hey role in Mao's decision to aim the spearhead of the Rectifi­
cation Movement not only at Wang Shih-wei, but at the so-called dis­
sident writers as a group. Given Ch'en's other influential positions 
in the Party's Propaganda Department, the Yenan mass media, and var­
ious government and cultural bodies, it seems likely that his in­
fluence was far from minimal. Certainly, he played a personal role 
of considerable prominence in the Rectification Movement itself, es­
pecially 'as it reached its peak in the summer of 1942.
(iv) Prelude to Rectification'
The Rectification Campaign of 1942 has usually been regarded as 
a consequence —  and an illustration —  of Mao Tse-tung's growing 
ascendancy in the CCP, and we do not wish to question the basic 
soundness of this evaluation. Nonetheless, this key episode in 
Party history can be better understood by bearing in mind the un­
settling events of 1940 and early 1941. Mao's personal authority 
had been challenged on a number of fronts, from politics to culture, 
and it is not surprising that he decided to confront the issue with­
out delay. His initial reaction was to seek a revival of the 
defunct cadre education movement of 1939-40. In an important
speech of 3 May 1941# Mao characterized the entire history of the
\
CCP as "twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism 
34Goldman, Literary Dissent, p. 37.
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has become more , and more integrated with the concrete practice of
35the Chinese revolution." In spite of this, continued Mao, the 
Party still had "very great shortcomings," and if they were not soon 
corrected the CCP would inevitably fail in its historical mission.
The three main areas of study in which improvements were in order 
were current affairs, history (Chinese history in particular), and 
the practical application of Marxism-Leninism in the course of 
revolutionary work. But Mao cautioned the assembled cadres that 
they were not all equally guilty of such shortcomings, the last of 
which was the most troublesome. The most susceptible to a "subjec­
tivist attitude" toward the study of Marxist theory were (l) the 
students, especially those who had studied in Europe, America, and 
Japan; and (2) "cadres of the middle and higher ranks." In 
bracketing these two specific groups as the main culprits, it was 
obvious that Mao was attacking the most prominent "returned students" 
in the Party, namely, the "Twenty-eight Bolsheviks" who had domin­
ated the Party leadership after their return from the Soviet Union, 
and who remained very influential among "cadres of the middle and 
higher ranks."
The Returned Students were doubtless not amused by Mao’s in­
direct suggestion that they should return to the classroom for
35Mao, Ji VII, p. 315. Because of its controversial nature, 
this speech was not published in Liberation until 27 March 194-2, when 
it appeared in revised form under the title of "Reform our Study" 
(Gai-su wo-men de xue-xi). By that time the cheng-feng campaign was 
well under way, and Mao had no need to be concerned about the ad­
verse reactions of the Returned Students.
3 Ibid., p. 317.
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further instruction in what they regarded as the subject of their 
greatest expertise, Marxist-Leninist theory. In any event, who was 
to be the new instructor, and whose texts were to be the required 
reading? Mao modestly recommended that Stalin's well-known History 
of the CPSU should be the "principal material, /with/ everything 
else as supplementary material." Mao referred to Stalin’s text pro­
bably as a token gesture to Moscow, but that his real interest lay 
elsewhere is suggested by the priority he assigned to the unspecified 
"supplementary material":
For the education of cadres in service and in schools, 
research should be focused on the actual problems of the 
Chinese Revolution, .and then on the study of Marxism-
Leninism. The method of static and isolated study of
Marxism-Leninism should be eliminated.37
It is readily apparent from this that the "actual problems" of the 
revolution in China were going to occupy pride of place in Mao’s 
proposed curriculum. Students were to approach the study of Marxist 
theory only after they had attained an adequate understanding of 
Chinese conditions. Gone were the days when aspiring Marxist theo­
rists were to turn their attention to Chinese conditions only upon 
completion of a rigorous course of study of classical Marxist- 
Leninist texts, whether in China or abroad. Mao’s proposal of 5 
May 194-1 represents a rather important turning point in the ideo­
logical history of the CCP. It was tantamount to suggesting that 
henceforth Chinese reality was to provide a methodology by which to 
study Marxist theory, rather than the other way around. This is 
very similar to his earlier argument of 1938, when he proposed that
the study of Chinese history (a part of the total reality of China)
37Ibid., p. 324.
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itself constitutes a methodology for the evaluation of the appli­
cability of Marxist theory to the revolution in China. If this were 
to be so, the classical Marxist-Leninist writings would lose a good 
deal of their sanctity, and Moscow's cherished role as keeper of the 
seals and protector of the faith would in consequence be severly 
undermined.
If Mao was indirectly proposing that his writings on China's 
"actual problems" should henceforth take pride of place in the CCP’s 
educational curriculum, one might ask whether or not the intrinsic 
quality -and scope of these works were adequate to the-task. It was 
painfully obvious to all but the most committed that, in terms-of 
both intellectual sophistication and sheer volume, Mao’s writings 
did not stand comparison with the .truly impressive corpus of theory 
and practice in the writings of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Cer­
tainly, an essay by Shih Fu (a pseudonym?) in Liberation on 16 Jan­
uary 1941 hid not unduly stress Mao's unique talents in adapting 
Marxism to China. True enough, Shih did claim that the "Chinese 
Communist Party, with Mao Tse-tung as leader," had "correctly 
grasped creative Marxism," and had even "pushed Marxism-Leninism a 
step forward" In the course of arduous revolutionary struggles. 
Still, this bracketing of Mao with the Party as a whole does atten­
uate the uniqueness of Mao’s role, and this is reinforced by Shih’s 
references to Wang Ming and Lo Fu in addition to Mao, and his praise 
of all three leaders for having creatively applied Marxism-Leninism
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38to the practical situation in China, It was Surely with the aim 
of establishing Mao's singular importance within the CCP that Chang
Ju-hsin, a young Party theoretician, wrote his important essay, 
"Advance Under the Banner of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Chang's ar­
ticle appeared in Liberation on 30 April 194-1 , just a few days be­
fore Mao's key speech of 5 May on the problem of study within the 
Party, and it was clearly intended to strengthen Mao's image as the 
Party's top theorist. Chang had been active in left-wing circles 
in Shanghai prior to the Japanese invasion, and he had already pub­
lished a number of articles in Yenan newspapers after his arrival 
in the Red capital. According to Chang, Mao Tse-tung was not sim­
ply one important revolutionary leader among many others; nor was 
he merely the first amongst equals. On the contrary, claimed Chang:
It should be pointed out that the leading, most typical 
person in applying creative Marxism to Chinese problems 
is our Party leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. He is our Par­
ty's great revolutionary, a talented theorist, a strate­
gist, and one of the most creative Marxist-Leninists in 
China. With a mastery of the theory of Marxism-Leninism 
and almost twenty years of extremely rich experience in 
revolutionary struggle, he is able skillfully to unite 
within himself the profound theory of Marxism-Leninism and 
the extensive, concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, 
and to link together organically the fixed principles and 
the flexible strategies of Marxism-Leninism. He is the 
most qualified, most typical person to be^Qur Party's 
political leader and military strategist.
Shih Fu, "Take Hold of Creative Marxism," JF 123 (16 Feb­
ruary 1941)# as cited in K'ung Te-liang, "First Appearance of 
;'Mao Tse-tung's Thought'," p. 37.
39Chang Ju-hsin, "Zai Mao Ze-dong tong-zhi de qi-zhi xia qian- 
-jin" (Advance Under the Banner of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, ) JF, 127 
(30 April 1941), pp. 17-18.
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One would have thought that Chang could have added little to this 
glowing appraisal of Mao's singular importance to the revolutionary 
cause in China. Yet there was more, for he concluded that Mao's 
creative development of Marxism-Leninism was of great significance 
not only for the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people's strug­
gle for liberation, but also for the "revolutionary movements" in 
the colonies and semi-colonies around the world. To Chang, Mao's 
Sinification of Marxism-Leninism was of more than parochial interest, 
for it provided a concrete model of the successful nationalization 
of a foreign theory in one specific country. With effective leader­
ship, this model could be applied elsewhere other than China.^
Considering that Mao's keynote speech calling for a new study 
campaign was not published at the time, it is not surprising that 
the campaign itself got off to a somewhat uncertain start. July 1, 
1941, the CCP's twentieth anniversary, was the logical occasion
r
to launch the new movement, and- the editorial in Liberation Daily
on that day duly addressed itself to the task. After summing up
the CCP's twenty glorious, years, the editorial declared that all
the Party's successes were due to
...the Chinese Communist Party's union of the scien­
tific truth of Marxism-Leninism and Chinese reality 
over the past twenty years, the undaunted leadership 
of Comrade Mao Tse-tung over the past twenty years, 
and the unceasing sacrificial struggles on behalf of 
the Party of countless martyrs, cadres and Party mem­
bers over the past twenty y e a r s .41
^  Lo g . cit.
editorial, Ji-nian Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang nian Shou- 
nian". (Commemorate the ..Twentieth Anniversary of the' Chinese Communist 
Party) JTFRB, (l July 1941), p. 2.
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This passage is noteworthy for the neat parallelism it sets up 
"between the "holy trinity" of Marxism-Leninism —  theory, leader 
and party —  and for the implication that Mao Tse-tung, having 
correctly grasped theory, had successfully led the Party for 
twenty years, i.e., since the day of its birth. This is indeed a 
heady claim on behalf, of Mao, but the editorial went on to streng­
then its case by discussing in brief detail the body of "theories 
and policies of the Chinese revolution" which had emerged during the 
course of the past twenty years. Specifically, these theories and 
policies were said to be manifested in (l) the CCP's "basic poli­
tical orientation"; (2) the ^ revolutionary Three People's Princi­
ples and the three great policies" of Sun Yat sen; and (3) "Com­
rade Mao Tse-tung's 'On Protracted War,' 'On New Democracy,' and 
the 'Shen-Kan-Ning Border Area Administrative Program"' which he 
edited, all three of which are the "highest crystallizations of the 
twenty years of the Chinese revolution." Yet in spite of this 
build-up of Mao's theoretical stature, the editorial ended in a 
strange note, calling upon the entire Party to plunge into renewed 
study only of Marxism-Leninism, the union of theory and Chinese 
reality, and the Three People's Principles. Although cadres were 
exhorted to unite closely "under the Party's Central Committee, led 
by Comrade Mao Tse-tung," there was no specific call to study Mao's 
writings as such.^
T^ioc. eit.
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This omission was most strange, and seemed to reflect an 
ambivalence as to. the real merits of Mao’s theoretical writings. 
Shortly after the appearance.of this editorial, Chang.Ju-hsin 
intervened to mate good the deficiency, penning an article, "On 
Creative Study.” This title is obviously an allusion to Shih 
Fu’s essay of the previous January which failed to stress Mao's 
singular importance in the Party. Lamenting that not only Mao's 
writings, but also the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.were 
being given insufficient attention within the CCP, Chang nonethe­
less was quite unambiguous as to the Party members’ priority in 
the forthcoming study movement:
Certain of our comrades still do not understand that 
without careful study and mastery of Comrade Mao Tse-
tung’s writings, one is incapable of becoming a Chin­
ese Marxist, for these are the most typical writings 
for our Party to use to Sinify Marxism-Leninism. There­
fore, they should be one of the best guides for all of 
our comrades in their study and analysis of Chinese soc­
iety, and in solving the problems of the Chinese revo­
lution.
With this injunction in mind, Party members could study the works 
of Mao and his four famous predecessors, especially their method of 
analyzing the distinctive characteristics of Chinese society.
Thus, all members of the Party could become effective disciples 
of Mao Tse-tung.in creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the 
practical problems of the revolution in China. In the course of 
his essay, Chang referred specifically to three of Mao's major
works to date (”0n Protracted Warfare," "On the New Stage," and
"On New Democracy"), claiming them to be "works of genius in creative
^  Chang Ju-hsin, "Lun ehuang-zao-xing de xue-xi" (On Creative 
Study), JF, 131-132 (joint issue of 7 July 194-1)? P« 45.
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Marxism," and to be numbered amongst the "world’s greatest con­
tributions of historic significance to Marxism-Leninism."^- Chang 
did not at this time undertake a systematic study and classification 
of Mao's writings and their significance, but this was a task to 
which he turned nearly a year later, just as the Rectification 
Movement was moving into, high gear. Nonetheless, these two essays 
of 1941 did establish Chang as a new voice in the swelling Maoist 
chorus.
In spite of Chang's efforts, there appeared to be a strange 
dualism'in the Party’s attitude toward Mao’s stature as a theore­
tician, and toward the value of his writings as study materials for 
the unfolding campaign to raise the Party's theoretical level. As 
in years past, Mao was having difficulty in shaking off his image 
as a practical leader, however important, one whose chief accom­
plishments lay in the field of organization, strategy, and tactics, 
and not in theory. Nor was it only the Returned Students and other 
Party antagonists who remained doubtful as to Mao’s theoretical cre­
dentials. This hesitation is well illustrated in the remarks of 
Chu Teh, the Party's top military leader,- who on 1 July 1941 pub­
lished a short essay to commemorate the CCP's twentieth anniversary. 
Chu maintained that the armies led by the CCP were guided in all 
their work by the "army-building principles" of Sun Yat-sen, and 
that, moreover, the Party had gone on to "inherit and develop" these 
principles of Sun. "The Chinese Communist Party," said Chu, "has 
created its own strategies and tactics.../which/...are great dis-
^Loc. cit.
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coveries and creations in the history of warfare." Yet nowhere 
in the essay did Chu even refer to Mao by name, let alone credit him 
with innovation in the military field. ■ Considering that all of 
Mao's important military writings had been published by this time, 
it is hard to escape the conclusion that Chu was deliberately 
slighting Mao on this key issue. The slight was doubly insulting 
insofar as it was precisely in the military field that Mao could 
claim to have added significantly to the Party's store of theore­
tical knowledge.
The attitude of Liu Shao-ch'i is also interesting. Liu, who 
had shown some concern at the first signs of a Maoist cult during 
the cadre study movement of 1939-40, appears to have remained am­
bivalent in his attitude to Mao as the Party's supposed leading 
theorist. Liu clearly recognized Mao as the Party's top leader, for 
in a series of lectures delivered in 1941> he instructed his audi­
ence to the effect that:
We obey the Party, the Central Committee and the truth, 
not individuals-. Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung have done 
good work and represented the truth. Hence we obey 
them/6
It is true that Liu's warning against obedience to mere "indivi­
duals" as opposed to the Party and Central Committee is reminiscent
^Chu Teh, "Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang yu ge-ming zhan-zheng,"
(The Chinese Communist Party and Revolutionary War), JFRB • (l July
1941)'p. 2.
^Liu Shao-ch'i, "Training in Organization and Discipline,"
a series of lectures delivered to the Central China- Party School in 
mid-to-late 1941> as translated in Collected Works of Lip. Shao-ch'i,
-iy p. 385.
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of his earlier attitude-in 1939, when he cautioned against the 
"worship of idols." However, this is more than compensated for by 
his bracketing of Mao with Marx and Lenin, his claim that Mao, like 
his two great predecessors, represents "the truth," and his decla­
ration that Mao is worthy of the Party members' obedience. Yet in 
another letter of 13 July, in which he discussed questions of theory 
at some length, Liu completely ignored Mao. While lauding the 
organizational and revolutionary strength of the CCP, Liu equally 
deplored the Chinese Party's "relative immaturity" in the important 
area of "ideological preparation and theoretical cultivation."
There were good reasons for this inadequacy, conceded Liu, in­
cluding previous ideological quarrels within the Party, the short 
history of Marxism in China, the pressing need for practical revo­
lutionary work, and the acute shortage of Chinese translations of 
Marxist-Leninist writings. This last problem, said Liu, was ag­
gravated by the scarcity of Party members who were competent in 
foreign languages. (Although Liu did not say so, the small body 
of foreign-language readers included himself and all of the Re­
turned Students, but not Mao Tse-tung.) For all these reasons, 
concluded Liu, the "Sinifieation of Marxism, that is, using the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism to interpret the historical prac­
tice of Chinese society, and to guide this practice, is exceeding­
ly difficult.By 1941 the alleged difficulty of Sinifying
47Liu Shao-ch'i, "Da Song Liang tong-zhi de xin" (A Letter in 
Reply to Comrade Sung Liang), in Liu Shao-qi wen-ti zi-liao zhuan- 
ji_ (A Special Collection of Materials on the Question of Liu Shao- 
ch'i), Fang Chun-kuei, ed., Taipei: Institute for the Study of
Chinese Communist Problems, 1970, pp. 113-115. The letter is dated 
13 July (1941?). Stuart Schram first brought attention to Sung
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Marxism had become a cliche within the CCP, and Liu was simply- 
restating the problem. But what of Mao's major treatise of 1940,
"On New Democracy," which was supposed to have effected in a syste­
matic way the union of Marxist theory and Chinese practice, and 
which had been accepted both at home and abroad as the CCP’s single 
most important theoretical and programmatic document to date? Of 
this Liu made no mention. Having totally ignored Mao’s theore­
tical contributions, Liu concluded in a most forthright manner that:
What we regard as the /clesired7 theoretical standard of 
the Chinese Party includes a unified grasp of the prin­
ciples and methods of Marxism-Leninism and the laws of 
development of the history of Chinese society. Regard­
less of what aspect of this /we wish to consider/, the 
large majority of comrades in the Chinese Party are still 
extremely inadequate. A great work /wei-da de zhu-zuo/ 
has still not yet appeared, and this remains^an exceed­
ingly important task for the Chinese Party.^
Though Liu perhaps did not realize it at the time, "On New Demo-
49cracy" was as great a work as any Mao was to produce in the future.
By mid-1943, however, Liu had reconsidered his position, and had 
discovered "great works" by Mao where he had earlier perceived none 
to exist.
Liang's letter and its implications in an article- of 1970, "The 
Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," in Lewi's, ed., op. cit., p. 
177, n.3.
/ e>
Lui, "Da Song Liang tong-zhi de xin," pp. 113-115.
^We do not wish to imply that Maor s many writings since 1940 • 
are neither interesting nor important. Nonetheless, "On New Demo­
cracy" was offered in 1940 as a polished, comprehensive synthesis 
of Mho's thinking on the Chinese revolution, and it had a dramatic 
impact at the time on both Chinese and foreign audiences. Even 
today, it is widely regarded as one of his most important writings.
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By mid-1940 Mao personally was not faring too well in the new 
study campaign he had proposed in May. This is not to suggest that 
the study campaign itself was faltering, for on both 1 July and 
1 August the Party’s Central Committee passed resolutions approving 
the campaign and establishing guidelines for its implementation.
In particular, these resolutions called for ’personal reform with 
the weapon of self-criticism and the method of intensified study,” 
and urged the entire Party to ’oppose the evil of separating the 
study of Marxist-Leninist theory and principles from the under­
standing of the conditions of Chinese society and the solution of
50the problems of the Chinese Revolution.’’ Yet the fact remains that 
none of these resolutions referred to Mao as the CCP's outstanding 
theoretician who was worthy of emulation, nor did they recommend 
any of his writings as official study materials in the upcoming 
movement. It thus becomes clear that the Central Committee was 
caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, it was urging 
the rejection of the abstract study of Marxism-Leninism divorced 
from Chinese reality. At the same time, it refused to recommend 
the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung, the Party leader who had 
specialized in the concrete application of Marxist theory to the 
practice of the revolution in China. The Party had reached an 
impasse. The Returned Students were understandably reluctant to 
support a campaign for the study of Mao's works, as they were most 
likely to be used as the negative examples in any such movement.
50” Central Committee Resolution on Strengthening the Party 
Spirit” (l July 1941 )> in Compton, op. cit., p. 159; "Central..Com­
mittee Resolution on Investigation and Research” (l August 194.1)#' 
in Compton, op. cit., p. 73.
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Even seemingly pro-Maoist leaders like Chu Teh appeared reluctant 
to see their own personal contributions swept aside in a mass 
movement to elevate Mao. Liu Shao-ch’i, who represented a wing of 
the Party which was hostile to the Returned Students, but who was 
not really in the Maoist camp, was obviously troubled over Mao's 
credibility as the Party's leading theoretician. As became in­
creasingly evident during cheng-feng, the intellectuals within the 
Party were also seriously divided on their attitude to Mao, and 
their internecine blood-letting was to provide the focus of the 
campaign during the spring and summer of 1942.
CHAPTER VII
THE MAOISTS'RECTIFY THE PARTY, 1942,
(i ) Mao1 s Ascendancy in the. Party
The Rectification Campaign of 1941-42 is one of those pivotal 
points in the history of the CCP that has generated endless analy­
sis. That it was essentially an indigenous Chinese phenomenon is 
no longer seriously questioned. Boyd Compton pointed out in 1952 
that the campaign benefited from the new permissiveness of the Com­
intern's Seventh Congress in 1935, but he concluded nonetheless 
that the "general reform movement.. .was a Chinese idea." There 
has been little dissent from this early evaluation of the role of 
Moscow in the cheng-feng movement; rather, controversy has focused 
on the difficult problem of divining the various motivations behind 
the campaign. The by-now classic realpolitik interpretation is 
stated succinctly by Wang Ming, writing in 1969 from Moscow. Mao 
Tse-tung, claimed Wang,
...repeatedly said that by carrying out the campaign he 
wanted to achieve three aims: (1) to replace Leninism
by Maoism; (2) to write the history of the Chinese Com­
munist Party as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone; (3) 
to elevate the personality of Mao-Tse-tung above: the Cen­
tral Committee and the'entire Party...2jn order to7... 
capture the chief leading place In the Party leadership 
and all power in the'Party in his own hands-.2 : '
C^ompton, op. cit., p. xlv.
Sfang Ming, China: Cultural Revolution or Counter-Revolutionary
Coup?, Moscow: Novosti Press-Agency:.Publishing House, 1969, p. 46.
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Whether or not Mao actually ever said any such thing can he dis­
puted, hut that the passage provides an excellent summary of what 
in fact happened cannot. Nor is Wang's conclusion simply a later 
rationalization of the obvious, for it accurately reflects unmis­
takable trends in the Party since the Tsunyi Conference in 1935, and
3
especially the Party's Sixth Plenum three years later. By 194-1 
these trends towards Mao's domination of the CCP.had become pro­
nounced. They were strongly reinforced by the Rectification Move­
ment and subsequent developments, and,, allowing for certain fluc­
tuations, they have persisted up to the present time.
Yet, as recent research has made abundantly clear, the cheng- 
feng campaign involved much more than a mere struggle for power on 
the part of Mao and his faction. Certain "revisionist" historians 
such as Mark Selden have focused attention away from the purely 
political aspects of cheng-feng and towards the social significance 
of the plethora of secondary campaigns that sprang up in the wake 
of rectification. It was this series of intensive campaigns in all
3
We do not wish to suggest that prior to the Rectification Move­
ment Mao had wanted to create a personal cult to the extent that it 
later developed. Nonetheless, although domestic and foreign circum­
stances conjoined in 1943 to provide the appropriate political cli­
mate for such a cult, there is little evidence to suggest that Mao 
took any decisive steps to nip the burgeoning cult in the bud. As 
became clear during the Cultural Revolution over twenty years later, 
Mao was quite prepared to foster his own cult as a means of streng­
thening his political power if he felt such a step was necessary.
In the mid-1940Ts no less than the late 1960's, it was clearly in 
Mao' s interest to promote —  -or at the very least not hinder —  his 
personal cult as pre-eminent thinker and leader of the Chinese Com­
munist movement. On this point, see Edgar Snow's interview with Mslo 
to which previous reference has been made, in Snow, ’ Long Revolution, 
pp. 168-170.
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sectors of Yenan life, argues Selden, that gave rise to the mass 
line —  "a conception of leadership in which mobilization of the 
masses was enshrined as the Party's fundamental approach to the pro­
blems of war, revolution, politics and production."^ This is un­
doubtedly true, but the "revisionist" argument sometimes goes a 
little farther, as in the case of Peter Seybolt, who notes the close 
correlation between the reformist slogans of cheng-feng and specific 
criticisms of the educational system that appeared in Liberation 
Daily between 1942-4-4. The education campaign that accompanied 
cheng-feng was a genuine effort at real reform, argues Seybolt, not 
just window-dressing to disguise the fierce power struggle within 
the top echelons of the Party. Thus, he concludes, "these criti­
cisms bring to life all of the cliches of the cheng-feng campaign 
and serve to refute the common contention that cheng-feng was pri­
marily a means employed to resolve a power struggle within the 
5Party." This, however, is simply not the case: Seybolt1s research
(like that of Selden and others) indicates that the power struggle 
was not the sole motivating factor in cheng-feng, but it fails to 
provide a satisfactory rank-order of ali possible factors ranging 
from "primary" on down the scale. Indeed, it is perhaps futile to 
attempt to construct such a rank order; attention should rather be 
focused on the interplay of the many diverse factors that undoub­
tedly went into cheng-feng, considerations of power being among
'Si&Lrk Selden, "The Yenan Legacy: The Mass Line," in A. Loak
Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action, Seattle: Univ­
ersity of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 110-112.
5
Peter J. Seybolt, "The Yenan Revolution in Mass Education,"
CQ, 48 (October - December 1971), p. 657.
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the most important of them. If in the following pages we focus 
mainly on the power aspect of the Rectification Movement, it is sim­
ply because it is the most relevant to our present discussion, and 
not because we wish to slight the importance of other contributing 
factors.
Certainly, Mao Tse-tung was not one to ignore the problem of 
power, especially in light of the multi-faceted attacks on his own 
position during the course of the previous year. Nor was he likely 
to have been appreciative of the ambiguities in the attitudes of 
many of the Party’s top leaders regarding his personal claim to 
theoretical and political pre-eminence, and the indecision to which 
this state of affairs had given rise. This was probably worrying 
to Mao, for he felt that the time was appropriate for some decisive 
action to give the CCP a clearly acknowledged leader. As early as 
18 March 1941* Mao' had concluded that Chiang Kai-shek was making 
renewed efforts to play up his stature as a "national leader" above 
class or party loyalties, concerned only with China's resistance 
to the Japanese. It is not surprising, then, that Mao moved quick­
ly to resolve the indecisiveness in his own Party, all the better 
to counteract this attempt by Chiang and the Nationalists to project 
themselves as the only true representatives of the Chinese nation. 
Mao had no need to fear a possible counter-move by Wang Ming, for 
by this time Wang was very much on the fringe of things in Yenan.
As late as 15 February 1941* Wang was still ranked second to Mao in 
an official Party document, but in the ensuing months Wang’s power
. ^Mao , XJ II, p. 736.
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rapidly ebbed and his contributions disappeared from the Party press. 
In all likelihood, Wang’s fall from power was officially confirmed 
at the "enlarged session” of the Political Bureau which was convened 
in Yenan in early September 1941. This important meeting made a 
thorough review of the "question of the political line in the past 
history of the Party, especially during the period of the Second
g
Revolutionary Civil War."• Unfortunately, as James Harrison has 
pointed out, "virtually nothing" is known of this meeting of the en-
9
larged Politburo. We do know, however, that the session was of un­
usual importance. Mao himself ranked this meeting alongside certain 
other "inner-Party struggles" (Tsunyi 1935, Sixth Plenum 1938, Rec­
tification 1942, Party history study movement 1943) as one of the 
decisive milestones in eliminating "factions which formerly existed 
and played an unwholesome role in the history of our Party. Ac­
cording to one official account, this Politburo meeting called for 
the "development of an all-Party ideological revolution" to over­
come problems of organization and the separation of theory and prac-
11 . .tice. And, writing in 1943> Jen Pi-shih revealed that this same
session passed a formal resolution concluding that the "political 
line predominant in the Party during the period from the September
7Tokuda, op. cit., p. 48.
M^ao, XJ III, p. 903.
H^arrison, op. cit., p. 334.
10Mao, XJ III, pp. S93-894-
11Chao Han, Tan-tan Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang zheng-feng yun-dong 
.(Talk's on the Chinese .Communist Party' Rectification Movement), Peking: 
no pub., 1957, p. 19. Cited in Harrison, op." cit., p. 334
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12Eighteenth Incident to the Tsunyi Conference was erroneous.1 The 
deadlock in the Party had thus, been resolved; Wang Ming and the 
Returned Students had fought and lost their last rearguard action, 
the other Party factions had been won over or at least neutralized, 
and the victorious Maoists were free to move ahead with their plans. 
And their plans were becoming more ambitious; as Harrison has con­
cluded, the September 194-1 Politburo meeting "probably made the for­
mal decision to escalate the cadre education movement Into the much
13more intense and politically orientated rectification movement."
We have no knowledge of the debates that went on behind the 
closed doors of this Politburo meeting. The main arguments of the 
Maoist faction, however, can be' deduced from the contents of an 
important editorial that appeared in Liberation Daily on 2 Septem­
ber 1941? on the very eve of the session. The editorial pointed 
out that as long ago as the Sixth Plenum in 1938, "Comrade Mao Tse- 
tung, our Party's leader," had called for the Party-wide study of 
Marxist theory and Chinese history. Specifically, Mao had urged 
the Sinification of Marxism as an antidote to "dogmatism" within 
the Party, Yet, asked the editors, have Mao’s "instructions" in 
this regard been adequately implemented in the course of the past
three years? "Very unfortunately, we can only answer: No, or very 
14little." Somewhat impatiently, the editors claimed that Mao’s 
12Jen Pi-shih, "Guan-yu ji-ge wen-ti de yi-jian" (Opinions on 
Several Problems), n.pl: n. pub., 1943. Cited in Tokuda, op. cit., 
p. 47.
13Harrison, op. cit., p. 334.
^"Fan-dui xue-xi zhong de jiao-tiao-zhu-yi" (Oppose Dogmatism 
in Study), JFRB (2 September 1941)? p. 1.
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call for the Sinification of Marxism was fully in accord with Marxist- 
Leninist tradition, and warned that the time had come for a "decisive 
change" in the Chinese Party's handling of ideology. After all, had 
not. Stalin himself stressed the need to distinguish clearly between 
"dogmatic Marxism" and "creative Marxism," and had not both Lenin 
and Stalin themselves departed from Marx and Engels in various sig­
nificant ways, e.g., on the questions of the Soviet republic, the vic­
tory of socialism in one country, and the persistence of the state 
under socialism? Regarding Marxist-Leninist theory, did not the 
recently published CPSU History itself call upon all Marxist revolu­
tionaries to be
■ ...good at enriching this theory with the new experiences 
of the revolutionary movement, good at enriching it with 
new principles and new conclusions, good at developing and 
advancing it, and not being afraid, on the basis of the 
substance of this theory, of replacing certain outdated 
principles and conclusions with new‘principles and conclu­
sions suitable to new historical environments.
Having established the orthodoxy of the principle of theoretical in­
novation, the editors concluded most forthrightly that, like Lenin, 
Stalin, and the CPSU before them:
Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the leader of our Party, and the 
Central Committee of our Party are also developing and 
filling out Marxist-Leninist theory in accordance with 
the practical experiences of our country's revolution 
and the war of resistance.
This editorial was probably a direct rebuttal of the line of argument
advanced by Liu Shao-ch'i in his letter to Sung Liang of the previous
July. The editors fully agreed with Liu that, in comparison with its
15Lo=. cit.
16t .. Loc. cit.
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work in other areas, the theoretical level of the CCP was "extemely 
backward" and "unusually low," and that the Sinification of Marxism 
was not an easy task. Nonetheless, the essential point of differ­
ence between Liu and Liberation Daily was the latterT s claim that 
Mao Tse-tung (and, as a concession to the principle of collective 
leadership, the Central Committee too) had gone a long way toward 
Sinifying Marxism in accordance with Chinese reality. Further, it 
was the Party's continued reluctance to implement Mao's instructions 
regarding theory that had perpetuated the CCP's backwardness in this 
crucial area. Hence, there was a need for a "decisive change" in 
the Party's (and undoubtedly much of the Central Committee's) atti­
tude toward Mao's repeated calls for the rejection of "dogmatic 
Marxism" and the acceptance of "creative Marxism" on the ideological 
front.
This important editorial set the mood for the debates at the 
.Politburo meeting of September.1941> and it most likely represents 
a close approximation of the argument of the victorious Maoists. 
Consequently, the "decisive change" they demanded of the Party was 
not long in manifesting itself; it came in a Liberation Daily edi­
torial of 21 January 194-2, entitled "Grasp the Key to Marxism- 
Leninism. " Written to commemorate the eighteenth anniversary of 
Lenin's death in 1924, the editorial called upon the Party to dis­
tinguish clearly between the "physical body" and the "spirit" of 
Marxism-Leninism. The physical body is the "individual formulas 
and set phrases" of Marxism-Leninism, while its spirit is its 
"standpoint and methods." Most important, it is only the latter
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which is the "genuine Marxist-Leninist weapon"-which will ensure 
the eventual victory of the CCP. The editorial goes on to praise 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin as "great teachers well-versed in 
the application of dialectics," and in particular lauds the CPSU 
History as an excellent source for the study of Lenin's and Stalin's 
correct application of dialectics. Nonetheless, the editorial con­
tinues :
Comrade Mao Tse-tung is applying dialectics and solving 
various practical problems in the present stage of the 
Chinese revolution. Therefore, his works are even more 
closely connected to and urgently needed by us, and should 
be carefully studied by us first of all /i.e., before any­
thing else7.^
Mao's important writings had of course been'praised in the past in 
the Party media, but this appears to have been the first time that an 
official organ of the CCP declared in no uncertain terms that the 
study of Mao's works should take precedence over the voluminous wri­
tings of the four founders and directors of the international commun­
ist movement. As such, this editorial marks a watershed in the ideo­
logical history of the CCP, for it brings to a close the era of ideo­
logical diversity which had characterized the development of the 
Chinese Party since its founding in 1921. Marxist-Leninist theory 
had at last entered upon the correct path in its application to 
China's concrete environment. Henceforth, it would evolve dialec- 
tically into a new and higher form, "Mho Tse-tung's thought;"
I r?
"Zhang-wo Ma-Lie-zhu-yi de suo-yao" (Grasp the Key to Marxism- 
Leninism), JFKB, (21 January 1942), p. 1.
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But this is anticipating events. Returning to 1942, we should 
note that the editorial of 21 January claimed that the work of the 
Party's ideological reconstruction had just begun. Mao personally 
contributed to the task ahead by issuing, only two days later, an 
order instructing the Border Region armies to publish and study the 
Party's "Kut'ien Resolutions1' of December 1929. These resolutions, 
which are equally concerned with combatting organizational and ideo­
logical deviations within the Party and the army, were in actual 
fact written by Mao himself, although this was not revealed "until 
1944. This belated revelation was probably designed to relieve Mao
of the embarrassment of being seen to be ordering the "attentive
18study of his own works," to use Stuart Schram’s apt phrase. The
Rectification Campaign was formally inaugurated by Mao in the opening
days of February, when he delivered two major speeches on the need
for ideological reform within the CCP. In these two addresses,
Mao asserted unequivocally that the "general line of the Party is
correct." Still, he felt compelled to acknowledge that in view of
the CCP's rich store of revolutionary experience, the "advance of
19our theoretical level has been exceptionally slow and retarded."
In particular, the CCP suffered from three "rather serious" problems 
—  subjectivism in thought, sectarianism in organization, and for­
malism in literary expression. These three problems could be re­
duced to one, namely, subjectivism, for "all sectarian thoughts
On this point, see Schram, Mao, p. 233.
19Mao's two speeches inaugurating the cheng-feng campaign are 
"Reform in Learning, the Party, and Literature" (l February 1942); 
and "In Opposition to Party Formalism" (8 February 1942). Both are 
translated in Compton, op. eit., pp. 9-32, 33-53. The passages 
cited are on pp. 9-12.
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are subjectivist.../and/...subjectivism and sectarianism' use
20Party formalism as their propaganda tool and form of expression."
Having singled out subjectivism as the chief source of ideological
error in the Party, Mao complicated the issue by claiming that there
were in fact two major forms of subjectivism, viz, "empiricism" and
"dogmatism." Both deviations were unwholesome, warned Mao, but of
the two there was no doubt that dogmatism was the "more important 
21and dangerous."
Thus, without directly naming them, Mao had pointed to the Re­
turned Students as the chief source of subjectivism (and hence sec­
tarianism and formalism) in the Party. He reinforced the case 
against them by suggesting that there were those within the Party 
who had ignored the Sixth Plenum's resolutions on the elimination
of formalism "as if they were intentionally opposing these deci- 
22sions." Yet, by the time Mao delivered this rebuke to the Re­
turned Students, their fate had already been sealed. According to 
a Liberation Daily account, the meeting of over 800 higher-level 
Party cadres to whom Mao had addressed his remarks rendered a "final
judgment" (mo-ri shen-pan) on the surviving phenomenon of Party
23
formalism within the ranks of the CCP. Castigating the Returned 
Students as the leading negative examples in the ideological sphere 
was but one side of the Maoist coin; the other was putting forward
20Ibid., pp. 30-33.
21Ibid., p. 20.
22Ibid., p. 53.
See the relevant news item in JFRB (10 February 1942)., p. 3-
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a positive model for the Party cadres to emulate. Mao of course
named no names, "but he did go into considerable detail in describing
the exact image he had in mind:
What type of theoretician do we need? We need theore­
ticians who base their thinking on the standpoints, con­
cepts, and methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, 
who are able to explain correctly the actual problems 
issuing from history and revolution, who are able to give 
a scientific interpretation and theoretical explanation 
of the various problems of Chinese economics, politics, 
military affairs, and culture. This is the type of theo­
retician we need.
In describing his model theoretician, was Mao Tse-tung immodestly re­
ferring to himself? This was most certainly the case, and it was pro­
bably appreciated as such by the high-level cadres in Mao's audience. 
Ten days later, however, Chang Ju-hsin removed any lingering doubts 
as to who was to be the CCP's theoretical paragon by publishing his 
two-part essay, "Study and Grasp the Theory and Strategy of Mao Tse- 
tung." In this article Chang concluded that to. "endeavour to study
and grasp Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory and -strategy is the glorious
25fighting task of the entire Party at the present time."
Chang's essay of 18-19 February 19.42 is of considerable inter­
est, for it represents the first official attempt to systematize 
the content and structure of Mao Tse-tung's thought on the basis of 
an integrated study of Mao's most important writings prior to 1942.
In the course of his exposition, Chang goes to considerable lengths 
in detailing the particular writings of Mao which best express the 
essence of the various component parts of his thought. Hence,
24Compton, op. cit,, p. 13.
25Chang Ju-hsin, "Xue-xi he zhang-wo Mao Ze-dong de li-lun he ce- 
lue" (Study and Grasp the Theory and Strategy of Mao Tse-tung), JFRB, 
(18-19 February 1942), p. 3, both issues.
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ChangTs discussion provides the first "annotated bibliography" of 
Mao’s writings, and it was obviously intended to follow up the Liber­
ation Daily editorial of 21 January, which had designated Mao's wri­
tings as the most important study material for the CCP. Chang’s 
article provided the Party cadres and others with an approved reading 
list on Mao’s thought in preparation for the coming Rectification 
Campaign, during which non-Chinese Marxist-Leninist texts were rele­
gated to a position of secondary importance in the CCP’s ideological 
curriculum. To return to the main point, however, Chang argues that 
Mao's thinking can be divided into three "component parts," namely, 
"ideological line," "political line," and "military line." The 
first of these (defined alternatively by Chang as "ideological 
methodology" ) is the most important part, as it determines the other 
parts, but it cannot be regarded as distinct from them. Rather, 
argues Chang, the "internal organic unity of these three component 
parts forms the system of Mao Tse-tung's theory and strategy."
For Chang, then, Mao Tse-tung's thought as of early 1942 consisted 
of a body of correct political and military doctrines based on the 
creative application of a correct theoretical methodology to the 
concrete problems of the revolution in China. As for the relation­
ship of Mao's "theory and strategy" to classical Marxism-Leninism, 
Chang makes it perfectly clear that:
2£>Loc. cit. It should be mentioned in passing that Chang thought 
highly of Mao's "Lecture Notes on Dialectical Materialism." He re­
garded them as an important source for the study of Mao's methodology, 
and drew particular attention to Chapter II, Part 11, entitled "On 
Practice." Apart from content analysis, Chang's attribution is our 
principal corroborative evidence for believing that Mao actually 
wrote these lecture notes during the Yenan period. For additional 
comments by Chang on Mao's "Lecture Notes," see his earlier essay 
on Mao in jp, 127 (30 April 1941), p. 20.
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Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory and strategy is precise­
ly the application and development of the theory and 
strategy of Marxism-Leninism in a colonial, semi-colo­
nial and feudal society. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory 
is Chinese Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, whoever wants to 
"become a Chinese Marxist-Leninist must study and grasp 
Comrade Mao Tse-tungTs theory and strategy and, moreover, 
become his loyal disciple.
On the reasonable assumption that Chang Ju-hsin’s analysis reflected
the point of view of the Maoist faction in Yenan, we can conclude
that the CCP was at last formally entering the period of Mao Tse-tung’s
ideological dominance.
Yet if we are to believe Chang Ju-hsin, even at this late date 
there were those within and without the Party who were less than 
happy with this' state of affairs. Chang naturally enough dismisses 
as Trotskyist slander Yeh Ch'ing’s accusation that Mao’s thought is 
little more than "Chinese peasantism" or "Hung Hsiu-ch'uanism."
i
Renegades like Yeh, scoffs Chang, are unable to understand that Mao 
Tse-tung’s thought is the "theory and strategy of the twentieth- 
century Chinese proletariat, the scientific weapon of the liberation 
of the Chinese nation and society." The criticisms of Yeh Ch’ing 
and his ilk are perfectly understandable to Chang, but he finds it 
rather surprising that in the CCP there are still a "small number 
of people who, right up to the present day... persist in maintaining 
an insufficiently respectful, and individually even a scornful atti­
tude" regarding Mao’s theory and strategy of the Chinese revolution. 
These people, continues Chang, can be divided into two major groups:
(1) those lacking in theoretical knowledge and political experience;
27Loc. cit.
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and. (2) those with "stubborn and conservative” minds, i.e., the 
"dogmatists” and the "sectarians." The first group can be helped 
by means of proper education, says Chang, but the second group must 
be resolutely exposed and made to discard their "anti-scientific, 
anti-Marxist-Leninist" attitudes. This task accomplished, the Party 
can then concentrate on using Mao’s theory and strategy to train 
large numbers of "Mao Tse-tung-style" (Mao Ze-dong shi de) cadres, 
thus ensuring the eventual triumph of the revolution. The develop­
ment of as few as one or two hundred cadres in the upper echelons of 
the Party, cadres who are able to "genuinely grasp Mao Tse-tungism
/Mao Ze-dong zhu-yi7 in theory and practice," will certainly ensure 
28final victory.
Chang's essay did much to strengthen Mao’s claim to be a sys­
tematic theorist in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, but nonetheless 
Chang failed to clarify the issue sufficiently well on at least two 
important points. In the first place, he failed to come up with 
a precise term which would adequately convey the essence of the 
body of theory associated with Mao. In the course of his essay,
Chang employed at least three separate terms to represent Mao's 
ideological system: "Mao Tse-tung's theory and strategy"; "Chinese 
Marxism-Leninism"; and "Mao Tse-tungism.1 Chang seems to have been 
the first known CCP theorist to have used "Mao Tse-tungism" in an 
official Party publication, and, for reasons we shall consider
28t . .Loc. cit.
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29later, appears to have been the last during the period under review. 
His preferred usage was clearly "Mao Tse-tung's theory and strategy" 
(i.e., theory and practice), but this is an excessively cumbersome 
term, whether in Chinese or English. Chang's failure to come up with 
a more adequate term should not be dismissed lightly in the context 
of a political movement that places great importance on exactness of 
terminology (if not always of thought), and it required another year 
and more before "Mao Tse-tung's thought" was accepted as the official 
term. A more worrisome problem for the Maoists was Chang's somewhat 
narrow interpretation of the content of Mao's thought. There could 
be little disagreement with Chang's claim that Mao's correct "ideo­
logical methodology" was the basis of his correct "political line" 
and "military line." The probable disagreement was likely to be 
centered on Chang's argument that these three component parts consti­
tuted the sum total of Mao's thought. That is, was the content of 
Mao's thought merely of an ideological, political and military na­
ture, and if so, would this provide a sufficient basis for Mao's 
claim to be the CCP's undisputed theoretical leader? Embarrassingly 
enough, Mao had already answered this question in his key speech of 
B February to the Party's leading cadres. At that time, Mao empha­
sized that the kind of theoretician the CCP needed was one who was
29During the Cultural Revolution of 1966-68, certain Red Guard 
groups used the term "Mao Tse-tungism" in some of their writings, 
but this usage was never approved officially, and it quickly passed 
from the scene. • For a-'discussion of some terminological problems re­
garding "Mao Tse-tung's thought," see James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology 
and Practice, (The Evolution of Chinese Communism), New York: Prae-
ger Publishers, 1970, pp. 126-147.
234
competent in four distinct areas, namely "Chinese economics, poli­
ties, military affairs, and culture." These four categories were 
not chosen randomly. Bather, they carefully reflect the comprehen­
siveness expected of anyone claiming theoretical leadership, and, 
true to Marxist tradition, economics is listed in first place.
Given the integrated and systematic nature of Marxist thought,
one had to be a complete theorist or none at all, a truth well
understood by Stalin in his own drive to consolidate power in the
Soviet Union. Yet as of early 1942 Mao Tse-tung fell far short
of the mark, and this was made all the more obvious by Chang Ju-hsin1 s
emphasis on Mao's political and military thought, and his failure to
even mention, let alone analyze, Mao's contributions in the fields
of economics and culture. Chang was a prisoner of his sources,
however, for the fact was that over the years Mao had devoted little
attention to either economics or cultural matters, and his writings
on these two subjects were very thin indeed. Mao never had been
much interested in purely economic matters, and his admittedly grow-
30ing concern with cultural problems had been of very recent origin.
In any event, as of the early spring of 1942 he had failed to produce
30Mao' s relative lack of interest in question s of economic theo­
ry prior to 1942 is undeniable. Recently, however, certain scholars 
have questioned Mao's alleged neglect of economics after 1942. Jack 
Gray, for example, claims that "Mao's theories concerning the econ­
omic aspects of social organization are as important as his theories 
concerning political leadership, but they have been almost totally 
ignored in the West." See Gray's chapter on "The Thought of Mao Tse- 
tung, " in Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, Chinese Communism in Cri­
sis (Maoism and the Cultural Revolution), New York: Praeger Publish­
ers, 1968, p. 62.
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any single, comprehensive treatise in either the economic or cultural 
fields which stood comparison with his many important writings deal­
ing with political and military problems. Mao was thus in danger 
of being hoisted on his own petard in his quest for theoretical sup­
remacy, as any thoughtful Party cadre who listened to his speech 
of 8 February and read Chang's essay ten days later must have been 
aware. With this perspective in mind, it would appear more than for­
tuitous that before the end of the year, Mao had delivered himself 
of the two most comprehensive treatises he was ever to write in the 
economic and cultural fields. The first of these is his celebrated 
"Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" (2, 23 May 1942), 
which have since served as the fundamental Maoist documents on cul­
tural matters, and to which we shall return later. The second (and 
much more obscure) dissertation is his "Economic and Financial Pro­
blems," a lengthy report Mao delivered in December 1942 at a con­
ference of senior cadres in the Border Region. Only the first 
chapter of this treatise was to be included in Mao1s Selected Works, 
but there is little doubt that the text as a whole is regarded by 
the Maoists as forming the cornerstone of Mao's claim to competence 
in the economic field. According to the introductory note to the 
chapter in the Selected Works, Mao "severly criticizes the mistaken
notion of concentrating on public revenue and expenditure to the
31neglect of economic development." Since economic development is at 
the very heart of the Marxist materialist conception of history, Mao 
could thus be portrayed as having redirected the CCP to the correct
31See the editorial comments in Mao, XJ III, pp.. 846-847.
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economic path under the trying and near-fatal conditions of the com­
bined Nationalist-Japanese blockade of the Yenan Border Area. In­
deed, as the same editorial note points out, Mao’s report of December 
1942 (plus two other related articles on economic matters) "formed 
the Party’s basic programme for leading the production campaign in 
the Liberated Areas...^ which in turn7,. .provided the Party with a
rich store of experience for guiding economic construction in later 
32years.” By the end of 1942, then, Mao had made good the two gla­
ring deficiencies in his theoretical credentials, and he was ready 
to take his place as the CCP's undisputed theoretical spokesman.
(ii) High Tide of Rectification
The cheng-feng movement developed rapidly following Mao’s two 
key speeches in early February 1942. In line with its formal deci­
sion to move ahead with a rectification campaign, the Politburo 
passed a special resolution on cadre education (28 February) which 
clearly delineated the CCP’s dual orientation in study. In Ideology 
for example, Party cadres were to take as their focus of study 
’’Marxist methodology in thought," and the "history of the develop­
ment of Chinese thought in the last hundred years." In political 
science, the required topics were to be "Marxist-Leninist writings
on tactics and strategy," and the "history of our Party's twenty- 
33year struggle." Characteristically, the Politburo failed to 
recommend the study of Mao’s writings, but this deficiency was made 
good a few days later by K’ang Sheng, who emerged as the leading
^Loc. cit.
33Compton, op. cit., p. 86.
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Maoist manager of the campaign. Addressing two large meetings of
Party cadres in the opening week of March, K'ang provided the study
guidelines for cheng-feng. Mao Tse-tung’s speech of 1 February,
said K'ang, is
...the guide for the ideological reconstruction of the 
entire Party, the primer in the dialectical materialist 
method for all those who engage in scientific work. It 
embodies both Marxist-Leninist theory which is genuinely 
combined with reality, and the development of the Party's 
. correct line since the Tsunyi C o n f e r e n c e . 4^
K'ang's reference to the Party's "correct line" since Tsunyi was 
clearly a warning sign to the audience. In their eagerness to up­
root the three "evil tendencies" In the Party, the cadres were to 
exercise careful discrimination in their choice of targets. To 
eliminate all confusion on this important issue, K'ang once again 
referred to Mao's speech of 1 February:
When studying this report, one should distinguish between 
/the periods/ before and after the Tsunyi Conference, be­
cause prior to the conference subjectivism and sectarian­
ism occupied a ruling position in the Party, while re­
maining merely as remnants after the conference.35
It was apparent from this remark that the spearhead of attack during
cheng-feng was to be the Returned Students, or, more specifically,
the mistaken line they had pursued prior to Tsunyi, and the lingering
"Kang Sheng tong-zhi tong-chi dang ba-gu" (Comrade K'ang 
Sheng Bitterly-Denounces Party Formalism), JFRB (8 March 1942), p. 1. 
See also "Zheng-dun xue-feng, dang-feng, wen-feng —  Kang Sheng 
tong-zhi liang-ci bao-gao zhai-yao" (The Rectification of Learning, 
the Party, and Literature —  Extracts from Two Reports by Comrade 
K'ang Sheng), in Zheng-feng wen-,]ian (Reform Documents), 4th ed., n. 
pi.: Ji-lu-yu shu-dian, 1944* I* pp. 101-105. The passage cited is 
on p. 102.
3 5
Loc. citi For a great deal of information (and hostile com­
ment) on K'ang Sheng's key role in directing cheng-feng, see Vladi­
mirov, op. cit., references throughout the book.
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influence it still exercised within the Party. Equally clear was 
the warning that the main target of the campaign was not to he the 
Party's present dominant line (viz., Mao's line) as it developed 
after Tsunyi.
K'ang did not specifically exempt the Party's current leader­
ship and policies from criticism, but he left no doubt as to where 
the bulk of any criticism was to lie. It is surprising, then, .that 
the "barrage of critical essays" that suddenly flooded the Yenan 
press from mid-March seems to have Ignored K'ang's words of advice 
and warning. These essays, from the able pens of such left-wing 
writers as Ting Ling, Hsiao Chun, Ai Ch'ing, and others, have been 
studied in detail by Merle Goldman. Goldman has classified these 
critical essays (za-wen) into two types: (1) criticisms of speci­
fic shortcomings of the CCP organization and its cadres, who were 
depicted as'betraying the true ideals of communism in the pursuit 
of short-term goals; and (2) assertions of the writer's role as the 
true guardian of man's spiritual needs, and the relegation of the
*3 A
Party's power to his material and physical needs. In actual fact, 
these two main types of essays were best exemplified in the writings 
not of the authors above, but in those of Wang Shih-wei, the rela­
tively obscure theorist and translator with whom Ch'en Po-ta had 
quarrelled in early 1941. In "The Wild Lily" (13, 23 March 1942), 
Wang accused the Party leadership of having failed to build a truly 
classless society, and lamented the fate of the young people who 
had eagerly come to Yenan "in search of beauty and warmth, but saw
Goldman, Literary Dissent, pp. 21-22.
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only ugliness and coldness.” In his "Statesmen and Artists," he
called upon his fellow writers and artists to play their due role
in reforming the Communist movement, for it was they who "stimulated
37the moral strength of the revolution." It is obvious that criti-
cisms of this type fell far outside the rather definite parameters
set for the cheng-feng campaign by K'ang Sheng. We can thus agree
with Goldman that as of April 194-2 the Maoists had not gained the
"full concurrence" of the Party's intellectuals, but had on the
38contrary "come up against a hard core of resistance."
The publication of Wang’s articles and other critical essays 
gave rise to immediate repercussions in the Yenan mass media. . On 
16 March the Party's Propaganda Department issued instruqtions re­
garding the reorganization of all Party newspapers in accordance 
with the needs of the Rectification Movement. It was stipulated 
that "well. intentioned" opinions different from those of the Party
were to be published, although no specific guidelines were given 
39in this regard. In a speech reported on 2 April, however, Mao 
personally clarified this important issue. He commented favourably 
on the "enthusiastic discussions" that had marked the inauguration 
of cheng-feng, especially in certain organisations. Nevertheless, 
he felt compelled tociifciqize 'feome people" who had recently been 
speaking from "incorrect standpoints," e.g., the "viewpoint of ab­
solute egalitarianism," and the "method of ridicule and intrigue."
57Ibid., pp. 26-27.
^Ibid., p. 32.
^See the relevant news item In JFRB, (l April 1942), p. 2.
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He rejected these individuals1 recent demands for "absolute equality" 
as mere illusion both now and in the future, and condemned their 
method of criticism as detrimental to the unity of the Party.^
MaoTs comments were clearly directed at Wang Shih-wei and his fellow 
literary leftists, but his warning appears to have gone unheeded. 
According to Goldman, the stream of critical essays went unchecked 
until the middle of April, when it "abruptly stopped."
Although this literary assault was quickly terminated by the
Maoists, it was not before considerable damage had been done to the
Rectification Movement itself. As Goldman has pointed out, the
writers helped to shape the course of cheng-feng, for the strength
of-their criticisms forced the Maoists to focus more attention on
the problem of the intellectuals1 dissidence, and less on the gen-
41uine shortcomings of the Party as such. Obviously concerned lest 
the movement get bogged down in side issues concerning the writers, 
the Propaganda Bureau on 4 April approved a report setting out in 
some detail the precise framework within which the campaign was to 
unfold. Complaining that the current "revolution in Party thought" 
was not developing properly, the report mapped out a rigorous course 
of study and struggle, the overriding aim of which was to contribute 
to the "consolidation of the entire Party." The report then listed 
eighteen readings (later increased to twenty-two) which were to 
form the core of the cadres1 study materials in cheng-feng; of the 
total, no less than one-third came from the pen of Mao Tse-tung
^See the report on Mao's speech in JFRB (2 April 1942), p. 1.
^Goldman, Literary Dissent, p. 33.
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himself. In contrast, although about one-quarter of the readings 
were from Soviet writers, they were only brief extracts, the major­
ity of which were added to the reading list later on, almost as an 
/ o
afterthought. Nonetheless, although the Maoists took these nec­
essary steps to prevent the campaign from being blown off course, 
they could not ignore the serious problem of dissidence that the 
writers1 criticisms had posed. Actually, the writers' attack had 
given Mao a Heaven-sent opportunity to present in a formal way his 
emerging theories in the cultural field, a subject he had hitherto 
largely neglected. Also, as noted previously, the 'writers served 
as a convenient target for cheng-feng, for the spearhead of criti­
cism could be aimed at them as negative examples, with the least 
possible damage being done to the fabric of the Party organization. 
In addition, the Returned Students had much to gain from the focus 
of attention passing to the writers, for it was thereby at least 
partially deflected from themselves. The political power of the 
Returned Students as an inner-Party faction was certainly broken 
during cheng-feng, but it is surely significant that not one of 
them —  not even Wang Ming —  became an individual target of public 
criticism and struggle. That dubious distinction was reserved for 
the unfortunate Wang Shih-wei, who had survived his quarrel with 
Ch'en Po-ta in the spring of 1941 > but was not to be so fortunate 
during the cheng-feng campaign.
42For a full translation of this report, see Compton, op. cit., 
pp. 1-8.
242
Mao Tse-tung’s counter-attack on the dissident writers was
heralded "by his opening and closing addresses at the series of
forums held in Yenan during May 1942, when the general problem of
culture (’’art and literature”) was discussed. We will not concern
ourselves with the content of Mao’s ideas on culture as he articulated
them here. As Howard Boorman has well expressed it, Mao's talks in
large part "represented his summation of theories which had been
widely discussed in leftist literary circles in China since the 
431930's.” Coming from Mao’s mouth, though, these cultural theories 
now became official CCP policy, and they filled an important gap 
in Mao's claim to be a leading Marxist-Leninist theorist in his own 
right. Mao’s key concern was not art and literature at all, but 
rather politics, the subject that came first in his list of interests. 
In an obvious reference to the dissident writers, Mao insisted that 
all Party members, including those involved in literature and the 
arts, "adopt the stand of the Party, the stand of Party spirit and 
Party policy." Unfortunately, continued Mao, "many comrades have 
themselves frequently departed from the correct stand," with the 
inevitable result that many defects exist on both questions of con­
tent and style in revolutionary art and literature.^ On the rela­
tive importance of content and style, Mao made it clear where his 
priorities lay: "As I see it," he informed his audience, "the
political side /i.e., content7 is more of a problem at present,
^Howard L. Boorman, "The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung, CQ,
13 (January-March 1963), p. 24.
44Mao, Ji VIII, p. 112.
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Some comrades lack "basic political understanding and consequently
45have all sorts of muddled ideas." Mao was not one to tolerate 
"muddled ideas" within the Party if he were in a position to do 
something about it, and he accordingly praised the ideological 
struggle which was "already underway in literary and art circles in 
Yenan." The existence of such a struggle came as no surprise.to the 
assembled cadres, but some were perhaps unprepared for the bitterness 
with which it was to be carried out in the ensuing months. Mao had 
given them a hint, however, for he described the unfolding struggle 
as one of "proletarian ideology against non-proletarian ideology." 
This served fair warning that no one was to expect an easy ride if 
he were engaged in oppositional activities, whether in speech, 
print, or behaviour.^
Mao's talks on art and literature were not published in Liber­
ation Daily until 19 October 1943, nearly one and a half years after
47he delivered them. Nevertheless, there was no delay in stepping 
up the ideological struggle, for the forum on art and literature 
was soon followed by another, the "Forum on Party Democracy and Dis­
cipline." This conference, held between 27 May and 13 June 1942, at 
the Central Research Institute, is much less well known than the 
famous one that preceded it. Yet there is little doubt that it is
45Ibid., p. 139. 
4 Ibid, p. 146.
47This long delay was probably due to a lingering reluctance on 
the part of Mao's ranking colleagues to support his- theoretical 
claims uncritically, especially in the cultural sphere, which was 
not really one of his areas of expertise. On this point see pp. 259- 
261 following.
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of equal, if not greater, importance in the development of cheng- 
feng. It was at this series of meetings that the Maoists drove 
home their attack on the dissident writers and, through them, on 
all manifestations of opposition within the Party. Fortunately, 
the Liberation Daily reporter Wen Chi-tse has left us with a skele­
ton outline of the forum in his "Diary of a Struggle," published on 
28 and 29 June, According to Wen, in its early days the forum fo­
cused on the general problem of reconciling the need for both demo­
cracy and discipline in the Party. Very soon, however, the main 
topic of discussion turned out to be Wang Shih-wei, and as the days 
went by his exposure and denunciation became the chief preoccupation
/ g
of those participating In the sessions. As Goldman has suggested,
there were several good reasons why Wang was singled out as the
main public target of cheng-feng. Wang, after all, had been the
"most caustic" of the writers in his criticisms of the Party, he
was one of the least well known and hence "most vulnerable" in the
group, and there was little doubt that he had definite connections
with Trotskyism, if only in the past. Finally, Wang had been in
"constant conflict" with Ch'en Po-ta ever since their quarrel in the
fall and winter.of 1940-41. Given Ch'en*s closeness to Mao, this
49probably sealed Wang's fate, .This last consideration is probably 
of some importance, for during the campaign Ch'en emerged as the 
Party's leading spokesman on the "Wang Shih-wei problem," and his
^Wen Chi-tse, "Dou-zheng ri-ji" (Diary of a Struggle), JFRB 
(28-29 June 1942), p. 4 both issues.
^Goldman, Literary Dissent, p. 37.
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speeches and articles attacking Wang were given due prominence in 
the Yenan press. For a few weeks in the summer of 1942, this shy 
and stammering scholar was to become the pivot of the Maoist purge 
of ideological dissidence within the Party, a role he was to repeat 
on a much larger scale during the Cultural Revolution in the late 
1960' s .50
In the course of the forum sessions, Wang was denounced by a 
wide variety of critics besides Ch'en Po-ta; of particular poignancy 
was the fact that his accusers also included such fellow literary 
leftists as Ting Ling and Ai Ch'ing. Nevertheless, the bitterness 
between Wang and Ch'en appears to have poisoned the atmosphere of the 
forum meetings, and to have at times reduced the debate to the level 
of a witch hunt. Wang claimed to have been discriminated against 
"on all sides" from the time he arrived in Yenan, remarking in par­
ticular that Ch'en had labelled him an "opportunist" in their debate 
on national forms in literature. At this point, according to Wen's 
account, Wang became very agitated and loudly denounced Ch'en as a
"sectarian" to his face, and had to be restrained from continuing
51with his denunciation of Ch'en at the session in question. In 
spite of his stammer, Ch'en was not one to mince words with his 
enemies, and in his major speech to the forum he gave vent to his 
undoubted talent for invective pun, both witty and vulgar. Accor­
ding to Ch'en, "Wang Shit-stench" ( described himself as
50For a useful, though limited, study of Ch'en's role in the 
Cultural Revolution, see the article by Parris Chang, of which pre­
vious mention has been made (p.19).
5"**Wen Chi-tse, op. cit.(pt. 2), p. 4.
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a "man of integrity" (ying-gu-tou), the literal meaning of which is
a man with "hard hones." Not so, said Ch'en. Not only does Wang
not have hard bones, he is little more than a leech, which of course
has no bones at all. Leeches may only be small and harmless-looking
insects, cautioned Ch'en, but they are very dangerous, for they suck
people's blood and harm them in many other ways. One cannot be too
vigilant in guarding against these harmful little creatures, he
reminded the audience, for they are often hidden deep within such
seemingly beautiful flowers as "wild lilies" (a reference to Wang's
52by now infamous essay of the same title).
Ch'en1 s deft use of multiple pun was both clever and vicious, 
but it did not detract from the list of more serious charges he 
leveled against his cornered opponent. Ch'en's major speech attack­
ing Wang was delivered to the forum on 9 June, and reprinted in 
part In the 15 June edition of Liberation Daily. In his address, 
Ch'en assembled such a long list of serious charges against Wang 
that one can sympathize with the latter's reputed characterization 
of Ch'en as one of his "biggest enemies" in Yenan. In a lengthy 
speech which Wen Chi-tse described as "brilliant," Ch'en accused 
Wang of, amongst much else, ideological dogmatism, cultural elitism, 
personal careerism, and splittist activities directed .against Mao 
Tse-tung. Ch'en's accusations against Wang illustrate the powerful 
combination of theoretical disputation, political manoeuvring, and
52Ch'en Po-ta, M-Guan-yu Wang Shi-wei," p. 4.
53For details of these and other charges against Wang, see 
loc. cit.
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personal vindictiveness which characterized the struggle against
Wang Shih-wei. In this sense, Ch'en Po-ta probably set the general
tone (albeit in a more intense manner) of much of the ideological
struggle that permeated the entire Party structure at Yenan during
the rest of 1942 and early 1943. As for the unfortunate Wang Shih-
wei, he became a model negative example of all that was wrong with
the Party as the Maoists conceived it. Needless to say, Ch'en's
final pronouncement on Wang was of the harshest hind:
The content of Wang Shih-wei's ideology is Trotskyism, 
which is anti-masses, anti-nation, anti-revolution and 
anti-Marxist, and serves the ruling classes, Japanese 
imperialism and international fascism.54
Although the odds were heavily stacked against Wang, he apparently
did not meekly give in to the unbearable pressure to which he was
exposed. In fact, Ch'en complained that even though the essential
Trotskyist nature of Wang's ideological position was fully exposed,
he refused to admit guilt and persisted in his erroneous views. In
particular, Wang claimed that cheng-feng was nothing more than a
campaign in which "Chairman Mao is uniting the orthodox people /in
55the Part^7 oppose those who are unorthodox." Wang disappeared
from the scene shortly after the conclusion of the formal struggle
against him; it was only much later that Mao personally admitted
(with regret) that Wang had been executed as a result of a local-
56level decision during the evacuation of Yenan in 1947.
^Loc. cit.
55 / \Wang's claim, as reported by Wen Chi-tse, op. cit. Cpt. 1)
p. 4.
56According to Mao, the decision to execute Wang "did not come
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Wang Shih-wei was the outstanding victim of the initial negative 
phase of the cheng-feng movement, a phase which came to an end with 
the final session of the forum at the Central Research Institute on 
13 June. Thenceforth, the focus of the movement switched from the 
heated denunciation of all "incorrect” ideas within the Party to the 
affirmation of what the Maoists perceived to he the "correct” ideo­
logical position. Chren Po-ta continued to play a prominent role in 
this more positive phase, and endeavoured in the second half of 194-2 
and early 1943 to spell out the general guidelines of thought reform 
among the Party's cadres. In a series of articles and speeches,
Ch'en hammered home the importance of eliminating the evil of petty- 
hourgeois ideology from the minds of certain of the Party's cadres. 
These unfortunate people, in Ch'en's diagnosis, were suffering from 
the "illness" of dogmatism, and they were in urgent need of the 
services of a reputable physician. Needless to say, Ch'en highly 
recommended "Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central Committee"
as "good doctors" (hao de da-fu) in the specialized field of ideo-
57logical pathology.' In their quest for mental health, the cadres
from the Centre." Wang' s unfortunate case later became a prime ex­
ample of how not to treat political deviants within the Party. On 
this issue, see Mao Tse-tung, "Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Con­
ference (30 January 1962), as translated In Stuart R. Schram, ed., 
Chairman Mao Talks to the People (Talks and Letters: 1956-1971), New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1974, pp. 184-185.
57 /Ch'en Po-ta, "Jiu jie-ji ben-xing de gai-zao" (The Transfor­
mation of Traditional Class Nature), JFRB (27 June 1942), p. 4.
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were urged by Ch'en to "continuously arm their minds with Marxism- 
Leninism," for only by doing so could they successfully make the 
all-important transition from perceptual to conceptual knowledge, 
thereby achieving a' true understanding of the real world. Such a 
transition is not to be easily achieved, however. For example, 
although over the years the CCP has produced many notable theorists 
and leaders, none of those who have been active mainly in the theo­
retical field has been successful in creating a distinctive Chinese 
revolutionary theory. Even his own efforts, in this regard have
achieved very little, confesses Ch'en, because he has not been suf-
58ficiently industrious and persistent. Ch'en's emphasis on the
importance of sincere‘self-criticism among the Party's cadres is a
constant theme in his writings' during this entire period. In one
speech in particular he stresses the need for every individual cadre
to make a full confession to the Party of his personal shortcomings
and errors in the past, so as to achieve a "new life" and a "new 
59ideology." In response to those who fear that such a total sur­
render to the Party would entail the destruction of human indivi­
duality, Ch'en argues that this fear is not well grounded. Basic 
human nature, says Ch'en, is essentially the same as class nature,"
^Ch'en Po-ta, "Si-xiang de fan-xing" (Reflection in Thought), 
JFRB, (28 August 1942), p. 4.
59Ch'en Po-ta, "Tan-bai yun-dong yu zi-wo fan-xing" (The Self- 
Confession Movement and Self-Reflection) (1943?), in Zheng-dun san- 
feng can-kao cai-liao (Reference Materials on the Rectification of 
the Three /Svil? Workstyles), edited by the Central Soviet Party 
Committee, n. pi..: n. pub., n. d., X, pp. 14-17.
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so it naturally follows-that the character of the Chinese Communist 
Party is the concentrated expression of the nature of the Chinese 
proletariat, which in turn is the manifestation of the most pro­
gressive form of human nature in China. Hence, in surrendering 
to the Chinese Communist Party, a cadre is not liquidating his own 
particular individuality but is in fact filling it with a new con­
tent —  proletarian human nature. Nowhere does Ch'en deny the 
existence of individual character, which is the.product of social 
conditioning, and he urges the Party to take into full account 
the individuality of its many diverse members. Nonetheless, the 
basic interests of a truly proletarian political party and its 
individual members should be identical, and the individual member 
should constantly strive to maintain this fundamental harmony.
If an individual Party member perceives a clash between his per­
sonal interests and those of the Party, it is incumbent upon him
60to subordinate his own interest's to those of the Party.
In all of this disputation on the importance of self-criticism 
and thought reform, Ch’en did not appear to differ significantly 
from the views held by other top Party leaders such as Mao Tse-tung, 
Liu Shao-ch’i and Ch’en Yun, all of whom were currently devoting
^Ch’en Po-ta, "Ren-xing, dang-xing, ge-xing” (Human Nature, 
Party Character, Individual Character), JFRB (27 March 194-3)? P-4-. 
This short essay has been reprinted many times in both the original 
and a revised version. For an example of the latter, see Ch'en 
Po-ta, et. al., Ren-xing, dang-xing, ge-xing (Human Nature, Party 
Character, Individual Character), Peking: Zhong-guo qing-nian chu- 
ban she, 1957, pp. 5-14-.
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some attention to similar 'questions. Yet, Ch'en's essay on human 
nature is of special interest to us, for it has been carefully scru­
tinized by David S, Nivison, who has'concluded that it represents
an excellent case study of "Sinification and synthesis" in the Chi-
6/2nese Communist handling of 'ethical questions. Indeed, Nivison 
claims that Ch'en's essay is "of a piece" with the techniques of the 
Buddhist missionaries who came to China in the early years of the 
Christian era. That is to say, Buddhist texts which seemed relevant 
to Taoist interests were selected for emphasis, and Buddhist■con­
cepts, where possible, "were conveyed by equating them with Taoist 
ones." In effect, argues Nivison, Ch'en "ostensibly picks up the 
problem /of human nature/, where Chinese philosophy leaves off," Of' 
all the ancient philosophers, Ch'en picks Kao Tzu (a heterodox pppo-. 
nent of Mencius), as being closest to the truth in his understanding 
of human nature; i.e., human nature is not cast in an absolute 
mould, but is "good" or "bad" according to the specific circumstances 
in which it takes form. In Kao Tzu's view, says Ch'en, human nature
/I-i
See, for example, Liu Shao-chU's essay of June 19-41, "The Class 
Character of Man." Although Lui's basic understanding of human na­
ture is similar to Ch'en's, it is unlikely that Ch'en would have en­
dorsed Liu's harsh characterization of the "narrow-mindedness" and 
"backwardness" of the peasantry, and his unfavourable comparison of 
them with the industrial proletariat, whom he praises lavishly. Un­
like Liu, who came from a small landlord background, Ch'en was born 
into a "poor peasant" family, and he invariably emphasizes the 
strengths of the peasant masses rather than their weaknesses. Liu's 
essay is included as an appendix in Liu Shao-ch'i, How to be a Good 
Communist, 1st ed., Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951, pp. 113- 
120.
62The discussion in the following paragraph is based on David 
S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, mimeo., Cambridge^  
Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1954, pp. 35-41.
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is like a stream of water: "Open a way to the. east and it will flow
to the east; open a way to the west and it will flow to the west." 
Kao Tzu's concept of the relativity of man's nature is immediately 
recognizable in Ch'en's modern Marxist concept of human nature as 
being "progressive" or "reactionary" according to the special class 
environment in which it is moulded. Likewise, argues Nivison, Ch'en 
establishes other linkages between past and present in seeming to 
equate party nature with the Neo-Confucian concept of li, the undes­
irable part of individual human nature with the Buddhist idea of 
(bad) karma, the desirable part of individual human nature with the 
Neo-Confucian idea of "individuality" (especially after Wang Yang- 
ming), and unselfish devotion to the Party with the Confucian conr- 
cept of "sincerity." In these and other ways, argues Nivison, Ch'en 
Po-ta is able to introduce Marxist concepts of human nature (as 
Ch'en understands them) in a format that would make sense within the 
Neo-Confucian tradition. In his Chinese definition of the Marxist 
view of human nature, concludes Nivison, Ch'en is clear as to where 
Marx differs from Chinese tradition, but he states his definition 
"in such a way as to make it read easily as a chapter in Chinese 
ethical literature." This, of course, is precisely Ch'en Po-ta's 
strength as perhaps the CCP * s leading proponent and practitioner 
of Sinification.
By late 1942 the cheng-feng movement had been well and truly 
launched in Yenan, and it was decided to extend the campaign to 
other areas as well. Such was Ch'en Po-ta's importance that he was 
sent in late 1942 to spearhead the Rectification Movement among
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Party cadres and left-wing intellectuals in Chungking, the Nation­
alists' war-time capital. Little is known of his precise job assign­
ment in Chungking, but'he seems to have Joined the editorial boards 
of both the New China Daily and the Life Bookstore. These two 
organizations were the CCP's major instruments of propaganda in 
Nationalist-controlled China, and they were the logical vehicles for 
the expansion of cheng-feng outside Yenan. As in Yenan, Wang Shih- 
wei was held up to criticism as the model negative example in the 
campaign, and the same Party ideologists —  Ch'en Po-ta, Ai Ssu-ch'i, 
and Chou Yang —  remained his chief accusers. The well-known Commu­
nist literary critics Feng Hsueh-feng and Hu Feng emerged as the 
Party's prime targets on the local scene in Chungking, and they were 
bracketed with Wang Shih-wei as the leading symbols of ideological 
dissidence in the Communist movement. The Party authorities obvious­
ly were less, able to carry out as thorough a campaign in Chungking
as in Yenan, but the same methods of small-group study and self-
64.criticism were used. In addition to his specific cheng-feng duties, 
however, Ch'en took advantage of his opportunity of living in Chung­
king to familiarize himself with the. general ideological climate 
within the Nationalist camp. Indeed, late 1942 and early 1943 was 
a period of intense intellectual activity in Chungking, as the 
Nationalists prepared to capitalize on the increasing evidence of an
Boorman and Howard, op. cit., p. 221,* Klein and Howard, op. 
eit., p. 123-
6 LSee Goldman,. Literary Dissent, pp. 51-66, for a discussion 
of the impact of cheng-feng on Party intellectuals in the National­
ist-controlled areas, especially Chungking.
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ultimate Allied victory over the Axis powers, Ch'en was thus well- 
placed to sensitize himself to the changing atmosphere among the 
Nationalists,.and to "become relatively well-informed on the important 
ideological offensive that Chiang Kai-shek was to launch with the 
publication in March 1943 of his key treatise, China's Destiny. The 
CCP's counter-offensive on the ideological front was to be one of 
the Party's primary concerns in the coming years, and Ch'en Po-ta, 
upon his return to Yenan, was to play a central role in the unfolding 
drama. Mao Tse-tung was to be cast as the heroic lead, and Ch'en 
Po-ta emerged as the acknowledged playwright.
(iii) Emergence of a Maoist Cult?
Mao Tse-tung's prestige as the CCP's top leader —  and leading 
theorist —  soared to new heights during the Rectification Movement. 
Mao delivered the keynote speeches calling for cheng-feng, and he was 
the single most important theorist to be studied during the move­
ment. In addition, he set the Party's policy in the controversial 
field of art and literature in May 1942, and he delivered the defin­
itive report on the Party's economic work the following December.
On top of all this, leading Party officials like K'ang Sheng had de­
clared the Party's general line, since Tsunyi to be entirely correct. 
Mao's growing stature was reflected in seemingly insignificant ways 
too; on 14 December, for example, Liberation Daily revealed that 
Hsiao San, a boyhood friend of Mao, had recently completed a long 
manuscript on his recollections^  of Mao as a youth. Pleading lack 
of space, the newspaper published only a few brief extracts from 
Hsiao's original text, one of which established Mao's intellectual
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inheritance from Li Ta-chao, who was himself gradually emerging 
posthumously as the CCP's official founding father. Hsiao's ar­
ticle, though brief, was accompanied by a picture of Mao as a young 
student, and it seems to have been the first biographical study of
65Mao to have appeared in the official CCP press. As such, it was 
the beginning of a definite trend toward the increasing glorifica­
tion of Mao in the immediate years to come, as was the poem "Mao 
Tse-tung” published sometime in late 1941 or early 1942 by the well- 
known left-wing poet, Ai Ch'ing.^ Likewise, a brief news item in 
Liberation Daily on 28 August 1941 revealed that one of Yenan' s 
institutes for the education of young cadres had been named after 
Mao Tse-tung, although it was later amalgamated into the newly- 
created Yenan University. Finally, on 10 March 1942, a headline 
in Liberation Daily referred to "Chairman Mao and various comrades 
on the Central Committee." This is probably the newspaper's first 
official reference to Mao as "chairman" (zhu-xi), and taken in con­
text indicates that Mao was now being regarded as the chairman of
65Hsiao San, "Mao Ze-dong tong-zhi de shao-nian shi-dai" (The 
Era of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Youth), JFRB (14 December 1941), p. 4. 
During the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's, Li Ta-chao, Ch'u 
Ch'iu-pai and many other once-revered CCP leaders were downgraded 
in the Chinese press, but this is probably only a temporary pheno­
menon. Like Teng Hsiao-ping, they will probably be rehabilitated in 
due course and take their former esteemed place in CCP history.
66Goldman, Literary Dissent, p. 29-
67See the news item in JFRB (28 August 1941), p. 2..
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the Party's Central Committee, and not merely of its Military Com- 
mission. Mao's formal elevation to this hey position did not take 
place until sometime in the spring of 1943? "but this early reference 
indicates which way the .wind was blowing. The doctrinal implica­
tions of Mao's growing supremacy are most graphically illustrated in 
a prominent cartoon which appeared in Liberation Daily on 6 April 
1942. It immediately brings to mind Franz Schumann's observation 
in 1966 that:
. If Mao's picture were ever to be ranged alongside the 
sacred quadrumvirate /of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Sta­
lin/, symbolically this would mean that Mao would have 
become the creator of new theory, binding on all Marxist- 
Leninist parties. 9^
That some in the Maoist camp were thinking along these lines is sug­
gested by the cartoon in question, for it clearly depicts an arrogant 
young man comparing himself with the "greats" of the international 
communist movement. The young man is strutting in front of a wall 
upon which are hanging portraits of no less than five of the clas­
sical masters —  Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung him­
self! The individual depicted may be no one in particular, but it 
is hard to resist the conclusion that tie represents the Returned 
Students and their claim to ideological pre-eminence within the 
leadership of the CCP. The cartoon, signed by one Chang 0, candidly
For this reference to "Chairman Mao," see the news item on 
the funeral of Chang Hao, a Central Committee member who had re­
cently died, in JFRB (10 March 1942), p. 3. This date is a little 
more than a month earlier than the date (15 April 1942) cited by 
Jerome Ch'en as the first occurance of the term, "Chairman Mao," in 
a Liberation Daily headline. See Jerome Ch'en, Mao Papers, p. 177, 
item 216.
69
Franz Schumann,. Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 
2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968 (1966), p. 29.
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ridicules the pretensions of the youth, who is. said to regard himself
as !,Lao Zi tian-xia di-liu," which may he translated freely as, "I’m
70
the sixth greatest in the world!"
Regardless of the precise significance of the cartoon, its 
addition of Mao to the sacred quadrumvirate of Communist leaders and 
theorists was indicative of the cult that was about to emerge. A 
more substantial indication of Mao’s growing prestige as a theorist 
of distinction was provided in the short essay Chu Teh wrote to com­
memorate the CCP’s twenty-first anniversary. Published on 1 July 
1942, the essay appears to have been Liberation Daily's sole effort 
to commemorate the date in any formal way; considering the impor­
tance of Chu's position in the Party and army however, the solitary 
appearance of his commemorative article only serves to underscore 
its significance in buttressing Mao’s claim to undisputed leadership. 
Never one to dwell unduly on ideological questions, Chu nonetheless 
was at pains to point out that the CCP, in its long and arduous 
years of struggle, had "correctly grasped Marxist-Leninist theory," 
and had even "created a Sinified Marxist-Leninist theory to guide 
the Chinese revolution." Lest the reader linger in suspense as to 
the leading architect of this Sinified theory, Chu made the follow­
ing observation:
70For this revealing cartoon by Chang 0, see JFRB (6 April 
1942), p. 4-
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Today, having been tempered "by a long period of revo­
lutionary struggle, our Party now has its own most tal­
ented leader in Comrade Mao Tse-tung. He has genuine­
ly comprehended Marxist-Leninist theory, and moreover 
is adept at using this theory to guide the Chinese rev­
olution step "by step to victory. Not only is he the 
most authoritative person in our entire Party, hut he 
also enjoys the greatest political confidence among the 
people throughout the country. In addition, a large 
number of sincere and courageous Party cadres, fully ex­
perienced in struggle and having close relations with 
the masses, have been nurtured for the Party and the re­
volution under his education and care.'71-
Mao could not have written a better appreciation himself, for Chu 
had depicted him virtually as the soul of the Party and the revolu­
tion, equally talented as leader, thinker, and educator. Nor was 
his greatness limited to the Chinese Communist movement, but it 
spread beyond to the whole of the nation itself. Significantly,, 
other military leaders took up Chu’s praise of Mao during the month 
of July; P’eng Teh-huai lauded Mao’s concept of !,new democracy,” 
and claimed he had effectively synthesized Marxist theory and Chi­
nese practice. Ch’en Yi for his part generalized the nature of
Mao's strategy, Insisting on the international significance of the
72
Chinese revolution. Once again, as in the months following the 
Party’s Sixth Plenum in late 1938, It was the military commanders 
rather than the Party’s top officials who took the lead in putting 
forward the claims of Mao Tse-tung to supremacy within the Chinese
71Chu Teh, ’Ji-nian dang de er-shi-yi zhou-nian” (in Commemor­
ation of the Party’s Twenty-first Anniversary), JFRB, (1 July 194-2), 
P* I-
72P’eng Teh-huai and Ch'en Yi are cited in Tokuda, op. cit.,
p. 52.
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Communist movement. It was not until the summer of 1943? fully a 
year after Chu Teh’s commemorative essay, that such eminent Party 
officials as Liu Shao-ch’i, Chou En-lai, and Wang Chia-hsiang (not 
to mention such obviously reluctant spokesmen as Po Ku) were to join 
their military colleagues in the public glorification of Mao.
In fact, in spite of the obvious rise in stature which Mao and 
his writings experienced during ehengTfeng, one can detect a reluc­
tance on the part of most leading Party officials to push things too 
far. While the trend towards the glorification of Mao as the single 
most important leader was clear enough, it appeared to be coupled 
with an equally strong tendency to maintain the prestige and autho­
rity of the Central Committee Itself. For example, even Chu Teh 
felt constrained in his commemorative essay to point out that it was 
the "Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung" who alerted 
the Party to the dangers of Ideological deviance, and he concluded 
that the successful implementation of cheng-feng required the joint
73leadership of "Comrade Mao Tse-tung and our Party Central Committee," 
For his part, Ch'en Po-ta also felt obliged to pay lip service to 
the notion of collective leadership; in one speech in particular he 
attributed the success of the CCP to the key role of the Party’s
74"great leaders," represented by "Comrade Mao Tse-tung and others."
It is not surprising, then,that Mao himself took care not to be seen 
to place himself above the top Party organ. In a Politburo resolu­
tion of 1 September 1942, for example (which Mao wrote himself),
73Chu Teh, "Ji-nian dang de er-shi-yi zhou-nian," p.. 1.
^Ch’en Po-ta, "Tan-bai yun-dong yu zi-wo fan-xing," p. 17.
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it was .stated that the ideological education of cadres was to he
carried out on the basis of "Central Committee resolutions and
75
Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s reports." It would appear, then, that while 
Mao was not adverse to recommending the study of his own writings 
during cheng-feng, he still felt it necessary to acknowledge the 
collective leadership of the Central Committee. This constant 
bracketing of Mao and the Central Committee leads us to an important 
observation, namely, that the Rectification Movement did not by it­
self lead directly to the undisguised cult of Mao Tse-tung which 
burst upon the Chinese Communist movement in the summer of 1943f 
culminating in the incorporation of "Mao Tse-tungTs thought" in the 
Party constitution of 1945. This would appear to be at odds with 
current interpretations of the cheng-feng campaign, which uni­
formly tend to view the cult of Mao in 1943 and later as the planned 
and inevitable result of the movement. Stuart Schram, for instance, 
reflects this close connection of campaign and cult in declaring that 
the appearance of Liu Shao-chl’s unashamedly hagiographic praise
of Mao In July 1943 "may be taken as -marking the symbolic ending 
*76of the campaign." This appears to be a reasonable conclusion, 
and one would be hard pressed to deny that some kind of Maoist 
cult inevitably had to flow from cheng-feng. Yet, there are 
cults and cults, and it Is our conclusion that the cult of Mao
75Mao, Ji VIII, p. 162.
76Stuart R. Schram, "The Cultural Revolution in Historical 
Perspective," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation 
and Cultural Change in China, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973> p* 22.
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that appeared in mid-1943 —  in the broadness of its claims, the 
intensity of its propagation, and the variety of its forms —  was 
partly the product of a very special set of inter-related domestic 
and international conditions which developed over the winter of 
194.2-4-3. Had these specific conditions been absent at this time, it 
is unlikely that the personal cult of Mao would have reached the 
heights that it did, or that the final triumph of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought would have been as thorough as it was. It was these con­
ditions, then, which led to Mao's spectacular triumph over the Par­
ty between 1943 and 1945, and which helped to establish the dis­
tinctive relationship between leader and party that was to colour 
much of Chinese politics in the years after 1949.
CHAPTER VIII
THE TRIUMPH OF "MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT," 1943
(i) The Nationalists' Ideological Offensive
■ The individual cult of Mao Tse-tung (and the unabashed glorifi­
cation of his thought) which burst upon the CCP in July 1943 was 
truly amazing in its intensity and scope, and provides a major theme 
of Party history during 1943-45. A good deal of the cult can be 
explained by the impressive control that Mao and his faction had 
gained over the Party by the end of 1942; the Returned Students had 
been routed, and during cheng-feng Mao's political and military pre­
eminence within the Chinese Communist movement had been augmented 
on the ideological front. Even in the economic sphere the Gods had 
been favourable to Mao, for by the end of 1942 the worst effects of 
the Japanese and Nationalist blockades of the Red areas had been 
surmounted, thus demonstrating the validity of Mao's economic and 
fiscal policies. As Mao claimed in his lengthy report on the eco­
nomy in December 1942, between 1941 and the end of 1942 the "firm 
foundation of self-reliance in production was laid....We are over­
coming difficulties."^ By the spring of 1943> then, Mao's personal 
position within the Party was extremely strong, definite signs 
of a cult had already made their appearance, and it is likely that 
they would have become ever more unmistakable in the normal course 
of events. Accordingly, the suggestion that the cult of Mao and
■Wo, Ji VIII, p. 187.
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his thought was more or less an inevitable product of Mao’s political 
supremacy within the CCP is evident in the writings of many students 
of Chinese communism. Noriyuki Tokuda, for example, has concluded 
that:
Considered as a consequence of the process of strengthen­
ing Mao's leadership which began in 1935, /the/ eruption 
of the Mao cult indicated.. .that Mao's 'big push' toward 
his complete domination of the CCP had been successful.^
That the cult developed with such rapidity, vigour, and depth, 
however, can best be explained by the fortuitous set of foreign and 
domestic circumstances that took shape in late 194-2 and the spring 
of 194-3. In particular, the Battle of Stalingrad, the publication 
of Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny, and the dissolution of the 
Comintern conjoined in early 1943 to provide a most suitable environ­
ment for the blossoming of the cult of Mao Tse-tung and his thought. 
This observation in no way invalidates the fundamental causal con­
nection between Mao's rise to power in the CCP and the subsequent 
emergence of his dual cult, a connection which this study has es­
tablished in some detail. Nonetheless, the three additional factors 
suggested above have usually been underestimated in most discussions 
of the appearance of the cult, and this tends to give too much em­
phasis to the apparent inevitability of the cult emerging from the 
internal political processes of the CCP. Assigning due weight to the 
contemporary domestic and foreign environment at the precise moment 
when the cult erupted will lead to a better understanding of the 
total scenario giving rise to the cult of Mao and his thought. Like 
all complex social organizations, the CCP is shaped in large part by
2
Tokuda, op. eit., p. 55.
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the particular environment in which it functions, and which helps to 
determine the precise configuration of forces which governs its 
internal evolution. This point will become clearer in the course of 
the ensuing discussion, and does not need to be pursued further for 
the time being.
It is essential to bear in mind that Mao’s cult developed in 
the context of ever increasing Nationalist-Communist rivalry, in 
which each side attempted to elevate its leader and ideology to a 
position of first importance in Chinese political life. A powerful 
impetus was given this rivalry by the sharp deterioration of the ■ 
united front, as witnessed in the New Fourth Army Incident of 
January 1941, and subsequent "incidents” too numerous to mention.
In spite of this, the first part of 1941 was hardly a propitious 
time for the two rivals to force a showdown. The Japanese were 
well entrenched in China, and were beginning to expand into South­
east Asia with little effective resistance coming from the European 
powers or the United States. Most of Europe had in fact been con­
quered by the invading Germans, and Britain was just recovering
t
from the onslaught of the Luftwaffe. Eussia had gained an unknown 
amount of breathing space through her mutual non-aggression treaties 
with both Germany and Japan, and the United States appeared reluc­
tant to enter the fray unless forced to do so by direct attach upon 
her own soil. With the international situation so menacing, neither 
the Nationalists nor the Communists were really in a position to drive 
the wedge between themselves even deeper. Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek 
was forced to divert a good deal of his energy to the task of
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repairing the damage done to the Nationalists' image by the defec­
tion of Wang Ching-wei and the establishment of his puppet govern­
ment in Nanking. Mao Tse-tung, for his part, was fending off' the 
fissiparous tendencies within the.CCP that were undermining his' 
own position as leader. Under these circumstances, it made better 
sense for each leader to put his own house in order and await a 
more favourable war situation before forcing a final confrontation 
with the other.
This more favourable situation began to take shape in the se­
cond half of 194-1; Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 
that year brought the reluctant Russians into the struggle, while 
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour in December dragged in the equally 
hesitant .Americans, From the point of view of both Chinese sides, 
Nationalist and Communist alike, the war could not have taken a 
better turn, and it is not surprising that they both adopted a 
scarcely disguised attitude of "sitting on a mountain top to watch 
the tigers fight." In deciding upon the attack on Pearl Harbour, 
even the Japanese leaders themselves realized they could not sur­
vive a long war of attrition with the United States, and this ob-
3servation was not entirely lost on their Chinese adversaries.
The Chinese were disappointed,then, when Washington decided to give 
immediate priority to the Western front, thus giving the Japanese 
a bit more breathing space than would have been the case otherwise.
3
For this interpretation of Japanese war strategy, see Chihiro 
Hosoya, "Twenty-five Years After Pearl Harbour: A New Look at 
Japan's Decision for War," in Grant K. Goodman, comp., Imperial 
Japan and Asia: A Reassessment, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1967, pp. 52-63.
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Nonetheless, the Chinese were gratified to see that the reck­
less over-extension of Japan’s military capacity gradually began to 
take its toll, and their thoughts soon turned to the problem of the 
appropriate offensive response. The whole process was speeded up 
by the addition of a most powerful catalyst —  Stalingrad. Between 
September 1942 and February 1943, the beleagured Russians not only 
stopped but even turned back the German invasion of Russia in a 
bloody victory reminiscent of the repulse of Napoleon Bonaparte in 
the autumn and winter of 1&L2. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad 
effectively turned the tide of the war in favour of the Allies, and 
it had a tremendous psychological impact not only on the Western 
world, but in the Far East as well. Certainly, the momentous signi­
ficance of Stalingrad was well appreciated by Chiang Kai-shek and 
Mao Tse-tung, both of whom saw in Russian victory their own personal 
opportunity to take the offensive.^ The offensive they had in mind, 
however, was not to be directed primarily at the Japanese, who had 
■ been faring rather badly in the maritime struggle with the United 
States, and whose fortunes had further declined in the wake of 
Stalingrad. Rather, each side in the faltering Nationalist-Communist 
united front regarded the other as the chief focus of attack, although 
the continuing demands of an at least nominal war-time unity pre­
vented the upsurge of actual civil war prior to the final defeat of 
the Japanese. What was not prevented, however, was a war of words,
^On the Communists' appreciation of the significance of the 
Battle of Stalingrad, see the special editorial written for Liber­
ation Daily by Mao Tse-tung, entitled "The Turning Point in World 
War II," JFRB (12 October 1942). Translated in Mao-, SW III, pp. 
103-107.
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or a battle for ideological supremacy throughout the nation, and it 
was to this task that'the two adversaries turned. The final strug­
gle for the allegiance of the Chinese people was initiated on the 
ideological front in the spring of 1943, extended to the military 
sphere in 1946, and finally resolved with the sweeping Communist 
victory of 1949.
Like Mao himself, Chiang Kai-shek was not one to underestimate 
the importance of ideological struggle, although he was much less 
adept than his adversary in employing it to effect. Nonetheless, 
Chiang got the jump on the Communists by publishing, on 10 March 
1943, his celebrated book, China's Destiny, at the same time inau­
gurating a massive ideological campaign throughout the country with 
his book as the movement's intellectual core. In all likelihood the 
volume was largely written by T'ao Hsi-sheng, a long-time Nationalist 
advisor, but Chiang presented the book to the public as his own.
The work was written during the very months of the fierce Battle of 
Stalingrad, and it clearly reflects the optimism to which the Rus­
sian triumph had given rise. With renewed confidence, Chiang de­
clared that the "opportunity for the recovery of the nation and the 
hope of the rebirth of the state are now presented to the citizens
5
The suggestion that T’ao Hsi-sheng drafted China's Destiny was 
widely accepted at the time, and was noted by Philip Jaffe in his 
introduction to Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (and Chinese Eco­
nomic ‘ Theory), London: Dennis Dobson, Ltd. 1947, p. 21. This volume, 
with notes and commentary by Philip Jaffe, is a translation of the 
original Chinese text of China's Destiny, and is used here as the 
standard reference to Chiang's book. An authorized translation of 
the later revised version of the book is Chiang Kai-shek, China *s 
Destiny, translated by Wang Chung-hui, New York: Macmillan Co.,
1947.
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of the entire country."^ * Chiang's book was obviously issued to 
assist the people of China to make the best possible use of this 
rare opportunity. Claimed at the time to be the "most important book 
written since the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen," Chiang’s 
treatise was often difficult in style and obscure in meaning; accor­
dingly, a catechism, synopsis, and book of notes were also published 
as reference aides for the book’s potential readers. That they were 
to be.numerous was determined by the fact that China's Destiny be­
came required reading for all civil servants, military officers, mem­
bers of the Nationalist Youth Corps, and students at the Party's 
Central Political Training Institute. Further, the book was desig­
nated as the "most important extra-curricular reading matter" in 
Chinese schools, colleges and universities, and the subject of for­
mal examinations at all levels of the educational system. In light 
of this, one must agree with Philip Jaffe, a critical reviewer of 
Chiang’s text, that it was the "political bible" of the Chinese
Nationalists, and the centerpiece of their nation-wide ideological 
7campaign.
Throughout China's Destiny, Chiang Kai-shek hammers home the 
importance of correct ideology as the foundation of all revolutionary 
endeavour and national reconstruction. "Sun Yat-sen," claims Chiang, 
"saw that the basis of the success of the revolution lay in the psy- 
chological reconstruction of the people." This is of course a 
£
Ibid., p. 4-3*
Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 185.
269
proposition with which even Mao Tse-tung would have agreed (his 
Marxism notwithstanding), hut it leaves open the question of the 
specific content of such reconstruction at the psychological level. 
Chiang quickly dismisses both "Liberalism and Communism" as unsuit­
able to the tasks ahead, claiming that these foreign ideologies are 
inherently "opposed to the spirit of China's own civilization," and
even instrumental in causing the "decay and ruin of Chinese civili- 
g
zation." Rather, says Chiang:
The psychological reconstruction of the people should be 
based on the development of an independent ideology, in 
which the greatest emphasis must be placed on a revival 
of the nation's ancient culture and the cultivation of 
genuinely scientific knowledge.... The teachings of Sun 
Yat-sen were based on China's ancient culture, and com­
bined with this the most advanced theories of the world 
in order to formulate China's superior principles of na­
tional reconstruction.10
With the substitution of Mao Tse-tung's name for that of Sun Yat-sen, 
this passage could well have appeared on the editorial page of Liber­
ation Daily. Certainly, it illustrates most clearly the degree to 
which both the Nationalists and the Communists had converged on the 
importance of constructing an official ideology that was at once dis­
tinctly Chinese and undeniably modern. What remained at issue be­
tween the two camps was the question of which political- movement —  
Communist or Nationalist —  best represents the "correct" path for 
the Chinese people to follow. On this critical question Chiang Kai- 
shek is quite unequivocal, stressing that the "highest guiding prin-
9Ibid., p. 100.
10Ibid., p. 163.
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ciple in the War of Resistance is the Three People’s Principles, and
11the highest directing organization is the Kuomintang." Sun Yat-sen
was of course long dead and "buried, but Chiang shows no hesitation in
putting himself forward as the new father of the nation, and the
instructor of the masses:
I, Chiang Kai-shek, have been identified from the begin­
ning with restarting the Republic of China on the road 
to independence and freedom. ...I wish all my countrymen 
to examine thoroughly what I have written, and carry 
these precepts into practice.1^
In the opinion of one experienced student of modern Chinese history,
it is no coincidence that Chiang became head of the National Central
University at Chungking at the same time that he published Chinar s
Destiny as a textbook. True to an "ancient pattern" in Chinese
political leadership, Chiang Kai-shek was inevitably seeking to "pro-
13gress from the status of Hero to that.of Sage."
In the months following the publication of Chiang's treatise on 
China's future, the Nationalist Party's accompanying propaganda cam­
paign unfolded throughout the country. The Communists were of course 
aware of the implications of the campaign\ as we know from later 
events, leading CCP polemicists such as Ch'en Po-ta were commissioned 
to prepare an official critique of Chiang's major theses. The Com­
munists were caught somewhat off guard, however, by the surprise 
announcement of the dissolution of the Communist International.
i:LIbid., p.222.
^Ibid., p. 43*
^John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, 3t& ed., Cam­
bridge, -Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 4-04.
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Having come Into the war against Germany as a full ally of the 
Western democracies, the Soviet Union was increasingly obsessed with 
the struggle in Europe to the relative neglect of the war zones fur­
ther to the East. Naturally enough, Stalin became ever more aware 
of the Comintern’s rather incongruous position, dedicated as it was 
to the promotion of proletarian revolution in the very nations with 
which Russia was allied in the desperate struggle against fascism. 
Finally, in response to Ailied prompting and as a gesture of good 
will to the United States in particular, the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a resolution on 15 May
1/
1943 recommending the dissolution of the world organization. In a 
sense, the Comintern had been put on ice as early as 1935, when its 
Seventh World Congress emphasized the importance of strengthening 
the national Communist parties and encouraging their participation 
in the anti-fascist united fronts being promoted everywhere by the 
Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the CCP did have to make a formal res­
ponse to the Comintern’s dissolution, and so on 26 May the Party's 
Secretariat convened a meeting in Yenan to deal with the issue. Mao 
Tse-tung elaborated on the Party resolution adopted at the meeting, 
and like it expressed his complete agreement with the Comintern's 
decision to disband. While noting the invaluable assistance of the 
Comintern In the early years of the CCP, Mao went on to stress that 
the CCP was the creation of historic forces within China, and would
1/
For the text of this important resolution recommending the 
dissolution of the Comintern, see Jane Degras, ed., The Communist 
International, -1919-1943' Documents, III, London': Oxford University 
Press, 1965, pp. 476-479.
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-have appeared and prospered even if the help from the Comintern had
15
not been forthcoming. In fact, now that the Comintern was departing 
from the scene, there was every reason to believe that the Chinese 
Party would develop even more rapidly. As the Central Committee 
resolution phrased it, the new situation would "further strengthen" 
the self-confidence and creativity of all CCP members, "further con­
solidate" relations between the Party and the Chinese people, and 
"further heighten" the Party's fighting strength for the arduous 
tasks ahead.^
The enthusiastic response the CCP gave to the Comintern's 
demise was by no means merely a function of their desire to put a 
brave face on a fait accompli on the part of their Russian comrades. 
Rather, it reflected the Maoists' genuine doubt as to the Comintern's 
ultimate value, and their relief at witnessing the nemesis of this 
once powerful organization that had consistently discounted the 
Maoist group in the Chinese Party. Indeed, the Maoists did little 
to conceal their almost improper delight over the Comintern's fate; 
they applauded the Comintern's non-intervention in the CCP's "or­
ganizational affairs" since 1935, and boasted that the Chinese Party 
had matured politically in the course of struggles "even more com­
plex. than the Russian revolution." As a result, the CCP had nur­
tured "its own outstanding and well-tested cadres," "had done its
"^ Mao, Ji IX, p. 16, 22. Stuart Schram first drew attention to 
this important speech by Mao in 1963, when he included extracts from 
it in the first edition of his Political Thought. For this extract, 
see the second edition (1969) of Schram's study cited previously, pp. 
421-423.
16Mao, Ji IX, p. 23.
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work very well" in the struggle for national liberation, and, with 
regard to the Comintern, had "no longer any need of this internation­
al leading centre." On the contrary, argued Mao, the pressing task 
at the moment was to strengthen the Communist parties of the various 
countries, and to render them "even more nationalized" (geng jia min-
zu-hua) and hence more suited to the needs of national liberation
17and reconstruction. These ringing declarations by Mao and his
colleagues obviously smacked of "petty-bourgeois nationalism and
chauvinism" (as defined in the Marxist lexicon), and one is prompted
to inquire as to the Soviet attitude toward these manifestations of
independence on the part of the Chinese. Turning once again to the
study of Charles Me Lane, we are reminded that by 193# Moscow had
come to accept Mao Tse-tung's leadership of the CCP, and was "content
to let Mao pursue his own course within certain broad limits al-
18ready well defined and accepted in Yenan." Questions of ideolo­
gical rectitude were placed well behind war-time needs in Moscow's 
scale of priorities, and the Soviet leaders' specific interest in 
the CCP hit an all-time low following Germany's invasion of Russia 
in June 194-1. A striking example of indifference amounting to 
neglect is the fact that the Comintern's major journal (Communist 
International), which had given extensive and continuing coverage 
of events in China up to 194-0, did not carry a single article on 
China or the Sino-Japanese war between June 194-1 and its final issue 
in June 194-3."^
17Ibid., pp. 17-19.
18McLane, op. cit., p. 155.
^Ibid., p. 157. Even if McLane has inadvertently overlooked
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Nonetheless, despite the dissolution of the Comintern, Moscow 
did "begin to pay more attention to events in China during the course 
of 1943. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad,the deterioration of Sino- 
Soviet relations in Sinkiang, and the renewal of tensions between 
the Nationalists and the Communists all tended to encourage a renewal 
of Soviet interest in China in the summer of 1943* Yet in spite of 
this .the Soviet leaders held back from open commentary on the CCP 
and its role in China until after the war, for fear of damaging re­
lations with the Nationalist Party and its increasingly enthusiastic 
benefactors in Washington. This fact is clearly illustrated by the
"omission of any reference whatsoever in the Soviet press" of the
20CCP’s important Seventh National Congress m  the spring of 1945. 
Considering that this was the first national congress held since the 
Sixth in 192&, and that it was hailed by the CCP press as a "Congress 
of Victory," the Soviet omission was more than fortuitous. If the 
Soviet leaders were adopting an attitude of studied indifference 
to the CCP, the same cannot be said of Chiang Kai-shek and his ad­
visors. On 6 July 1943> the Nationalists’ Central News Agency is­
sued a news release claiming that (as Liberation Daily reported it) 
certain cultural organizations in Sian had held a meeting and re­
solved to cable Mao Tse-tung, calling upon him. to "dissolve” the CCP 
in light of the Comintern’s earlier dissolution, and to "abolish the 
separatist border region regime." In a direct rebuttal of the news
a certain amount of peripheral coverage of China in this journal 
during the period in question, his general point regarding Comintern 
indifference is still valid.
20Ibid., pp. 174-176.
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release, however, Mao declared that the whole affair was the handi-
21work of the Nationalist secret service. Naturally enough, Mao de­
clined the advice to disband the CCP, but the incident was indicative 
of an important negative influence that had emerged in the wake of 
the Comintern1 s disbandment. From the point of view of the National­
ists, the demise of the Comintern could not have come at a better 
time, dovetailing neatly with the major ideological campaign sparked 
off by the recent publication of Chiang's volume, ChinaTs Destiny.
That the Communists did not treat the matter lightly is evi­
denced in the concern expressed in a speech of 1 August by Chou En- 
lai, who had recently returned to Yenan after a lengthy sojourn in 
Chungking. Chou dwelt at some length on the problems resulting from 
the Comintern's disappearance from the international scene, and 
spoke harshly of those
...anti-Communist elements inside the country who dare to 
shout shamelessly for the dissolution of the Chinese Com­
munist Party.... They did not raise the outcry before, but 
at a time after the dissolution of the Communist Interna­
tional. They claim that after the dissolution of the Co­
mintern, Communism is no longer fit for China, the Chinese 
Communist Party has lost its backing, the Chinese Communist 
Party will split from within.^
"Will there be anyone," cried Chou, "to believe their slanders?" He
apparently thought so, for he continued on to rebut these "slanders"
individually and in some detail. Regarding Marxism's fitness for
China, Chou claimed that "owing to the achievements of our party
21Mao, Ji IX, p. 44.
pp
Chou En-lai, "Address to a Reception Party at Yenan," (l August 
1943)? as translated in Stuart Gelder, ed., The Chinese Communists, 
London:-Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1946, pp. 173-180. The passage cited is 
on pp. 177-178.
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leader Comrade Mao Tse-tung," Marxism has already "closely united" 
with the needs of the Chinese nation and people, and has "become 
rooted in Chinese soil." On the question of the CCP's popular sup­
port, Chou acknowledged the early help from the Comintern, but added 
that it is more important to realize that the CCP is a "party of 
the masses," one that "grows and develops among the toiling masses 
of China." On the embarassing charge of internal Party splits, Chou 
claimed that the CCP is "united under the leadership of Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung," and that in the previous three years (194-0-1943) it had 
"reached the highest degree of consolidation" in its entire history. 
To underline this point, Chou referred approvingly to Mao's leader­
ship of the Party at least seven times in the course of his address, 
concluding that after the Comintern's demise the CCP will be "more
responsible and independent to solve the problems of the Chinese 
23revolution." Chou's formal acknowledgement of Mao's supremacy in 
the CCP is an interesting illustration of the linkage existing be­
tween the dissolution of the Comintern in May 194-3 and the pronounced 
cult of Mao that erupted within the Party the following July. Yet, 
we have seen that other factors were at work too, in particular the 
dramatic turn in the global military situation after Stalingrad, and 
the intense Nationalist ideological campaign designed to boost Chiang 
Kai-shek as China's true national leader. These developments heavily 
reinforced the already noticeable tendencies toward a Maoist cult 
that had gradually emerged simultaneously with Mao' s personal domin­
ance in the Party's top leadership, and they provided the necessary
23Ibid., p. 179.
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catalyst for the blossoming of the cult in the course of 194-3-45.
(ii) The Birth of "Mao Tse-tung’s Thought”
In the spring of 1943 Yenan was most certainly alive with specu­
lation as everyone —  Party member or not — awai-t.edthe leadership's 
reaction to the momentous developments detailed above. The initial 
response, as we know from later revelations, came unannounced to the 
general public, and probably to many ordinary Party members as well. 
Most authorities agree that sometime during the spring Mao Tse-tung 
was formally elected chairman of the CCP's Central Committee, and 
thus of the Political Bureau as well. It Is most likely that Mao 
was elevated to these top Party posts in late May, when the Central 
Committee met to discuss Its reaction to the dissolution of the Com­
intern. At or about the same time, Liu Shao-ch'i replaced Chang Wen- 
t'ien on the Party's five-man Central Committee Secretariat, simul­
taneously taking over his key position as secretary-general of the 
24Party. While there is no evidence of an "explicit bargain" between
Mao and Liu, the latter's elevation to the number two spot in the
Party was soon followed by his open praise of Mao's leadership. This
suggests that Liu was promoted to these high posts as part of a deal,
in return for his acknowledgement of Mao's supreme position and his
25concurrence in Mao's election to the Party's top posts. Accordingly,
24See, for example, the biographical dictionaries of Boorman and 
Howard, II, p. 408, III, p. 155 and Klein and Clark, II, pp. 621, 683.
25For this interpretation of Liu’s motivations, see Stuart R. 
Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, 1939-1969/' Asian Survey,
XII:4, (April 1972), pp. 280-281.
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Mao was able to announce on 1 July 1943, the GCP's twenty-second an­
niversary, that the cheng-feng campaign of the previous year had
"guaranteed ideological and political unanimity in the Party, ‘and
26purity in its organizational composition," Mao's announcement was 
the green light for the rapid development of the Maoist cult that 
was to dominate Yenan for the next couple of years. Every person 
high or low, Party* member or not, was called upon to express his un­
bridled enthusiasm for and limitless confidence in Mao Tse-tung's 
leadership. The atmosphere in Yenan at this time was very much one 
of the "gathering of the clans" around the mighty chieftain, for on 
28 June, just three days prior to Mao's keynote speech, the CCP's 
top-flight delegation to Chungking returned home to Yenan in time 
for the Party's anniversary. The mission, headed by personages no 
less than Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, claimed to have been unable to
discuss a "single concrete problem" with Chiang Kai-shek during their
27lengthy stay at the Nationalist capital. No doubt, the timely 
return of Chou, Lin and "other comrades" from such fruitless nego­
tiations with the CCP's leading adversary contributed to the general 
feeling that the Party had to go it alone in the decisive years 
ahead. In any event, soon after the delegation's return to Yenan, 
all eyes unhesitatingly turned to Mao, the one true helmsman who 
would safely chart the course of the Party through the stormy seas 
that lay beyond.
26Mao, Ji XX, p. 39.
27
Mao, Ji IX, p. 64.
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Considering Liu Shao-ch'i1s previous refusal to endorse Mao’s 
leadership claims, especially in the realm of theory, it is some­
what ironic (or perhaps inevitable?) that he should set the tone for 
the new campaign to glorify Mao and all his works. As his contribu­
tion to the commemoration of the CCP’s twenty-second anniversary,
Liu wrote a long essay in which he declared that the CCP had finally 
found its "own leader in Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Mao, said Liu, is 
a truly great proletarian leader who
...has stood the test as a strong and great revolutionary, 
is completely versed in Marxist-Leninist strategy and tac­
tics, and possesses unlimited loyalty to the Chinese wor­
king class and the cause of the Chinese people's libera­
tion.^
Furthermore, suggested Liu, the history of the CCP has developed 
"with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as the centre"; Mao had triumphed over 
"all groups of opportunists" such as those who formerly espoused 
"dogmatism,” and ’"left1 opportunism of the civil war period."
Having vindicated Mao’s line over that of the Returned Students, whom 
he described indirectly as the representatives of "Chinese Menshi- 
vism," Liu characterized the CCP as having "richer experience in 
revolutionary struggle" than any other communist party in the world. 
Yet in spite of this, Liu returned to his long-standing criticism 
of the CCP on the theoretical front. He admitted that the Chinese 
Party's "preparation in scientific Marxist-Leninist thought has been
2$Liu Shao-ch'i, "Qing-suan dang-nei de Meng-sai-wei-shu-yi ;si- 
xiang" (Liquidate Menshevik Ideology in the Party), JFRB (6 July 
194-3). The text used here is -in Zheng-feng wen-jian (Reform Docu­
ments), 4th ed., n.pl: Ji-lu-yu shu-dian, 1944, II? Appendix, pp. 
53-64. The passage cited is on p. 54.
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very inadequate/1 and that the "theoretical level of many Party mem-
29hers and cadres is low." We will recall that in 194-1 j when Liu
voiced similar complaints about the Party’s theoretical level', he
had failed to come up with any positive solutions. He simply con­
cluded that the Sinifieation of Marxism was "exceedingly difficult," 
and decried the lack of any "great works" from the pen of a Chinese 
Communist thinker. Now the situation was entirely different. "All 
cadres and Party members," advised Liu,
...should diligently study and master Comrade Mao Tse-
tung 1 s theories of the Chinese revolution and other sub­
jects. They should arm themselves with Comrade Mao Tse- 
tung Ts thought, and use Comrade Mao Tse-tung's system 
/of thought7 to liquidate Menshevik thought in the Par- 
ty.3°
Liu's essay, of 6 July was the signal for the other top Party leaders 
to rally around Mao Tse-tung as the undisputed head of the CCP.
There followed a veritable flood of hagiographic literature from the 
pens of representatives of the Party's most powerful circles. Among 
those appearing in print were (in addition to Liu Shao-ch'i) Chou 
En-lai, K'ang Sheng and Teng’Hsiao-p’ing as spokesmen for the poli­
tical wing of the Party; Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai and Ch'en Yi repre­
senting the military; and people as diverse as Hsu T.'e-li, Hsiao San,
and the Japanese .Communist Okaho Susumu (Nosaka Sanso) on behalf of
31cultural circles within the movement. The Returned Students were 
represented also, but in a most fragmented manner which clearly re­
vealed the state of disarray into which this once cohesive group had
^Ibid., pp. 56, 60.
^Ibid., pp. 63-64-.
31Tokuda, op. cit., pp. 54-57
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fallen by 1943. Wang Chia-hsiang published a -key article praising 
Mao Tse-tung's thought on 8 July, just two days after Liu Shao-cJ^i's 
essay had appeared. Po Ku procrastinated a little, but he finally 
issued an enthusiastic essay on 13 July. Neither Chang Wen-t’ien 
nor, more importantly, Wang Ming, could be persuaded to pay obeisance 
to their former subordinate. Their absence from the pages of Liber­
ation Daily, though conspicuous, did not dampen the enthusiasm of 
those leaders who did take pen in hand. The general tone is well 
illustrated by Po Ku, who took note of the adverse implications the 
dissolution of' the Comintern had for the unity of the CCP, and res­
ponded by calling upon the whole Party to strengthen its already un­
precedented degree of unity by rallying T,under the banner of Mao Tse- 
tung.1’ Taking stock of the many strengths of the CCP which had en­
sured its steady growth through all adversities, Po reminded the 
reader that:
Finally, and very importantly, we have our Party leader, 
the helmsman of the Chinese revolution —  Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung, His direction is the direction of our entire 
Party, and of the people of the whole nation.32
Liu Shao-chi’s essay of 6 July 1943 has rightly been regarded 
as setting the tone of the Maoist cult that was to blossom in later 
months. In addition, it has been pointed out that it was in this 
article that the term "Mao Tse-tung's thought" first appeared in 
Chinese Communist literature. This appears to be true, but it would
32Po Ku, "Zai Mao Ze-dong de qi-zhi xia, wei bao-wei Zhong- 
guo gong-chan-dang er zhan!" (Fight to Defend the Chinese Communist 
Party Under the Banner of Mao Tse-tung!), JFRB (13 July 1943)f p. 1.
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■be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that Liu was the actual crea­
tor of the term that was to occupy such a prominent place in modern 
Chinese intellectual history. It is more likely that the official
use of the new slogan was the result of a formal, collective deci-
33sion among the top Party leadership. In his essay of 6 July, Liu 
referred to "Comrade Mao Tse-tung*s thought** (Mao Ze-dong tong-zhi de 
si-xiang); yet in an article written on 5 July (though not published 
until the 8th), Wang Chia-hsiang used the more precise form which 
later became the terme fixee, "Mao Tse-tung*s thought" (Mao Ze-dong 
si-xiang). In addition, other Party leaders and theorists (e.g.,
Ch'en Po-ta, of whom more later) began to use the term in their wri­
tings at this time, indicating that there had probably been a prior 
decision on its use coming from high authority. Regardless of who 
actually thought up the slogan in the first place and lobbied for 
its acceptance by the Politburo, it was Wang Chia-hsiang who com­
posed the most interesting and important interpretation of what the 
term really meant. This he did in a lengthy essay, "The Chinese Com­
munist Party and the Road to China’s National Liberation," a text 
of considerable importance in the intellectual history of the CCP.
The basic ideas in Wang’s essay are not original. Rather they re­
flect the arguments of Ch’en Po-ta and other "Sinificationists" in
33Tokuda, op. cit., pp. 55-56, refers to "Mao Tse-tung*s thought" 
as "Liu's new term." It should be noted however, that in an entry in 
his diary dated 26 January 1943 > the Comintern representative Peter 
Vladimirov referred specifically (within quotation marks) to the 
"thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." It is probable then, that the term had 
been in circulation among the Party leadership in Yenan for some time 
before it was officially adopted in July 1943* See Vladimirov, op. 
cit., p. 95.
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the theoretical debates which had been going on within the CCP from 
at least 1935. Wang had personally contributed to these debates from 
time to time; in 1939, for example, he published an article ("The 
Three People’s Principles and Communism") which reflected his concern 
with the need to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the concrete reality of 
the Chinese revolution. The importance of the essay lies in the 
fact that it represents the first time that the arguments of the 
"Sinificationists" were applied to the explicit interpretation of 
Mao’s personal theoretical contributions. Wang claimed that the es­
sential union of Marxist theory and Chinese reality, which the CCP 
had been pursuing throughout the twenty-two years of its existence, 
was to be found in Mao Tse-tung’s thought. The Chinese Communist 
. Party, in Wang1 s. opinion, had at long last come of age; it had recog­
nized that:
The correct path in the entire course of China's national 
liberation —  past, present and future —  is Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung's thought, the path pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse- 
tung in his writings and practice.^
^See Wang's essay of 25 September 1939, "Guan-yu san-min-zhu- 
yi yu gong-chan-zhu-yi" (The Three People’s Principles and Communism), 
JF, 86 (10 October 1939), pp. 14-18. Reprinted in Lo Fu, et al., San-
inin-zhu-yi yu gong-chan-zhu-yi (The Three People's Principles and Com­
munism), Hong Kong: Xian-shi chu-ban she, 1947, pp. 11-21.
^Wang Chia-hsiang, "Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang yu Zhong-guo min- 
zu jie-fang de dao-lu" (The Chinese Communist Party and the Road to 
China's National Liberation), JFRB, (8 July 1943), pp. 1-2. (The text
is dated 5 July 1943.) Reprinted in Zheng-feng wen-jian, 4th ed.,
Appendix, pp. 40-52. The passage cited is on pp. 43-44.
2B4
How does Wang justify this claim in terms of theory? Before
going into his argumentation, we should note the sense of national
pride that informs the entire discussion. China, says Wang, is a
"great country,” and deduces from this that the CCP should therefore
36be a "great party" possessing its own "Chinese Communist theory."
The scientific validity of this proposition can be seriously ques­
tioned, but Wang does offer a more sophisticated rationale for the 
appearance of Mao Tse-tung's thought in China. To provide the Chi­
nese reader with a comparative historical context, Wang refers him to 
the development of Leninism in Russia. Citing the authority of Lenin 
himself, Wang points to the gradual formation of Bolshevism in the 
context of European intellectual trends (especially Marxism) and the 
practical revolutionary movement in Tsarist Russia. "This was the 
process," Wang concludes,
...which gave rise to Russian Bolshevism. It was the 
union of Western European Marxist theory and Russian 
revolutionary experience which produced Boshevism, Len­
inism.
Is the situation any different in the Chinese case? Wang does not
think so, apart from indicating that the intellectual and political
milieu in which the CCP has developed is perhaps even more complicated
than in the case of pre-revolutionary Russia. With this exception,
the process is essentially the same:
Chinese communism —  Mao Tse-tung's thought —  is the pro­
duct of the combination of Marxism-Leninism and the prac­
tical experience of the Chinese revolutionary movement.3#
36Ibid., p. 52 
■^ Ibid., pp. 47-48 
^Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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This interpretation of the origins of Mao Tse-tung's thought, con­
tinues Wang, completely undermines the allegations of those "anti­
communist elements" in China who maintain that the "theory of* the
Chinese Communist Party is the theory of the German Marx and the Rus-
39sian Lenin, and hence is not suitable to the national situation."
Quite to the contrary, concludes Wang, these critics of the CCP have 
failed to grasp the fundamental truth that "Mao Tse-tung's thought is 
Chinese Marxism-Leninism, Chinese Bolshevism, Chinese communism.
Lest any ambiguity remain, Wang reiterates that Mao Tse-tung's thought 
is "creative Marxism-Leninism, the development of Marxism-Leninism
/I
in China; it is Chinese communism, Chinese Bolshevism."
It is clear that Wang is advancing "Liao Tse-tungTs thought" as 
a substantive replacement for "Marxism-Leninism" as such. This is 
not because he believes that Mao's thought —  as pure theory —  is 
in any way superior to Marxism-Leninism, but rather because, in the 
Chinese context, Mao's thought is Marxism-Leninism. This interpre­
tation is derived from the oft-repeated (cf., Ch'en Po-ta) Chinese 
Communist assertion that there is no such thing as abstract truth 
or theory; they can only exist in specific, concrete, and, in the 
ease of political truths and theories, national -forms. Marxism, then, 
is the appropriate form of proletarian theory for the Germans (and 
the West Europeans in general), Leninism (and Stalinism) for the 
Russians, and Mao Tse-tungTs thought for the Chinese. In light of
39Ibid., p. 50.
°^Ibid., pp. 4-3-44.
^Ibid., p. 46.
286
this, Wang sees no need to distinguish explicitly between Mao's 
political doctrines in terms of whether or not they represent only 
Msi-xiangn (thought) or, more broadly,only "zhu-yi" (-ism* i.e., 
principle, tenet). Clearly, these two terms are completely inter­
changeable —  Mao Tse-tung1 s thought is Marxism-Leninism, and vice- 
versa; si-xiang is zhu-yi, and conversely zhu-yi is si-xiang. Hence, 
it would appear that later academic attempts to divide Chinese Com­
munist ideology into two distinct components, namely, "pure ideology" 
(Marxism-Leninism) and "practical ideology" (Mao Tse-tung*s thought) 
are faulty, at least for the period under consideration. Even if 
these terms are retained for purposes of analysis, we can readily 
see that for Wang Chia-hsiang and his colleagues, Mao Tse-tung*s 
thought is the embodiment of both the "pure" and the "practical" as­
pects of proletarian ideology in China. In any event, such a divi­
sion of their ideology would probably be seen by most Chinese Comr
munist theoreticians as mechanistic, and not reflecting the inte-
4-2grated unity inherent m  Mao's thought.
Yet, we are still left with the puzzle as to why the term "Mao 
Tse-tung*s thought" was used in the first place, especially as it 
was equated with Marxism-Leninism as such. Have we not seen that in 
1942 Chang Ju-hsin referred to Mao's body of doctrines as "Mao Tse- 
tungism"? Why was Chang's perfectly logical term dropped in favour 
of the new formulation? We have already discounted the possibility
42For a well-known attempt to analyze Chinese Communist ideo­
logy into separate "pure" and "practical" elements, see Franz Schur- 
mann, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
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that the Chinese were trying to distinguish between "pure" and "prac­
tical" ideology (zhu-yi and si-xiang), for they clearly believed that 
Mao's thought represented both. Nor does it appear likely, as some 
have suggested, that the term zhu-yi carries with it undesirable con­
notations associated with such "evil winds" as individualism, com- 
mandism, tailism, Trotskyism, etc. After all, the Chinese Communists 
have consistently used zhu-yi in their translation of such highly
respectable ideological currents as Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism and
4-3even Sun Yat-senism, to name but a few. Rather, it would seem that 
the use of si-xiang was a distinct attempt to get away from the es­
sential foreignness of zhu-yi, and the sense of abstractness associa­
ted with it. As James ChiehHsiung has pointed out, the term zhu-yi 
was imported into China, possibly via Japanese (shugi), in the early 
twentieth century.^ In their intense desire to Sinify Marxism- 
Leninism, it was only natural that the Maoists would want to replace 
the foreign term with one that was unmistakeably Chinese. Hence 
their use of si-xiang. Nonetheless, it should not be concluded that 
it was merely for reasons of linguistic nicety that the term zhu-yi 
was abandoned. The fact is that while the actual term, Marxism- 
Leninism, had long been foreign in form, the new formulation of Mao’s 
thought had rendered Marxism-Leninism abstract in content as well.
By defining Marxism and Leninism as solely the European and Russian 
forms respectively of proletarian ideology, the Maoists denied their 
concrete existence in China, and hence demonstrated their need to be
4.3On the alleged idiosyncratic quality of zhu-yi, see James Chieh 
Hsiung, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
p. 129.
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replaced. Thus, in choosing a new term to represent the concrete 
nature of Mao's reformulation of the classical doctrines, there was 
a need to avoid close identification with the old terms.. All this 
does not tell us, however, why the Maoists specifically choose si- 
xiang to illustrate the unmistakable Chineseness and concreteness 
of the new orthodoxy. Regarding form, si-xiang, a common word in 
the Chinese vernacular, met the need for a term that was distinctly 
Chinese, one that would not grate on the Chinese ear, nor appear 
strange when written. As to the question of content, si-xiang lacks 
the sense of abstract ilgxlity which had come to be associated with 
zhu-yi. An anthropomorphic term, si-xiang fully reflects its vital 
link with a real, live human being, a specific flesh-and-blood indi-'. 
vidual —  in this case Mao Tse-tung ;—  who is engaged in the contin­
uing process of thought. This in turn suggests a certain dynamism, 
a feeling that the si-xiang in question is engaged in a process of 
interaction with reality, creatively responding to the changing 
circumstances with which it is- confronted. Nor does si-xiang give 
an impression of dogma, a body of doctrine frozen in time. Rather, 
it conveys the feeling of open-endedness, the possibility of flexible 
response, and the promise of a continuing dialogue with reality. It 
is this dynamic fusion of the human mind and external reality that 
best characterizes the distinctive quality of si-xiang and,-interes­
tingly, of Mao Tse-tung's personality as well. As James Hsiung has 
suggested most convincingly:
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szu-hsiang perspective conceives of man (the subjec- 
tive world) and his environment (the objective world) as 
forming an integral whole....Any analysis that separates 
ideology in its ’pure’ form from ideology in practice 
fails to capture the true spirit of s z u - h s i a n g .45
In a sense, the formal appearance of ”Mao Tse-tung’s thought1 in 
July 1943 brought to an end a lengthy process of fermentation within 
the Chinese Communist Party. The demands of Chinese nationalism for 
the Sinification of Marxism-Leninism had been met, and the fusion of 
power and ideology that had for so long eluded Mao Tse-tung had at 
last taken place. While the Russians maintained their wartime silence 
on this momentous development within the CCP, Mao’s ideological claims 
received the approval of other sections of the international Commun­
ist movement. In his introduction to the American publication of 
Mao’s ’New Democracy,” for example, Earl Browder, the leader of the 
United States Communist Party, wrote on 11 November 1944 that Mao’s 
famous essay was ’’thoroughly Chinese and at the same time thoroughly 
Marxian, and proceeds from many assumptions and conceptions of Chi­
nese and Marxian origin. For people like Ch'en Po-ta, who was 
both an ardent nationalist and a fervent supporter of Mao’s claim 
to Party leadership, the Party’s twenty-second anniversary must have 
been a most gratifying occasion. Interestingly enough, though, Ch’en 
does not appear to have participated in the wave of official adulta- 
tion of Mao that swept over Liberation Daily and other Party publi­
cations in the summer of 1943. At first glance, this appears
45Ibid., pp. 146-147.
46See Earl Browder's introduction to Mao Tse-tung, China’s New 
Democracy, New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1944; p. 48. "
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surprising, for Ch'en had long been an active promoter of Mao's claims 
to ideological leadership, and one would have thought that he might 
have contributed to the eulogies that were appearing daily in the 
press. Ch'en was probably one of the unspecified "other comrades" 
who accompanied Chou En-lai and Lin Piao on their return from Chung­
king to Yenan in late June. Having been involved in editorial work 
in the Party media in the Nationalist capital since the fall of the 
previous year, we can assume that Ch'en returned to his former edi­
torial desk at Liberation Daily. Barring more specific evidence, 
we will have to question the claim in one Soviet source that upon 
his return to Yenan Ch'en assumed the post of. editor-in-chief of the
mParty's leading newspaper. Yet, whatever his exact position at the 
time, Ch'en was well placed to contribute his name to the Maoist 
cult that was fast taking shape. That he did not can of course be 
explained by one obvious fact, namely, that a simple hagiographic 
essay from Ch'en Po-ta would gain little prestige for Mao, for the 
former was a well-known supporter of Mao's claims and carried little 
authority in his own name. At this stage, the Maoists were more 
eager to encourage appreciative essays from the Party's most promi­
nent political, military and factional leaders, whose eulogies were 
to be valued more for their symbolic than substantive importance.
With Ch'en Po-ta it was exactly the opposite; he was to be called 
upon to provide intellectual substance to the incipient cult of Mao 
Tse-tung, and, equally important, to the fresh concept of "Mao Tse- 
tung's thought."
/ 7
Moscow Radio, "Mao Tse-tung's Trustful Bodies," a talk broad­
cast in Mandarin, 19 May 1969, as cited in IS, VI: 7, pp. 89, 93.
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Indeed, upon his return to Yenan, Ch'en entered upon yet another 
intense period of intellectual endeavour, to some extent comparable 
to the period 1938-39. There was much to do in the wake of the Party 
leadership’s decision to promote the cult of Mao and his thought in 
response to the new challenge posed by the Nationalists’ recent ideo­
logical offensive. In the field of ideology, Ch’en’s specialty, five 
major tasks presented themselves: (l) propagation of Mao’s cult and
thought both within and without the Party; (2) formulation and propa­
gation of a major critique of Nationalist ideology; (3) provision of 
historio-philosophical content to the concept of ”Mao Tse-tung’s 
thought”; (<4) construction of an official Maoist interpretation of 
CCP history; and (3) preparation for the long-delayed Seventh Party 
Congress to formally ratify the Maoist ascendancy. It is an indica­
tion of Ch’en Po-ta’s importance in the Maoist camp that he was to 
assume unquestioned leadership in fulfilling tasks two, three, and 
four above, and he most likely played a key role in tasks one and 
five as well. In so doing, Ch’en provided the major intellectual 
input into the cult of Mao and his thought, and thereby reinforced 
his unique relationship with Mao Tse-tung himself.
(iii) The Cult pf Mao and His Thought
Having put their own house in order following the Nationalists’
ideological offensive and the dissolution of the Comintern, the Mao­
ists moved quickly to the offensive. The chorus of praise that
greeted the birth of Mao Tse-tung’s thought was much more than a 
transitory phenomenon; rather, it heralded a massive, two-pronged 
ideological campaign on the part of the CCP. The months after July
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194-3 witnessed, on the one hand, the unfolding of a well-planned 
movement to establish Mao Tse-tung’s personal image as the brilliant 
leader of the CCP, and the heroic defender of the Chinese nation.
On the other hand, another campaign was launched for the undisguised 
purpose of destroying Chiang Kai-shek’s stature as China’s sole legi­
timate spokesman both at home and abroad. In a very real sense, the 
Chinese civil war had begun; it was only after three full years of 
ideological battle that the both sides were to take to the field of 
armed conflict. Having been approved at the meeting of the enlarged 
Politburo the previous May, the popular cult of Mao was sparked off 
in July 194-3 when the Party’s leading cadres published their glowing
tributes to Mao. The spectacle of such mature, seasoned Communist
leaders bidding to outdo each -other in the degree of enthusiasm with 
which they hailed Mao is somewhat puzzling to the outside observer. 
Yet, whatever the precise mix of genuine admiration and political 
expediency in their motivations, these senior figures in the Party 
helped to set the frenzied tone that was increasingly to characterize 
the "Mao Tse-tung mania” that swept over Yenan during 194-3-4-5. 
Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, two American correspondents who
visited the Communist capital in June 1944? were plainly taken aback
by the peculiar relationship that seemed to exist between Mao and 
his senior colleagues. Recognizing that this relationship was attri­
butable ”in part to a solid affection,” the Americans observed that:
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At public meetings it was not unusual for other members 
of the Political Bureau, men of great rank themselves, 
to make ostentatious notes on Mao’s free-running speeches 
as if drinking from the fountain of knowledge. Nor were 
panegyrics of the most high-flown, almost nauseatingly 
slavish eloquence unusual.4-8
With the Party’s leading personalities setting the pace in such a
flamboyant style, the common people in the Soviet areas could hardly
be less exuberant. One is struck by the rapidity with which the
campaign to exalt Mao and his thought filtered down to the grass-roots
level of Party and society alike. In turn, the mass organizations
among the people (and individuals as well) responded by echoing back
to the Party leadership their belief in the greatness of Mao, and
the absolute correctness of the revolutionary path which he trod.
In their efforts to stimulate the Maoist cult, the Party elite 
were by no means alone; Liberation Daily and other sectors of the 
Yenan mass media functioned as powerful amplifiers to get the message 
across. Increasingly, Items of an overtly hagiographic nature began 
to appear in the Communist .press: tales of Mao’s early life and
struggles; articles in praise of his personality and thought; wood­
block portraits of the leader; approving resolutions from various 
mass organizations; letters from appreciative individuals, etc. Many 
songs appeared in praise of Mao, the most famous of which is "The 
East is Red," said to be based on a poem written by a young peasant 
(Li Tseng-cheng), and set to the melody of a traditional country tune.
4$Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China, New 
York: William Sloan Associates, Inc., 194-6, p. 230.
^For further details on these popular manifestations of the cult 
of Mao, see Tokuda, op. cit., pp. 55-57, 70. According to a study
294
These outward signs of the campaign are well known and often referred 
to, and they are not our major concern here. A rather clear indica­
tion of the highly expressionistic character of the literature, and 
the unambiguous linkage between elite and popular levels in the cam­
paign, can be given by referring to the large conference of "labour 
heroes" which was held in Yenan in mid-November 1943* Kao Kang, the 
Party official directly responsible for the administration of the 
Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, spoke to the assembled workers and pea­
sants. In the course of his address, Kao posed a most serious ques­
tion, if only rhetorically:
Who is the leader of the Chinese Communist Party? Its 
leader is Chairman Mao.'-. .Chaiman Mao is the saviour 
of the Chinese people, the shining light of the workers 
and peasants, the banner of the broad labouring masses.50
Having had this decisive question posed and answered in the same 
breath, the assembled masses were left in no doubt as to the proper 
response. In the collective message to Chairman Mao that the con­
ference delegates published in Liberation Daily on 21 November, they
51
too praised their leader as the "saviour of the Chinese people."
published in China, by 1951 over 500 poems in praise of Mao Tse-tung 
had already been collected, most of them written by peasants in the 
1940's. On this point, see Ting Yi, A Short History of Modern Chi­
nese Literature, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959, pp. 274-276.
50This passage from Kao Kang’s speech is cited in Selden,
Yenan Way, p. 204.
51See the relevant news item, "Mao Ze-dong tong-zhi shi Zhong- 
guo ren-min de jiu-xing" (Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the Saviour of the 
Chinese People), JFRB (17 July 1943), p. 2.
!
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Regardless of the genuine feelings that many people may have had to­
ward Mao (and no doubt their number was legion), the cult clearly had 
behind it the active backing of the Party organization. - Although 
paper was constantly in short supply in Yenan, a Chinese journalist 
who visited in 194-6 observed that the Yenan bookshops were doing a
brisk trade in portraits, of Mao: "At any place of convention with a
52crowd of more than three, there is a portrait of 'Chairman Mao'." 
Returning to 1944 > we are reminded by White and Jacoby that "Mao 
Tse-tung’s personality dominated Yenan.. ./and he/.. .was set on a 
pinnacle of adoration." They also noted of Mao that "his leadership 
was theoretical", and, finally, that his treatise "On New Democracy" 
(though published in 1940) "is still the Bible of the movement.
This mention of "On New Democracy" is most interesting, for it in­
dicates that, in spite, of the burgeoning cult, the Party had not yet 
systematized its approach to the huge and scattered corpus of Mao's 
writings. Rather, it appeared to be adopting a rather ad hoc atti­
tude, simply selecting and reprinting individual important writings 
that were judged most relevant at the time. According to one account, 
for example, in January 1944 the Shansi-Suiyuan branch office of the 
Politburo printed and distributed 5000 copies of three of Mao's most
famous treatises, namely, "On Protracted War," "On the New Stage,"
5/
and "On New Democracy." Nonetheless, a more systematic approach
rn
Chao Ch*ao-kou,Ye-nan yi yue (A Month in Yenan), Nanking: n. 
pub., 1946, p. 64. As cited in Jerome Ch'en, Mao, p. 21.
^White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 229-230, 234.
54Jerome Ch'en, Mao, p. 52.
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to the publishing of Mao’s major writings had been evident as early 
as 193?> when a small selection of his essays had been issued as an 
anthology in Shanghai. Probably guided by this precedent, the Shansi- 
Chahar-Hopei Border Region published the first edition of Mao's 
Selected Works (Mao Ze-dong xuan-ji) in December 194-4. Noting that 
none of Mao's Selected Works were actually published in the Shen- 
Kan-Ning Border Region, the seat of Mao's power, Jerome Ch'en has con­
cluded that this probably indicates Mao's greater support from the 
military than from the Party. For example, it was Nieh Jung-chen's 
headquarters in the Chin-Ch'a- Chi region that issued the original edi­
tion of Mao's Selected Works in.1944? arid this lead was later fol-
55
lowed by Lin Piao in Harbin, m  the Manchurian sector. While Mao's 
position was definitely stronger in the eyes of the military than in 
those of the Party, by late 1944 even once-reluctant Party leaders 
were outdoing themselves in their praise of Mao. The publication of 
the Selected Works outside Yenan can probably be ascribed to tech­
nical and administrative rather than political factors, considering 
the heavy burden the Yenan press had to shoulder in the CCP's over­
all publication responsibilities. This interesting question aside, 
however, there can be no gainsaying the remarkable flowering of Mao's 
cult in the months after July 1943? and its formal confirmation at 
the Party's Seventh Congress in April 1943. Nor can it be doubted 
that this cult was the conscious product of the Maoist propaganda 
machine, whose campaign to glorify Mao and his thought was part of
55Jerome Ch'en, "Tsunyi Resolutions," pp. 3V-3S; also Jerome 
Ch'en, Mao, pp. 22, 53.
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the CCP’s two-pronged counter-attack on the ideological campaign 
launched by the Nationalists in the spring of 1943.
(iv) Ch’en1 s Critique of ’China’s Destiny”
For reasons previously cited, Ch'en Po-ta does not seem to have 
participated in the overt campaign to elevate Mao. He was, however, 
the single most important contributor to the accompanying campaigns 
to discredit Nationalist ideology, provide Mao’s thought with his- 
torio-philosophical content, and reconstruct an official Maoist in­
terpretation of CCP history, an interpretation that largely received 
the blessing of the Central Committee in the spring of 1945. Turning 
first to the problem of Nationalist ideology, we note that in an 
unsigned editorial of 12 July 1943? Mao himself set the general tone 
for the bitter debate that was to be launched by Ch'en. The ’gentle­
men" of the Nationalist Party, charged Mao, have much in common with 
the various, "enemy parties" and "traitor parties" that are selling 
out the country to the Japanese. Of these "common features," warned 
Mao with reference to the KMT leaders, the "most fundamental is your 
common ideology, which is anti-communist and anti-people." Indeed, 
argued Mao, "you and the enemy and the traitors are exactly alike,
in fact, identical and indistinguishable both in your words and in 
56your deeds." Mao's essay was nothing less than a declaration of 
war against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party, and it left 
very little possibility for the continuation of the faltering united 
front. Having sounded the call to arms, Mao then stepped aside to 
allow Ch'en Po-ta to lead his small band of warriors onto the field
56Mao, Ji IX, pp. 46-47.
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of ideological "battle. Ch’en took up the struggle eagerly; on 21 
July 194-3 he published his major attack in Liberation Daily under 
the title of "A Critique of China's Destiny.” Such was the impor­
tance of Ch'en's critique that it was allocated the entire issue of 
the newspaper for that day; 'It was reprinted many times in pamphlet
form in later years, and was included in several official compila-
57tions of Party documents relating to the period m  question. To 
assist people in studying China’s Destiny, Ch’en issued yet another 
work (not to be confused with the first) entitled An Introduction to 
China's Destiny. Unlike Ch'en's Critique, which is a substantive 
study, his Introduction is simply a compilation of lengthy extracts 
from Chiang's original text, interspersed with brief notes and com­
mentary written by Ch'en. Party members and other interested per­
sons were thus provided with a comprehensive guide to the study of 
Chiang's treatise, and one wonders how many got beyond Ch’en’s guide 
to read the original work. Be that as it may, Ch'en's two texts were 
carefully designed to complement each other, and in the following 
discussion reference will be made to both, albeit the Critique is 
by far the more important work.
57 .
Ch'en Po-ta, "Ping 'Zhong-guo zhi ming-yun'" (A Critique of
"China’s Destiny"), JFRB (21 July 194-3)? pp. 1t4- (entire issue). A 
later reprint of the original text is Ch'en Po-ta, Ping "Zhong-guo 
zhi ming-yun," Hong Kong: Xin Zhong-guo wen-xian -chu-ban-she, 194-6. 
This text will be cited here. An at times faulty English transla­
tion of the entire text is in Gelder, op. cit., pp. 256-290.
58Ch'en Po-ta, Jie-xiao "Zhong-guo zhi ming-yun" (An Introduc­
tion to "China's Destiny"), Yenan: Jie-fang she, 194-3 (preface dated
19 July 194-3).
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Ch’en.first reminds the reader that the Chinese Communists have 
been very forebearing in the face of constant Nationalist provocation. 
For example, says Ch'en, ’countless Nationalist Party publications" 
have criticized Mao Tse-tung’s "On New Democracy" since its publi­
cation in January 194-0, but to date the CCP has not made any reply 
in the interests of preserving the united front against Japan. But 
now, with Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny as a point of departure, 
he (Ch'en Po-ta) intends to express the CCP's opinions on the topics 
raised by Chiang. It is crucial to answer the charges brought by 
Chiang, argues Ch'en, for much more is at stake than a mere academic 
debate; indeed, Chiang's treatise represents "nothing more than the 
preparation of anti-communist, anti-people, counter-revolutionary 
ideology." No wonder, continues Ch'en, that soon after its publi­
cation in March 1943, the rumour began to spread that it was a "de­
claration of war against the Chinese people-, and the preparation of
59ideology and public opinion for the launching of civil war." In 
light of this, Ch’en urges the Chinese people to study Chiang's new 
book attentively, paying particular attention to its central message, 
namely, the call for internal unity if China’s destiny is to be as­
sured, and the need to bring about this internal unity within a two- 
year period. This is most worrying to Ch'en, for Chiang’s desire 
for internal unity amounts to little more than the Nationalist Par­
ty's need to "seize everything and consolidate its one-party dicta­
torship." And the desire to accomplish this during the next two 
years suggests that the attempt will be made not after the Japanese
59Ch’en, Ping, p. 26.
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have been defeated and expelled from China, but actually during the
war, when all patriotic Chinese are united to resist the common 
60enemy. In light of all this, asks ChTen rhetorically, can anyone
really believe anything other than that Chiang's treatise was "not
written to serve the war of resistance, but rather for the purpose
61of opposing communism, democracy, the masses, and progress?”
Yet, cries Ch'en, if Chiang Kai-shek wishes to launch a debate 
about China’s destiny, the CCP is only too happy to respond. In 
typical fashion, Ch'en interlards his critique of the ideas expressed 
in China's Destiny with a constant stream of innuendoes regarding the 
personal and political integrity of the author. In particular, he 
suggests that the book was not really written by Chiang at all, but 
by the "traitor” T'ao Hsi-sheng, a notorious fascist whose views 
Chiang was only too happy to accept as his own. Also, the "Chung- 
shan Incident” of 20 March 1926 was deliberately fabricated by Chiang 
to serve as a pretext to suppress the Communist Party, just as Hitler 
later concocted the infamous Reichstag fire in 1933 for the same pur­
pose. Further, Chiang had stooped to co-operate with the infamous 
Chinese traitor Wang Ching-wei long after the Communists had broken 
with him (sic) in 1927. And finally, in spite of his protestations 
to the contrary, Chiang has repeatedly betrayed Sun Yat-sen and his
principles on many important questions regarding the Chinese revo- 
62lution. Lest the reader be bewildered by this host of charges,
^Ch'en, Jie-xiao, pp. 1-2,
^Ibid., p. 25.
For these various charges, see Ch'en, £ing, pp. 1, 3j 18, 20.
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Ch'en simplifies the argument somewhat by referring time and again 
to the ultimate choice the Chinese people must make between two fun­
damentally conflicting visions of China's destiny. The first vision 
is, of course, that of "New Democracy," the ideological system of 
the CCP which was put forward by Mao Tse-tung, and which combines 
the most progressive thought of both the Chinese and foreign intel­
lectual traditions. The second is that of "New Absolutism" (xin 
zhuan-zhi-shu-yi), Chiang Kai-shek's and the Nationalist Party's sys­
tem of "compradore-feudal fascism" that inherits all that is reac- 
tionary both in China and abroad. Ch'en's astute paralleling of 
his freshly-coined "New Absolutism" with the well-known "New Demo­
cracy" established an effective contrast between the two competing 
ideologies, and conditioned the reader throughout the text to accept, 
if only unconsciously, the need to take a final, irrevocable stand 
on one side or the other. There was clearly no third way in the pur­
suit of China's destiny, or so Ch'en suggested.
Ch'en .rationalized this need to make a clear choice between the
two competing "isms" by raising the question of ideological evolution
and synthesis in modern China. To start the reader thinking, Ch'en
begins with a firm proposition:
It is obvious that from the beginning there have been two 
kinds of traditional thought in Chinese culture. One kind 
belongs to the people, and is revolutionary and bright; 
the other is against the people, and is counter-revolution­
ary and dark.°^
6\bid., p. 1.
^Tbid., p. 15.
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To illustrate this "basic thesis-, Ch’en refers to modern Chinese his­
tory, singling out the Taiping rebels and later Sun Yat-sen as arche­
typical representatives of the "revolutionary” tradition in Chinese 
history, with such infamous personalities as Tseng Kuo-fan and Li 
Hung-chang representing the "counter-revolutionary" side of the coin. 
For Ch’en, it is not sufficient merely to take pride in traditional 
Chinese history and culture; one has to go beyond this and inquire 
into the diverse strands in this complex legacy, carefully sifting 
the wheat from the chaff. Needless to say, it is the Chinese Com­
munists who have emerged as the true inheritors of the progressive 
strand in Chinese tradition, while the Nationalists have fallen heir 
to its reactionary aspects. Applying this same basic analysis to 
the question of foreign ideologies, Ch'en points out that:
The various countries of the world not only have pro­
gressive and revolutionary ideologies, but also have re­
actionary and counter-revolutionary tides of thought, 
and both kinds of foreign thought are naturally reflected 
in China.
As for the "progressive" side, Sun Yat-sen enthusiastically accepted 
the liberal "democracy of /Abraham7 Lincoln and others," and later 
on also absorbed the "experience of the Russian revolution." The 
Chinese Communists, however, went even further and assimilated the 
more advanced ideology of "scientific communism —  Marxism-Leninism." 
As for the "reactionary" side, relates Ch'en, Chiang Kai-shek has 
openly denounced both Western liberalism and Soviet communism in his 
recent book, while the Chinese Nationalist Party is busily "propa­
gating on a large scale the fascism of Hitler and. Mussolini, and
65Ibid., p. 13.
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describing Hitler and Mussolini as two of the 'six great leaders' of
'* 6 6  tthe world." Surely, concludes Ch'en, will not the publication of 
Chiang's book greatly please people like Wang Ching-wei, Hitler, 
Mussolini, and Tojo, and equally disappoint Roosevelt, Churchill, 
Stalin, and all other anti-fascist people?
According to Ch'en, it is not important whether a particular
ideology is Chinese or foreign in origin; the question is whether
or not it is progressive or reactionary, beneficial or harmful to
the Chinese people and nation. For example, although there was a
certain amount of foreign thought (viz, Christian theology) in the
ideology of the Taipings, their slogan of "liberty, equality, /and7
fraternity" genuinely represented the aspirations of the Chinese
people. On the other hand, although people like Tseng Kuo-fan spoke
constantly of traditional China's "benevolence, righteousness, /and7
morality," in practice he was no more than a "two-fold slave, a
67slave to both the Manchus and the foreigners." Having dispensed 
with these illustrations from history, Ch'en takes up a more con­
temporary theme, one much closer to his heart:
The ideology of the Chinese Communist Party is Mao Tse- 
tung's thought —  Sinified Marxism-Leninism. As a Marx- 
ist-Leninist ideology, /Mao Tse-tung's thought/ is not 
only identical /xiang-tong7 to the ideology of the Com­
munist Party of the Soviet Union, but it is also identi­
cal to the ideology of the Communist parties of the var­
ious countries throughout the world. However, scienti­
fic Marxism-Leninism demands that the Communists in each 
country put forward political programs and decide upon 
policies in accordance with their own national conditions,
^Ibid., pp. 13-14- 
67Ibid., p. 15.
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rely on the people, and educate themselves. In its work 
in China, the Chinese Communist Party does exactly this 
...</and7 is truly a one hundred per cent revolutionary 
political party of the Chinese people themselves, lear­
ning for China and applying its learning for China.1 It 1 
no longer finds comparison in China
As for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party, scoffs Ch'en deri­
sively, they are simply "ru zhu chu nu," "proud before one's country­
men but submissive before foreigners." Arrogant and dictatorial at 
home, they have successively placed themselves in dependence first on
the Russians, then the' Japanese and Germans, and finally the Ameri- 
69cans. Of course, concludes Ch'en, Chiang Kai-shek's China's Des­
tiny tries to cover up this ugly truth, and to do so it resorts to 
the age-old practice of "fabricating facts, and confusing truth and 
falsity." All is in vain, however, because Chiang's book, "between
the lines, reveals its hatred of the revolutionary people" of China,
70and they are not deceived.
Ch'en Po-ta's critique of China's Destiny is of considerable 
importance in the evolution of Chinese Communist ideology, and In 
the history of Communist-Nationalist relations as well. It pre­
sented in sharp contrast the conflicting visions of Mao Tse-tung and 
Chiang Kai-shek regarding China's immediate and long-range future, 
and provided a powerful Ideological rationale for the breakdown in 
the war-time united front. After the publication of Ch'en's trea­
tise, little possibility remained of genuine co-operation between
68 .,Loc. cit.
69Ibid., p. 14-.
70Ch'en, Ji'e-xiao, preface page.
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the two warring parties. Certainly, this was the opinion of United
States Ambassador C.E. Gauss, who, in a dispatch to Washington on
6 October 1943> concurred in the prevalent opinion that (with regard
to the polemic over China’s Destiny):
Possibilities of any agreement between the two parties 
/via, Nationalists and Commum.sts7 are expected to be 
lessened by the increasing bitterness likely to result 
from this propaganda war*
Interestingly, Ambassador Gauss included with his memorandum a copy 
of Ch’en1s review of Chiang's book, which Gauss described as "bitter­
ly critical" of the Nationalists, and representative of the CCP's
counter-attack against the Nationalists’ recent propaganda offen- 
72sive. It. was not long before the new, harsh attitude toward the 
Nationalists expressed in Ch’en's Critique and other CCP writings 
began to filter down to the grass-roots level. Clare and William 
Band, two British teachers who had been living for some time in 
Yenan, noticed the change in the Communists' public attitude as early 
as 10 September 194-3* Attending a mass meeting at Paoteh on that 
day, they were surprised to see Chiang Kai-shek's portrait missing 
from the usual "gallery of honour." Not only that, the local guer­
rilla leader opened the meeting by violently denouncing Chiang and 
the Nationalist Party, and the agitated crowd responded by calling: 
"Down with Chiang Kai-shek! Long live Mao Tse-tung!" According to 
the Bands, it was obvious that the Communists were finally dispensing
71See the brief summary of Chiang's book in Dispatch No, 1651 
(6 October 194-3) from Ambassador Gauss to the Secretary of State, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943> 
China, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1957, pp. 347-348.
72Loc. cit.
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with the limitations of the united front, and were "thoroughly en-
73
joying themselves for a change."
Certainly, this was the case with Ch'en Po-ta. Being chosen to 
spearhead the ideological attack on the Nationalists was in itself a 
distinct honour in the Chinese Communist camp, and he must have found 
Chiang's hook eminently susceptible to criticism and satire. Ch'en 
was by no means alone in his hostility to China's Destiny; even the 
U.S. Embassy in Chungking noted in a confidential dispatch the role 
of the "reactionary T’ao Hsi-sheng" in writing- the volume, the "nar­
rowness of the views" expressed therein, the "widespread and strong 
resentment against the book among Chinese intellectuals," and the 
"unfavourable foreign reaction" anticipated even by the Nationalists 
themselves. With some dismay, the Embassy concluded by pointing out
that the Chinese Communists regard the book as the "best possible
74-source of propaganda for their cause." Certainly, the cause of 
Ch'en Po-ta's career was well served by the polemic over China1s 
Destiny, for his Critique was widely disseminated not only by the 
CCP in China, but abroad by several foreign agencies as well. In 
the United States, for example, the English version was transmitted 
via cable by the United Press International for use in the American 
press. In addition, it was reprinted and distributed by the State 
Department, and appeared in at least one journal of the American
^Claire Band and William Band, Two Years With the Chinese Com­
munists, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, pp. 210-211.
^See Dispatch No. 1220 (31 May 1943) from George Atcheson, Jr., 
the Charg^ in China, to the Secretary of State, in Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China, pp. 244-248.
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75Communist Party. Long regarded as a theoretician of considerable 
significance within the Chinese Communist movement, Ch'en Po-ta was 
now achieving international prominence as a Chinese Communist spokes­
man of national stature. Yet, no sooner had Ch'en achieved this 
unprecedented prominence than he retreated once again within the con­
fines of the CCP. His tasks between 194-3 and 194-5 were interlinked, 
and of the utmost importance to the Maoist cause. He was to prepare 
a formal historio-philosophical exposition of "Mao Tse-tung's thought," 
and simultaneously draft an official Maoist reconstruction of the 
Party's history from its founding in 1921 to date. While the pro­
pagation of the'Maoist cult —  and the denunciation of Chiang's philo­
sophy —  dominated the Communist press during these two momentous 
years, Ch'en patiently laboured on the twin tasks he had been set.
For the time being, the products of Ch'en's new researches were 
strictly "inner-Party documents"; it was only in the early 1950's, 
long after their conclusions had .been largely ratified’ by the Seventh 
Plenum in 194-5, that they were made available to the public, Chinese • 
and foreign alike.
75 1For example, Ch'en's critique of China's Destiny was pub­
lished in the January 194-4- issue of The Communist, the leading theo­
retical journal of the American Communist Party. It was also issued... . 
in 1944 by the People's Publishing House, Bombay, India. Incidently, 
in his remarks on the CCP’s own theoretical journal (also The Com- 
munist), Jerome Ch'en has confused the two separate publications.
Ch'en Po-ta's scathing review of Chiang Kai-shek's book was reprinted 
in the American journal, but not (as far as we know) in the Chin­
ese publication of the same name. On this point, see Jerome Ch'en,
Mao, p. 18.
CHAPTER IX
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PARTY HISTORY, 1943-45
(1) The Movement to Study Party History
By the autumn of 1943 the Maoists were in firm control of the 
Chinese Communist Party, and the twin campaigns to praise Mao Tse- 
tung and damn Chiang Kai-shek were making good progress. Yet, if 
Mao's commanding position in the Party were to he consolidated, and 
his leadership to weather the many storms ahead following the Japan­
ese defeat, more was required than the mere glorification of Mao and 
his thought in slogan and song. What was needed was an intellectual 
rationale which would justify the dual cult the Party was promoting, 
i.e., the cult of Mao the correct leader of the Chinese Communist 
movement, and the cult of Mao's thought as the ideological manifes­
tation of this correct leadership. In their quest for this ration­
ale, it was only natural that the Maoists should turn to history, 
particularly the history of the CCP, Indeed, Chinese tradition and 
Marxist theory combined in the CCP to elevate history to a position 
of major concern. For most Chinese, history was much more than mere 
chronology; behind every event there lay a truth which transcended it, 
and gave it meaning. In this perspective, the study of history was 
no less than the study of the universal laws which governed the rise 
and fall of civilization, and the destiny of man himself. For a 
Marxist, history is the laboratory of the social scientist, the 
fundamental source to which one turns in the search for basic truths
of individual and social behaviour. . Certainly, Chinese Marxists in 
the CCP did not need to be reminded of the alleged hollowness of 
"abstract” truth divorced from its historical context; if, as they 
were now claiming, Mao's thought represented revolutionary truth in 
China, its ultimate validity would be demonstrated in the "concrete" 
historical process which nurtured and tested the Chinese Communist 
Party. A thorough review of the CCP's twenty-two year history, then, 
would surely reveal the intricate relationship between Mao's correct 
leadership of the practical movement, and the correct thought which 
guided and, paradoxically, which was created by this leadership.
For Karl Marx and his Chinese disciples alike, history was the great 
arbiter of human destiny —  reactionaries and their ilk would surely 
be cast into oblivion, but the true proletarian revolutionary would 
win an honourable place in posterity.
If the experience of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union was any­
thing to go by, the Maoists' expectations along these lines were 
likely to be fulfilled. Stalin, it will be recalled, had emerged 
supreme in the CPSU after a fearsome struggle with Leon Trotsky and 
nearly all the "Old Bolsheviks" who had engineered the revolution in 
1917. Stalin's official History of the CPSU was published in 1938, 
and thereafter it became the only orthodox version of the Party's 
turbulent past, and was assigned for study at all levels of Soviet 
society. Needless to say, Stalin emerged as the only true succes­
sor to the revolutionary legacy of Marx and Lenin, and this or­
thodox account remained unchallenged until after Stalin's death in
310
1
1953. Mao and his colleagues in Yenan were well aware of these en­
deavors on. the part of Stalin, and initial signs of this interest 
began to appear in late 193S. Lengthy extracts from Stalin's His­
tory accompanied by commentary appeared regularly in Liberation in 
Yenan, and the entire book was eventually translated into Chinese
and assigned as required reading during the cadre education move-
2
ment of that year. By the time of the cheng-feng campaign in 1942, 
there were probably very few literate cadres in the CCP who were not 
familiar at least with the main outline of Stalin's interpretation 
of CPSU history. In all likelihood the Maoists were influenced by 
the Soviet model in reconstructing Party history. We already know, 
for example, that in 1938, the very year that Stalin’s History ap­
peared in Russia, Ch’en Po-ta published a preliminary Maoist version 
of CCP history. At the same time, the CCP launched an intensive 
search for the raw materials (documents, polemics, reminiscences, 
etc.) from which to compile a more definitive version of the Party's 
struggles since 1921. Given his earlier efforts in this direction, 
it is not surprising that Ch'en reappeared as the leading Party his­
torian in the spring of 1944? when he completed the study he first 
took up in 1938.
The imperatives of Chinese tradition, Marxist theory, and Soviet 
example, then, combined to urge upon the Maoists the necessity of
F^or Stalin's official history of the Soviet Party, see Central 
Committee of the. CPSU (B), ed,, History of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1939.
2
For further information on this point, see.Tokuda, op. cit.,
pp. 61, 86..
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rewriting the history of the CCP in the wake of their final victory 
over all inner-Party opposition. The initiative to review the Party's 
history came in the fall of 194-2, immediately after the height of 
cheng-feng. The anti-Maoist factions in the Party had been routed, 
and they would have to suffer the ignpminy of having their names —  
and their errors —  enshrined as "negative examples" in the proposed 
Maoist chronicle. Surprisingly, the impetus for this historiographi­
cal review came not from the Politburo, but from a lengthy Party 
conference called to deal with local problems peculiar to the Shen- 
Kan-Ning Border Region, with its capital at Yenan. Held from 19 
October 194-2 to 14 January 1943, this meeting tackled and solved 
three major problems facing the local Party organization: the
quest for unified leadership, the definition of the Party's present 
tasks in the area, and, finally, the revision of Party history in
3
the Border Region. Representing the Politburo and the Northwest 
Bureau of the CCP respectively, Mao Tse-tung and' Kao Kang emerged 
as the two dominant figures at the convention. Mao in particular 
gained new stature by delivering his lengthy report on economic and 
financial problems of the Border Region. As we have already dis­
cussed the significance of this speech in Mao's rise to power, we 
will now turn to Kao Kang's role at the conference. Kao, a native 
of north Shensi and an experienced guerrilla fighter in the Yenan 
area, had much to gain from a review of the history of the Party in 
the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Like Mao himself, Kao had suffered
3
F^or details of this Senior Cadres Conference, see Selden,
Yenan Way, pp. 200-207.
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persecution as a "rightist" during the era of the Returned Student 
leadership and shortly thereafter, and he had been rehabilitated 
only after Mao and Chu Teh had arrived in the Yenan area at the end 
of the Long March. Even so, Kao felt that the individuals respon­
sible for the "leftist" line in the Border Region had not been ade­
quately exposed and censured; nor had the official history of the 
local Party organization been revised to include the exoneration of 
Kao and his comrades, and the formal condemnation of those who had 
been in error. The Conference of Senior Cadres provided an excel­
lent opportunity for Kao to raise these questions. Thus, in a leng­
thy speech to the assembled cadres (which was said to reflect their 
collective opinion), Kao vindicated the so-called border area 
"loyalists" centered around Liu Chih-tan (and Kao himself) during 
the guerrilla struggles prior to 1935. On the other hand, the Cen­
tral Committee representatives who had suppressed the "loyalists" 
amongst the local partisans were formally censured, in particular 
Kuo Hung-t'ao and Chu Li-chih.^ It must have given Kao a good deal 
of satisfaction to see his former opponents reproached at such an 
important Party meeting, and he no doubt looked forward to an ap­
propriate entry in the Party history then being compiled.
Kao was not alone in his condemnation of the "leftist" leader­
ship in the north Shensi area, for Jen Pi-shih elaborated on Kao’s 
strictures. He referred to these local errors as the consequences of 
the incorrect line prevailing in the highest echelons of the Party
4Ibid., pp. 202-205.
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from the September 18th-Incident (1931) to the Tsunyi Conference in
5
1935. Jen's comments are most interesting, for they sharply focus
on the precise parallelism between Mao Tse-tung and Kao Kang that
emerged in the course of the debate on local Party history* The
newly emergent orthodoxy claimed that Kuo's and Chu's leadership in
the north Shensi area had been characterized by "left opportunism"
prior to 1935, and "right opportunism" after the policy of the united
front had been decided upon. It was not until May 1938, when Kao
Kang replaced Kuo Hung-t'ao as Party secretary of the Yenan region,
that the local Party group began to follow a "political and organi-
6zational line which was entirely correct." This interpretation of 
events is, of course, identical with the critique of the Returned 
Student leadership which Mao and his colleagues had gradually con­
structed since Mao's victory at Tsunyi. An obvious parallelism had 
thus been established between Kao, the regional leader, and Mao, the 
leader at the national level. Both men, it was said, had pursued 
correct policies during the early 1930's, both had been censured by 
the Returned Student leadership or their representatives, both were 
removed from their positions of authority, and both had been sub­
jected to some form of detention. Finally, both men had been com­
pletely vindicated after the Party had belatedly awakened to the 
erroneous line of the Returned Students, removed them from their
5
This opinion is attributed to Jen Pi-shih by Tokuda, op. cit., 
p. 59. Tokuda does.not cite any source, although Jen's comments are 
presumably from a speech he made at the Senior Cadres Conference.
Selden, Yenan Way, p. 204.
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positions of authority, and placed the destiny of the Party in the 
hands (at their respective levels) of the two former victims. This 
unambiguous parallelism between Kao and Mao certainly did much to 
strengthen Kao's position as the undisputed leader of the Party or­
ganization in the border region, but it played another, more impor­
tant role as well. Since an intensive campaign to study Party his­
tory was inaugurated at the highest levels immediately after the 
conclusion of the Conference of Senior Cadres, it would appear that 
the revision of local Party history initiated by Kao Kang served as 
a concrete model for the new campaign then being planned.
Mao probably used Kao's examination of local Party history to 
test the atmosphere among the Party elite before launching his own 
campaign at the national level. Certainly, the fact that it took 
two and a half years (autumn 1942 to spring 1945) to arrive at some 
degree of consensus on the question of Party history to present to 
the Seventh Plenum does suggest that time was required to bring 
everyone round to the new point of view. Nonetheless, whatever 
serious opposition Mao encountered in the initial stages of the cam­
paign to examine Party history, all doubts evaporated after the Cen­
tral Committee' s decision in the spring of 1943 to launch a full-blown 
cult of Mao and his thought. From that time on, Mao's former enemies 
in the Party became somewhat resigned to their fate, although their 
individual reactions were different. While Po Ku called upon the 
Party to rally "under the banner of Mao Tse-tung," Wang Ming simply
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dropped out of active political life in the upper echelons of the 
7
Party. If Wang’s later recollections are to he believed, both he 
and Mao were fully aware of the importance of controlling the Party’s 
history. Mao, claimed Wang, wanted to revise Party history to ensure 
the "especially high and unshakable place of Mao Tse-tung in the 
CCP." On the relationship of Mao's ideological claims to the revi­
sion of Party history, Wang was also explicit, paraphrasing Mao to 
the effect that "if the services of other persons in the history of
the CCP and the Chinese revolution were recognized then 'there would.
8be no Maoism’." ■ Ironically, the services of Wang and his fellow 
Returned Students were not to go unrecognized in the new Maoist his­
tory, albeit their main role was to serve as negative examples whose 
experience was to be carefully studied, and avoided.
Official sources have revealed that the discussion of Party his­
tory at the higher levels was initiated by the Politburo sometime 
9
m  194-2. No specific date is given, but these discussions probably 
followed soon after Kao Kang’s key report at the Senior Cadres Con­
ference in the autumn of that year. As for Kao’s report, it received 
official approval from the Party's Northwest Bureau (which Kao headed)
7
It seems that Wang was seriously ill during much of 194-2-44-; in 
any case, he was deliberately isolated from normal intercourse with 
other Party leaders, and was often out of touch with what was going 
on in Yenan. On this point, see Vladimirov,' op. cit., pp.. 110-113 
and numerous other references.
Wang Ming, Cultural Revolution or Counter-Revolutionary Coup?
p. 49.
9For further details, see the editorial note in Mao, XJ III, pp. 
.891-892.
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in June 194-3, and was designated a formal study material in the cheng - 
feng campaign under the Bureau's jurisdiction."^ The movement to 
study Party history received a sharp stimulus in July 194-3; w*hen the 
cult of Mao and his thought hurst upon the scene. In his well-known 
eulogy to Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i referred once or twice to the pressing 
tasks on the historical front, demanding that "all cadres and Party 
members should study the twenty-two year historical experience of 
the Chinese Party diligently." The intensive study of the Party's 
rich store of historical experience, argued Liu, is "one of the most 
important tasks" facing the Party, because a "Marxist-Leninist summary 
of these experiences is the most important condition for the consoli­
dation, education, and elevation of the entire Party for the attain-
11ment of victory in the Chinese revolution." In calling for the 
study of the Party's past experience, Liu was by no means breaking 
new ground. Of more significance was the set of guidelines Liu pro­
posed to assist the cadres in their perusal of the Party's arduous 
years of struggle. In their study of the CCP's past, cautioned Liu, 
the cadres should always bear in mind that:
The history of the Chinese Party should be the history of 
the development of Marxism-Leninism in China; it should 
also be the history of the struggle of Marxist-Leninists 
with all groups of opportunists. Objectively, this his­
tory has developed with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as the cen­
tre. The history of the various opportunist factions in 
the Party certainly cannot become the history of the
10Tokuda, op. cit., p. 60.
11Liu Shao-ch'i, -"Qihg-suan dang-nei de Meng-sai-wei-zhu-yi si- 
..xiang.,," p. 34-.
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Party, and the system and tradition of Party Menshe- 
vism can certainly not become the system and tradition 
of Party thought.
If, even in the wake of cheng-feng and Kao Kang’s revision of local 
Party history, the Returned Students still clung to one last hope 
that they would be given an honourable (if secondary) place in the 
new Party history that was being compiled, this hope was finally 
dashed. Mao Tse-tung was to be the central figure in the forth­
coming history of the CCP, the two main themes of which were to be 
the evolution of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism ("Mao 
Tse-tung's thought”), and his constant and unrelenting struggles 
against erroneous factions such as the Returned Students. This is 
clearly seen in the anthology which the Central Committee issued 
in the autumn of 1943. Entitled The Two Lines In an obvious allusion 
to Wang Ming's historical treatise of 1931, this new collection of 
documents covered CCP history to date, and was designated for study 
by high and middle-ranking cadres. According to Peter Vladimirov, 
who apparently acquired a copy of it, The Two Lines' main purpose 
was to "laud Mao Tse-tung's policy and fiercely denounce Wang Ming's 
'sedition'.” From what we know of other texts in the movement to
study Party history, there is no reason to question Vladimirov's
13characterization of the book.
It was on the basis of Liu's guidelines, which likely reflected 
the Politburo's collective opinion, that the next stage.of the "Party
12Ibid., p. 63.
Vladimirov, op. cit., pp. 180, 182.
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History Study Movement1 got underway. Having held several special
sessions of their own on the question of Party history, and having .
reached the general conclusions represented in Liu Shao-ch'i’s
speech, the members of the Politburo then led the senior cadres of
the entire Party in holding similar discussions In the fall of 1943
and the spring of 1944. These sessions apparently went well for the
Maoists, for official sources later characterized them as "important
preparation for the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945,
enabling it to attain an ideological and political unity without
14precedent in the Communist Party of China." Nonetheless, given 
the harshness of the guidelines laid down by Liu, it is not sur­
prising that certain problems emerged in the course of the sessions. 
On 12 April 1944, in an important address summing up the discussions 
to date, Mao acknowledged the need to defuse some of the excessive 
hostility that the cadres were venting on the Returned Students and 
other members of the losing factions. After applauding the success 
of the-discussions so far, Mao reminded the senior cadres present 
that they were to avoid excessive negativity in assessing the errors 
of the past. They were to place less emphasis on the individual res­
ponsibility of the cadres who. committed mistakes, and were to adopt
a sincere attitude of "curing the sickness to save the patient,"
15rather than one of vindictiveness and exclusionism. Finally, in 
an attempt to weaken the excessive factionalism that was causing 
problems in inter-cadre relations, Mao brought to an end a whole era
^See the editorial note in Mao, XJ III, pp. 891-892.
15Mao, XJ III, p. 892.
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in Party history be declaring quite unequivocally that:
It should be stated that as a result of the series of 
changes since the Tsunyi Meeting, the factions which 
formerly existed and played an unwholesome role in the 
history of our Pgrty no longer exist....The old fac­
tions are gone.
Presumably, such leaders of the "old factions" as Li Li-san, Wang 
Ming and Po Ku could derive some satisfaction from their new status 
as individual Party members, and not living negative examples who 
would continue to bear the brunt of daily criticism and self-criti­
cism. They would, of course, continue to play this unhappy role in 
the new Party history being undertaken, but this was something with 
which they would have to live. In a last attempt to lay the past to 
rest, and to turn the Party’s mind to the new tasks ahead, Mao re­
vealed that the long-awaited Seventh National Congress "will pro­
bably be held soon." As for the main items on the agenda, added Mao,
they would certainly include the "problems of strengthening our work
17in the cities and winning nation-wide victory."
(ii) Ch’en Po-ta and the Maoist Myth
Mao delivered his speech on Party history at the last of the 
special sessions organized by the Central Committee for the instruc­
tion of the senior cadres in the Party. Surprisingly, he made no 
attempt to give a comprehensive summary of the conclusions that had 
emerged in the course of the year-long discussions on Party history. 
Even with regard to the controversial 1931-34 period, when the Re­
turned Students were in the ascendancy, Mao was content to refer 
briefly to the Political'Bureau's previ-ous-conclusion that
l6Ibid., pp. 893-S94.
17Ibid., p. 900.
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the "provisional central leadership that was formed in Shanghai in 
1931 and the Fifth Plenary Session which it subsequently convened... 
/were/.. .legal,1 hut that the "procedures for the election were in­
adequate and that this case should be taken as a historical lesson."^ 
Considering that the campaign to study Party history had focused 
specifically on the 1931-34 period, one would have thought that the 
Politburo would have come up with a more comprehensive and devas­
tating indictment of the Returned Students than the one announced by 
Mao. Surely, Liu Shao-ch'iTs essay of 6-July 1943 had suggested a 
much harsher verdict than mere admonishment for "inadequate proce­
dures" on the part of the errant Party leaders. This puzzle is
quickly solved, however, when it is realized that the debate on Party
history was by no means closed by Mao's brief remarks. On the con­
trary, the discussion was to continue from the late spring of 1944 to 
the convening of the Seventh Congress in April 1945, but only within 
the Politburo and the Central Committee, whose task it was to make 
the final judgements on the interpretation of the Party's history. 
Nonetheless, Mao's remarks about the "legality" of the Returned Stu­
dents' tenure in the top leadership posts during 1931-34 did much to
clear the air in Yenan. However mistaken they may have been in poli­
tical and military policy, their leadership was legally established 
and not at gross variance with established Party procedures. Al­
though the Returned Students were to be castigated for their errors 
in policy, there would be no question of criminal prosecution and 
physical punishment, a fate that most of the "Old Bolsheviks" in the 
Soviet Union had not so luckily escaped at the hands of Stalin.
18Ibid., p. 893-
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In the course of the above speech, Mao revealed that the Polit­
buro was chiefly concerned with drawing conclusions only with regard 
to the Party1 s history prior to Tsunyi. According to the emerging 
Maoist consensus, the CCP's development since January 1935 did not 
present any fundamental problems regarding interpretation. The 
Maoists claimed that the Party took the "correct” path after Tsunyi, 
and that in the course of 1935-37 the earlier "leftist" policies of 
the Party leadership had been replaced by those of Mao and his sup­
porters. As for the period following the Japanese invasion in July 
1937, Mao believed there were no real problems in its proper periodi­
zation and' characterization: 1937-4-0, the overcoming of the "right 
deviation"; 194-1-42, the suppression of the "ultra-left deviation";
and, finally, 1943 to the present (April 1944)? when "no basic
19deviations" were held to have occurred. Even in April 1945, when 
the Central Committee adopted its formal resolution on Party history, 
no attempt was made to confirm, reject, or amend this tentative 
periodization suggested by Mao. Noting simply that it was "appro­
priate to postpone to a future date" the drawing of conclusions re­
garding the Party’s history after Tsunyi, the Central Committee
turned its undivided attention to the pre-1935 period, especially
20the Returned Students’ tenure of office. Apart from this apparent 
consensus regarding the Party’s history after 1935, there would ap­
pear to be another important reason for the decision to focus ex­
clusively on the years prior to 1935, namely the lingering doubts
19It>id., pp. 895-897.
20rbid.,-p. 922.
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within the CCP leadership regarding Mao's personal stature as a 
Marxist-Leninist theoretician. This sensitive problem is confronted 
directly by Ch'en Po-ta, who was to emerge shortly after Mao's speech 
as the chief architect of the new interpretation of Party history, 
and the foremost creator of the Maoist myth. In a revealing passage 
that was later deleted in the revised version of the text in ques­
tion, Ch'en complained that:
Without any doubt, it Is completely contrary to histori­
cal fact to recognize Comrade Mao Tse-tung only as a 
practical activist of the revolution /ge-ming de shi-Ji 
xing-dong-jia7, or to maintain that Comrade Mao Tse-tung 
became a theorist only during the period of the war of 
resistance, and was not a theorist previously, and in 
this way to hold that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's practice and 
theory took shape and emerged only then /I.e., during the 
anti Japanese war/.^-
It comes as no secret, of course, that there were many within 
the Party elite who seriously questioned Mao's claim to theoretical 
leadership. Certainly, the Returned Students had done little to 
conceal their disdain for Mao's abilities as a theorist, and even 
such relatively ardent supporters of Mao as Chu Teh paid tribute to 
Mao's importance in the ideological sphere only under the pressure 
of the cheng-feng campaign. Yet, by the spring of 1944, when Ch'en 
made his complaint, the Party leadership had come around (however
PICh'en Po-ta, Nei»zhan shi-qi de fan-ge-ming yu ge-ming (Coun­
ter-revolution and Revolution in the Civil War Period), Inner-Party 
Cadre Reading Material, Yenan: n.pub., 1944, p. 65. This study was 
later revised and published as Ch'en Po-ta, Guan-yu shi-nian nei-zhan 
(On the Ten-Year Civil War), Peking: Ren-min chu-ban-she, 1st ed., 
1953* The corresponding English version is Ch'en Po-ta, Notes on Ten 
Years of Civil War (1927-1936), Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1st 
ed., 1954* For a detailed discussion of this important text, see 
part (iv) of this chapter.
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reluctantly) to Mao’s position, and most of them had thrown themselves 
with some abandon into the campaign to glorify Mao and his thought.
One must assume, therefore, that at the time Ch'en voiced his con­
cern, Mao’s position as the CCP's premier ideologist was not serious­
ly in question within the Party's most influential circles. Rather, 
the main point of contention appears to have been the difficult pro­
blem of periodizing Mao's intellectual and theoretical development as 
a revolutionary leader. Indeed, Ch'en's comments strongly suggest 
that there were those within the Party who accepted Mao's ideological 
claims, but only with reference to the post-Tsunyi period when the 
problem of the anti-Japanese resistance assumed first place on the 
Party’s agenda. Ch'en's concern seems to be well founded, for Mao's 
reputation as a theorist was largely based on his voluminous literary 
output dating only from 1936, when he wrote his famous military trea­
tise, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War." The Essays 
of Mao Tse-tung, published in Shanghai in late 1937, was the first 
known anthology of Mao's writings, but it did not include anything 
written prior to Tsunyi. Even during the cheng-feng campaign and 
after, when Mao's theoretical stature came to be recognized within 
the Party, reference was nearly always made to such post-Tsunyi wri­
tings as "On Protracted War" (193$), "On the New Stage" (1938), and 
his influential essay, "On New Democracy," first issued in 1940.
Chang Ju-hsin, who had published the first systematic study of Mao's 
"theory and strategy" in early 1942, failed to mention a single wri­
ting of Mao prior to 1935. When excerpts from one of these early 
works ("Kut’ien Resolutions") were actually assigned for study during
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cheng-feng, no indication whatsoever was given that they had come 
from Mao's pen. There would appear to be considerable basis, then, 
for Ch'en's lament that Mao's theoretical contributions prior to 1935 
were being largely ignored by the Party.
Still, why all the worry? Surely, the Maoists would be well 
content to see Mao's theoretical correctness established for the post- 
1935 period, when he attained a commanding position in the Party's 
leadership? Was it necessary also to stake a claim for his correct­
ness in the years prior to Tsunyi, when the Party's fortunes wavered 
erratically between success and failure? Ch'en (and Mao) apparently 
thought so. Soon after Mao's speech of 12 April 1944> in which he 
confined the continuing discussions on Party history to the Central 
Committee alone, Ch'en issued a series of three integrated treatises 
designed to establish Mao's reputation as a theoretician prior to 
1935. There were many reasons for this, not the least of which was 
the probable realization that continued silence regarding Mao's 
early activities in the revolution suggested either of two unwelcome 
interpretations, if not both. In the first place, continued silence 
on the early period implied that in the first fifteen years of his 
revolutionary career, Mao had not made any significant contributions 
to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory in the context of 
Chinese reality. In other words, he had not effectively combined 
the foreign theory with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolu­
tion, and had thus failed to develop a correct theoretical under­
standing of the inner dynamics of the revolutionary movement. This 
proposition would have serious connotations to anyone with even a
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rudimentary grasp of Marxism-Leninism, especially its insistence 
that correct revolutionary practice inevitably gives , rise to correct 
revolutionary theory, which in turn guides new practice towards new 
theory in .an endless chain of dialectical interaction. To put it 
bluntly, the slightest suspicion that Mao's theoretical abilities 
prior to 1935 were open to question immediately suggests that his 
concurrent leadership of the practical movement was equally suspect.
To a Marxist, theory and practice must be combined,* either Mao Tse- 
tung was correct in both theory and practice prior to- 1935, or he 
was mistaken in both, He could not under any circumstances be right 
in one and wrong in the other, and this conclusion was unlikely to 
be passed over by Mao and his colleagues.
This lingering ambiguity concerning Mao's historical role prior 
to Tsunyi would have proven intolerable to the Maoists, who had only 
recently launched their massive campaign to elevate Mao as both leader 
and thinker. Certainly, the realization that Mao was only a "half 
right-half wrong" leader would have undermined his new image as the 
undisputed helmsman of both the Party and the nation. More directly, 
this ambiguity would also have opened up a Pandora's box regarding a 
host of unsettling questions relating to the many bitter struggles 
that had tormented the CCP in the first fifteen years of its exis­
tence. Doubtless, people like Wang Ming and Po Ku (not to mention 
Li Li-san) would have taken great satisfaction in an interpretation 
of Party history that, while proving them wrong, did not prove Mao 
right. This in turn would severely weaken the strength of the Mao­
ist critique of the Returned Students, and would plunge the Party
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into yet another round of acrimonious debate over the past. Further, 
if the suggestion were to remain that neither the Returned Students 
nor Mao himself were completely right or wrong, this would encourage 
unwelcome speculation concerning the "real” locus of correct theory 
and practice in early Party history. This "real” locus had to be 
somewhere, since there was common agreement that, in spite of numer­
ous setbacks since its founding in 1921, the CCP’s record had ulti­
mately been one of genuine growth and success. However, if the man­
tle of correct leadership were to be equally denied to Mao Tse-tung 
and to his many opponents in the 1921-35 period, one would be com­
pelled to search for this correct leadership outside the ranks 
of the CCP. Inevitably, the search would have shifted to the Com­
intern, and hence to the Kremlin in Moscow, the accepted center of 
the world revolution during the period in question. For a host of 
reasons with which we are familiar, this would have been totally 
unacceptable to Mao and his supporters, who had spent the years since 
Tsunyi in establishing the CCP's virtual independence from the CPSU 
in matters of both theory and practice. To admit at this stage that 
in all the years prior to 1935 the CCP was too incompetent to nur­
ture its own indigenous leaders, and was forced to rely on foreign 
guidance on both theoretical and practical matters, was simply un­
thinkable. Such a suggestion was undoubtedly repugnant to the Maoists 
from either a Marxist or a nationalist point of view. The decision 
to rewrite the early history of the CCP, therefore, was not simply 
an exercise in the glorification of Mao (although an element of this 
was certainly present); rather, it was a final task of considerable
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importance in the Sinification of Marxism, the pursuit of which had 
long occupied a prominent position in the intellectual concerns of 
Mao and his like-minded colleagues such as Ch'en Po-ta.
In many ways, Ch’en was the obvious person to be assigned the 
task of reconstructing the early history of the Party. As a former 
Moscow-returned student who was fluent in Russian, Ch’en was well 
versed in the history of the Russian revolution, and the CPSU in par­
ticular. In addition, his intimate contact with the Returned Stu­
dents during his years at Sun Yat-sen University gave him a degree of 
personal knowledge (and hostility) vis-a-vis Mao's key opponents that 
was probably unsurpassed in the Party. As early as 1937, when Ch'en 
first came to Yenan, he participated in research and teaching on 
Party history, and in 1938 he published an initial draft of the Mao­
ist version of the CCP's history. During cheng-feng, Ch'en emerged 
as one of the leading polemecists in the Maoist camp and, in his 
celebrated critique of Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny, he achieved 
a prominent reputation both in China and abroad as a leading CCP 
theoretician. Most important, in the years since 1937 Ch'en had es­
tablished a close intellectual link with Mao, had influenced his 
thinking in many specific ways, and was perhaps more privy to the 
nuances of Mao's mind and personality than any other member of the 
Party (other than Chiang Ch'ing?). Ch'en's historical task was two­
fold: First, he was to demonstrate that in the fifteen years from
the founding of the CCP in 1921 to the Tsunyi Conference in 1935, it 
was essentially Mao Tse-tung. alone who developed a correct theoreti­
cal, strategic and tactical understanding of the proletarian revolu-
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tion in China. Second, in accordance with the first proposition,
Ch’en was to present the Party’s history prior to 1935 basically as 
the history of the gradual evolution of Mao’s correct line, and its 
struggle for supremacy against all the incorrect lines that rose to 
challenge it. To Ch'en, the history of the CCP was above all an in­
tellectual history; it was a chronicle of one man's mind writ large, 
the drama of which was to be found not in the detailing of military 
campaigns, but in the unfolding of a greater (Hegelian?) Idea which 
subsumed the entire revolutionary process within it. How else are 
we to interpret Ch’en's remarkable statement regarding the theoreti­
cal import of Mao's "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Move­
ment in Hunan" (1927)?. "Without doubt," claims Ch'en, "this histor­
ical document is the equal in brilliance and glory of the tumultous
22revolution of 1924—27 created by all the comrades in our Party." 
Implied in this sweeping comparison, of course, is the proposition 
that the essential historical significance of the entire revolution 
of 1924-27 lies in the fact that it provided the historical context 
which gave rise to the political theories of a single individual,
Mao Tse-tung. To Ch'en, history was above all the incubator of ideas, 
and it was the task of the historian to extract them from the raw, 
experiential matter in which they were embedded.
22Ch'en Po-ta, Du "Hu-nan nong-mm yun-dong kao-cha bao-gao"
(A Study of "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in 
Hunan"), Peking: Ren-min chu-ban-she, 1st ed., 1951, p. 42. The 
corresponding English text is Ch'en Po-ta, Notes on Mao Tse-tung's 
"Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," 
Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1st ed., 1954. For a detailed dis­
cussion of this text, see part (iii) of this chapter.
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Before turning to a detailed examination of Ch'en's reconstruc­
tion of Party history, we should devote a few lines to textual con­
siderations. Ch'en wrote three substantial pamphlets totalling some 
175 pages for the consideration of the higher Party cadres. That they 
were of a controversial nature is suggested by their classification 
as "dang nei gan-budu.wu" (inner-Party reading material for cadres), 
and by the fact that they were not issued publicly (and only then in 
their revised form) until the early 1950's. Two date from the spring 
of 1944 and were issued under Ch'en's own name*, the third dates from 
the spring of 1945, and was issued in the name of the Central Commit­
tee. The first of the trilogy is On Reading 'Report on an Investi­
gation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, ' which was later published 
with the same title in 1951. The second, entitled Counter-Revolution 
and Revolution in the Civil War Period, was belatedly published in 
1953 with a new title, On the Ten Year Civil War. The year 1953 also 
saw the appearance of the well-known "Resolution on Certain Histor­
ical Problems /in our Party/*1 adopted by the Seventh Plenum of the
CCP Central Committee on 20 April 1945, just prior to the Party’s
23Seventh National Congress. Assigning this important resolution to 
Ch’en Po-ta's authorship is a somewhat controversial step, but for a 
variety of reasons it would appear to be a reasonable one. We shall,
23Ch'en Po-ta (?), "Guan-yu ruo-gan li-shi wen-ti de jue-yi" 
(Resolution Concerning Certain Historical Questions), adopted on 20 
April 1945 by the Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Cen­
tral Committee of the CCP. The full text is in Mao, XJ III, pp. 904- 
953. The corresponding English text is in Mao, SW III., pp. 177-225. 
For a fuller discussion of this text, and of Ch'en Po-ta.’s probable 
authorship of it, see Chapter X, part (i).
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however, delay our discussion of the evidence for Ch'en’s author­
ship of the resolution until we are in a position to discuss its 
substantive content. A problem we will pose now concerns the* use of 
textual materials which exist in both original and revised versions. 
Regarding Ch’en's study of Mao’s "Hunan Report," and the resolution 
he drafted for the Central Committee, we have little choice but to 
use the revised versions dating from 1951 and 1953 respectively, for 
the original texts do not appear to be available outside the CCP’s 
official files. Fortunately, however, we do have access to the ori­
ginal text of Counter-Revolution and Revolution, and with this as a
point of comparison we are able to draw a few general conclusions con-
24.cerning all three treatises. Without going into too much detail, 
it would seem that there are few significant differences in either 
factual material or interpretation between the original and the 
revised texts. The revised version shows evidence of a certain 
amount of up-dating, some deletion of inessential material, and a 
general attempt at tidying up the presentation. The most significant 
difference in the revised text of Counter-Revolution and Revolution 
is the tendency to weaken the strength of the claims made on behalf 
of Mao’s theoretical originality, and at the same time to give
24.The original text of Counter-Revolution and Revolution in the 
Civil War Period can be found inYou-guan Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang cai- 
liao (Materials on the Chinese Communist Party), Tokyo: Yushodo Book- 
store Microfilms, 1970, Reel 12 of 20. The preface to this text is 
dated 1 May 1943? but this is obviously a misprint for 1944* In his 
concluding comments (p. 66), for example, Ch’en refers to Wang Chia- 
hsiang’s article on Mao Tse-tung!s thought which was published only 
on 8 July 1943, i.e., two months after the date given in the preface. 
For this and other reasons, we can safely assume that Ch’en’s text 
was first issued on 1 May 1944.
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increased prominence to the omnipresent ideological influence of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and especially Stalin. Such attempts to "sani­
tize" early CCP documents in the interests of Sino-Soviet harmony
after 194-9 are well known, especially with regard to Mao's own works,
25and the details need not concern us here. Thus, Ch'en's claims re­
garding Mao's ability or originality as a theorist in the revised . 
texts of either his study of the "Hunan Report" or his "Resolution" 
on Party history are likewise certain to he weaker in tone than in 
their original versions, and the deference shown to the foreign mas­
ters of Marxism, and Stalin in particular, somewhat enhanced. This 
is. illustrated most clearly in the following example. In the conclu­
sion to his Counter-Revolution and Revolution (original text of 194-4-)> 
Ch'en states quite categorically that, in the years following the 
CCP's Sixth Congress in 1928:
Comrade Mao Tse-tung solved the fundamental problems of 
the revolution in both theory and practice, in a more 
comprehensive way, and in their entirety.26
This is quite a forthright and sweeping statement, and fully reflects
the general tone of Ch'en's claims regarding Mao's theoretical and
practical leadership of the Chinese revolution. Yet, in Ch'en's Ten
Year Civil War (revised text of 1953), this-particular sentence has
been altered to read:
25For numerous examples of later alterations to Mao's original 
writings, see Schram, Political Thought, pp. 150-151, 174-, 252, 276, 
■etc.
26Ch'en Po-ta, Fan-ge-ming yu ge-ming, p. 63.
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Applying the methods and theories of Marxism-Leninism and 
following and developing Stalin’s teachings regarding the 
Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung then solved, in 
a more comprehensive way, the fundamental problems raised 
by the revolution at that time.
The addition of the first two clauses regarding Marxism-Leninism 
and "Stalin’s teachings" tends to weaken Mao's theoretical signifi­
cance, as does the substitution of "at that time" for "in their en­
tirety" on the nature of his solutions to the basic problems of the 
revolution. Nonetheless, these significant revisions to Ch’en’s text 
did not come about until 1953, nine years after Ch’en wrote his ori­
ginal treatise. In the meantime, it was the original and more forth- 
*
right text that was being avidly studied and assimilated by the CCP 
membership during the current movement to study Party history. In 
194-4-,- Mao’s singular importance was at the center of their concerns, 
with Stalin and the classical Marxist-Leninist heritage very much in 
the background.
(Hi) Mao’s Early "Bolshevism"
As Noriyuki Tokuda has pointed out, it was in his important 
treatises In the spring of 1944 that Ch’en Po-ta attempted to "re­
construct Mao’s thought systematically for the first time within the 
2$Party." At the same time, Ch’en had to familiarize the Party mem­
bers with Mao's long-neglected writings prior to 1936; consequently, 
Ch’en’s texts are interlarded with copious citations from the most 
Important (in Ch’en's view) of Mao’s early writings, especially 
those dating from 1927-30. This device does not do justice to Ch’en's
27Ch’en Po-ta, Guan-yu shi-nian nei-zhan, p. 66.
2$Tokuda, op. cit., p. 62.
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fluent prose style, but the lengthy quotations no doubt served as a 
surrogate until these early writings could be published in a more com­
plete form. Considering his On Reading ’Report on an Investigation 
of the Peasant Movement in Hunan1 in the first instance, we are quick 
to note the influence of Ch'en the historian. He immediately places 
Mao within the context of Chinese revolutionary history, pointing 
out specifically that the province of Hunan has been one of the 
"focal points" in the struggle between "progressive and revolutionary" 
and "conservative and counter-revolutionary" forces in modern China. 
Indeed, Hunan' has witnessed "typical struggles" between these con­
tending forces in the past century. Further, Ch'en argues, Hunan has 
also witnessed the "emergence of various personalities typical of both 
the-revolution and the counter-revolution." Ch'en declines to name 
Mao specifically as one such "typical" personality on the "revolu­
tionary" side, but the point is made perfectly clear when he refers 
to Mao's "Hunan Report" as "one of those works in which is crystal­
lized the best thinking of the finest people in China's history." In’
any event, Mao's Hunan origins were well known, as was the prominent
place of Hun^n in China's modern history, a fact often noted by both
29Chinese and Western writers alike. Ch'en does not dwell upon the 
issue, but his mere allusion to Hunan's pivotal place in Chinese
29Ch'en Po-ta, Du Hu-nan bao-gao, pp. 43-44-. For a highly sug­
gestive discussion of certain distinctive characteristics of Hunan 
province in modem Chinese history, and their possible effect on Mao 
Tse-tung, see Jerome Ch'en, Mao, pp. 1-7. For a paean to the 
stirring qualities of the Hunanese, see the essay by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 
"Salute to the Spirit of the Hunanese" (May 1920), in d'Encausse and 
Schram, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
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history is quite enough to make the point, and to establish in the 
reader's mind (or perhaps his subconscious) an almost mystical link 
between Mao Tse-tung and China's romantic and glorious past.
But however romantic in even revolutionary terms, the past is 
after all the past. What relationship exists between Mao and the 
present era of proletarian revolution? Does not Ch'en's earlier al­
lusion, however colourful, contain within it the merest hint that Mao 
is nothing more than a traditional Chinese rebel, perhaps in the style 
of the nineteenth-century Taipings? Ch'en is quick to dismiss this 
suggestion by drawing a neat parallel between Mao and the Chinese 
Communist Party itself. From its founding in 1921, argues Ch'en, the 
CCP has developed through three distinctive stages: (l) the urban 
working-class movement; (2) the Nationalist-Communist united front; 
and (3) the peasant movement in the countryside. This periodization 
of the Party's history is quite orthodox; Ch'en's novel addition to 
this standard account, however, is his suggestion that:
From the founding of the Party up to the 1924-27 revolu­
tion, the revolutionary activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung 
also went through these three main phases. First, he par­
ticipated in the working-class movement; next, in -united 
front work; and then in the peasant movement.30
Interestingly, Mao's early career did in fact follow this general 
pattern, and Ch'en's attempt at establishing this parallel is not 
without considerable justification. Yet, this comparison of Mao's 
and the CCP's development does contain within it the suggestion that 
there exists, however nebulously, an almost organic relationship be­
tween Mao and the Party, the individual and the collective. If this
30Ch'en Po-ta, Du Hu-nan bao-gao, p. 43.
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relationship does exist, is it symbiotic as well as organic; that is, 
is the development of Mao and the Party based on a mutuality of need? 
Does Mao depend on the existence of the Party as a necessary ‘condi­
tion of his own existence, or conversely, does the Party depend on 
the existence of Mao as a necessary condition of its own existence? 
Ch’en comes close to claiming the latter, not by explicitly denying 
the collective nature of the Party and the integral, yet subordinate, 
role of its constituent members, but by singling out the decisive 
role of one individual. In each of the three phases in the CCP's 
history between 1921 and 1927, claims Ch’en, Mao Tse-tung consistent­
ly ’stood at the foremost and most important post...came into the
closest contact with reality... and pondered most profoundly over
31/problems ofj the revolution.”
Yet, one might ash, what specific evidence is there to support 
Ch’en’s extravagant claims regarding Mao’s superiority? In parti- . 
cular, what decisive advances has Mao made in Marxist theory which 
might reflect his alleged commanding position in the early stages 
of the Chinese revolution? Interestingly, Ch’en completely Ignores 
all of Mao’s writings during the period under discussion up to March 
1927. One can only assume that these texts are either immature, un­
distinguished, erroneous, or a combination thereof, at least in
32Ch’en's opinion (and possibly that of Mao as well). This omission
31Loc. cit.
32This negative appraisal of Mao’s early texts appears to have 
remained constant in later years, for only-one of Mao’s texts dating 
from prior to March 1927 has been included in the official Selected 
Works published after 194-9. Even then, this essay, ’Analysis of all
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is of no consequence, however, for the deficiency is more than made 
up hy a single writing of Mao, namely, his "Report on an Investir- 
gation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," dating from March 1927. To 
Ch’en, Mao’s "Hunan Report" is of considerably more importance than 
its title would suggest, for it goes much further than merely chro­
nicling the experience of the peasant movement in the single province 
of Hunan. Indeed, Ch’en claims that Mao's study "sums up" the ex­
perience of the "mass struggle throughout the country during the
period of the 1924-27 revolution." Hence, it "represents the essence
34of that whole epoch, that entire historical period." One might 
ash, of course, how it is possible that a report on the peasant move­
ment (as opposed to the urban working-class movement) can, in the 
eyes of a seasoned Marxist, be regarded as representing the "essence" 
of even the early stages of a potential proletarian revolution in 
China. Further, is it possible for Mao Tse-tung, a petty-bourgeois 
intellectual with unmistakable rural origins, actually to write such 
an important work? Yet, no sooner are these troublesome questions 
posed than Ch’en responds to them, claiming that:
It was as the representative of the Chinese proletariat 
that Comrade Mao .Tse-tung in this report presented a com­
plete solution to this central problem /viz, the pea­
sant question/ of the revolution (which was also the most 
pressing problem of the day.34
the Classes in Chinese Society" (February 1926), was published in a 
highly revised and abbreviated form. For further information on this 
text, see Schram, Political Thought, pp. 210-214, and Mao, SW I, pp. 
13-21.
■^Ch'en Po-ta, Du Hu-nan bao-gao, p. 44.
•^ Tbid., pp. 1-2.
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Hence, since Mao is the "representative" of the Chinese proletariat, 
and since the peasant problem is the "central problem" of the pro­
letarian revolution in China, it is logical to conclude that Mao's 
"complete solution" of this particular problem is also the complete 
solution to the entire revolution. It is for this reason, concludes 
Ch'en, that Mao's "Hunan Report" can be accurately described as a 
"generalization of the Bolshevik strategy and tactics of the Chinese
Communist Party," and a "summary of our Party's Bolshevism" in the
35period of the 1924-27 revolution."
These are heady claims Ch'en is making on Mao's behalf, and one 
is naturally interested in how he backs them up. The verification, 
argues Ch'en, is to be found in three distinctive elements in Mao's 
thinking in the 1924-27 period: (l) his possession of a revolutionary
methodology; (2) his recognition of the pivotal importance of the 
peasants; and (3) his advocacy of a dictatorship of the revolutionary 
people. Let us consider these three elements in turn. According to 
Ch'en, Mao's "revolutionary methodology" is none other than the mass 
line: "Be students of the masses, concentrate the experience of 
their struggles and their views, and In turn become their teachers." 
Such a methodology is essential to the success of the revolution, 
argues Ch'en, for it prevents genuine revolutionaries from falling 
into the "bookish dogma" of those, like Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who are ar­
dent practitioners of their own distinctive "Menshevik methodol^ - 
ogy." As for Mao's emphasis on the peasantry, continues Ch'en,
35Ibid., p. 42.
36Ibid., p. 7.
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this is due to his recognition that in a vast agricultural nation
like China, "if the Chihe.se proletariat proves unable to lead the
peasant revolution, it will certainly be unable to consummate the
cause of the nation and the proletariat /Itself7." This proposition
is based on Mao's observation of the need to depend on the "rising
of the peasants" to destroy feudalism and imperialism in China, says
Ch'en, and it is at complete variance with Ch'en Tu-hsiu's persistent
underestimation of the key role of the peasants in the Chinese revo- 
37
lution. Finally, Ch'en points to Mao's constant espousal of Lenin's 
theory of the "dictatorship of the revolutionary people," which, in 
the context of the peasant movement in China, amounts in actuality to 
the "dictatorship of the revolutionary peasantry." Lest there be any 
doubt as to this equivalence, Ch'en quickly reminds the reader that 
the "dictatorship of the revolutionary people described by Lenin is 
the very dictatorship of the revolutionary people lauded by Comrade 
Mao Tse-tung." This theory is of course vastly different from that 
of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, for he was violently opposed to the peasants' in­
terfering in administrative affairs in the course of establishing 
their revolutionary power.
37Ibid., pp. 19-20.
^Ibid., pp. 21-24* 29-30. As Stuart Schram has pointed out in 
a private communication, Lenin never talked about the "dictatorship 
of the revolutionary people," nor did Mao ever mention the "dictator­
ship of the revolutionary peasantry." These "heresies" on the part 
of Ch'en simply highlight his pronounced populist attitudes towards 
the peasantry, and the "people" in general. In later years, such 
populist sentiments were expressed in Ch'en's espousal of the Paris 
Commune model during the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's, and 
in other ways as well. On this point, see the reference to Ch'en in 
John Bryan Starr, "Revolution in Retrospect:- The Paris Commune 
Through Chinese Eyes," CQ, 49 (January - March, 1972), pp. 116-117.
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Throughout his discussion, Ch'en at no time claims that Mao has 
actually created new revolutionary theory. Nor is the "Sinification" 
of Marxism mentioned; by 1944- this particular terminology had been 
largely dropped from the CCP's lexicon, probably in recognition of 
its excessively parochial connotation. Yet, Ch'en is at constant 
pains to demonstrate the compatibility of Mao's own ideological re­
formulations with the classic theories of Marxism-Leninism, as well 
as with the policies of Stalin and the Comintern during the period 
in question. Despite this fundamental unity of theory and strategy 
between the Comintern and Mao's "Bolshevik" line, this does not pre­
clude considerable diversity in the specific tactics adopted in 
light of the concrete demands of time and place. For example, says 
Ch'en, the tactics used by the Chinese proletariat in dealing with 
the bourgeoisie are by necessity "vastly different" from the tactics
adopted by the Russian proletariat in dealing with their own bour- 
39geoisie. How is it, then, that although the tactics of the inter­
national communist movement and those of the Chinese Party can at 
times be "vastly different," a .basic underlying harmony in theory 
and strategy can be maintained? In answering this important ques­
tion, Ch'en gives the reader a fruitful insight into his conception 
of the nature of Mao's thought. With particular reference to the 
"question of power," a central problem in all political theory and 
practice, Ch'en declares that:
9^Ibid., p. IS.
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The characteristic of Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s thought, 
like that of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and all other 
most outstanding communists, is that it is capable of 
drawing conclusions by generalising direct, vital and 
concrete reality, thus further concretely developing 
the general line laid down by the Communist Internation­
al regarding the question of power /in the Chinese re­
volution/ . ^
A moment ago it was pointed out that at no time does Ch'en claim that 
Mao had created any new theories as of 1927, but the above passage 
clearly indicates that such a possibility existed. In Ch’en’s mind, 
by 1927 Mao had emerged as the outstanding scientist of the prole­
tarian revolution in China. His mental constitution was identical 
to that of Marx and the other classical masters of proletarian theory, 
and he had the ability to "generalize” from reality (i.e., to create 
theory). Further, his distinctive generalizations had the power ac­
tually to "develop" the existing body of proletarian theory regarding, 
for example, the decisive question of political power. Hence, con­
tinues Ch’en, one is inevitably led to the conclusion that:
With the birth of the Party, /Mao Tse-tung/ emerged as the 
most outstanding Bolshevik representative in the Party, 
and by the time of the period of the 1924-27 revolution he 
'had already emerged as the major theorist /ji-da-cheng-zh§/ 
of Bolshevik ideology in our Party.41
Ch’en’s use of the rather unusual term "ji-da-cheng-zhe" to describe 
Mao is most interesting to our discussion, and deserves additional 
comment. A somewhat archaic phrase, "ji-da-cheng-zhe" can be trans­
lated as "one who gathers many proposals and formulates theories
°^Ibid.., p. 31
41Ibid., p. 43.
m12from them.1' This immediately suggests one of the characteristic 
features of traditional Chinese philosophy, namely, its emphasis on 
the syncretization of highly eclectic elements into a single, com­
prehensive world view, whether it be that of Tung Chung-shu of the 
Han dynasty, or K'ang Yu-wei of the late Ch'ing. In using this dis­
tinctive term, is Ch'en suggesting, if only unconsciously, that Mao 
Tse-tungTs qualities as a theorist have much in common with the 
theorists of China's past? Is the fundamental cast of Mao's mind 
substantially different from that of Tung and K'ang, or is it, des­
pite the new Marxist content, largely in the same tradition? That 
Ch'en perceives a basic similarity between Mao and the philosophers 
of the past is dramatically suggested in a revealing passage in 
Ch'en's essay of April 1939, "The Philosophic Thought of Confucius."
In this essay, Ch'en claims that it was during the Spring and Autumn 
period in ancient Chinese history that "feudal ideology developed 
to the /stage of'J 'theory' /ji da cheng de fa-zhan7.1' During this 
period, Chou, the feudal state in which Confucius was educated, can be 
regarded as a "typical" state in the prevailing system on the East 
Asian mainland. Hence, it was possible for Confucius, the product of 
a "typical" feudal state in a period of ideological development, to 
become the "representative" of this feudal ideology precisely at the 
moment when it was developing to the stage of theory. In this way,
/o
This is the relevant translation of the term suggested by R.
H. life'thews in his well-known Chines e-English Dictionary, rev. ed., 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 66. A more
literal translation of the verb would be "to crystallize," "to be 
a concentrated expression of," etc. See, for example, Han-Ying shi- 
shi yong-yu ci-hui (A Chinese-English Dictionary of Current Events 
Terminology), Hong Kong: Shang-wu yin-shu-guan, 1972, p. 175.
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Ch'en demonstrates that Confucius became the "theorist /ji da cheng
zhe7 of the ruling feudal ideology" by synthesizing diverse elements
from the Shang dynasty, which first gave rise to the "feudal cultural
system," and from the Chou dynasty, during which this feudal cultural
43system reached its full development. Just as Ch’en had previously 
described Confucius as the "theorist" of the Chou feudal system, he 
now singles out Mao Tse-tung as the "major theorist" of the contemporary 
era of the proletarian revolution in China. Nowhere does Ch’en suggest 
(even indirectly) that the ideological content of Mao’s thought bears 
any similarity to that of Confucius. Mao is not a Confucian, nor was 
Confucius a Marxist. The sole point of comparison between the two 
individuals, Ch’en suggests, is the similarity in their roles, with­
in their specific historical contexts, as the outstanding ideological 
spokesmen of their own ages. It is in this light that Ch’en can 
claim that Mao’s political thought, as represented in his "Hunan Re­
port," can be seen as embodying the "essence" of the "entire histo­
rical period" which gave birth to the Chinese Communist Party, and 
which witnessed its early years of trial and growing maturity.
Thus does Ch'en establish Mao Tse-tung's ideological supremacy 
within the CCP from its founding in 1921 to its virtual destruction 
by the Nationalists in 1927. But this catastrophe is in no way at­
tributable to Mao, cautions Ch’en, for the CCP was "still young,,"
^Ch’en Po-ta, "Kong Zi de zhe-xue si-xiang" (The Philosophic 
Thought of Confucius), JF, 69 (April 1939), as extracted in Wu-si yi- 
lai fan-dong-pai, di-zhu zi-chan jie-ji xue-zhe zun-Kong fu-gu yan- 
lun ji-lu (A Compilation of Sayings on Honouring Confucius and fee- 
storing Tradition by Reactionaries and Landlord and Bourgeois Scho­
lars Since the May Fourth Movement), Peking: Ren-min chu-ban-she,
1974, pp. 28-29.
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and "history had not reached a stage where the conscious Bolshevik 
political line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung could assume organized, con­
centrated rule over the entire Party. On the contrary, it was the 
"Menshevik line" (which was at one and the same time also a "Trot­
skyist line") of Ch’en Tu-hsiu that dominated the Party leadership 
during the period in question, and which was fully responsible for 
leading the Party to disaster in 1927, Nonetheless, these years of 
trial and error were not without positive result, for they alerted 
the Party's true Bolshevik members to the erroneous policies of Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu and his fellow "Mensheviks," and hence prepared the way for 
the reconstruction of the Party along correct lines. Therein lies 
the decisive importance of Mao’s historic "Hunan Report," concludes 
Ch’en, for it is a document which manifested the "open ideological 
split" between these two contending forces within the Party, and pre­
pared the soil for the ultimate victory of "Bolshevik truth as repre-
45sented in China by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." The "Hunan Report" is 
thus to be regarded as a watershed document in the history of the 
CCP and, more importantly, in the intellectual evolution of Mao Tse- 
tung as the pre-eminent theoretician of the Chinese revolution.
(iv) Mao’s "Revolutionary Wisdom"
Mao Tse-tung's "Hunan Report" of March 1927 is of the utmost 
importance, claims Ch’en, for it marks the emergence of Mao as the 
CCP’s leading theoretician, and it set the Party firmly on the road 
to revolutionary success. Yet at no time does Ch’en suggest that
Ch'en Po-ta, Du Hu-n'an bao-gao, p. -43.
^Loc. cit.
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Mao’s thought had developed fully as of 1927; rather, it was only 
during the following period, 1927-30, that Mao’s thought reached a 
relatively mature stage. Indeed, Ch'en wrote his second treatise on 
Mao, Counter-Revolution and Revolution in the Civil War Period, pre­
cisely for the purpose of demonstrating that it was during 1927-30 
that Mao’s thought ’took a hig stride forward in the course of ac- 
tual struggles’’ compared to when he wrote his "Hunan Report." It 
was during these few years, claims Ch’en, that Mao was able to solve,
"in their entirety, and in a more comprehensive way, the fundamental
47problems of the revolution in both theory and practice." Hence, 
although some fifteen years have lapsed since this decisive period 
in Mao’s intellectual development, the series of articles he wrote be­
tween 1927 and 1930 contain "many fundamental principles" of the 
Chinese revolution. Even though these intervening years have been 
ones of "many changes" in the course of the revolution, Mao’s ar­
ticles from this earlier period have not by any means been reduced to 
the level of mere historical documents. Rather, their intrinsic sig­
nificance transcends the limitations of time, and they are as impor­
tant today (1944) as they were when they were first composed. Lest 
there be any comrades within the Party who might wish to slight these 
early writings of the chairman, preferring to focus attention on his 
well-known treatises of the late 1930’s and early 1940’s, Ch’en sets 
the record straight:
it
Ch’en Po-ta, Fan-ge-ming yu ge-ming, p. 33.
47Ibid.,'p. 63.
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The theoretical work in which /Mao Tse-tung/ engaged 
during the early stage of the Soviet movement was in 
actual fact the total theoretical and strategic basis 
of the ten-year internal revolutionary war..*.If one 
does not clearly understand Comrade Mao Tse-tung1s 
theory and strategy of the early period of the Soviet 
movement and the Red Army1 s wars, then one cannot com­
prehend fully the creation of the forces of the Chi­
nese revolution, or the reasons for the /gigantic/ 
scale of the present-day revolution in China. Nor can 
one clearly understand Chinese Bolshevism in its en­
tirety, nor the goal of Bolshevization which our whole 
Party is pursuing at the present time under the direc­
tion of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.48
In Ch’en1s eyes, then, Mao’s writings of the 1927-30 period assume 
a position of utmost significance in the ideological history of the 
CCP. Not only did they solve the ’’fundamental problems" of the Chi­
nese revolution, but they even epitomize the essence of the CCP’s 
history during its two great revolutionary periods (1921-27 and 1927- 
37). Further, these same few writings provide all Party members with 
a ’’clear understanding’’ of the Party’s tasks in the current (post- 
1937) stage of its development, and of the future goals it is trying 
to achieve on behalf of the Chinese people.
So far we have been talking in generalities, and the questions 
naturally arise: What are these highly significant writings of the
1927-30 period, and why does Ch’en place so much importance on them? 
In addition to Mao’s pivotal ’’Hunan Report,” there were five other 
writings that Ch’en singled out as providing the basis of Mao's re­
volutionary thought: (1) a resolution drafted for the Second Party
Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area (3 October 192S); (2) a 
report submitted to the CCP Central Committee on behalf of the Ching- 
kengshan Front Committee (25 November 192&); (3) an ordinance of the
^Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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Red Army's Fourth Army Headquarters (January 1929); (4) a resolution
drafted for the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red
Army (December 1929); and (5) a letter written by Mao to Lin’Piao,
at that time a young Red Army commander (5 January 1930). With the
exception of item three —  the Red Army ordinance —  all of the above
writings have been included in Mao1s official Selected Worhs, and
they form the core of Mao's officially-endorsed writings for the
period in question. It would appear, then, that the importance Ch'en
assigned to these few writings has since been accepted by Mao and the
Party elite, a fact which has probably done much to enhance Ch'en's
49reputation as the CCP's leading interpreter of Mao's thought. Yet, 
why is it that Ch'en (and presumably Mao also) holds these early wri­
tings in such high regard? A careful study of Ch'en's Counter-Revo­
lution and Revolution reveals his belief that it is in these writings 
that Mao arrived at a series of decisive decisions regarding the cha­
racter of the Chinese revolution, and the appropriate role of the 
CCP in the difficult years after its near-destruction in 1927. In 
brief, Ch'en argues that Mao's correct estimate of the character of 
the new Nationalist "dictatorship" in turn led him to a correspon­
dingly accurate appraisal of the overall revolutionary situation pre­
vailing at the time. Basing himself on this correct understanding of
^The only article written by Mao prior to the "Hunan Report" 
to be included in the official Selected Works is his "Analysis of 
All the Classes in Chinese Society," first published in February 
1926. Even so, the official version of this early essay has been so 
extensively revised that it "bears little resemblance to the origi­
nal." Otn this point, see Schram, Political Thought, pp. 210-214.
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the revolutionary situation, Mao was able to work out a suitable 
long-range strategy for the revolution, and to devise a set of ap­
propriate tactical principles to guide short-term policies. Finally, 
and very importantly, Mao succeeded in formulating a correct "metho­
dological key" which would unlock the door to the eventual triumph 
of the true revolutionary forces in China. With this key in hand, 
the proletarian revolutionaries were able to build up a dynamic Com­
munist Party, consolidate and expand a powerful people's army, and 
achieve unprecedented success in carrying out mass work in China's 
countryside. Hence, concludes Ch'en, the entire later history of the 
Chinese revolution, and the CCP in particular, is clearly mirrored 
in these early writings of Mao Tse-tung, immortal works whose lustre 
has in no way diminished with the passage of time, and which still
50possess "great practical .significance" for the revolutionary cause.
Let us look at Ch'en's argument a little more closely. After 
the failure of the revolution of 1924-27, says Ch'en, it was neces­
sary for the CCP to answer a series of critical questions concerning 
the precise class nature of the new Nationalist leadership that 
emerged victorious. "Our Party had to answer these questions," he 
continues, "because this would determine the basis of our Party's 
overall policies." It was Mao Tse-tung who correctly answered these 
fundamental questions by concluding that the Nationalist regime was
one of the "new warlords," a "new counter-revolutionary military
51dictatorship of the big compradores and the big landlords."
50Ch'en Po-ta, Fan-ge-ming yu ge-ming, pp. 64-65.
51Ibid., pp. 2-4.’
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Following the recitation of a good many statistics to prove that 
these T,new warlords” had systematically stepped up their oppression 
and exploitation of the Chinese people after achieving power* in 
1927, Ch’en reasserts the validity of Mao’s conclusion at the time 
that China still needed a genuine ’'"bourgeois democratic revolution” 
under the leadership of the proletariat. While acknowledging cor­
rectly that after 1927 the revolution had "temporarily entered a 
low tide,” Mao nonetheless demonstrated that the foundations of the 
new Nationalist regime were inherently "weak and unstable,” and could 
he undermined by correct revolutionary strategy. Hence, Mao was able 
to refute in. a decisive manner the joint Trotskyist claims that the
victory of the Nationalists in 1927 represented a "victory for the
bourgeoisie," and that the "proletarian/ revolution is already 
52dead.” Having arrived at this correct appraisal of the nature of 
the revolution in China, continues Ch’en, Mao could not stop half­
way,* it was now his task to work out an appropriate strategy which 
would guide the CCP through the revolutionary labyrinth and on to 
final victory. From the point of view of strategy, argues Ch’en, the 
"most fundamental problem" of any revolution is the problem of power. 
In the context of China in the late 1920's, the key question was
whether or not "Red political power could exist for a long time and
53
develop despite its encirclement by White political power." Basing 
himself on his earlier proposition (in the "Hunan Report") that the 
Chinese revolution was essentially an agrarian revolution led by the
52Ibid., pp. 15-18.
^Ibid., p. .30.
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proletariat, Mao put forward the concepts of the "agrarian revolution
of the peasants, the arming of the revolution, and the /establishment
of/ revolutionary base areas as the trinity /san-wei-yi-ti de 'dong-
54xi/ by which to establish the political power of the masses." In 
this way, continues Ch'en, Mao established the central strategic con­
cept of an "armed independent regime of the workers and peasants,"
and planted the CCP firmly on the path.to the practical realisation
55of this strategic goal. Mao worked out this correct strategy in the 
face of repeated challenges from a myriad of mistaken opponents: Chi­
nese Narodniks, who underestimated the role of the proletariat; Chi­
nese Trotskyists, who slighted the importance of the peasantry; Li 
Li-san, who denied the possibility of an independent Red regime; and, 
finally, the "third ’left' opportunist line," which failed to grasp 
the protracted, zig-sag nature of the revolution in China.^ Yet 
Mao's task was not over; he had still to fashion a correct set of 
practical tactics by which to implement the strategy which he had 
derived from his earlier.appraisal of the nature of the revolution.
At this point, Ch'en becomes a little vague in contrast to his pre­
vious disputation, claiming only that Mao espoused a "flexible poli­
cy" (ling-huo de sheng-ce) toward the inherent contradictions within 
the enemy camp. Such a flexible policy, argues Ch'en, allowed Mao 
to analyze and utilize effectively the contradictions within and be­
tween the Nationalists and their allies, thus enabling the CCP to
^Ibid., p. 65.
55Ibid., p. 33.
56Ibid., pp. 26, 36-37.
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maintain and even expand "Red political power." This policy of Mao 
is in complete contrast to the "rigid policy" (zhi-xian de zheng-ce) 
of the left opportunists, who consistently allowed their ignorance 
of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution to lead them to under­
estimate the opportunities presented by the contradictions not only 
within the ruling classes, but within the broad fabric of Chinese 
society as a whole. Consequently, these left opportunists rejected
the. flexible —  and correct —  tactics of Mao Tse-tung at various
57times during the civil war period (1927-37).
However correct they may be, Mao’s analysis of the Chinese revo­
lution, and the strategic and tactical principles he devised accor­
dingly, are above all intellectual concepts. Ch'en is quick to real­
ize this, and to point out that mental abstractions must be realized 
through concrete organizations and behavioural modes. Indeed, says 
Ch’en, if the revolution is to be realized in practice, "it is neces­
sary to build up a very good party, establish an excellent revolution-
58ary army, and carry out effective work among the masses." Of these 
three concerns, it is Ch’en’s opinion-that party-building is the 
"most basic keypoint" in guiding the revolution to victory; further, 
because the CCP is being built up in a rural environment, proper 
ideological education of all Party members assumes a position of the 
utmost importance. Indeed, so concerned is Mao with this point that 
as early as December 1929 (the Kut’ien Conference), he "elevated 
theory and Ideology to the first position in the problem of building
57Ibid., pp. 42-43.
5^ Ibid., p. 52.
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59up the Party and the army.” By placing primary emphasis on ideo­
logical training, Mao led the entire Party in combatting left and 
right "subjectivism" on the one hand, and left and right "sectarian­
ism" on the other. Thus, concludes Ch’en, the party which Mao Tse- 
tung has built up in the rural base areas is a "revolutionary party 
guided by Marxism-Leninism and possessing strict, centralized pro­
letarian discipline." As for the Red Army, protracted struggles also 
proved necessary against two particular deviations within its ranks, 
namely, "war-lordism" and "roving rebel ideology." Interestingly, 
Ch'en gives a certain modicum of credit to Chu Teh in building up 
the army, but he waters it down considerably by making Chu share the
honours with Mao, the CCP, and the "entire body of officers and men 
£>0
in the Red Army." Yet, concludes Ch’en, whether one is speaking 
of success in building up the Party and the army, or in carrying 
out revolutionary tasks in other fields of concern, there is simply 
no substitute for effective work among the masses. The Chinese re­
volution is above all a mass movement for national and social liber­
ation, and its organizational forms —  the CCP and the Red Army —  
depend on the masses for their existence and growth. Just as the
59Ibid., p. 65. Ch'en is probably exaggerating Mao's emphasis 
on ideology here, for the original Kut'ien resolutions were as much 
concerned with organization as with ideology in the building up of 
the Party. Still, in his later use of these resolutions (as during 
the cheng-feng campaign), Mao chose to emphasize their ideological 
aspects, especially regarding the indoctrination of cadres, rather 
than their concern with organization. Indeed, in the official 
Selected Works, only the ideological section of the resolutions has 
been retained, under the title of "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in 
the Party." See Mao, SW I, pp. 105-116.
60Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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key to revolutionary success is effective mass work, says Ch'en, so
then is Mao Tse-tung's "mass line" the key to good work among the
masses. "There is no other way," he concludes, because:
The mass line is the key to activating work of all types; 
it is also the key to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct lea­
dership of the Chinese revolution. Having grasped this 
key, we can have a good Party, a good army, and can do 
good work among the masses.°1
How, one might ask, was Mao able to acquire such a penetrating
understanding of the inner laws of the Chinese revolution? How can
it be, as Ch'en claims, that "almost the entire history" of the
period of the civil war (1927-37) was foretold in the short letter
62Mao wrote to Lin Piao in January 1930? The answer, it would • appear, 
is to be found in Mao's singular development of "revolutionary wis­
dom" (ge-ming de 2hi-hui) in the course of his long years of arduous 
struggle. To illustrate this important point, Ch'en compares and 
contrasts Mao with Sun Wu-kung, the fabulous "Monkey King" from the 
well-known Chinese novel, Pilgrimage to the West (Xi you ji). Like 
Mao, Sun Wu-kung was a revolutionary, for he launched a "revolution 
against the Emperor of Heaven"; again like Mao, he was possessed of 
a certain wisdom to help guide his struggle, only his was "super­
natural wisdom" (shen tong). This is as far as the comparison be­
tween Mao and Sun goes, however, for Sun eventually met with failure 
in his revolt against the Emperor of Heaven, while Mao is guiding 
the down-to-earth Chinese revolution to certain victory. The rea­
sons for Sun's defeat and Mao's success are to be found in the
^Ibid., pp. 62-63.
62Ibid., pp. 19.
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qualitative difference "between the "supernatural” wisdom of the one, 
and the "revolutionary" wisdom of the other. Unlike the case of
Sun, Mao’s wisdom is not based on the supernatural, but rather on a
"grasp of the totality of historical and actual existence"; conse­
quently, such revolutionary wisdom is "omnipotent and without equal." 
"With this wisdom," says Ch’en,
...one may lead the revolutionary forces from weakness to 
strength, and change defeat into victory. Without such
wisdom, the revolutionary forces can be led from strength
'to weakness', and victory can be changed into defeat. 3^
Lest the reader mistakenly conclude that he is coming dangerously 
close to claiming quasi-supernatural powers for Mao, Ch’en immediate­
ly registers a qualification. There is no unfathomable mystery to 
Mao's wisdom, for it is based squarely on the scientific principles 
of dialectical materialism, and on their practical application in 
real life. To illustrate his point, Ch’en draws attention to Mao's 
"theory and policy" on utilizing the fissures within and between the 
forces of reaction to develop the forces of revolution. Mao's effec­
tive use of contradictions in this case, argues Ch'en,
...is an example of the greatest Marxist-Leninist wis­
dom, and at the same time, it has further concretely 
strengthened the application of Marxism-Leninism in Chi­
na. All revolutionaries and Communist Party members very 
much need to understand this point. 4^
As might have been expected, Ch’en believes that the Party's 
former top leaders have proven incapable of developing this "revolu­
tionary wisdom" based on true Marxist-Leninist principles. Ch’en is
6;3Ibid., pp. 43-44 
^Xoc. cit.
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by no means completely -ungenerous towards all of the Party’s former
leading personalities, for he presents the reader with a list of
prominent martyrs such as "outstanding statesmen" like Li Ta-chao,
"brilliant mass leaders" like P’eng P'ai, and "numerous theorists and
65propagandists" like Ch’u Ch’iu-pai. Nor are the.CCP1 s only worth­
while leaders all dead and in their graves, for both Chu Teh and Liu 
Shao-ch’i are given passing praise for their correct policies in the 
military and urban spheres respectively. In acknowledgement of his 
rather belated alignment with the Maoist camp, Liu in particular is 
given credit for having developed a proper urban strategy within the 
broad context of Mao’s theoretical analysis of the revolution as a 
whole. No doubt, this limited praise was part- of the price Mao had
to pay for Liu’s eulogy to Mao's "genius" at the Party’s Seventh Con- 
66gress in 1945. Still, in spite of these few limited concessions, 
Ch'en's appraisal of the Party’s'former top leaders is uniformly nega­
tive. - Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Li Li-san had both failed to nurture within 
themselves the "revolutionary wisdom" personified in Mao, and this
was true also of "some comrades" in leadership positions during the 
67civil war period. There is no question that these anonymous com­
rades were none other than the Returned Students, Wang Ming and Po
. ^Ibid., pp. 65-66. In the revised text (1953) of this study, 
Ch’en referred to Ch’u Ch'iu-pai only as an outstanding "propagan­
dist," but not as a "theorist" as well. By this time, the only emi­
nent "theorist"—  living or dead —  in the CCP was Mao Tse-tung. See 
Ch'en, Guan-yu shi -nian nei-zhan, p. 69.
66Ibid., p. 12.
I^bid.., pp. 44-45.
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Ku in particular, but apparently the Maoists were not yet ready to 
censure them by name. In an indirect acknowledgement that he is 
writing with the benefit of hindsight, Ch'en does admit that popular 
understanding of Mao's "revolutionary principles" (ge-ming zhu-yi) 
was perhaps not so profound in the early years as at the present 
time. Although Mao’s general line as it emerged in the 1927-30 pe­
riod was based on a correct Marxist-Leninist analysis of China's 
unique "national situation," this was not immediately appreciated by 
many members of the Party. In fact, confesses Ch'en, it was "simply 
very difficult" at the time to estimate the impact that Mao's line 
would have on "transforming the entire /course7 of Chinese history,"
or to evaluate its potential "role and Influence in the past, pre-
68sent, and future" of China, Yet, if a certain degree of uncertain­
ty in the past over the correctness of Mao's line is at least under­
standable, if not excusable, the same is not true today. This is 
because all members of the Party, regardless of whatever errors they • 
might have committed in the past, are now able to emulate the "revo­
lutionary wisdom" that they now perceive in Mao. How can they do 
this? Very simply, says Ch'en:
If one wishes to acquire wisdom, one must study Comrade 
Mao Tse-tung. One must study his method of thinking, 
his theories /Ii-lun7, his policies, and finally, one must 
study his working style. Making mistakes is undesirable, 
but if we regard these errors as experience and learn from 
them, and hence grow in wisdom and improve ourselves, then 
we can transform the undesirable into the desirable.69
68Ibid., p. 16.
69Ibid., p. 45.
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Ch'en's call for all CCP members to take Mao Tse-tung as their 
model for emulation raises the question of the position of Stalin 
and the classical masters of Marxism-Leninism in the new scale of 
values amongst the Chinese Communists. Clearly, for ChTen, there is 
no fundamental conflict of loyalties; Mao is the undisputed leader 
of the Chinese Communist movement, but he himsel-f is the self-acknow­
ledged disciple of Marx, Lenin and Stalin.- Yet, although Ch'en 
refers frequently to this foreign triumvirate, and Stalin in parti­
cular, their writings do not constitute an integral part of Ch'en's 
general line of reasoning. They are merely introduced from time to 
time to underscore the claim that in spite of his own "revolutionary 
wisdom," Mao remains firmly within the international Marxist tradi­
tion. For example, Ch'en places considerable importance on Mao's 
military strategy and its intimate relationship with his broader 
political thought, but he does acknowledge a direct link on this 
issue between Mao and Stalin. Mao's entire military thinking on the 
Chinese revolution, says Ch'en, is the product of the "concrete, 
practical application and development!’ of Stalin's general observa­
tion in 1927 that the essential character of the Chinese revolution
is that of an armed struggle between the forces of progress and 
70 •reaction. Yet, with this example as with others, Ch'en is content 
70Ibid., p. 30. It is true that Stalin's observation was made 
in the context of the revolution of 1924-27, when the Nationalist 
Party represented the progressive side and the various warlords the 
side of reaction. Nonetheless, Stalin's characterization of the Chi­
nese revolution as an armed struggle remains valid, and this is the 
context in which one must view Ch'eh's remarks. For Stalin's origin­
al comments on this issue, see J.V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the 
Revolution in China," Works, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1954, VIII, p. 379.
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simply to make a perfunctory statement about the relationship be­
tween Stalin's thought and that of Mao, without attempting to sub­
stantiate the linkage to any degree of sophistication. In any case, 
Ch'en would probably be irritated by overly zealous attempts to 
document the precise relationship between Mao's thought and the wri­
tings of the foreign masters, for this would suggest, however indi­
rectly, that substantial differences did in fact exist. Also, such 
a "pedantic” approach to the study of Mao's thought would no doubt 
be considered excessively mechanistic by Ch'en, for it would tend
to negate the innate spark of creative genius which Mao had brought
71to his handling of Marxist-Leninist theory. Rather, Ch'en ex­
presses his agreement with Wang Chia-hsiang's earlier evaluation of 
Mao's thought, quoting Wang's essay of S July 1943 to the effect
that "Mao Tse-tung's thought is Chinese Marxism-Leninism, Chinese
72Bolshevism, Chinese communism." In other words, whatever the 
exact relationship between Mao's thought and that of the foreign 
masters, the fact remains that Mao's thought is Chinese Marxism, and 
not simply Marxism in China. Therein lies the decisive difference 
between Mao' s handling of Marxism-Leninism and that of the Returned
71In an important, essay of 1949, Ch'en underscored Mao's intel­
lectual creativity and independence by claiming that Mao had not been 
able to make a "systematic study" of Stalin's writings on the Chinese 
revolution until the time of the cheng-feng campaign in the mid- 
1940's. "But despite this situation," continues Ch'en, "Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung has been able to reach the same conclusions as Stalin on 
many fundamental problems." See Ch'en Po-ta, "Stalin and the Chinese 
Revolution" (13 December 1949), in Ch'en Po-ta, Stalin and the Chi­
nese Revolution, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953; pp. 24-25, 27.
72Ch'en Po-ta, Fan-ge-ming yu ge-ming, p. 66.
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Students and other unsuccessful leaders of the CCP; they had perhaps 
"been more faithful to the letter of Marxism, hut Mao had proven more 
loyal to the spirit. It is primarily at this level of mental abstrac­
tion, concludes Ch'en, that one discovers the essential unity between 
Mao and his illustrious predecessors:
The most outstanding characteristic of Comrade Mao Tse- 
tung's thought —  precisely the same as the most out­
standing feature of the thought of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
and Stalin —  is the. total unity of theory and prac­
tice.7^
This alleged unity of theory and practice in Miao's thought 
brings us to Ch'en's concluding summation of Mao's stature within the 
CCP. It must be realized, he says, that Mao Tse-tung is both the 
"practical, political leader" of the Party, and its undisputed "the­
oretical leader" as well. Mao's dual claim to leadership is not 
lightly made, but is based on the now common knowledge that:
Since the founding of our Party, it is Comrade Mao Tse- 
tung who has proven able to solve the problems of Chi­
nese society and the Chinese revolution at the theoreti­
cal level in a comprehensive, integrated and philosophi­
cal way. Consequently, it is he who has been able con­
sistently to lead forward and advance China's revolu­
tionary cause.74
Ch'en's two treatises in the spring of 1944 constitute the first 
major attempt to provide historio-theoretical content to the concept 
of "Mao Tse-tung's thought." At the same time, they represent a sub­
stantial up-dating of Ch'en's earlier draft Maoist history of the 
CCP, and their specific conclusions were to be very much a part of
^Ibid., p. 65.
^Ibid., p. 66.
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the Seventh Plenum's resolution on Party history adopted in April 
1945. In concluding this chapter, mention should he made of the 
pioneering study of the origins of Mao Tse-tung’s theory and prac­
tice published by Benjamin I. Schwartz in 1951. Schwartz placed 
heavy emphasis on the years 1927-30 as the creative period in the 
evolution of the "essential features of Maoism." Indeed, Schwartz 
claims that the "basic elements" of the Maoist strategy were in evi­
dence well before Mao actually assumed the leadership of the Party 
following the Tsunyi Conference in 1935. Precisely, the essential 
features of Mao's thinking can be traced to the report he wrote for
the Central Committee on behalf of the Chingkahgshan Front Committee 
75(5 October 1928). All this is very reminiscent of Ch'en Po-ta's 
conclusions of 1944? and were it not known that Ch'en’s two studies 
were not made public until the early 1950's (after Schwartz's study), 
one would have suspected Schwartz's reliance on the earlier findings 
of his Chinese counterpart. (There is no mention of either Ch'en Po- 
ta or his two studies of Mao in Schwartz's text of 1951, nor in the 
second edition in 1958, by which time Ch'en’s earlier works were well 
known to scholars outside China. ) Allowing for the substantial dif­
ferences in intellectual orientation between Ch'en and Schwartz, one 
is as impressed with the similarities in their conclusions about the 
origins of Mao's thought as with the undeniable differences in their 
interpretations. In any case, while Schwartz's study must still be 
regarded as a pioneering work in the context of Western scholarship,
75Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed., 1958 (1951), pp. 
189 ff.
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due acknowledgement must equally be made of Ch’en Po-ta's intellectual 
labours some years earlier within the Chinese Communist movement it­
self.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION: A CONGRESS OF VICTORY
(i) Ch’en Po-ta and the "Resolution on Party History"
Ch'en Po-ta's treatises on Mao Tse-tung's role in the early 
years of the CCP were more than simple studies of a single indivi­
dual; they were, in addition, advanced drafts of the new Maoist 
version of Party history that was to become the official orthodoxy. 
With Ch'en's essays before them, Party members could view CCP 
history as one seamless web. —  the emergence and struggles of Mao's 
correct line prior to 1935, and its initial triumph and gradual, vic­
torious development since Tsunyi. In this light, it is easy to ap­
preciate the later Maoist claim that the movement to study Party his­
tory, of which Ch'en's studies were the major intellectual products, 
played an "important role" in preparing the stage for the long a- 
waited Seventh Congress of the CCP. Yet, other powerful forces were 
also at work in prompting the Maoists' to give the green light for 
the congress, a meeting they had seen fit to delay since 193&? when 
it was first mooted and then cancelled due to "war-time pressures." 
Indeed, it was the rapid lifting of these pressures that made the 
further postponement of the congress both unnecessary and undesir­
able. Despite the widespread impact of the final Japanese offensive 
in China in the spring and summer of 1944 (Operation Ichi-go), it 
was obvious to all that Japan had exhausted her military potential.
362
The disasters she had been suffering in the Pacific were gradually- 
taking their .toll, and’the defence of the home islands was fast 
becoming Japan's first priority. • Likewise, the war in Europe was 
rapidly coming to a head; Italy had been knocked out of the con­
flict in the summer of 1944> and the once-invincible Germans were 
being pushed back towards their own borders. It was only a matter of 
time before Germany would be defeated by the combined strength of 
the Allies; this would isolate Japan and bring upon her the joint 
American-Soviet offensive she had persistently tried to ward off.
With victory over the enemy so close at hand, it was not sur­
prising that the Chinese Communists chose the spring of 1945 as the 
moment to renew their claim to be a truly national force in China's 
political destiny. The holding of the CCP's Seventh Congress, the 
first since the Sixth in 1928, would provide the Party with an un­
equalled opportunity to display its internal unity and sense of pur­
pose, and to appeal for popular support in the post-war realignment 
of forces within China. It was perhaps merely coincidental that .in 
mid-May 1945, when the Seventh Congress was getting into stride, 
Marshal Zhukov was leading his Soviet troops into the suburbs of 
Berlin. It was not fortuitous, however, that at the very same mo­
ment Chiang Kai-shek was exhorting delegates to the KMT's Sixth 
National Congress to "redouble efforts for the early achievement of
■j
final victory" on all fronts. Held simultaneously with the
1"Political Program and Policies," as proposed by Chiang Kai- 
shek, and adopted on 18 May'1945 by the Sixth National Congress of 
the Chinese Nationalist Party, in Hollington K. Tong> ed., China 
Handbook, 1937-1945, rev.ed., New York: Macmillan Company, 1947, p. 41.
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Communists' meeting in Yenan, Chiang's assembly served notice that 
its major tasks on the eve of final victory over Japan included
"seeking a political solution of the Chinese Communist problem with
2
renewed vigor." It is in this context of intensifying competition 
for national (and international) attention between China's two major 
political movements that we should view the CCP's Seventh Congress, 
and the strident claims its main speakers made on behalf of their 
leader and his thought.
Plans for the congress had been underway for some months prior 
to its convocation in April 1945, and there was little doubt that 
Mao could expect a strong display of support from most of the Party. 
What little overt opposition remained was expressed not by the de­
feated Returned Students, but by P'eng Teh-huai, long a leading fig­
ure in the Maoist military establishment.. However, P'eng apparently 
withdrew his opposition at a forty-day North China Work Conference
3
held in Yenan just prior to the Seventh Congress. With P'eng back 
in the fold (if only reluctantly), the Maoists convened the Seventh 
(and final) Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, which had not met 
in full assembly since the Sixth Plenum in 1938. The major task of
2
"Resolution on the Communist Problem," adopted on 17 May 1945 
by the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Nationalist Party, in 
ibid., p. 53.
good deal of material on P'eng's alleged conflicts with Mao 
over the years has been compiled by students at Tsinghua University, 
and translated in CB, 851. For these and other documents on P'eng, 
see P'eng Teh-huai, especially pp. 190-194. For Mao's rather off- 
colour comments on his forty-day conflict with P'eng, see Sehram, 
Chairman Mao Talks, p. 194.
364
this plenum was to prepare for the convening of the Seventh Congress, 
where the Party would chart its. new course for the post-war years 
ahead. The key document of this plenum is, of course, the well 
known "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions," adopted on 20 
April 1945. From the point of view of the Maoists, it was vitally 
important that such a resolution be passed, for it would bestow the 
formal approval of the Central Committee on the Maoist version of 
Party history that had been in the making since Ch'en Po-ta's first 
draft in 1938. Such approval would render final judgement on the 
various issues of contention between the Maoists and their erstwhile 
opponents within the Party, and would terminate once and for all the 
endless debate over who was right and who was wrong. With this de­
bilitating debate behind them, all members of the Party, regardless 
of their previous factional affiliations, could unite as one to meet 
the pressing challenges of the future.
The "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions" is an important, 
and much quoted document, and it represents one of the Central Com­
mittee's rare departures into the historiography of the CCP. Yet, 
little effort has been made to trace the author of the document; 
coming as it does as an appendix to one of Mao's speeches in the 
Selected Works, it has been widely assumed to reflect the opinions 
of Mao himself, if not actually to have Issued from his hand. A 
closer study of the treatise, however, reveals that the author is 
in all likelihood Ch'en Po-ta, and that its arguments reflect Mao's 
opinions only in part. According to Peter Vladimirov, the "Reso­
lution" was based on a draft report presented to the Seventh Plenum
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"by Jen Pi-shih, under the title "On the Political Line of the Party 
Between 1931 and 193.5." (Although this report was probably drafted by 
Ch'en Po-ta, he was not a member of the Central Committee at the time, 
and hence he did not have sufficient rank to present his report in 
person to the Seventh Plenum. Jen, on the other hand, was both a 
close associate of Mao and a member of the Politburo, so he was in 
a position to address the Central Committee with considerable author­
ity.) The report sparked off a vigorous debate, and it was in anti­
cipation of this that Mao had previously arranged for the debate on 
Party history to he moved to the Seventh Plenum from its original 
place on the agenda of the forthcoming congress. In the much smaller 
plenum, Mao was in a better position to control the discussion, and 
with his personal intervention the heated debate was finally wound 
up, with the plenum endorsing the main conclusions of the draft re­
port. There was apparently sufficient disagreement on the original 
draft to dissuade the plenum from endorsing it entirely; instead, the 
members adopted their own "Resolution" based on the original draft 
report, but differing from it to a significant extent.^
Let us now consider the reasons for believing that the "Reso­
lution" was most likely drafted by Ch'en Po-ta, or at least under his
^Vladimirov, op. cit., pp. 374? 339-395. For some detailed com­
ments on the "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions" (20 April 
1945) (Mao. XJ III, pp. 904-953), see Rue, Mao in Opposition, pp. 8-11 
and elsewhere In the book. A Red Guard claim that Hu Ch'iao-mu draf­
ted the "Resolution" is probably a guess based on Hu's later study of 
Party history in 1951, and can be dismissed as such. For the Red 
Guard reference, see Harrison, op. cit., p. 591, n. 83.
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personal influence, but that the final text was somewhat modified by 
the Central Committee. To begin with, the "Resolution" clearly dove­
tails with Ch'en's two major studies discussed in the previous chap­
ter. As the "Resolution" points out, it is only Party history prior 
to Mao's ascendancy at Tsunyi in 1935 that is the subject of review. 
The Party's development after 1935 is characterized by the "entirely 
correct" line of Mao Tse-tung, and it is not to be reviewed by the 
Central Committee until a "future date." Taking the years from the 
Party's founding in 1921 to Mao's rise to power in early 1935 as the 
focus of the study, it becomes clear at once that this entire period 
is covered by Ch'en's two studies and the "Resolution." Ch'en's 
study of Mao's "Hunan Report" attempts to sum up the period 1921-27 
(with particular emphasis on 1924-27), and his commentary on the 
civil war period is focused almost exclusively on the years 1927-30. 
As for the "Resolution," it declares its interest in dwelling par­
ticularly on the period "from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth 
Central Committee to the time of the Tsunyi Meeting," i.e., from 
1931 to 1935.^ Thus, Ch'en's two studies interlock neatly with the 
"Resolution" to provide total coverage of the 1921-35 period of the 
CCP's history, when Mao's leadership was not universally accepted as 
being correct at all times. That Ch'en did intend to supplement his 
two earlier studies with one on the 1931-35 period is strongly
5
Mao, XJ III, pp. 921-922. According to Vladimirov, prior .to 
the Seventh Plenum certain "discrepancies" arose in connection with 
the evaluation of the Party's history since Tsunyi, and this may have 
inhibited the Central Committee from dealing with this period in de­
tail. See Vladimirov, op. cit., p. 349.
6Mao, XJ III, p. 907,
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suggested in the closing comments to Ms Counter-Revolution and 
Revolution. Declaring this study an attempt to discuss some "fun­
damental political questions1' in early Party history, he concludes by
suggesting rather cryptically that, "as for certain /other? questions,
7
it is best to await another time to subject them to scrutiny." This 
surely was a reference to the problem of the Returned Students, whose 
dominance of the Party's line during 1931-34 Ch'en felt constrained 
to ignore in his first two studies except for random, indirect com­
ments. As many of these former leaders still occupied high positions 
of authority in the Party, a detailed study by Ch'en would have to 
await the sanction (if only nominal) of the Central Committee, the 
Party's highest authority.
Further credence is given to Ch'en's authorship of the "Reso­
lution" by certain distinct affinities between his earlier studies 
and the Central Committee document. We will recall, for example, 
that in Counter-Revolution and Revolution, Ch'en claimed that Mao's 
resolutions at the Kut'ien Conference in 1929 "elevated theory and 
ideology to the first position in the problem of building up the 
Party and the army." In the "Resolution," Mao's Kut'ien resolutions 
are claimed to have "raised Party-building to the plane of ideologi­
cal and political principle, and firmly upheld the leading role of 
proletarian ideology." Again, with regard to.the Party's work in 
the urban centers after the failure of the revolution in 1927, Ch'en
7Ch'en Po-ta, Fan-ge-ming yu ge-ming, p. 66.
Ibid., p. 65. (This passage was. deleted in the revised text of 
Ch'en's study published in 1953* )>* M!ao, XJ III, pi 937.
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argued that "history has proved that...Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i was
right, and the Li Li-san line and the new Li Li-san line were wrong."
In the "Resolution," the opinion is expressed that, with regard to
urban work at this time, the "principal policies should have been
those advocated by Comrade Liu Shao-ch’i," and not those of the
9
"various ’Left1 lines." These are only two examples of rather spe­
cific judgements which originally appeared in Ch’en's essay of 1944, 
and which were repeated in the "Resolution" of the following year. 
Indeed, it would seem that the "Resolution" added nothing new to 
Ch'en’s previous analysis of Party history between 1921 and 1930; 
since the two earlier studies fully dealt with this nine-year period, 
the "Resolution" was apparently directed toward a similar consider­
ation of the 1930-34 period. As Ch’en had already demonstrated the 
essential correctness of Mao’s strategy prior to the ascendancy of 
the Returned Students, all that remained was to illustrate the er­
roneous nature of their particular lines. Indeed, the bulk of the 
"Resolution" is devoted to a detailed discussion of the "main content 
of these lines where they were contrary to the correct line politi­
cally, militarily, organizationally, and ideologically."10 As is to 
be expected, the Central Committee gave its formal approval to the 
critique of the Returned Students that had been gradually developed 
by the Maoists. The Party’s Fourth Plenum in January 1931* for ex­
ample, which ratified the Returned Students' ascendancy, is deemed 
to have played "no positive or constructive role" in the development
^Ch'en Po-ta, Fan-ge-mihg yu ge-ming, p. 12; Mao, XJ III, p. 927.
10Mao, XJ III, p. 922.
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of the revolution. On the contrary, this ill-fated plenum only re­
inforced the dominance of the third (and most serious) "left" line 
of the "two dogmatists, Comrades Ch'en Shao-yu and Ch'in Pang-hsien." 
It is largely because these two individuals have "completely dis­
torted the history of the Party" in their efforts to legitimize their 
erroneous line between 1931 and 1934> that the Central Committee has 
decided to set forth "formal conclusions" regarding their tenure in 
the Party's top posts. The mention of Ch'en Shao-yu and Ch'in Pang- 
hsien immediately brings us to the "Resolution's" main contribution 
to the debate on Party history. For the first time in a decade of 
argument and innuendo, the two principal leaders of the so-called 
"third 'left' line" were formally named in an official Central Com­
mittee document. Mao must have taken great pleasure in this official 
disposition of his case against his two leading opponents in the 
Party, and in the Central Committee's confirmation that the political
line of the Party under the leadership of Mao has been "entirely 
11correct."
Yet, the "Resolution" lacks equal decisiveness in evaluating 
Mao1s contributions to the revolution in the years 1921-30, the 
period which provides the focus of Ch'en Po-ta's two known studies
11Ibid., pp. 920-922. According to Vladimirov, Kang Sheng told 
him that Wang Ming had asked Mao "not to accentuate,. .or, at least, 
to mollify" the discussion of his past mistakes and errors at the 
Seventh Congress. Mao appears to have kept his promise to "take ev­
ery precaution to prevent an anti-Wang Ming conflict" at the congress, 
but not to the extent of withholding Wang's (and Po Ku's) name from 
the official record. On this point, see Vladimirov, op. cit., pp. 
197-198.
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of Party history. ' To he sure, Mao is credited with "concretely sum­
ming up" the essence of the revolution in the early years —  1924-27 
in particular —  and with registering "brilliant achievements" in es­
tablishing his correct line in the years after 1927. Nonetheless, 
very little space is devoted to Mao’s achievements during the nine 
years between 1921 and 1930, and none of Mao's writings prior to his 
"Hunan Report" is even mentioned. Indeed, it is claimed that in the 
years 1921-27, and especially 1924-27, the Chinese revolution was 
"correctly guided by the Communist International and influenced, im­
pelled forward and organized by the correct leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party." Further, it was only during the final six months 
of this period that the Party leadership developed a "capitulation­
ist" line, and refused to carry out the "many wise directives of the
Communist International and Comrade Stalin, and refused to accept the
12correct views of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades." The 
lumping together of no less than three sources of "wise directives" 
and "correct views" in addition to Mao himself naturally tends to 
water down the singular importance of Mao’s role at the time, and this 
reflects the Central Committee's rather indecisive attitude‘toward 
Mao during these early years. This observation still rings true even 
if one considers the possibility that this particular passage was a 
product of the document's probable revision prior to publication in 
the early 1950's. The fact remains that the "Resolution" does not 
evince a noted interest in Mao's early activities, nor does it attach 
to them the importance evident in Ch'en Po-ta's two earlier studies.
12Mao, XJ III, p. 939*
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This conclusion would appear to invalidate our earlier conten­
tion that the "Resolution" is probably based on a report drafted by 
Ch'en himself, or under his direct guidance. This objection is met, 
however, by recalling Ch'en's earlier complaint that there was a 
persistent tendency within the Party to date Mao's theoretical 
achievements from after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 
1937. Clearly, if Ch'en's two studies of Mao's thought in the ear­
lier period were intended to offset this tendency (as they most like­
ly were), it would seem that they were not completely-successful in 
achieving this goal. Ch'en's relatively systematic studies of Mao's' 
thought probably did much to encourage the publication, in December 
1944* of the first edition of Mao's Selected Works. Yet in spite of 
this, the tendency to downplay Mao's early years was apparently still 
prevalent within the Party. In the first edition of the Selected 
Works, for example, only the "Hunan Report" and the "Kut'ien Reso­
lutions" were included from amongst the early texts. This was of 
course a step in the right direction from the point of view of the 
Maoists, but nonetheless it continued the neglect of the other early
texts to which Ch'en Po-ta had attributed so much importance in the
13formulation of Mao's thought.
Indeed, one might question the motivations of the Seventh Plenum 
in issuing a formal resolution not on the entire span of Party his­
tory prior to 1935, but only on the narrower 1931-34 period-. It is 
clear, for example, that considered as a trilogy, Ch'en's two trea­
tises and the "Resolution" represented an integrated study of Party 
history (and Mao's role therein) for the entire period from 1921 to
  .....—  1 1 ■■   1
^Tokuda, op. cit., p. 72.
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1935. It is not unreasonable to assume that they were to be regarded 
as the definitive Maoist version of Party history during this contro­
versial period. Surely, the Central Committee's decision to down­
grade Ch'en's studies of the early period provides a clue as to why 
neither the Seventh Plenum nor the Seventh Congress following it pro­
duced a Party history as comprehensive and definitive as Stalin's 
History of the CPSU. Is it just possible that certain powerful fi­
gures in the CCP, while quite prepared to accept the Maoist critique 
of the Returned Students, and willing to agree with Mao's claims to 
correct leadership since Tsunyi, revolted at the idea of extending 
the claim of Mao's infallibility right to the founding of the Party 
itself? That this is probably the case is suggested by the speeches 
of Liu Shao-ch'i and Chu Teh (especially the latter), who qualified 
their overt praise of Mao with reservations as to the extent to which 
such praise was to be taken (more below). In any event, the truncated 
nature of the "Resolution" adopted by the Seventh Plenum clearly in­
dicates the Central Committee's reluctance to hand Mao the entire 
history of the CCP on a platter, as had been the case with Stalin and 
the CPSU In 1938. While substantial enough, Mao's triumph over the 
Party and its history was a good deal less absolute than that of his 
senior counterpart in Moscow. Given the importance of the revision 
of Party history, however, it is not surprising that Mao wished to 
come up with a document more comprehensive and decisive than the 
Seventh Plenum's abbreviated "Resolution." According to Vladimirov, 
Mao later told him personally that he (Mao) hoped to write a book "on 
all the phases of the Chinese Revolution," presumably along the lines
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of Stalin's well-known history of the CPSU. This wish does not ap­
pear to have been realized, however, and to this day the CCP has not
issued an official history of the scope and importance of the Soviet
14-Party's account of its own historical development.
(ii) The Leader Becomes the Sage
We do not wish to give the impression that Mao was treated bad­
ly by the Seventh Plenum, but only that their appraisal of his contri­
butions to the revolution prior to 1930 was perhaps less positive than 
he and Ch'en Po-ta had hoped for. Nonetheless, the plenum did set the 
tone for the congress that was to follow, declaring in no uncertain 
terms that:
Today, with unprecedented unanimity the whole Party re­
cognizes the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line, 
and with unprecedented consciousness rallies under the 
banner of Mao Tse-tung.15
The Seventh Congress, described by the New China News Agency (NCNA) 
as "one of the most important events in the history of modern China," 
met for a full fifty days from 23 April to 11 June 1945. The four 
main items on the agenda of the congress were Mao Tse-tung's poli­
tical report', Chu Teh's report on military affairs, Liu Shao-ctfiils 
commentary on the revision of the Party constitution, and, finally, 
the election of the new Central Committee. Besides the three main
14The tiiost comprehensive study of the history of the CCP to 
have appeared in China is Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chi­
nese Revolution, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959. While Ho ad­
heres closely to the Maoist interpretation of Party history, his 
study is "unofficial" in that it was published.in his own name, and 
not that of the CCP Central Committee. Likewise, Hu Chiao-mu's much 
shorter study, to which we have already referred, lacks the authority 
of the CCP's highest .body. For Vladimirov's comments, see his 
Diaries, p. 517.
15Mao, XJ III, p. 950.
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speakers, many other delegates also addressed the assembly, some of 
whom "engaged in criticism and self-criticism in regard to past mis­
takes of the Party. Even those unable to attend because of illness 
presented their opinions in writing." Individual self-criticisms 
were delivered by such former Returned Students as Po Ku and Lo Fu, 
while others including Wang Chia-hsiang and, most importantly, Wang 
Ming, wrote letters of repentance to Mao and the congress. Despite 
the plethora of individual speeches, there was no doubt as to whose 
was the most importantMao's report, it was claimed, was the "cen­
tral item of this Congress," whose assembled delegates declared them­
selves "entirely satisfied" with its content, and insisted that the
"tasks pointed out in the report be carried out in the practical work 
l6of the Party." Indeed, in his lengthy report Mao did place empha- • 
sis on the host of concrete tasks that lay before the CCP in the 
political, military, economic, social and international spheres. In 
particular, he declared that the establishment of a "democratic coali­
tion government" in China had become a "matter of deep concern for
17the Chinese people and for public opinion m  the allied countries." 
Nonetheless, having surveyed the entire range of tasks facing the 
Party in the immediate post-war years, Mao returned in his concluding 
remarks to one of his favourite themes, reminding his audience that:
-j /
See the dispatches of the New China News Agency concerning the 
Seventh Congress, as translated in Brandt, Documentary: History, pp. 
2S7-295. For the references to individual Returned Student leaders, 
see Vladimirov, op. cit., p. 467 and various other references.
17Mao, Ji IX, p. 184-
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Ideological education is the key link to he grasped in 
uniting the whole Party for carrying out /its7 great 
political struggles. If this task is not solved, the 
Party cannot'accomplish any of its political tasks.
Mao's concluding remarks on the importance, of ideology and ideo­
logical education provided Chu Teh with an appropriate point of de­
parture for his own speech on the military., situation. Speaking to 
the assembly on 25 April, immediately after Mao's address, Chu de­
clared that his military report was based on the "spirit and policy
19of the political report by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Accordingly,
Chu scattered his long speech with numerous flattering references to 
Mao's important theoretical contributions not only in the sphere of 
politics, but in "military science" as well. The "new" military 
theory of the Chinese Communists, said Chu, is not based on "unchan­
ging dogmas" from foreign countries,* rather, it is one which has "ab­
sorbed experiences in all fields and which best suits the needs of the 
Chinese people." Modestly declining any credit for himself in the 
creation of this new military science, Chu declared that its "repre­
sentative works" are to be found in the "many books on warfare writ­
ten by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Accordingly, concluded Chu:
All army units, all military schools and all military 
training classes must regard the military teachings of 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung as a basic textbook and the soul 
of education, so that we may equip ourselves ideologi­
cally for the defeat of the enemy.
1 c>
Ibid., pp. 269-271.
19Chu Teh, On the Battlefronts of the Liberated Areas, Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1952, p. 34.
20
Ibid., pp. 63-64, 90-91.
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In light of this blanket endorsement of Mao's claims as the 
Party's pre-eminent military theorist, it would be rash to detect in 
Chu’s report any clear-cut signs of dissatisfaction with the chair­
man. Yet in the course of his address Chu did refer briefly to a 
problem connected with Mao's continual emphasis on ideological edu­
cation within the army. In the past," complained Chu,
...there was a tendency in the army'to make light of the
need for a strong physique and technique. It seemed quite
enough for the army to possess political consciousness.
This is very wrong.21
Of course, Chu was quick to point out that this incorrect attitude had
been overcome in "recent years"; nonetheless, he had made his point,
and it is unlikely that it passed unnoticed by the delegates to the 
congress, and certainly not by Mao himself. Chu's distaste for Mao's 
ideological claims is also evident in his careful avoidance through­
out his report of the. term, "Mao Tse-tung's thought." Given the 
increasing use, of this term within the Party since July 1943? it is 
unlikely that this omission was a mere oversight on Chu's part; more 
probably, it represented a protest against elevating Mao's individual 
policies —  however correct in themselves —  into a formal, ideolo­
gical slogan with universal pretensions. Such a fusion of Mao's 
various theories and policies into a single, holistic concept would 
be more ritualistic than scientific, and would contribute substan­
tially to the already powerful cult that was enveloping Mao. Nor was 
Chu the only military leader hostile to the whole idea of raising 
the status of Mao's thought to the status of "Truth," Take for ex­
ample the case of P'eng Teh-huai, who had fallen out with Mao on
21Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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several important issues over the years, and had only recently emerged 
from a lengthy process of self-criticism. P'eng is said to have made 
his self-criticism "reluctantly and resentfully," and he did not 
emerge from the experience suitably chastened. Indeed, at the Se­
venth Congress he "maliciously attacked the thought of Mao Tse-tung.
He nonsensically said: "99.9 percent of Mao Tse-tung's thought is
22correct, but 0.1 percent of it is not." This alleged remark cer­
tainly rings true in light of what we know of P'eng and his attitudes, 
and it can be regarded as essentially factual.
Whatever the reservations of Chu and P'eng about the use of the 
term, "Mao Tse-tung's thought," Liu Shao-ch'i does not appear to have 
shared them. In his major report to the Seventh Congress on 14- May 
("On the Party"), Liu used the term liberally, as did the new Party 
constitution whose interpretation provided the major focus of Liu's 
speech. Let us consider the new constitution first, for it contains 
a troublesome sentence which Liu hailed as a "most important histori­
cal characteristic of our present revision of the Party constitu- 
23tion. " This of course refers to the now-famous stipulation m  
the preamble to the constitution that formally designates "Mao Tse- 
tung ' s thought" as the single ideological guide to the CCP in all
22For this and other material on P'eng Teh-huai at the time 
of the Seventh Congress, see CB, 851, p. 7; and P'eng Teh-huai^  
pp. 193-194.
23Liu Shao-ch'i, Lun Dang (On the Party), Peking: Xin-hua shu- 
dian, 1950, p. 31. This text contains both Liu's report to the 
Seventh Party Congress (14 May 1945), and the new Party constitution 
adopted by the congress on 11 June 1945.
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its work. The particular sentence containing this provision has been 
troublesome because it has been frequently mistranslated into Eng­
lish, and this faulty translation has been used erroneously in Western 
scholarship. This is best illustrated in the work of Franz Schumann, 
who has translated the sentence in question as:
The Chinese Communist party takes the theories of Marxism- 
Leninism and the unified thought of the practice of the 
Chinese Revolution, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, as the 
guideline for all of its actions. 4^
The reader will immediately note the dualism that exists in this 
translation; the CCP appears to take not one, but two ideological sys­
tems (viz* Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung) as its 
theoretical guides. .Basing his analysis on this reading of the Chi­
nese text, Schumann concludes that "the Chinese Communists, in their
official labeling of doctrine, have always regarded the total struc-
25ture of their ideology as consisting of two major components." On 
the basis of this seeming dualism in CCP ideology, Schumann proceeds 
to elaborate a sophisticated interpretation of Chinese Communist 
ideology which gives.considerable emphasis to its distinct "pure" and 
"practical" aspects. Regardless of its applicability.to later phases 
in the evolution of the CCP's ideology, we have previously rejected 
Schumann’s dualism in analyzing the Party’s ideology as of 1945. As 
we have endeavoured to show, "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" as it evolved 
within the Party during the years 1935-45 was regarded by its expo­
nents as the sum total of Party ideology. In China, Mao Tse-tung's
24Schumann, op. cit., p. 21. Schumann's translation of this 
sentence has omitted the final clause in the original, but this 
has no bearing on our present discussion.
25Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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thought was Marxism-Leninism; it did not simply co-exist with 
Marxism-Leninism as one of two official ideologies guiding the CCP. 
Indeed, a closer reading of the Chinese text reveals that no such 
dualism actually exists where Sehurmann perceives it to he. A more 
exact rendering of the hey sentence in question would he something 
like this:
The Communist Party of China takes Mao Tse-tung's thought 
—  the thought which unites Marxist-Leninist theory and 
the practice of the Chinese revolution —  as the guide for 
all its work, and opposes all dogmatic or empiricist devi­
ations . 26
In this reading of the Chinese, we note immediately that Sehurmann's 
dualism disappears, and that the integral unity which Mao Tse-tung's 
thought is claimed to represent is restored. With this reading in 
mind, we are In a position to understand the significance of the con­
stitution's injunction that the very first duty of every Party mem­
ber is to "vigorously raise the level of his own consciousness, and 
to master the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's 
thought" (not, it should be noted, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse- 
tung's thought). In this perspective, we can readily appreciate
that the new CCP constitution of 1945 was truly a Maoist, as opposed
27to a Marxist-Leninist document.
In later years, a certain degree of confusion and/or disagree­
ment within the CCP has been evident regarding the status of Mao's
Zhong-guo gong-chan-dang dang-zhang (Statutes of the Chinese 
Communist Party), in Liu, him dang, pp. 143-176. The passage cited 
is from the preamble, p. 147.
27njid., pp. 151-152.
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thought. For example, some official translations of the term "Mao
Tse-tung*s thought" have been rendered consistently as "Mao Tse-tung's
theory" or even more limiting, "Mao Tse-tung*s theory.of the Chinese 
28revolution." In this and other ways, the full equivalence of "Mao 
Tse-tung *s thought" with "Marxism-Leninism" has been seriously atten­
uated, with Mao's thought representing merely the parochial Chinese 
variant of the classical theories coming from the West (including 
Russia). This attenuation of Mao's thought probably reflects the 
fears of non-Maoist factions within the CCP that the Party was set­
ting up "Mao Tse-tung*s thought" as the substantive equivalent —  and 
near total replacement —  of Marxism-Leninism in China. As our 
study has made clear, this is precisely what the Maoists were doing, 
but not with the enthusiastic support of all factions, in the Party, 
nor, of course, of the CPSU in Moscow. Mao's thought suffered its 
most severe setback in 1956, when, apparently with the urging of Liu
Shao-ch'i, P'eng Teh-huai and other leaders, it was removed complete-
29
ly from the revised Party constitution. It was not until the Cul­
tural Revolution in the mid-1960's that the term was restored to its 
original meaning and significance. At*this time, in fact, the Mao­
ists went even further in their claims, suggesting that Mao Tse- 
tung* s thought was more than merely the embodiment of Marxism-Leninism
28A good example of this attenuation of Mao's thought is the 
English translation of Liu Shao-ch'i*s report to the Seventh Congress 
("On the Party"). See Liu, Collected Works, II, pp. 26-31 and 
throughout the text.
29For comments and references on this deletion of Mao's thought 
from the 1956 Party constitution, see Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, 
pp. 133-134. For an important Red Guard document accusing P'eng Teh- 
huai, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing of coordinating the attack 
on Mao's thought at the Party's Eighth Congress in September 1956, 
see P'eng Teh-huai, p. 201.
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in China. Rather, Mao's thought was now defined as "Marxism-Leninism
of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and
socialism is advancing to worldwide victory." More directly, Mao’s
thought was said to represent the development of Marxism-Leninism to
a "higher and completely new stage.." Hence, it was the most advanced
form of scientific socialism and proletarian revolutionary theory in
30the contemporary era. This basic interpretation of Mao's thought
was adopted by the CCP's Tenth Congress in August 1973, for the new
Party constitution approved at that time stipulates that the CCP
"takes Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought as the theoretical
31basis guiding its thinking." This particular terminology (carried 
over from the 1969 constitution) is ingenious, for it gives due 
recognition to the status of both Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's 
thought, yet at the same time it suggests the superiority of the 
latter. Just as "Marxism" was hyphenated when it was enriched by 
the theory and practice of Lenin and the Russian revolution, so too 
is "Marxism-Leninism" hyphenated in recognition of the fresh contri­
butions of Mao Tse-tung's theory and practice of the Chinese revo­
lution. Thus, Mao takes his place as the outstanding exponent of 
scientific socialism in the second half of the twentieth century.
30For this definition of Mao's thought, see the Party's short­
lived "Lin Piao" constitution adopted at the CCP's Ninth Congress in 
April .1969, as reprinted in Winberg Chai, ed ., Essential Works of 
Chinese Communism, rev. ed., New York: Bantam Books, 1972, p. 431.
31See the most recent CCP constitution (adopted by the Tenth Par 
ty Congress in August 1973), in The Tenth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China (Documents), Peking: Foreign Languages Press 
1973,'pp. 61, 65.
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Returning to 194-5, we will recall that Lui Shao-ch’i was a 
tardy convert to the Maoist side; yet, whatever his inner reservations 
about the swelling cult of Mao and his thought, he was careful to 
disguise them. Indeed, Liu's report to the Seventh Congress has all 
the earmarks of a prodigal son restoring himself to his father's 
grace. Whether, as Han Suyin has suggested, Liu was cynically 
praising Mao in order to ingratiate himself is a moot point, hut the
sheer extravagance of his praise of the chairman is not to be dis-
32puted. "Our Comrade Mao Tse-tung," he intones, "is not only the 
greatest revolutionary and statesman in Chinese history, but also 
the greatest theoretician and scientist in Chinese history." Indeed, 
Liu's speech is important in Party history not because of anything- 
original he says, for he simply repeats the arguments regarding Mao 
and his thought that the pro-Maoists had gradually built up over the 
previous decade. Rather, his report is significant because in it 
these same arguments now came from the lips of the Party's number 
two leader, and were unanimously approved and accepted by an offi­
cial Party congress. The key to Mao’s greatness, says Liu, lies in 
his brilliant synthesis of Marxist-Leninist theory and the actual 
practice of the Chinese revolution. The glittering product of this 
synthesis is, of course, "Mao Tse-tung's thought, Comrade Mao Tse- 
tung 's theories and policies regarding Chinese history, /Chinese7 
society, and the Chinese revolution." Mao's thought, continues 
Liu, is an "outstanding example" of the "nationalization" and the
2^Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge (Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese 
Revolution), London: Jonathan Cape, 1972, p. 489.
33Liu, Lun dang, p. 37.
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"Sinification" of Marxism. "It is as Chinese as it is thoroughly 
3/
Marxist."  ^ Getting down to specifies, Liu declares that Mao’s 
thought has two major facets: It is both diagnostic and prescrip­
tive, being composed of Mao’s "analysis of the present world situ­
ation and China's national situation," and his "complete theory of 
revolution and national reconstruction for the Chinese people."
Liu then lists the key elements in Mao’s prescription for the Chinese 
people's revolutionary cause, which include the
...theory and policy regarding new democracy, the eman­
cipation of the peasantry, the revolutionary united 
front, revolutionary wars, revolutionary bases, the es­
tablishment of a new democratic republic, Party-building, 
and culture.^
It will be immediately noted that this list of Mao’s contributions 
to "revolutionary science" contains no reference to any achievements 
in the field of dialectical materialist philosophy. Apart from the 
perfunctory reference to "culture," Liu's list is very specific and 
practical, and reflects his high evaluation of Mao's strength as a 
leader of the practical revolutionary movement, and his equally ad­
verse judgement of Mao's ability as an abstract thinker and theore­
tician. Similarly, Liu's catalogue of Mao's achievements is essen­
tially domestic in scope, and seems to lack an appreciation of the 
applicability of Mao’s theories and policies beyond the confines 
of China. Yet.this is not the case. Liu notes that "Chinese com­
munism —  Mao Tse-tung's thought" arose in China from the union of 
Marxist-Leninist theory and Chinese revolutionary practice, just as
3^ Ibid., pp. 33, 37.
35Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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"Russian Bolshevism —  Leninism-Stalinism" was horn of the union of 
Marxist theory and the practice of the Russian revolution. But the 
similarities between Russian Bolshevism and Chinese communism do not 
end here, suggests Liu; just as Leninism-Stalinism has played a gui- 
ding role in the emancipation of both the Russian and the world’s 
people, so too Mao Tse-tungTs thought will make "great and useful 
contributions to the cause of emancipation of the peoples of all 
countries, and especially the cause of liberation of the various 
nations of the East." In his concluding remarks on the question 
of ideology, Liu notes that Mao is a loyal "disciple" of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin, but he nonetheless stipulates in no uncertain 
terms that it is the writings of the disciple, and not of the four 
masters, which are to be the CCP’s future intellectual regimen. The 
key task now, concludes Liu, is to "mobilize the entire Party to 
study and disseminate Mao Tse-tung’s thought." In order to expedite 
the performance of this duty, Liu issued a specific set of instruc­
tions for the immediate years ahead: (l) all Party cadres are to
study Mao's writings "systematically"; (2) all Party schools and 
training classes must adopt Mao's writings as "basic teaching mat­
erial"; (3) all sections of the Party press are to propagate Mao's 
thought "in a systematic manner"; and (4) in order to facilitate all 
the above tasks, the Party's propaganda organs are to edit Mao's im­
portant works "in the form of popular reading matter adapted to the
37level of the average Party member." Whatever neglect Mao's writings
^Ibid., p. 35.
37Ibid., p. 38.
385
might have suffered in the past, it was now perfectly clear that 
such was not going to he true of the future. Mao’s thought was 
here to stay.
Liu Shao-ch’i's panegyrics to Mao set the tone of his lengthy
report to the Seventh Congress,1 hut on at least one occasion during
his speech he sounds a note of caution. Uncomfortably aware that
his unrestrained praise of Mao will do much to fuel the cult that is
already enveloping the leader, Liu tries to set definite limits to
the cult. Choosing his words carefully, Liu declares that:
Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the leader of our Party, hut he 
is also an ordinary member of our Party. He is under 
the direction of the Party /zai dang de zhi-pei zhi-xia7, 
and adopts a most scrupulous attitude in observing Party 
discipline in every respect.38
Liu's words of warning to Mao on the dangers of setting himself up
above the Party have often been commented upon, and there is little
doubt that- they reflect the genuine concern of Liu and other top
Party leaders lest Mao over-step the limits of his authority in the
future. Yet, in the very same report Liu largely negates the impact
of the warning he had just issued. This he does in his comments on
the nature of the CCP’s organizational unity, a subject on which
he has long been regarded as the Party’s outstanding spokesman.
Speaking of the duties and rights of Party members, Liu states that:
The Party’s organizational unity is above all based on the 
premise of the ideological unity of Party members as laid 
down by Marxism-Leninism, Mho Tse-tung’ s thought, without 
which the Party’s unity in organization and action has no 
founding.39
38Ibid., p. 13.
39Ibid., p. 79.
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As Liu knew only too well, organizational unity in a Gommunist party 
is guaranteed by the practice of democratic centralism. This provides 
that all party members are encouraged (at least in theory) to parti­
cipate actively in all decision-making processes within the party. 
However, democratic centralism also stipulates that once a final de­
cision has been made by the Central Committee (in practice, the Poli­
tical Bureau, or the individual leader), all Party members must re­
spect this decision. In case of any doubt, the standard practice is 
that the individual obeys the collective, the minority obeys the 
majority, lower organs obey higher organs, and the whole party obeys 
the Central Committee (or it's, leading figures).^ A serious contra­
diction had thus crept into Liu's reasoning: In the interests of
organisational unity, even the CCP's top leader was to submit him­
self to the discipline of democratic centralism, but at the same 
time the "thought" of the top leader was to provide the basis of 
this organizational unity. The next question is, of course, obvious: 
What would happen if the top leader were to disrupt the existing or­
ganizational unity of the Party, and at the same time justify this 
breach of democratic centralism by declaring that this existing or­
ganizational unity was not genuine or desirable, i.e., it did not 
correspond to his "thought" at that given moment in time? The im­
plication of.this line of reasoning Is all too clear; under such 
circumstances, the top leader could In effect set himself against 
the discipline of the Party, and at the same time justify his actions
^For Mao's own discussion of democratic centralism very much 
along these lines, see Mao, SW III, p. 44-
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by appealing to the authority of his own "thought." This fundamental 
contradiction in Liu's argument might have been overlooked in 1945, 
but exactly twenty-one years later it was to contribute to the tem­
porary destruction of the CCP at the hands of Mao Tse-tung, and the 
abrupt termination of Liu's own career.^ Amidst the euphoria of 
the Seventh Congress, however, the possible dangers of the- swelling 
cult of Mao and his thought were for the most part cast aside.
After many weeks of discussion, the Seventh Congress fulfilled
its final duty by electing a new Central Committee of forty-four
regular and thirty-three alternate members. It is not surprising
that of the regular members, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Liu Shao-ch'i
ranked first, second, and third respectively, nor thatCh'en Shao-yu
and Ch'in Pang-hsien were, allocated the forty-third and forty-fourth 
42slots in turn. As for the alternates, the top three were listed 
as Liao Ch'eng-chih, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Ch'en Po-ta, in that 
order. After eight years of intensive work on behalf of Mao and his
41For a good analysis of the changing relationships between 
Party and leader in the history of the CCP, see Stuart R, Schram,
"The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," in Lewis, op. cit., pp. 
170-202,
42What is surprising, however, is that while Li Li-san was 
ranked high at the fifteenth position, Chou En-lai only managed the 
twenty-third spot, while P'eng Teh-huai had to settle for the thirty- 
third rank. For statistics, on the new Central Committee elected by 
the Seventh Congress, see the NCNA dispatch of 13 June 1945, in 
Brandt, Documentary History, p. 292.
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claims to ideological supremacy within the CCP, Ch’en was given a 
formal status in keeping with the importance of the largely infor­
mal roles he had been playing during these eight years. As luck 
would have it, Ch'en did not have to wait for full membership in the
Central Committee, for upon the death of Wang Jo-fei in 194-6, Ch’en
4-3was immediately elected a full member of the Party's highest body.  ^
For the shy and stammering scholar-revolutionary from Fukien, the 
decade from 1935 to 1945 had been a period of almost feverish work, 
and few would have guessed that he would have risen so high. Ch’en’s 
close personal relationship to Mao was surely unique within the Party, 
and as Mao's star rose even higher Ch'en's rose with..it. At the 
first plenary meeting of the new Central Committee, which met short­
ly after the conclusion of the Seventh Congress, Mao was confirmed 
in the highest offices the Party could bestow. One by one, he was 
named chairman of the Central Committee, of the Political Bureau, of 
the Central Secretariat, and, finally, of the Revolutionary Military 
Committee.^ Yet, Mao probably (and Ch’en Po-ta most certainly) took 
greatest satisfaction from the singular honour the Seventh Congress 
had conferred upon him by ratifying the insertion of "Mao Tse-tung's 
thought" into the new CCP constitution. Mao had become more than a
43Loc. cit. It is a remarkable coincidence that Yeh Ch'ing, 
Ch’en's long-time rival in Marxist polemics, was elected an alter­
nate member of the new Central Executive Committee elected by the 
Sixth Congress of the Nationalist Party, which was held in Chung­
king in May 1945. On this point, see Boorman and Howard, op. cit.,
II, p. 219.
^On Mao's formal assumption of these key positions within the 
CCP, see Boorman and Howard, op. cit,, III, p. 15; and Klein and 
Clark, op. cit., II, p. 683.
389
mere mortal within his own lifetime, more even than simply the 
leader of the Chinese Communist Party. True to the ancient Chinese 
impulse that had fired the dreams of his rival Chiang Kai-shek, Mao 
Tse-tung had achieved the ultimate transformation: the Leader had
"become the Sage.
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